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Transatlantic competition relations have transitioned from a largely adversarial reliance
on unilateral extraterritoriality to cooperative bilateralism. To explain this surprising
transition to international cooperation, the dissertation introduces a cross-level approach
that accounts for the influence of economic internationalization and the strategic
interaction among various actors operating within causally significant domestic
institutional environments. The findings suggest that self-interested competition
regulators have driven transatlantic cooperation in competition policy, using their
discretionary authority to structure policy coordination through three distinct processes:
rule-making, implementation and exploratory institutional cooperation.
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1CHAPTER 1: Introduction
“I am proud to say that EU/US cooperation in [competition policy] has become
something of a model for transatlantic cooperation generally.”
Mario Monti, European Commissioner for Competition (2001, 2)
I. Why Care About Transatlantic Relations?
The transatlantic relationship is quite possibly the most important bilateral
relationship in the world today.1 Agreement between the European Union (EU) and the
United States (US) often provides a basis for international action in a variety of policy
areas that impact global security and economic relations.2 Similarly, disagreement
between the US and the EU often decreases the likelihood of action in a wide range of
matters facing the international community.3 Due to the centrality of this bilateral
relationship in the international system, EU-US agreement and cooperation is frequently
crucial for facilitating the development and design of new forms of international
governance across multiple policy areas. Given the prominence of the transatlantic
relationship in shaping international political decisions, scholarly investigations of the
causes and consequences of cooperation between the EU and US are particularly useful
for understanding the likelihood of cooperation and stability in the international system.
The current study identifies a policy area in which EU-US cooperation excels—
competition policy—in order to explain the causes of international cooperation and to
determine whether bilateral relations in this policy area can provide general insights for
cooperation in other transatlantic and multilateral relations. Examinations of transatlantic
cooperation in competition policy can be particularly informative for understanding the
                                                
1 In general, the current study uses the term “transatlantic relationship” in reference to relations between the
United States (US) and the European Union (EU) as well as the individual member states of the EU. The
term “EU-US relationship” is employed when discussing relations in which the US and the EU are the
primary interlocutors  (e.g., those conducted by the EU under Pillar I of the Maastricht Treaty).
2 The term “European Community” is still legally correct when referring to activities that fall under the
rubric of the Single Market (Pillar I), including competition policy.  For simplicity, the current study refers
to only the “European Union,” regardless of whether the activity in question is legally subsumed under the
competency of the European Community.
2political, economic and legal dynamics of international relations more generally. Indeed,
this case displays a useful synthesis of the political, economic and legal dynamics that
motivate formal and informal efforts to enhance bilateral and multilateral governance.
These dynamics are all the more important because they are occurring in a policy area
that fundamentally organizes domestic economies but increasingly addresses cross-border
activities.
Since the US issued its first antitrust law in 1890, competition policy has become
an increasingly important regulatory tool for constructing and maintaining other domestic
free market economies.4 By prohibiting monopolistic and other anticompetitive business
activities, competition policies are intended to create a level playing field among
competitors and, ultimately, to determine opportunities and incentives for producers and
consumers. Not surprisingly, the two largest free market economies, the US and the EU,
rely heavily on domestic competition policies to prevent anticompetitive business
activities in their respective markets. However, as foreign direct investment grows and
firms and markets internationalize, anticompetitive activity based in multiple jurisdictions
challenges the ability of purely domestic competition policies to ensure the “public good”
of fair competition in their respective domestic markets.
One way in which states can overcome the challenges of economic
internationalization is to pursue anticompetitive activity that originates in foreign
jurisdictions by exercising their domestic competition policies extraterritorially.
However, the extraterritorial exercise of domestic competition policies threatens the
sovereignty of other jurisdictions and frequently results in international political disputes.
For example, bilateral competition relations between the US and Europe historically have
                                                                                                                                                
3 Of course, EU-US agreement is not a prerequisite for international action. For example, in environmental
policy, climate change negotiations provide a useful example of international action despite EU-US
disagreement (Damro and Luaces-Méndez, forthcoming 2003).
4 As Brittan notes “More than 80 countries have already enacted a competition law and at least 20 others
are in the process of preparing competition legislation. More than 60% of competition laws came into effect
in the last 10 years” (1999). See also Fox (2001), Klein (1999), Leary (2001, 1) and Monti (2001a). In
relation to free market economies, “In the last several decades, more and more nations have come to
recognize the value of competition as a tool for spurring innovation, economic growth, and the economic
well-being of countries around the world. National industrial policies and other government interventions
that constrain or order competition within markets have not wholly disappeared but are far less evident than
they were even a decade ago” (ICPAC 2000, 33).
3been largely adversarial affairs, characterized by a reliance on extraterritoriality and
unilateral retaliation with countermeasures designed to protect national interests.5
Alternatively, states can enter into legally-binding international treaties to manage
disputes that may arise from jurisdictional overlaps in competition matters. Such
cooperative agreements could prevent the international political disputes that arise from
extraterritoriality and unilateral countermeasures. Despite their potential utility, the US
and EU have declined to negotiate and sign any treaties governing transatlantic
competition relations. Rather, they have responded to the challenges of economic
internationalization by enforcing their domestic competition policies in a more active and
internationally-oriented fashion. The resulting jurisdictional overlaps threaten the
sovereign interests of both the US and the EU and increase significantly the likelihood of
transatlantic political disputes that can destabilize the international political economy.
In a surprising development given these circumstances, transatlantic cooperation
in merger control—a central component of competition policy designed to prevent
corporate mergers from significantly reducing competition—has increased considerably
in the 1990s. This unexpected increase in cooperation suggests a transition in
transatlantic competition relations from a historically adversarial reliance on
extraterritoriality and unilateral countermeasures to cooperative bilateralism. Absent a
US-EU competition treaty, this transition to cooperative bilateralism begs the following
question: Given the increasing internationalization of business activity and historical
discord in transatlantic competition relations, how and why has EU-US cooperation in
competition policy increased since 1990?
To answer this important research question, the current study employs a case
study of the emergence of EU-US cooperation in merger review since the late-1980s.
Dominant theoretical approaches from the International Relations/International Political
Economy literature provide incomplete explanations for this bilateral transition to
cooperation in competition policy because they tend to exclude important actors from the
analysis and focus on the role of treaties when explaining international cooperation. To
overcome these shortcomings, the current study develops a cross-level approach that
                                                
5 The adjectives “national” and “domestic” typically describe characteristics of traditional, Westphalian
states. While the EU is not a traditional state, for simplicity, the Union’s legal jurisdiction is referred to as
4identifies a relationship between economic internationalization and EU-US cooperation.
This relationship is then explained by investigating domestic politics in the EU and the
US, in particular the behavior of regulators with similar preferences operating under, and
possibly overcoming, different domestic institutional constraints.
The study finds that EU-US cooperation in competition policy occurs primarily as
three “bottom-up” processes—rule-making, implementation and exploratory institutional
cooperation—driven by the discretionary authority of utility-maximizing competition
regulators reacting to the challenges of economic internationalization and the constraints
of domestic political institutions. Instead of pursuing treaties as a basis for increasing
cooperation, the EU and US competition regulators have attempted to sign executive
agreements under their own discretionary authority. These findings reveal the means by
which international cooperation is developing in a traditionally conflictual and largely
domestic policy area, a development that, according to EU Competition Commissioner
Mario Monti, may serve as a model for transatlantic cooperation more generally (2001,
2). If Monti is correct, the current study will provide insights into the modalities of
cooperation in the transatlantic relationship and may suggest useful avenues for
enhancing international governance across multiple policies areas.
In order to understand the domestic politics of international cooperation in
competition policy, the study relies on insights from the principal-agent framework of
delegation. The logic of behavior drawn from this framework is supported by various
primary documents, speeches and expert interviews with sixty individuals, including EU
and US competition officials, business representatives and private-practice competition
lawyers.6 The current study employs a qualitative analysis to demonstrate the patterns of
behavior for politicians (principals) and regulators (agents) that follow from the cross-
level approach. More specifically, the analysis focuses on five cases of formal and
informal EU-US cooperation in competition policy—the Bilateral Agreement, the
Positive Comity Agreement, the Administrative Arrangements on Attendance, the EU-
US Mergers Working Group and the International Competition Network—and numerous
                                                                                                                                                
“national” and “domestic” throughout the current study.
6 The research was conducted from 1999-2002, in Brussels, Belgium; Washington, DC; and Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania.
5individual merger cases, in particular, the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas and
GE/Honeywell mergers.
This introductory chapter begins by providing a discussion of the linkages
between competition policy and internationally-oriented merger activity. It then
elaborates the theoretical and practical significance of the current study. Next, the chapter
describes and discusses two central analytical concepts—international cooperation and
economic internationalization. Finally, the chapter concludes with an outline of the
subsequent chapters in the dissertation.
II. Merger Control and the Regulation of a Free Market Economy
This study focuses on merger control—a regulatory instrument designed to
manage anticompetitive merger activity—as the area where transatlantic cooperation in
competition policy is the “most developed and effective” (James 2001, 4-5).7
Competition policy broadly incorporates a number of other regulatory activities designed
to ensure competitive markets, including antitrust, cartel policy and state aids.8 In
general, the goal of competition policy is to increase economic efficiency.9 As Nicolaides
argues, “Economic theory suggests that efficiency is usually, but not always, improved
by rivalry among firms. To encourage rivalry, competition policy prohibits practices and
policies that seek to exclude or discriminate against rival firms or that intend to reduce
competition among incumbent firms” (1994, 9). One way in which competition can be
                                                
7 Among others, this claim is supported by Stark (2000, 6). For a discussion of why transatlantic
cooperation excels in merger cases, see (Monti 2000b, 4).
8 Competition policy, or antitrust as it is more commonly known in the US, covers a variety of regulatory
activities. Fox argues
…antitrust (or competition law) is whatever legislators and judges of particular
jurisdictions say it is, and it ranges from law to control business practices in order to
protect or empower the undergdog, to law to check and disperse business power and
ensure a better distribution of opportunity and wealth to the non-established, to law to
preserve the competitive process and its governance of markets, to law to advance
efficiency through markets anchored (for example) by an aggregate wealth or by a
consumer welfare paradigm (2001, 348).
As such, antitrust/competition policy covers cartels, monopolies, merger review and, in the EU, state aids.
See also Doern (1996b, 15) for a discussion of the core elements of competition policy. The term
“competition policy” will be used in the current study to mean the entire range of both EU and US
regulatory activities designed to ensure competitive markets, including merger control. “Merger control” is
used when specifically referring to the process of reviewing mergers in both the EU and US.
9  This goal typically includes allocative, productive and dynamic/technological efficiencies. For a useful
discussion of these different types of economic efficiencies, see (Motta 2003).
6threatened is when corporate mergers create dominant firms that squeeze out or prevent
entry into the market by rival firms.
Merger control, which allows states to review proposed mergers before they are
finalized, is an extremely important tool for safeguarding the competitiveness of domestic
markets.10 The merger review process results in regulatory approval, conditional approval
or prohibition of a proposed merger.11 The process requires an analysis of the levels of
competition in relevant geographic and product markets in which the merging firms
operate. These geographic and product markets may be domestic and/or international (see
Chapter 2). Thus, while the merger review process may be initiated to address an initial
concern with competition in the domestic market, the relevant geographic and product
markets may be international. In such situations, domestically based competition
authorities must analyze competition in the international and/or foreign markets.
As foreign direct investment increases and business activity internationalizes (see
section IV below), not only do relevant geographic and product markets become
increasingly international in nature, but so too does merger activity. Cross-border merger
activity is a major source of foreign direct investment (see below). These internationally-
oriented mergers affect concurrent domestic jurisdictions by threatening competition in
multiple national and/or international markets. Such mergers in concurrent jurisdictions
challenge the capacity of national competition authorities to review business activity that
is not occurring exclusively within their domestic territory. In response to these
challenges, states have traditionally resorted to extraterritorial measures, which, in turn,
frequently resulted in destabilizing political disputes and uncertainty over the
implications for competition in domestic markets.
                                                
10 As Graham argues, “Mergers and acquisitions are one of the prime means by which modern economies
‘restructure’ themselves to adapt to new technologies and to changing circumstances that inevitably occur
with the advancement of time. The decision of a competition authority to intervene or not to intervene in a
merger and acquisition case can have lasting and important consequences for an economy” (2000, 57).
11 These potential results apply to both mergers and acquisitions, two terms frequently used
interchangeably. Such interchangeable usage of these two terms is inaccurate from the perspective of the
economics literature. Campbell and Garbus provide a simple, but useful, distinction between mergers and
acquisitions: “generally, a merger involves at least a change in the financial control of one or more
businesses, and… in an acquisition, one entity gains control of another. This is often accompanied (and
sometimes preceded) by changes in financial structure and often followed by a change in operations”
(1991, 3). While noting this distinction, the current study generally employs the term “mergers” to cover
both types of activity because the political dynamics of transatlantic cooperation investigated herein do not
typically vary between mergers and acquisitions.
7III. The Significance of EU-US Cooperation in a Free Market Economy
The insights gained from the current study have theoretical and practical
significance. Given the fact that the internationalization of business activity is
challenging domestically based merger control, the extent to which EU-US cooperation
meets that challenge is of considerable importance to academics and practitioners alike.
This section lists some of the more important contributions offered by the current study.
First, the scholarly literature that focuses on the International Political Economy
(IPE) is dominated by studies of trade policy. These studies generally investigate the
interaction between domestic politics and the international system to explain the causes
and consequences of traditional tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade. However, in reality,
the international trade agenda is increasingly focusing on the removal technical barriers
to trade, such as regulatory differences.12 This new interest in regulatory differences is
coupled with a growing realization of the importance of foreign direct investment (FDI)
and increasing levels of cross-border merger activity.13 While the IPE literature has been
slow to address this real-world shift of attention to technical barriers and FDI, the current
study offers insights into the international “regulation of foreign direct investment” via
the emergence of bilateral cooperation in competition policy.
Second, this study raises a particularly interesting theoretical question given
frequent concerns that domestic institutional differences in the EU and US may limit the
ability of competition authorities to cooperate.14 Such institutional obstacles include
different evidence-gathering tools, different roles played by courts and different statutory
objectives of competition policy. Procedural differences between the EU and US, such as
different timetables for merger review, may also reduce the likelihood of cooperation. In
                                                
12 A large body of literature on IPE and comparative political economy has investigated in great detail the
relationship between domestic politics and trade policy. However, this literature does not directly compare
its findings with the relationship between domestic politics and regulatory policy. For examples of the trade
policy literature, see Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff (2000), Meunier (2000), Destler and Balint (1999),
Morrow, Siverson and Tabares (1998), Hanson (1998), Frieden and Rogowski (1996), Alt et al. (1996),
Garrett and Lange (1995), Destler (1995), Mansfield and Busch (1995), Goldstein (1993), Hayes (1993),
Frieden (1991), Rogowski (1989), Milner (1988) and Destler and Odell (1987).
13 While FDI has been called “the neglected twin of trade” (Julius 1991), merger activity—as an important
component of overall FDI flows—is even less studied and understood by political scientists than FDI.
14 See Majone (2000b, 279), Cambell and Trebilcock (1997), Doern and Wilks (1996, 328-334), Laudati
(1995), and Doern (1995).
8addition, substantive differences in EU and US merger review, whether defining markets
or calculating market power, raise obstacles to cooperation. Given the preponderance of
these organizational differences in domestic competition policies, how can EU-US
cooperation in this policy area be explained? The answer to this question should provide
insights into the role of domestic institutions in facilitating or obstructing international
cooperation.
Third, the current study will also make significant contributions to the literature
on European integration. As this literature grapples with explaining the ever-changing
nature of the EU, questions are increasingly emerging about the sources and causal
implications of the Union’s growing role as an international actor.15 Within competition
policy, the Commission enjoys its greatest degree of supranational authority due to its
considerable discretionary powers. This supranational authority has been expanded
internationally as the Commission pursues institution building through competition
policy (Damro 2001). For instance, a landmark European Court of Justice decision in
1994 (Case C-327/91 France v. Commission) was prompted by a Commission attempt to
enter into a transatlantic competition agreement without prior approval of the Council of
Ministers (see Chapter 4). Similar developments make competition policy an excellent
test case for understanding the domestic and international sources of the EU’s
increasingly important role as an international actor.
Fourth, EU-US cooperation in merger control is extremely interesting given the
adversarial and discordant history of transatlantic relations in this policy area, especially
over issues of extraterritoriality. The initial reasons for creating competition policies were
different in the EU and US: the US promulgated the 1890 Sherman Act to protect
individual entrepreneurs from large trusts, while the EU developed competition policy as
a way to encourage economic integration. During the 1980s, domestic events in the US
and Europe compounded the historical tensions in this policy area. Given the historical
tensions that peaked in the 1980s, it is particularly surprising that transatlantic
competition relations transitioned to cooperative bilateralism in the 1990s. This transition
                                                
15 For general examples across different policy areas, see Ginsberg (2001), Knodt and Princen (2001),
Pollack and Shaffer (2001), Henning and Padoan (2000), Meunier (2000), Young (2000), Bretherton and
Vogler (1999), Golub (1999), Jupille (1999), Sbragia with Damro (1999), Hanson (1998), Rhodes (1998),
Sbragia (1998) and Smith (1998).
9had to overcome the different interests of the EU and US and the “discord” that arose
from those differences. Therefore, in practical terms, the current study offers useful
insights into what appears to be a historically anomalous outcome of cooperative
bilateralism. These findings may help to determine whether transatlantic cooperation in
competition relations can actually serve as a model for transatlantic cooperation more
generally.
Fifth, competition policy traditionally has been a “behind-the-border” domestic
issue, and the majority of EU and US competition policy investigations still focus on
domestic transactions.16 Why then would the EU and US allow intervention by foreign
authorities in their sovereign domestic affairs?17 How states manage one policy area that
is becoming increasingly international/cross-border can reveal avenues for conflict
prevention and cooperation in other, similar policy areas. Thus, a number of regulatory
issues that were once considered “behind-the-border” (e.g. environment, government
procurement, health and safety) may share similarities with competition policy and, as a
result, will benefit from the findings of the current study.
Sixth, while international cooperation is an inherently political issue, scholarly
work by political scientists on competition policy is limited.18 The general topic of
competition policy does enjoy attention from economists and legal and business scholars.
However, the political implications of and motivations for international cooperation in
regulating cross-border mergers are almost entirely unanalyzed by these scholars.19 These
deficiencies across the disciplines are alarming because, as economic internationalization
                                                
16 See Cini and McGowan (1998, 198), Doern (1996a, 277) and OECD (1987).
17 Held et al. echo this question in their assertion that “It is now commonplace for American or European
competition authorities to intervene, either diplomatically or legally, in what might before have been
regarded as purely domestic issues concerning major business mergers or acquisitions which could
potentially undermine the competitive position of their own industries or corporations” (1999, 259).
18 For example, Doern argues “The analysis of comparative competition policy and competition policy
institutions has not been a central concern of political scientists or of scholars in public administration and
public policy who focus on institutions and policy formation” (1996b, 7).
19 Two recent studies by economists that argue for the development of a multilateral agreement on
competition policy are Lloyd (1998) and Graham and Richardson (1997). Fox (2001), Parisi (1999) and
Fidler (1992) offer notable legal analyses of internationally-oriented competition policy. A recent legal
study by Esty and Geradin (2001, 40-46) investigates regulatory cooperation as “co-opetition”, which
focuses on the comparative dynamics of regulation as intergovernmental (across different levels of
governance within the US and EU), intragovernmental (across different branches of government within the
US and EU) and extragovernmental (between governmental and non-governmental actors, such as the
WTO). Notably, this study overlooks the dynamics of regulation between the US and EU. For a useful
study of general transatlantic regulatory cooperation, see Bermann et al. (2001). 
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continues, the importance of competition policy continues to increase. As Devuyst
argues,
In a world economy gradually freed from governmental
barriers to trade, competition policy is likely to become an
increasingly important structural factor determining the
behavior of private firms on the global market.  As an
instrument to structure the world market, competition
policy deserves attention, not only from antitrust lawyers
and economists, but also from international relations
specialists (1998 479).
Indeed, as the recently failed GE/Honeywell merger and transatlantic disagreements over
whether to add competition policy to the WTO agenda show, the political salience of EU-
US competition relations remains very high.
Finally, the current study has immediate implications for international economic
certainty and stability. Transatlantic cooperation in competition policy is crucial to
international certainty and stability because not only does an enormous amount of
internationally-oriented merger activity occur among EU and US firms, but the EU and
the US also represent the two largest and most interpenetrated, developed markets.
Furthermore, the EU and the US possess the two most developed and internationally
active competition policies.20 This increasingly important policy manages the
fundamental structure of their respective domestic markets, shaping national economic
policy and determining opportunities for both consumers and producers. As such,
transatlantic conflicts over competition matters are not easily resolved and hold the
potential to escalate into destabilizing trade wars (ICPAC 2000, 41), which can seriously
undermine overall certainty and confidence in the international economy.
IV. Analytical Concepts
A. International Cooperation
Before investigating the central research question, the current study requires
clarification of two central concepts. The first concept is EU-US cooperation. While few
                                                
20 The international significance of the transatlantic relationship in competition policy is also witnessed by
the fact that the EU and US are the hubs of the international “hub-and-spoke” system of bilateral
competition policy cooperation agreements (Devuyst 2000).
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concepts in political science enjoy consensus definitions, the notion of international
cooperation does boast strong definitional agreement. International cooperation is
frequently defined in political science as occurring “when actors adjust their behavior to
the actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy coordination”
(Keohane 1984, 51).21 Keohane cautions that this definition of international cooperation
must be distinguished from “harmony”, which refers to a situation in which “actors’
policies (pursued in their own self-interest without regard for others) automatically
facilitate the attainment of others’ goals” (1984, 51).22 Thus, analyses of international
cooperation need to differentiate between cases in which actors with different interests
coordinate policies and those cases in which actors merely share common interests. As
will be discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, the current study examines a case in which the
elected politicians in the EU and US (the “states”) have different interests that appear to
have been brought into conformity through a process of policy coordination driven by
competition authorities with similar preferences.
While Keohane’s general definition of international cooperation clearly applies to
the type of behavior investigated in the current study, two stipulations are necessary.
First, for a variety of reasons mentioned in the preceding sections, the current study
focuses on an important geographical subsection of international cooperation—bilateral
cooperation between the EU and US. Second, the current study investigates cooperation
specifically in merger control, not generally across a wide variety of different and
analytically separable policy areas.
While a useful starting point, Keohane’s general definition of international
cooperation benefits from more precise specification of the possible types and processes
of cooperation that may occur in international relations. Differentiation among these
types and processes is crucial to understanding EU-US cooperation in competition policy.
                                                
21 For a discussion of the wide agreement on this definition of cooperation, see Milner (1992) and Milner
(1997). Specifically, Milner (1997, 7) notes that Oye (1986), Grieco (1990), Haas (1990), and Putnam and
Bayne (1987) have agreed on the utility of Keohane’s definition.
22 Harmony is further distinguished from “Discord”: “a situation in which governments regard each others’
policies as hindering the attainment of their goals, and hold each other responsible for these constraints”
(1984, 52).
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1. Types of International Cooperation
EU-US cooperation in competition policy occurs as two potential types: Non-
discretionary and discretionary. These two types are classified according to the degree of
discretion enjoyed by un-elected regulators. On the one hand, traditional
conceptualizations of international cooperation largely focus on non-discretionary types:
cooperation occurs between states via formal and binding political agreements. Such non-
discretionary cooperation is frequently based in treaties, which require ratification
procedures and have the effect of domestic law. Non-discretionary international
cooperation is established via political agreements because the “state” (i.e., elected
politicians) will typically reserve this important sovereign right to sign international
agreements for itself.
On the other hand, international cooperation also can occur between actors
operating at sub-state levels, such as regulators. This cooperation is considered
discretionary when it occurs between domestic and foreign regulators and is conducted
without direct political involvement. The discretionary authority of regulators comes
from the power delegated to them by elected politicians and is typically based in policy
objectives founded in statutory law. As Viscusi et al. argue, “Given the general and vague
policy objectives provided by legislation, a regulatory agency is often left with
considerable discretion as to how it regulates the industry” (1996, 321). In order to
achieve these objectives, regulatory authorities are allowed to use their own initiative to
promulgate rules, guidelines, codes, procedures, etc. In certain cases, regulators can use
this discretionary authority to initiate cooperation with foreign regulators. When they do
so, this type of behavior is termed discretionary international cooperation.
Provisions for both non-discretionary and discretionary international cooperation
are found in EU and US domestic law. To varying degrees, these domestic laws allow
competition authorities to cooperate with their foreign counterparts. While cooperation
can occur via non-discretionary and/or discretionary means, since 1990, most
transatlantic cooperation in competition relations has been conducted under the
discretionary authority of regulators. This fact raises difficult questions for the
International Relations literature regarding the actors involved in and the nature of
transatlantic cooperation (see Chapter 2).
13
2. Processes of International Cooperation
Keohane argues that international cooperation occurs through “a process of policy
coordination” (1984, 51). For analytical purposes, this general process of policy
coordination benefits from a realistic disaggregation of three distinct processes of EU-US
cooperation: rule-making, implementation and exploratory institutional cooperation.
Rule-making cooperation, which may be non-discretionary or discretionary, creates the
formal basis for increasing contacts between competition authorities. Implementation
cooperation then typically occurs on a case-by-case basis through which competition
authorities exchange information and coordinate their investigations in order to reduce
the likelihood of divergent decisions. Implementation cooperation may encourage
substantive convergence (e.g., consistent decisions) and procedural convergence (e.g.,
investigation coordination). After successful rule-making and implementation
cooperation, informal efforts at exploratory institutional cooperation can emerge as new
ways to review and evaluate transatlantic competition relations.
Despite previous transatlantic discord, EU-US cooperation via non-treaty
cooperative agreements is readily apparent since 1991. Through rule-making cooperation,
the EU and US have entered into the 1991 Bilateral Agreement, the 1998 Positive Comity
Agreement (PCA) and the 1999 Administrative Arrangements on Attendance (AAA).
The Bilateral is the most important agreement guiding EU-US cooperation in merger
control. This agreement provided a framework for EU-US competition relations, the most
central components of which include
1. Notification when competition enforcement activities may affect the
“important interests” (Art. 2, Para. 1) of the other party,
2. Exchange of information,
3. Conduct of enforcement activities, “insofar as possible” (Art. 4, Para. 3), that
are consistent with objectives of the other party, and
4. Consultation and confidentiality of information.
The Bilateral also addresses anticompetitive business behavior that occurs outside
the jurisdiction of one party, but adversely affects the important interests of that party.
First, in an instance of such anticompetitive behavior, the emphasis is on mutual
notification by competition authorities during the initial decision-making process.
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Second, consideration of the effects of enforcement activities on the other party is
stressed. The Bilateral also introduces the notion of positive comity, a principle allowing
one competition authority to request formal consideration of their national interests by a
foreign counterpart.23
While the Bilateral formalized positive comity, the PCA encouraged competition
authorities in one jurisdiction to request that their foreign counterparts undertake
competition investigations on their behalf in cases where their counterpart was in a better
position to investigate the case. Thus, the PCA further clarified the cooperation
procedures in the Bilateral Agreement and encouraged reciprocal deferrals of
investigative authority between EU and US competition regulators.
While the Bilateral and Positive Comity agreements are binding on the
signatories, the Administrative Arrangements on Attendance (AAA) is a non-binding
effort at rule-making cooperation.24 The AAA provides reciprocal arrangements for
competition authorities to attend certain stages of each other’s merger review processes
on a case-by-case basis. As a non-binding agreement, the AAA provides useful
comparative insights into the political dynamics that surround binding, rule-making
cooperation. Table 1 summarizes the three cases of transatlantic rule-making cooperation,
in particular noting their legal standing.
                                                
23 For a more detailed discussion of the principle of comity, see Chapter 4.
24 The Bilateral and PCA are “executive” agreements. In the US, executive agreements “are formal and
binding international agreements, but they have not been ratified by the United States Senate as treaties and
thus do not override any inconsistent provisions of U.S. law” (ICPAC 2000, Annex 1-C, v). In the EU, both
the European Commission and the Council of Ministers sign such agreements (see Chapter 4 and Macleod
et al. 1996).
15
Table 1: EU-US Rule-Making Cooperation Agreements
Year Legal Standing Substance
EU-US Bilateral
Agreement 1991 Binding
Formal cooperation
and positive comity
introduced
Positive Comity
Agreement 1998 Binding
Clarification of
cooperation and
positive comity in
practice
Administrative
Arrangements on
Attendance
1999 Non-binding
Reciprocal
attendance at
investigatory
meetings
Rule-making cooperation establishes the general framework by which the EU and
US cooperate in implementing their respective competition policies. As they cooperate
within this framework, EU and US competition authorities contact each other on a daily
basis. Since 1991, this EU-US implementation cooperation in specific competition cases
has increased dramatically and is readily apparent in the number of notifications
exchanged between the two authorities (see Chapter 5). Notifications occur when one
competition authority informs the other that it is initiating a competition investigation that
may affect the interests of their foreign counterpart. Once a notification has been made,
the competition authorities proceed to cooperate on a number of procedural and
substantive matters that are central to EU and US enforcement activities. As discussed in
Chapter 5, this cooperation occurs in four analytical distinct stages: initial contacts,
notification contacts, review process contacts and remedial contacts.
Finally, exploratory institutional cooperation is the most recent and experimental
process of EU-US cooperation in competition policy. The EU and US have only begun to
engage in exploratory institutional cooperation since 1999. This type of cooperation is
witnessed in the establishment of the EU-US Mergers Working Group (MWG). The
MWG is an ad hoc forum mandated to study different approaches in the EU and US to
the formulation of remedies and the scope for convergence of merger analysis and
methodology. In addition, the EU and US have been engaging in discussions over the last
two years to establish an International Competition Network (ICN). Instead of a formal
international organization, the ICN is an informal venue for discussing the
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multilateralization of cooperation in competition policy. The EU and US competition
authorities consciously pursued the establishment of the MWG and the ICN under their
discretionary authority, in a manner that did not require review and approval by the
respective political principals.
Considering the adversarial nature of transatlantic competition relations before
1990 and the political reluctance to negotiate and sign a relevant treaty, the development
of EU-US cooperation is particularly surprising. The three processes of cooperation
become even more interesting when one realizes that they are largely discretionary and
conducted by regulators. Table 2 summarizes the two types (discretionary and non-
discretionary) and three processes (rule-making, implementation and exploratory
institutional) of cooperation through which US and EU competition regulators currently
engage each other.
Table 2: Current Competition Regulators’ Authority to Cooperate
PROCESS of COOPERATION
Rule-Making Implementation ExploratoryInstitutional
EU Competition
Authorities Non-discretionary Discretionary Discretionary
US Competition
Authorities Discretionary Discretionary Discretionary
This dissertation shows how competition authorities have overcome the domestic
differences in EU and US rule-making authority (non-discretionary versus discretionary)
to pursue greater cooperation via discretionary implementation and exploratory
institutional processes.
B. Economic Internationalization
The second central concept in the current study is economic internationalization
(EI). As the term suggests, EI is a change in the international economy, which resembles
the common notion of economic globalization. However, the current study uses the term
“internationalization” with the intent of distancing itself from frequent claims in the
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globalization literature that the phenomenon in the current study is 1.) making “the state”
obsolete,25 and 2.) occurring globally.26
EI is conceptualized as a systemic “stimulus” that simultaneously effects and
prompts policy responses in both the EU and the US.27 More specifically, EI is defined as
an expansion of markets from the domestic level to the international level, caused by
economic liberalization, deregulation and technological development. EI dramatically
increases rivalry among firms, both within national borders and across national borders,
which significantly changes business strategies (UNCTAD 2000, 12). A common
business response to this new pressure is to increase FDI through the pursuit of
internationally-oriented mergers. While trade remains an important element of
international economic activity, FDI is becoming an increasingly significant component
of overall international economic transactions. This trend is witnessed in the fact that
overall FDI inflows have increased dramatically since the 1980s, especially in the
developed economies (see Table 3).
                                                
25 For a useful argument that globalization does not necessitate the end of the nation-state, see Gilpin
(2001). In short, Gilpin argues
…the extent and significance of economic globalization have been greatly exaggerated
and misunderstood in both public and professional discussions; globalization in fact is not
nearly as extensive nor as sweeping in its consequences (negative or positive) as many
contemporary observers believe. This is still a world where national policies and
domestic economies are the principal determinants of economic affairs (2001, 3).
26 For a similar usage of the term “internationalization”, see Keohane and Milner (1996), Frieden and
Rogowski (1996) and Garrett and Lange (1995).
27 The use of the term “stimulus” is inspired by Gourevitch’s (1986) investigation of different countries’
responses to the external stimulus of international economic crises.
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Table 3: World FDI Inflows, 1980-200028
This increase in FDI reflects the increasing numbers of internationally-oriented mergers
and acquisitions (M&As), an substantial source of overall FDI flows. For example, as
UNCTAD reports, “The ratio of the value of cross-border M&As to world FDI flows
reached over 80 percent in 1999. M&As are particularly significant as a mode of entry for
FDI in developed countries” (2000, 13).
Firms are increasingly pursuing these internationally-oriented mergers as a means
to attain internationally competitive economies of scale and enhance overseas market
access (with new distribution networks and locally-familiar reputations).29
Internationally-oriented mergers, in turn, must be reviewed concurrently by competition
authorities in different national jurisdictions. This change in the international economy
raises the possibility that competition authorities in different jurisdictions may reach
different decisions on whether to approve or prohibit the same merger. This challenge to
implementing domestic competition policy is at the core of the current study.
                                                
28 Source: UNCTAD, http://www.unctad.org/en/subsites/dite/fdistats_files/fdistats.htm.
29 For more on the impact of EI on business strategies, see Chapter 2.
19
V. Chapter Outline
The current study is organized into six chapters. The second chapter begins with a
discussion of the interaction between economic internationalization and EU-US
cooperation in competition policy, specifically merger control. After establishing the
relationship, the chapter discusses briefly the shortcomings of the competing arguments
generated by the relevant international relations (IR) literature on international
cooperation. The next section focuses on the linkages between the international and
domestic levels in order to assess the potential sources of international cooperation. An
argument is developed in this section for employing a cross-level approach that
acknowledges the stimulus of economic internationalization at the systemic level and
incorporates power-sharing arrangements at the domestic level in order to explain more
convincingly the discretionary nature and three processes of EU-US cooperation. The
next section introduces the principal-agent framework (PAF) of delegation as a
simplifying mechanism for understanding the domestic politics of international
cooperation in competition policy. The next section posits patterns of behavior that
follow from incorporating PAF into a cross-level approach to international cooperation.
These patterns of behavior address the international and domestic sources of rule-making,
implementation and exploratory institutional cooperation in EU-US competition
relations. Finally, the chapter discusses the methodological approach used in subsequent
chapters to demonstrate the patterns of behavior.
The third chapter begins with an overview of the historical foundations of
competition policy, in particular the US’s 1890 Sherman Antitrust Act and the similar,
but much later, laws establishing the competition regime in the EU. These institutional
developments provide the foundation for US and EU competition regulators’
discretionary authority and the respective domestic constraints within which they operate.
The next section outlines the domestic control instruments and foreign intervention
instruments available to EU and US political principals. This section also discusses the
establishment of extraterritorial jurisdiction in antitrust law—initially and primarily by
the US—which was largely responsible for the adversarial nature of transatlantic
competition relations prior to the 1990s. After discussing these legal foundations, the
chapter clarifies the central actors (US and EU principals and agents) in competition
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policy and addresses their potential relative influence. Next, the chapter discusses the
different interests of the EU and US that have led to historical adversity and discord in
transatlantic competition relations. Much of this part of the chapter focuses on
transatlantic competition conflicts from the 1950s through the 1980s. This section
includes a brief discussion of the limitations of early efforts at international cooperation
in competition policy. The chapter concludes with a summary of the findings.
The fourth chapter demonstrates patterns of behavior in EU-US rule-making
cooperation. The content of three EU-US competition agreements are analyzed in light of
the revised cross-level approach developed in Chapter 2. The domestic politics
surrounding the signing of the Bilateral Agreement, the Positive Comity Agreement and
the AAA are a central part of the analysis of rule-making cooperation. These initial rule-
making steps established the framework for transatlantic cooperation and provide the
basis for subsequent implementation and exploratory institutional cooperation. The
efforts at rule-making cooperation resemble a conscious attempt to design a system of
dispute prevention by regulatory agents over dispute resolution by political principals. In
particular, the chapter considers how these processes of cooperation in an EI environment
are determined by the interaction of domestic preferences and institutions in the EU and
US. According to the patterns of behavior (P1, P2 and P3) presented in Chapter 2, the
process of rule-making cooperation is characterized by agent attempts to reduce
information asymmetries through shirking (pursue their own preferences via
discretionary authority), and principal attempts to intervene in that shirking when the
costs of not intervening exceed the costs of intervening.
The fifth chapter analyzes the EU-US implementation and exploratory
institutional cooperation that has followed from the process of rule-making cooperation.
The chapter begins by discussing the reasons why competition agents pursue
implementation cooperation. Next, the chapter outlines four different stages of
implementation cooperation in merger review: initial contacts, notification contacts,
review process contacts and remedial contacts. The implications of EU-US cooperation in
each of these stages is demonstrated through the analysis of selected merger cases. While
the cases suggest that discretionary cooperation generally functions without direct
principal intervention, two instances are also analyzed in which EU-US cooperation
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failed to prevent intervention: the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger and the
GE/Honeywell merger. Both of these cases require more in depth analysis to understand
where and why flaws occurred in the different stages of implementation cooperation. The
chapter then details two efforts at exploratory institutional cooperation: the EU-US
Mergers Working Group and the International Competition Network. These two cases
reveal concerted attempts by EU and US competition agents to increase bilateral and
multilateral cooperation in competition policy through discretionary means.
The final chapter begins with a brief recapitulation of the central puzzle and
discusses the theoretical implications of the current study. Next, it summarizes the
findings of the study in terms of the patterns of behavior for agents and principals. The
chapter then comments on the role of societal (in particular business) influences in EU-
US cooperation in merger review. This section also investigates potential ways in which
to determine the role of firms in the intervention cost calculations of principals. The
chapter concludes with a discussion of the generalizability of the findings to international
regulatory cooperation in other policy areas. In particular, insights from the current study
are compared to the international politics of trade policy and the emerging political
dynamics of cooperation in areas characterized by increasing international regulation.
These comparisons raise additional interesting questions that form a clear and promising
agenda for future research on the politics of international regulatory cooperation.
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CHAPTER 2: Theory and Methods—The International and Domestic
Sources of Transatlantic Cooperation in Competition Policy
I. Introduction
This chapter begins with a discussion of the interaction between economic
internationalization and EU-US cooperation in competition policy, specifically merger
control. After establishing the relationship, the chapter discusses briefly the shortcomings
of the competing arguments generated by the relevant international relations (IR)
literature on international cooperation. The next section focuses on the linkages between
the international and domestic levels in order to assess the potential sources of
international cooperation. An argument is developed in this section for employing a
cross-level approach that acknowledges the stimulus of economic internationalization at
the systemic level and incorporates power-sharing arrangements at the domestic level in
order to explain more convincingly the discretionary nature and three processes of EU-
US cooperation. The next section introduces the principal-agent framework (PAF) of
delegation as a simplifying mechanism for understanding the domestic politics of
international cooperation in competition policy. The next section posits patterns of
behavior that follow from incorporating PAF into a cross-level approach to international
cooperation. These patterns of behavior address the international and domestic sources of
rule-making, implementation and exploratory institutional cooperation in EU-US
competition relations. Finally, the chapter discusses the methodological approach used in
subsequent chapters to demonstrate the patterns of behavior.
II. The Interaction of EI and Merger Control
This section argues that EI functions as an international factor that alters the
context in which domestic competition authorities review concurrent jurisdiction
mergers. Data presented below suggest that EI is a stimulus for increasing international
merger activity. The relationship between this international stimulus and business activity
reveals the causal linkages between changes in the international economy and increasing
EU-US cooperation in merger review.
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As discussed in Chapter 1, EI is defined as an expansion of markets from the
domestic level to the international level, caused by economic liberalization, deregulation
and technological development.30 Such a definition of EI, at least tacitly, also includes the
expansion of domestic corporate strategies, activities and organizational structures to the
international level.31 EI has dramatically increased rivalry among firms, both within
national borders and across national borders, which significantly changes business
strategies.32 A common business response, especially in the developed economies, to this
new pressure is to increase foreign direct investment (FDI) by pursuing internationally-
oriented mergers (UNCTAD 2000, 13).33 Indeed, since 1990, mergers and acquisitions
“have accounted typically for a third to over a half of all FDI flows” (Held et al. 1999,
243).34 Such mergers are intended as a means to attain internationally competitive
economies of scale and enhance overseas market access (with new distribution networks
and locally-familiar reputations). More specifically, according to UNCTAD, firms pursue
internationally-oriented mergers in order to access strategic proprietary assets, gain
                                                
30 Much of this EI follows from the successive GATT liberalizations of business activity (Commission
1995, 3; European Commission 1994, Annex I, 2).
31 For example, Evenett et al. argue
Falling trade barriers, a revolution in communications technology, declining restriction
on foreign investment, ongoing deregulation, and the embrace of market-friendly policies
by many governments have wrought significant changes in business strategies on both
sides of the Atlantic. The following corporate developments have taken center stage in
this new environment: a cross-border merger wave of unprecedented scale; a reevaluation
of the benefits of vertical integration, resulting in increased outsourcing and the
fragmentation of stages of production across national borders; and the spread of network-
based industries (2000, 3).
32 ICPAC supports this contention: “…as national markets evolve into a global marketplace, more and more
companies are deciding that they must become bigger to compete effectively” (2000, 44). See also Group
of Experts (1995).
33 It should be noted that while internationally-oriented M&A activity continues to rise, domestic M&A
activity still accounts for the majority of overall M&A activity. For example, in comparison to domestic
M&A activity since 1987, internationally-oriented M&As have remained below fifty percent of overall
M&A activity (UNCTAD 2000, 11).
34 As noted in Chapter 1, UNCTAD reports “The ratio of the value of cross-border M&As to world FDI
flows reached over 80 percent in 1999. M&As are particularly significant as a mode of entry for FDI in
developed countries” (2000, 13). With a similar assessment, Waverman et al. argue “mergers and
acquisitions are the main instrument of FDI today” (1997, 8). In addition, The Economist noted FDI “grew
by 25% to $827 billion in 1999, driven primarily by cross-border mergers and acquisitions” (2000a). The
Economist recently noted “Figures from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development showed
that cross-border merger and acquisition activity was up by more than a third in 1999 to $720 billion”
(2000b). Finally, “In 1999 global merger and acquisition activity was at an all-time high, with over $3.4
trillion in mergers announced worldwide. This volume renders small by comparison the previous year,
itself a record year with approximately $2.5 trillion in merger activity” (Cohen 2000, cited in ICPAC 2000,
44).
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market power and market dominance, achieve synergy gains, become larger, diversify
and spread risks, exploit financial opportunities, and reap personal benefits (2000, 154).35
These internationally-oriented mergers, in turn, must be reviewed concurrently by
competition authorities in different national jurisdictions.
As a major source of FDI, internationally-oriented merger activity has increased
dramatically in the last decade.36 Figure 1 shows the increase in merger activity through
the 1990s among US, European and Japanese firms and firms from the entire developing
world.
Figure 1: Cross-border M&A Activity, 1990-1999 (Sales and Purchases, Billion
$US)37
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While Figure 1 demonstrates the global nature of cross-border M&A activity,
increasing EI via internationally-oriented merger activity is particularly evident in the
                                                
35 For more on the impact of EI on business strategies, see Evenett et al. (2000, 4-5), Garten (2000), and
Gaugan (1999).
36 For a discussion that compares the magnitude of historical mergers waves in the US and Europe with the
current wave of the 1990s, see Graham (2000, 57-60).
37 Note: EU measures of cross-border M&A activity do not include intra-EU activity. However, they are
consistently higher than US levels, possibly because of dramatically higher levels of M&A activity with
Central and East European firms.
Source: UNCTAD (2000), World Investment Report 2000: Cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions and
Development, table IV.3, p. 108.
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transatlantic marketplace.38 For example, in 1997, eighty percent of global
internationally-oriented merger activity occurred between firms located in the US and EU
(UNCTAD 1998, 20). This trend showed no signs of abating during the 1990s as the
waves of merger activity continued to reflect ongoing economic liberalization,
deregulation and technological development in the transatlantic marketplace.
The ability of states to control merger activity with domestic competition policies
is being threatened by the increasing internationalization of markets. This threat is
particularly evident in concurrent jurisdiction cases where a merger and its effects are not
fully located within one national territory. As Devuyst argues, these changes are related
to increasing economic internationalization:
While antitrust enforcement functions essentially on the
basis of national (or in the EU’s case regional) competition
legislation, technologic developments and trade
liberalization agreements have been inviting business to
become global. Given this internationalisation of economic
activity, there are an increasing number of competition
problems that transcend national boundaries (2000, 320-
321).39
This change in the international system represents a significant challenge to states as
previously domestic—or “behind-the-border”—issues become more cross-border and
international in nature.40
The fact that EU and US merger control laws remain domestic while markets are
becoming increasingly transatlantic, even international, creates a crucial disconnect
                                                
38 Domestic mergers in the EU and US have also increased during the same period: “In the United States,
approximately $1.7 trillion worth of U.S. deals were announced in 1999, a slight increase from the $1.6
trillion announced the year before. As the total value of transactions grew in the United States, however,
the number of deals actually declined to 10,892 compared with 12,279 in 1998. By contrast, the value of
European transactions announced in 1999 more than doubled that of the prior year to $1.2 trillion spread
over 12,062 transactions. This merger wave has encompassed virtually every industry from financial
services, to telecommunications, to defense” (ICPAC 2000, 44-45).
39 Fox agrees: “…the World Trade Organization (WTO) has become more aggressive in requiring lower
tariffs and open markets, thus facilitating global competition and a more nearly integrated world.
Globalization, in turn, has brought with it needs and incentives for cooperation among antitrust agencies”
(2001, 350). Similarly, Gual argues “…the existence of multinational firms operating outside the
jurisdiction of individual countries may weaken the effectiveness of competition policy” (1995, 15), due to
the jurisdictional disconnect brought on by EI. For similar arguments elaborating the challenges EI presents
to national competition policies, see also Gerber (2001, 435) and Waverman et al. (1997).
40 For more on the linkage between increasing trade and the likelihood of antitrust conflict, see Evenett et
al. (2000, 14-15).
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between national sovereignty and national jurisdiction.41 The challenge to domestic
competition policies occurs because as firms engage in internationally-oriented merger
activity, they internationalize their production, distribution and management beyond the
sovereign territory and national jurisdiction of their respective domestic competition
authority.42 As EI changes opportunities and incentives for firms, so too must
governments change their behavior if they wish to control merger activity that
increasingly occurs across or outside their national borders but still affects their domestic
market (European Commission 1994, Annex I, 2; Parker 1999; OECD 1999b; OECD
1999e).
These new realities of international business activity have the potential to outpace
the legal resources and sovereign authority of individual states to review and enforce
national competition policy on mergers not fully located within their national legal
jurisdiction. Such mergers are known as concurrent jurisdiction mergers. When a merger
occurs in multiple jurisdictions, the firms are required to file pre-merger notifications (see
Chapter 3) with the competition authorities in each jurisdiction to which they are subject
to review and approval. The related costs to firms of filing in multiple jurisdictions can
become extremely high as more and more states develop pre-merger notification
requirements.43
In its simplest formulation, jurisdiction defines the limits of national legal
authority. National jurisdictions are typically mutually exclusive, with jurisdictional
overlap precipitating contact and, often, confrontation and conflict (ICPAC 2000).44 As
mergers internationalize, national jurisdiction becomes increasingly disconnected from
the economic concept of relevant geographic market, an important analytical tool of
merger control. Relevant geographic market is an instrument of merger analysis that
                                                
41 For other arguments that elaborate a disconnect between national sovereignty and national jurisdiction
due to changes in the international economic system, see Monti (2001a), Monti (2000b), ICPAC (2000),
Falk (1999), Cerny (1994), Korbin (1997), Cox (1996), Matthews (1997), Ohmae (1995a, 1995b, 1993),
Petrella (1996), Rosenau (1997, 103-108) and Held et al. (1999).
42 “Sovereignty” here is understood as the ability of states to achieve specific domestic policy outcomes,
not the autonomy of individual states to act in the international system.
43 Waller cites the Exxon-Mobil merger as an example of the burden of multiple filings, noting that the
merger “may ultimately involve the filing of up to 40 premerger notifications in different jurisdictions”
(2000, 574-575).
44 While the EU is not a traditional state, for simplicity, the Union’s legal jurisdiction is referred to as
“national” and “domestic”.
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indicates “the place where supply and demand interact” (European Communities 1999,
43).45 Merger analysis must identify the exact location where supply and demand interact
in order to determine whether the proposed merger is anti-competitive (i.e., will
adversely affect competition within that geographic market). 
The current study categorizes mergers as three types based on the affected
geographic market. Since the onset of EI, common geographic markets frequently
identified in merger analysis include nationally exclusive (or domestic), concurrent and
international markets. First, in a nationally exclusive geographic market, a proposed
merger will affect one national jurisdiction only. In such cases, one sovereign authority
reviews the merger. Second, in a concurrent geographic market, a proposed merger will
affect two national jurisdictions concurrently. In such cases, both sovereign authorities
review the merger. Third, in an international geographic market, a proposed merger will
affect two national jurisdictions concurrently as well as a larger segment of the global
economy. In such cases, all sovereign authorities affected review the merger.
The current study is concerned with mergers in which the relevant geographic
market spans more than one national jurisdiction—those mergers in which supply and
demand interact in concurrent and/or international geographic markets. By spanning
more than one national jurisdiction, such mergers cause the interests and sovereign
authority of individual states to come into direct contact and possibly confrontation and
conflict.46 At its most obvious, the impact of EI on merger control is evinced in the
                                                
45 When defining the relevant market for merger analysis, the geographic and product markets must be
identified. The geographic market is most important for the current study because this is where national
sovereignty and national jurisdiction become disconnected. US and EU definitions of relevant geographic
market are very similar (ICPAC 2000, 50) and increasingly include international markets instead of
exclusively national markets. The US calculation for definition of market is provided by the Department of
Justice and Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines (April 2, 1992, as amended April 8,
1997, reprinted at 4 Trade Reg. Rep. [CCH] paragraph 13,104). The current EU definition derives from the
Commission Notice on the Definition of the Relevant Market for Purposes of Community Competition
Law (O.J. C 372, Dec. 9, 1997).
46 Campbell and Trebilcock provide three scenarios in which interjurisdictional conflict in mergers is likely:
1. A multinational enterprise based in country A acquires another multinational enterprise based in
country B. Both firms have subsidiaries producing similar lines of products in various domestic
markets throughout the world. Here the impact of the merger would presumably have to be
assessed market-by-market in the light of alternative sources of domestic or import competition in
each market, with the possibility that competition authorities in some jurisdictions would find the
merger objectionable while others would not.
2. A foreign firm based in country A acquires a firm based in country B where the relevant products
produced by the two firms are traded freely in a regional market (e.g., Canada and the United
States or member countries of the European Union). Given that the relevant geographic market for
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changing market definitions used by US and EU competition authorities. As Evenett et al.
argue, “As markets integrate across national borders, the logic of purely national antitrust
policy breaks down. The most immediate problem… is how to define the relevant
‘market’” (2000, 13). Changes in these market definitions directly reflect changes that are
occurring due to the internationalization of business activity.
As firms and markets internationalize, states must find ways to correspondingly
expand their national jurisdiction or lose their sovereign ability to ensure the “public
good” of fair competition in domestic markets.47 In addition to ensuring fair competition
in a free market, governments must also consider the increasing possibility that foreign
authorities will intervene in their domestic matters by reviewing competition cases in
concurrent and international geographic markets. Governments can respond to this new
threat of market failure and the complication of foreign political intervention through the
extraterritorial imposition of domestic merger review authority—via various punitive
measures based in domestic law—on concurrent and international geographic market
mergers. Such a unilateral approach exacerbates the uncertainties and tensions that follow
from overlapping national jurisdictions, increasing the likelihood that national interests
and competition policies come into conflict.48 Historically, transatlantic competition
relations have been such reciprocal, political exercises of unilateral extraterritoriality,
frequently threatening to escalate into multi-sectoral trade wars.49
Alternatively, governments can choose to cooperate while reviewing mergers and
reduce the likelihood of tensions caused by external political intervention in concurrent
and international geographic markets. Beginning in the 1990s, the EU and US chose to
                                                                                                                                                
the product is supranational, domestic antitrust authorities throughout the regional market are each
likely to view their jurisdiction as legitimately engaged. The competitive effects should be
essentially uniform across a properly defined economic market, but it is possible that the various
domestic competition authorities would come to different factual or legal conclusions.
3. A foreign firm in country A acquires a competitor in county B producing a similar product line,
but here the geographic market is global rather than national or regional (e.g., the commercial
aircraft manufacturing industry). Here, at least in theory, domestic competition authorities in all
countries throughout the world where the product is sold may be interested in reviewing the
transaction. The probability of divergent decisions obviously increases greatly when a large
number of jurisdictions with different laws and enforcement policies have the potential to become
involved (1997, 89-90).
47 See below for more on the assumption of competition policy designed to ensure the “public good”.
48 Graham agrees, arguing that the frequency of conflicts between national interests “rises with the
increasing globalization of industry and the growing anxiety of many governments over its impact on their
own efficacy” (1996, 45). See also Baker et al. (1997, 443).
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meet the challenge of internationalizing business activity by cooperating with their
counterparts across the Atlantic. Notably, however, the EU and US did not establish this
cooperation through treaty-making. This cooperation appears to have largely overcome
the challenges presented by EI and overlapping jurisdictions. Yet, while EU-US
cooperation in merger control has increased dramatically over the last decade, it is not
clear how and why this cooperation has occurred, especially given the historically
adversarial nature of transatlantic competition relations.
III. Competing Explanations of International Cooperation
The current study considers competing explanations of international cooperation
to explain transatlantic competition relations.50 While the study focuses on a topic within
the realm of International Political Economy (IPE), because the central question is
concerned with international cooperation, the analysis first considers traditional
explanations from the International Relations (IR) literature.51
The IR literature has long tried to develop convincing, generalizable theoretical
explanations of both international conflict and cooperation. While much of this literature
has focused on international conflict, the last three decades have witnessed an emergent
interest in international cooperation. Two major rationalist52 IR perspectives—realism53
                                                                                                                                                
49 For a historical accounting of this adversarial relationship, see Chapter 3.
50 The international relations literature on the sources of international cooperation is voluminous. For a
useful review, see Milner (1992). Other recent, notable contributions include Boyer (1993), Grieco (1990),
Haas (1990), Feldstein (1988), Putnam and Bayne (1987), Axelrod (1984) and Krasner (1983).
51 The scholarly literature in IPE is still dominated by studies focusing on trade policy. However, the
current study investigates an area of IPE that is increasingly important as the international trade agenda
turns toward the removal of behind-the-border technical barriers, such as competition policy. The field of
International Political Economy (IPE) is increasingly dividing between those who engage in the more
general debates about international relations, such as issues of international cooperation, and those who
focus the majority of their efforts on the study of political economy (including comparative political
economy and IPE, with frequent overlaps in American politics). Both of these approaches to IPE have
contributed useful models and methods to the broader study of IPE (Martin et al. 2002). For a useful
discussion of recent developments in the field of IR/IPE, see Katzenstein et al. (1999). 
52 The term “rationalist” is used to describe these literatures due to their reliance on rational choice
assumptions (Katzenstein et al. 1999). This reliance leads the literatures to employ interest-based
explanations of international cooperation and conflict. See Snidal (1986) for an endorsement of rational
choice assumptions in IR analyses.
53 The realist approach to international politics has undergone numerous revisions and clarifications. The
origins of the “scientific” realist research agenda are dated to Morgenthau (1946, 1948). The current
influential variant is the neorealist, or structural realist, research agenda developed by Waltz (1959, 1970).
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and neoliberalism,54 the latter a challenge to the former—have dominated much of this
discourse in the IR literature. While realism and neoliberalism offer very different
explanations of international cooperation, they do share similar simplifying assumptions
of rationality and anarchy that are analytically attractive for their parsimony and
generalizability.55 A more recent, non-rationalist challenge—constructivism—remains at
the formative stages but does offer different explanations for international cooperation.56
                                                                                                                                                
More recent treatments include Mearsheimer (1995), Buzan et al. (1993), Walt (1992), Mearsheimer
(1990), Walt (1987) and Gilpin (1981).
International cooperation is not typically a high-interest item for the research agenda of neorealism
(e.g. Mearsheimer 1995). In addition, realists rely on a unitary actor model of the state, typically arguing
that the unitary actor assumption is necessary for parsimonious analysis. For example, Waltz argues that
relaxing the unitary actor assumption “will lead to the infinite proliferation of variables” (1979, 65), which
lessens the power of theory by unnecessarily complicating the analysis. Moreover, realist explanations are
state-centric, arguing that non-state actors are less (or not at all) important for understanding international
politics. As such, domestic politics, international institutions, multinational corporations and non-
governmental actors are typically absent or considered epiphenomenal in realist explanations of
international cooperation.
54 The neoliberal research agenda is frequently traced to Keohane (1984). Neoliberalism shares common
assumptions with neorealism that states are unitary actors and are self-interested, goal-seeking actors. Like
the realist explanation, domestic politics, multinational corporations and non-governmental actors are
typically absent or considered epiphenomenal in neoliberal explanations of international cooperation.
55 Neorealist and neoliberal theories cannot explain why EU-US cooperation is largely discretionary instead
of based in treaties signed by “the states”. Therefore, while the rationalist systemic explanations can
explain the EU-US transition to cooperation in their own terms, they fall short of convincingly explaining a
crucial element of the resulting cooperation. The problem follows from two central assumptions of the
rationalist systemic approaches—states are unitary actors and states are the most important units of
analysis. Before discussing this problem, two other shortcomings unique to each of these approaches must
be addressed.
First, cooperation in transatlantic competition policy does not seem the likely result of calculations
by unitary states operating in a neorealist, self-help world. Problematic for the neorealists, most activity in
competition policy still occurs in domestic markets. Thus, cooperation with overseas authorities would
allow foreign intervention in a primarily domestic policy area. When the result of cooperation is an
unbalanced (relative) loss of sovereignty over a respective domestic market, why would a self-interested,
unitary state allow foreign intervention in the way it decides to manage the very structure of its domestic
market? This reality of domestic competition policies operating in an international system characterized by
EI presents a fundamental challenge to the neorealist emphasis on the importance of national sovereignty
and relative gains.
Second, a crucial problem also exists for the neoliberal regime theories. Neoliberal explanations of
transatlantic cooperation, which claim that overcoming information shortages are a crucial reason for
creating regimes, would likely predict a regime in competition policy for the exchange of information and
the establishment of a bilateral dispute settlement mechanism. In reality, the transatlantic cooperation
regime prohibits the exchange of confidential business information due to protections afforded by domestic
law and lacks a dispute settlement mechanism. Rather, the regime focuses on the exchange of non-
confidential information and dispute prevention. In the transatlantic competition regime, the only recourse
to dispute settlement seems to be (the decreasingly likely) intervention by domestic politicians threatening
to exercise unilateral extraterritorial measures.
While the neorealists and neoliberals suffer from the preceding shortcomings, they also share
problems that arise from their mutual reliance on a unitary actor assumption and state-centric focus. By
assuming a unitary “state” as the unit of analysis, systemic explanations often overlook and/or disregard
31
                                                                                                                                                
crucial sub-systemic actors that may contribute significantly to compelling causal explanations of
international cooperation.
To understand the domestic politics that may explain the discretionary nature of EU-US
cooperation, the analyst must relax the unitary actor assumption. Anticipating criticism for relaxing this
assumption, Milner argues
abandoning the assumption of a unitary state need not condemn one to hopeless
complexity nor to a lack of parsimony. Once one leaves the world of states as unitary
actors, one can use the concepts and theories from American and comparative politics,
some of which provide powerful, parsimonious tools for understanding strategic
interaction in different institutional environments (1998, 779).
Related to the unitary actor assumption, the systemic approaches encounter an analytical problem
due to their state-centrism. According to the systemic IR theories, states are the most important and
analytically necessary units of analysis (Milner 1998, 761). Therefore, these approaches typically overlook
the causal impact of other international actors, such as self-interested international organizations,
multinational corporations and non-governmental organizations. It should be noted that neoliberalism does
consider the role of international organizations, but typically as a forum through which states operate, not
as independent and causally significant actors with interests separate from their member states. As a result,
the state-centrism of systemic IR theories encounters some difficulty when trying to incorporate a self-
interested, non-traditional governmental actor like the EU. This flaw is particularly noticeable in
competition policy, where the European Commission wields its greatest supranational authority.
The interaction between EI and national interests suggested by the rationalist systemic IR theories
may help to explain why a cooperative regime has been created, but it cannot explain the crucial
characteristic of that cooperation—its discretionary nature. In order to explain why EU-US cooperation in
competition policy is largely discretionary, the analysis must consider the behavior of actors within the
process of policy coordination identified by Keohane (1984) as an essential component of international
cooperation. The domestic politics that led competition authorities to try to isolate other domestic actors
from the cooperative process are lost or made trivial when the research is limited to unitary, state-centric
analyses. In the current case, the domestic EU and US competition regulators play an important role in
international cooperation because their preferences are more similar to each other than to other actors in
their respective domestic environments.
56 The broad constructivist research agenda is frequently traced to the work of Wendt (1999, 1994, 1992),
but includes other notable contributions such as Thomas (2001), Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), Keck and
Sikkink (1998), Haas (1992, 1990). The crucial difference with rationalists is that the non-rationalist
approaches conceive of states as role-players rather than utility-maximizers. Constructivists argue that
interest-based analyses cannot adequately determine state behavior because they do not fully consider the
origins of state interests, nor the impact that national identities and ideas (e.g., democracy, capitalism, anti-
apartheid, environmentalism) can have on state behavior within and toward a regime.
While constructivist approaches like Wendt’s do consider the domestic politics of identity and,
thus, preference formation, their explanation of international political change—based on states accepting
changes in an international norm of what is appropriate behavior—is not convincing in the current study. In
competition policy, the “state” (i.e., politicians) is not more likely to cooperate with other states due to
some norm of appropriate behavior. Indeed, politicians will still intervene in competition policy, and
decrease the likelihood of cooperation, whenever they are compelled by perceived threats to national and/or
constituent interests. Rather than politicians, it is the regulatory authorities’ behavior that has changed due
to the impact of EI on their interests—interests that are ever-present because they are formally specified in
domestic institutions of power-sharing arrangements.
Thus, constructivism—like neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism as discussed below—
focuses on traditional forms of international cooperation that change the nature of “the state” while
overlooking the new forms of discretionary cooperation that change only the nature of regulators’ behavior,
not their incentives for behavior. In short, constructivism identifies actors in networks who gradually
change their understanding of what behavior is appropriate for states, which ultimately changes the beliefs
and values (i.e., identities) of politicians and the content of policy. This is not what occurred in the case of
transatlantic competition relations. Instead of changing the identities of states and the content of foreign
policy, EI is causing competition authorities to follow their interests and adjust their behavior to increase
discretionary cooperation.
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Although these traditional explanations focus on different levels of analysis, they
accept, to varying degrees, a causal link between the systemic-level EI and international
cooperation. However, these traditional approaches do not offer convincing explanations
of 1) why systemic-level EI initiates specific processes of EU-US cooperation in
competition policy, and 2) why EU-US cooperation in competition policy is primarily
discretionary. A more convincing explanation will explain the three specific processes
through which the EU and US cooperate (rule-making, implementation and exploratory
institutional) as well as the specific forms of that cooperation (non-discretionary or
discretionary). To do so, this chapter turns to cross-level analyses that incorporate
domestic politics as important causal factors in explaining international politics.
IV. Cross-Level Approaches to International Cooperation57
The identification of an appropriate level of analysis is central to theory-building.
As Singer (1961) points out, the nature of a theory relies on the level at which it is
posited, with theories of different levels often advancing very different explanations and
                                                                                                                                                
Evidence of the competition authorities following their interests is apparent in two related
examples. First, as will be shown below, competition authorities pursued a binding agreement as a way to
compel their counterparts to cooperate. Thus, the competition authorities’ actions were based on a lack of
trust and a desire to reduce the likelihood of their counterpart’s extraterritorial tendencies, which would, in
turn, prompt undesirable political intervention. Without some shared understanding of the appropriate
behavior in international competition relations, the competition authorities were left to devise a way in
which they could be assured that their foreign counterparts would not defect from cooperation. They chose
to bind each other into a cooperative agreement that reduced the likelihood of defection and, as a result,
satisfied their respective interests.
Second, this desire to reduce the extraterritorial tendencies of their counterparts is particularly
apparent in the push for positive comity to be included in bilateral agreements. For positive comity to
function regularly and effectively, competition authorities must trust overseas institutions and competition
authorities. Thus, positive comity requires a reciprocal “culture” of confidence in cooperation and actions
of overseas counterparts. In this situation, a shared understanding of what behavior is appropriate might be
expected to develop out of necessity. However, behavior that conforms to such a shared understanding is
lacking; no reciprocal culture of confidence exists. In fact, only one formal positive comity request has
been made and it can be argued that the request was actually made in the self-interest of the US. This
request occurred in the Sabre/Amadeus case in which the US competition authorities requested the
Commission investigate the allegedly anticompetitive behavior of a French firm. (On Sabre/Amadeus, see
Devuyst [2001, 140-42], Janow [2000, 39-40] and Griffin [1999, 184-185].) Ultimately, the Commission
decided against the French firm, much to the annoyance of the French Government. In effect, the US
competition authorities had used the Commission in an instrumental fashion to challenge the French firm.
As a result, the US authorities achieved their interests—the anticompetitive behavior of the firm was
remedied and they avoided infuriating French politicians who instead directed their anger toward the
Commission.
57 The term “cross-level” is used to distinguish the approach employed in the current study from the
specific two-level model posited by Putnam (1988).
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conclusions. The level at which the analysis will take place concerns the location of the
causal factors. Most scholars agree that causal factors can be identified at the systemic
level, the level of the state and/or the level of the individual (Waltz 1959).58 Identifying a
level of analysis directs the research agenda and informs the audience as to the context
within which the argument is formulated, patterns of behavior are expected and,
ultimately, events and behavior are explained.
When a level of analysis is determined, the researcher risks overlooking important
causal factors at other levels. One solution to this problem is to combine theories from
different levels. However, combining theories that emphasize different levels of analysis
may diminish the parsimony of the resulting theory. Cross-level analysis offers a
productive approach to solving the level-of-analysis problem. In cross-level analysis, new
theories are posited that draw from the explanatory power of causal factors at different
levels. Such new theories need not be entirely unique; they can rely on a synthesis of
previous theories that identify causal factors at different levels of analysis. What is
unique about such efforts is the way in which variables are linked to improve the overall
explanatory power of the resulting cross-level theory.
A cross-level approach requires a relaxation of the unitary actor assumption
common in most systemic theories. In short, national interests cannot just be assumed,
they must be explained through careful investigations of domestic politics.59 The IR
literature does offer some valuable examples of earlier scholarly work that relaxed the
unitary actor assumption, such as transgovernmentalism (Keohane and Nye 1978, 1974),
                                                
58 In the IR literature, the origins of the level-of-analysis debate are often traced by scholars to Waltz’s
(1959) seminal work on the different levels from which analysis proceeds: first image (individual), second
image (state), and third image (international system). Today, most major debates in IR still draw on
concepts organized around these three levels. Waltz argued that the system is the appropriate level of
analysis in order to prevent explanatory reductionism—reference to first and second image factors to
explain international phenomenon—and questioned the very utility of cross-level analysis. Indeed, in later
work, Waltz argued that analysis across systemic and other levels of analysis was impossible because
domestic structure is an independent variable, and sometimes an irrelevant one (1975, 8).
59 Efforts to bring domestic politics into the analysis of IR include Bueno de Mesquita (2002), who claims,
“Without bringing leaders and their domestic incentives back to the forefront of our research, I believe that
we cannot really hope to understand the motivations and constraints that shape international politics and
economics, the very factors we hope to explain” (2002, 4). See also Kapstein (1995) on the domestic
sources of international cooperation. Moravcsik argues domestic politics can be viewed as “an intervening
variable that introduces residual variance around the predictions of systemic theory” (1993, 9). Such an
approach requires consideration of international-level factors in order to understand domestic interests
across different countries and deviations from the predictions of traditional systemic IR theories. Moravcsik
adds that privileging systemic approaches cannot be justified prime facie (1993, 14).
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transnationalism (Risse-Kappen 1995) and bureaucratic politics (Allison 1971, Allison
and Halperin 1972, Halperin 1974). This literature did not rely heavily on systemic
factors to account for international cooperation but, rather, emphasized the importance of
domestic actors for understanding international politics. Nevertheless, these approaches
have significant shortcomings when applied to the behavior investigated in the current
study.60
More directly related to the current study, the work of Putnam (1988) on
international bargaining provided the first powerful metaphor for scholarly work on
cross-level analysis.61 Putnam relies on the conceptualization of international bargaining
as a two-level game between two different levels of analysis—domestic politics and
international politics.62 The interface of these two levels is the chief negotiator
(considered the chief of government, or COG) of an international agreement. In
international negotiations, a COG is constrained by the need for ratification of a given
agreement by other international negotiators (Level I) as well as respective domestic
constituents, both elites and the general public (Level II).63
When bargaining internationally, the COG is engaged simultaneously in domestic
and foreign games. Focusing the analysis on the chief negotiator incorporates systemic
(interaction with other states based on the constraints of the international system) and
non-systemic (state behavior based on the constraints of domestic structures and
                                                
60 Two major shortcomings that follow from these explanations are that sub-state actors (e.g., regulators)
function in isolation from other governmental actors and that domestic institutional environments are not
causally significant in determining political behavior. As discussed below, without an explicit
understanding of the strategic interaction that occurs among different domestic actors, these approaches
encounter difficulties explaining why transatlantic cooperation in competition policy is primarily
discretionary in nature. In addition, these explanations—in particular bureaucratic politics—often discount
international phenomena like EI as important causal factors.
61 Putnam’s work also inspired Evans et al. (1993). Additional notable efforts at cross-level analysis include
Moravcsik (1998) and Sandholtz and Sweet (1998)—these two works focus on European integration and
are less useful for understanding the bargaining in competition policy that occurs across the Atlantic. For
other approaches that consider the relationship between the international system and domestic politics and
structures, see Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992), Cowhey (1993), Gourevitch (1978, 1986, 1996),
Kang (1997), Katzenstein (1978), Rosecrance and Stein (1993) and Snyder (1991).
62 For examples of studies considering n-level games, see Collinson (1999) and Patterson (1997).
63 As Putnam summarizes, “At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the
government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those
groups. At the international level, national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy
domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments” (1988, 434).
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cognitive and perceptual sets of policymakers) elements. Because Level I agreements
need to be ratified at Level II, a crucial link is developed for cross-level analysis.64
Putnam’s approach is a useful contribution to cross-level analysis. However, as
Pollack and Shaffer argue, the approach does have limitations: “while Putnam’s model is
best known for combining the domestic and international arenas into a single bargaining
model, it turns out that the strategies and preferences of individual statesmen, or COGs,
are central to determining the outcome of any international bargain” (2001, 22). This
emphasis on individual COGs focuses the analysis on those domestic actors most directly
engaged in the international negotiations and ratification processes—executives and
legislatures.65 In other words, while this approach is a very useful endeavor in cross-level
analysis, it does not consider fully the interests of other important domestic actors, in
particular regulators.
The cross-level approach proposed by Milner advances Putnam’s (1988) earlier
two-level framework by developing an explanation based on a rational institutionalist
approach to domestic politics.66 Building on Putnam’s two-level framework, Milner’s
model incorporates a more sophisticated approach to understanding the strategic
interaction that occurs among domestic actors. She argues that the outcome of domestic
politics depends upon the policy preferences of domestic actors and the institutions for
power sharing among them (1998, 774-775).67
For Milner, the interaction between domestic actors is best characterized as the
strategic, utility-maximizing behavior of individuals who are constrained by domestic
power-sharing arrangements (i.e., political institutions). On the relationship between the
                                                
64 For more detailed discussions of the limitations of Putnam’s two-level analytic, see Evans (1993),
Moravcsik (1993) and Pollack and Shaffer (2001, 20-24).
65 Evans (1993) suggests other shortcomings: Putnam’s approach encounters some difficulties regarding the
interests of transnational actors, the necessity for ratification, the lack of opportunities for collusion by
chief negotiators, and the potential for issue linkage to gain negotiating leverage.
66 For discussions of this approach, see Bates (1998, 1997), Green and Shapiro (1994), Schweers Cook and
Levi (1990), Tsebelis (1990) and Tversky and Kahneman (1986). See also, Milner’s overview (1998, 782-
785) and Milner (1997).
67 In Milner’s 1997 book, “information” is employed as a separate independent variable, which is as
causally important as interests and institutions. In her 1998 article in International Organization, Milner
emphasizes interests and institutions as the two primary independent variables with information less
important, but, presumably, entering the analysis due to her endorsement of the use of rational
institutionalist approaches to domestic politics. The current study more closely resembles the latter
approach.
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interests of these actors and their domestic institutions, Milner argues that multiple
domestic
actors share control over the key elements of policymaking:
setting the agenda, devising policy proposals, amending,
ratifying, and implementing policies. How their diverse
preferences are aggregated into collective outcomes
depends on the nature of their political institutions. In
[democracies], strategic interaction among the players
within certain political institutions is of central importance
to policy choices (1999, 135).68
Such an approach does not simply assume that diverse domestic preferences are
aggregated into a collective, national policy decision like the traditional explanations in
IR. Rather, it opens the “black box” of the state to gain analytical leverage and can
explain more convincingly and accurately the emergence of EU-US cooperation in
competition policy.69 The approach’s emphasis on the strategic interaction of rational
actors also highlights the importance of information asymmetries that are created by
domestic institutional environments.
While Milner provides useful analytical insights, the current study diverges from
her approach in two important ways. First, she remains overly dependent on Putnam’s
two-level game analytic. Her research primarily investigates cases in which executives
bargain at the international level with other executives. In these cases, legislatures are
responsible for ratifying or rejecting the international agreement entered into by the
executives. The probability for cooperation is then negatively correlated with the degree
of divided government found in the domestic systems (Schultz 1998, 667).70 As a result,
the likelihood of international cooperation is low.
                                                
68 While domestic power-sharing arrangements are different in the EU and US, they share a fundamental
similarity in determining how domestic preferences are aggregated into collective policy decisions on each
side of the Atlantic, such as the decision to cooperate internationally. These domestic power-sharing
arrangements shape the strategic interaction that occurs among the domestic actors and, in turn, is reflected
in foreign policy decisions on when, how and why to cooperate internationally.
69 In addition, unlike traditional explanations from the Comparative and American politics literatures, the
approach does not necessarily discount or eliminate consideration of the impact of a systemic phenomenon
(EI) on the way in which domestic interests and institutions are aggregated into collective policy decisions.
As such, when applied to the current study, Milner’s cross-level approach suggests that the influence of
increasing EI—when mitigated by domestic interests and institutions—may lead to increasing cooperation
in transatlantic competition relations.
70 For another argument emphasizing the impact of divided government on foreign policy, see Lohmann
and O’Halloran (1994). Evidence from competition policy suggests no systematic variation in international
cooperation due to the presence or absence of divided government. The lack of correlation is readily
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The current study is not a Putnamian two-level game because it does not focus on
the ratification process that is contested between domestic executives and legislatures.
Instead of focusing on ratification battles, the current study investigates the creation of
Level I agreements by competition regulators. This approach reflects the desire of
regulators to avoid political battles with and between executives and legislatures, which
can explain the emergence of specific processes and types of international cooperation in
competition policy. The preferences of EU and US competition regulators (which are
created by the interaction of EI and domestic institutions) become so similar as to reduce
the contentious nature of the external bargaining that characterizes Putnam’s Level I
negotiations. Thus, the current study moves beyond Milner to focus on the preferences
and political bargains that created the domestic power-sharing arrangements between
regulators and other domestic actors. This approach encourages greater consideration of
the role of domestic regulatory actors in explaining international cooperation and reveals
the reasons why such cooperation may be likely.
Second, the current study is distinct from Milner’s cross-level approach because it
employs a different strategic bargaining approach to domestic politics, specifically the
principal-agent framework of delegation. This framework considers the preferences of
and incorporates a causal role for domestic regulators. This revised formulation provides
an understanding of how policy outcomes are the result of strategic interaction among
rational, domestic actors. Thus, the policy outcome of EU-US cooperation is not merely
the result of two-level struggles between foreign and domestic executives and
legislatures. Nor is it merely the result of transgovernmental interaction between like-
minded competition authorities. Rather, EU-US cooperation is the collective result of
diverse, utility-maximizing, domestic actors functioning within different institutional
environments. By incorporating the principal-agent framework into a cross-level
approach, the analysis also can consider seriously the causal impact of a systemic
stimulus (EI) on the preferences of the domestic actors. Most importantly, the strategic
behavior of regulators operating in different domestic institutional environments becomes
                                                                                                                                                
apparent considering pre- and post-1991 transatlantic competition relations have seen varying degrees of
divided government in the US and the EU while cooperation became standard practice after 1991. On the
impact of divided government from the Comparative and American politics literatures, see also Krehbiel
(1996), Weaver and Rockman (1993) Mayhew (1991), Laver and Shepsle (1991) and Pierce (1991).
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an international-domestic interface for explaining EU-US cooperation in competition
policy.
V. Interests and Institutions in Domestic Politics
The current study introduces a revised cross-level approach for understanding the
interaction between a systemic stimulus (EI), domestic preference aggregation and
collective decision-making in domestic and international environments. To do so, the
logic of the principal-agent framework of delegation (PAF) is incorporated in order to
understand better the domestic politics underlying EU-US cooperation in competition
policy.71 PAF provides a useful simplification of domestic politics that focuses on the
actors (principals and agents) involved in rule-making, implementation and exploratory
institutional cooperation.
PAF relies on three central assumptions: 1) different domestic actors engage in
rational, utility-maximizing behavior, 2) elected politicians and non-elected regulators
have different interests, and 3) information asymmetries are crucial for understanding the
relationship between politicians and regulators. According to PAF, political principals
delegate regulatory authority on a contractual basis to un-elected agents. After delegating
this authority, the elected politicians face the challenge of creating a system that compels
the agents to act in the principals’ interest.72 The challenge for principals to control the
behavior of agents is caused by inherent information asymmetries that benefit the agents.
Because of agent expertise and the fact that principals have limited resources with
which to observe all the daily activities of agents, principals provide agents the authority
                                                
71 For an overview of the principal-agent framework, see Moe (1984). Some of the earliest work on the
principal-agent framework in political science comes from Mitnick (1980). Other notable examples that
address the delegation issues inherent in the principal-agent framework include Huber and Shipan
(forthcoming), Huber et al. (2001), Huber and Shipan (2000), Epstein and O’Halloran (1999), Banks and
Weingast (1992), Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991), Ferejohn and Shipan (1990), Calvert et al. (1989),
McCubbins and Page (1987), (McCubbins et al. 1987), Bendor and Moe (1986, 1985), McCubbins (1985),
McCubbins and Schwartz (1984), Weingast (1983), (Weingast and Moran 1983).
72 The principals and agents in the EU and US competition systems are clarified in the next chapter. The
current study assumes hierarchical control within the regulatory agencies of EU and US competition policy.
See Moe (1984, 764 and 769) for a discussion of the problem of hierarchical control within regulatory
agencies.
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to engage in certain activities at their own discretion.73 However, agents can exercise
their discretionary authority to produce regulatory outputs that conform to their own
preferences.74 Such behavior is known as “shirking”.75 In order to overcome these
problems that arise from information asymmetries and agent discretion, principals must
develop institutional mechanisms to ensure their control over agent activities76 In
Milner’s terminology, these control instruments are found in the domestic “power-
sharing arrangements” established between principals and agents.
The current study relies on the control-independence dynamic suggested by PAF
to reveal some of the behavioral patterns of political principals and regulatory agents in
EU and US competition policy.77 The current study assumes that, given budgetary and
other resource constraints, both politicians and regulators are interested in maximizing
their own certainty and decision-making authority.78 These differing interests lead to
important variations in the behavior of principals and agents: principals will seek to
                                                
73 Discretionary authority allows regulatory agencies to fill in the gaps of policy implementation that are
left when political principals draft broad legislation (Epstein and O’Halloran 1999, 51). While it is
conceivable that political principals could draft very detailed legislation that left no room for discretionary
authority, it is unlikely to occur in a large, complex regulatory system that imposes multiple demands on
political principals.
74 Majone outlines the dynamic tug-of-war that follows the initial delegation of regulatory authority: “Over
time… bureaucrats accumulate several advantages, including institutionalization and job-specific expertise,
which alter the original relationships. Now politicians must deal with agents they once selected… [who]
have a strong bargaining position because of their technical and institutional expertise. As a result, they are
increasingly able to pursue their objective of greater autonomy” (1996a, 72).
75 For more on the origins of the “information-shirking” problem within information economics, see Moe
(1984). Agents may also succumb to “slippage”, which results when the structure of the initial delegation
provides incentive for the agents to pursue activities contrary to the goals of the principals (Pollack 1998,
220). In addition, agents can engage in deceptive behavior via adverse selection prior to the initial
delegation and moral hazard after the initial delegation. For a useful discussion of adverse selection and
moral hazard, see Moe (1984, 754-756) and Elgie (2002). These other theoretical concepts are less central
to the current study.
76 Majone and others organize these control instruments into two main categories: administrative
procedures (i.e., rules that must be followed in agency decision-making, professional standards) and
oversight procedures (i.e., monitoring, hearings, investigations, budgetary reviews, sanctions) (2000b, 293).
For further discussions of these control instruments, see McCubbins and Schwartz (1984) and Pollack
(1998).
77 These preferences are also based on evidence collected from research interviews.
78 Majone notes the origin of the different interests of politicians and regulators:
First, bureaucratic agents are bound by contract to serve democratically elected
principals; their primary duty is faithful implementation of the law. Second, over time the
interests of politicians and bureaucrats tend to diverge. This is because political coalitions
change from those existing when democratic principals adopted a certain policy, and also
because bureaucracies develop separate interests as a result of institutionalization and
external pressures (1996b, 36).
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maintain control over regulatory agents while agents will seek to increase their regulatory
independence from political principals. In practice, principals will exercise control
instruments when they perceive threats to their ability (i.e., certainty and decision-making
authority) to protect national and/or constituent interests. Likewise, agents will shirk in
order to reduce the likelihood of principals intervening in their activities because such
political intervention is viewed as reducing their certainty and decision-making authority.
As discussed below, when faced with an increasing number of internationally-oriented
mergers, regulatory agents will prefer to pursue this interest through a process of policy
coordination (i.e., cooperation) with their foreign counterparts.
VI. Patterns of Behavior
This section posits several patterns of behavior for political principals and
regulatory agents. These patterns of behavior are then demonstrated in subsequent
chapters with qualitative case studies. The case studies trace the process of transatlantic
cooperation in accordance with the revised cross-level approach introduced above. The
patterns of behavior follow from the central research question: Given the increasing
internationalization of business activity and historical discord in transatlantic
competition relations, how and why has EU-US cooperation in competition policy
increased since 1990?
Before introducing the patterns of behavior, it is useful to make two points. First,
it is important to recall Keohane’s definition of international cooperation: EU-US
cooperation occurs “when actors adjust their behavior to the actual or anticipated
preferences of others, through a process of policy coordination” (1984, 51). This
definition requires that the actors have different interests, otherwise, a situation of
“harmony” exists. When harmony exists, the analyst cannot speak of cooperation, but
rather, simply “the mere fact of common interests” (Keohane 1984, 12). The current
study makes a subtle, but very important, distinction in this regard by contrasting EU and
US “national” interests with the interests of their respective competition regulators.
Because “the states” of the EU and US have different “national” interests, historical
                                                                                                                                                
Citing Wood and Waterman (1991, 802-803), Majone notes that these two assumptions are derived from
agency theory.
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transatlantic competition relations resembled a situation of “discord”.79 However, the
competition regulators have very similar interests. Thus, while “the states” of the EU and
US have different interests that create a discordant relationship, the complementary
interests of their respective competition regulators are creating a cooperative relationship.
The process of policy coordination (i.e., cooperation) throughout the 1990s occurred
because, as regulatory authority has gradually expanded via discretionary means, the
preferences of the competition regulators have emerged as the prevailing force driving
the adjustment of EU and US behavior in transatlantic competition relations.
Second, the PAF literature typically argues that increases in agent shirking will
lead to increases in political intervention via control instruments. Political principals
prefer intervening with control instruments to prevent agents from shirking when the
costs of that shirking exceed the costs of intervention. However, the patterns of behavior
posited below suggest a counter-intuitive argument that as agent shirking increases in
international competition relations, political intervention (both domestically and
internationally) decreases. While agent shirking increases in order to cope with the new
challenges presented by merger activity in an EI environment, political intervention
decreases because agent shirking to expand cooperation reduces the likelihood of
divergent decisions that might prompt politicians to intervene. Indeed, agent shirking
includes the conscious construction (via rule-making, implementation and exploratory
institutional cooperation) of a dispute prevention system that would preclude the need for
dispute resolution by political principals. In other words, the principals are less likely to
encounter situations in which the costs of no intervention exceed the costs of
intervention.
To explore these points, the following patterns of behavior incorporate linkages
among agent shirking, political intervention and international cooperation. More
precisely, the patterns of behavior indicate the 1) reasons why competition agents shirk,
2) reactions of political principals to competition agent shirking, and 3) linkages between
the preferences of competition agents and the emergence of international cooperation. In
addition, the patterns of behavior address the specific processes through which EU-US
                                                
79 “Discord” exists when “governments regard each others’ policies as hindering the attainment of their
goals, and hold each other responsible for these constraints” (Keohane 1984, 52). Chapter 3 provides a
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cooperation has emerged and the nature (non-discretionary or discretionary) of these
three processes.
Pattern 1: Because EI increases the likelihood of concurrent jurisdiction mergers,
regulatory agents will pursue ways to reduce information asymmetries that could lead to
divergent decisions.
This pattern of behavior reflects the desire of regulatory agents to seek ways to
increase information exchanges and, in turn, counteract the increasing likelihood of
divergent decisions caused by EI. As discussed above, EI increases the likelihood of
concurrent jurisdiction merger cases. Such concurrent jurisdiction mergers require review
and approval by competition authorities in both jurisdictions. In these cases, competition
authorities will typically have better information on firms located within their respective
national jurisdiction. This information asymmetry increases the likelihood that the
analyses of different national competition authorities will generate divergent decisions on
concurrent jurisdiction mergers—i.e., they disagree on whether to prohibit, approve or
conditionally approve a merger.80 Such divergences can also arise as disagreements over
the specific conditions necessary for approval of a merger.
Political principals will perceive such divergent decisions as threats to their
national and/or constituent interests. National interests are perceived as being threatened
because divergent decisions function as a threat to political sovereignty. Constituent
interests are perceived as being threatened because divergent decisions can delay or
disrupt a merger that could potentially benefit political constituents. Both of these
outcomes contribute to “discord” in transatlantic competition relations. However, by
reducing information asymmetries regulators can reduce the likelihood of divergent
decisions. This, in turn, increases the certainty and decision-making authority of the
agents because it reduces the likelihood that political principals will intervene based on
perceived threats to national/constituent interests.
                                                                                                                                                
summary of these different interests and the resulting discordant transatlantic competition relationship.
80 For an important differentiation between divergent decisions as “conflicting” or “inconsistent”, see
Chapter 5.
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Pattern 2: Given the higher costs associated with changing non-discretionary
authority, competition agents will pursue increases in rule-making cooperation (aimed at
increasing exchanges of information) with foreign agents via discretionary means (i.e.,
shirking).
The statutory delegation of regulatory authority from domestic principals
formalizes the discretionary and non-discretionary authority of competition agents. By
definition, behavior that does not require approval by principals is primarily
discretionary, while behavior that requires approval by the principals is primarily non-
discretionary. Thus, attempts by regulatory agents to increase international cooperation
via discretionary authority do not require approval by political principals. Likewise,
attempts by regulatory agents to increase international cooperation via non-discretionary
authority require approval by political principals.
This second pattern of behavior occurs because, by pursuing rule-making
cooperation through discretionary means, agents expand their independence and face
fewer domestic veto points than they would changing non-discretionary rules. Regulatory
agents consciously design this rule-making cooperation to increase their ability to prevent
disputes in favor of dispute resolution by political principals. Agents will pursue such
cooperation via shirking (i.e., discretionary pursuit of own preferences) because it
conforms to their preference for expanding their own regulatory independence while
circumventing requirements for principal approval. This pattern of behavior is analyzed
in the three qualitative case studies of the Bilateral Agreement, Positive Comity
Agreement and the Administrative Arrangements on Attendance.
Pattern 3: Political principals will intervene in domestic agent attempts to shirk
(increase discretionary rule-making cooperation) if the costs of not intervening exceed
the costs of intervening.
This pattern of behavior occurs because political principals will resist domestic
agent attempts to increase their discretionary authority to sign international agreements
unless the costs of intervention are comparatively higher. The costs of intervention and
no intervention are related to domestic institutional arrangements in the US and EU.81
Principals will exercise domestic control instruments when they perceive domestic agent
                                                
81 For further discussion of the factors influencing political cost intervention calculations, see Chapter 6.
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attempts to shirk via rule-making cooperation as threats to national and/or constituent
interests. Such behavior is directly related to the principals’ interest in maximizing their
certainty and decision-making authority, given budgetary and other resource constraints.
This pattern of behavior is analyzed in the three qualitative case studies of the Bilateral
Agreement, Positive Comity Agreement and the Administrative Arrangements on
Attendance.
Pattern 4: Following successful rule-making cooperation, EI prompts competition
agents to continue shirking (discretionary pursuit of their own preference to maximize
certainty and decision making authority) via attempts at implementation cooperation to
maximize their independence from political principals.
This pattern of behavior occurs because regulatory agents seek implementation
cooperation as a way to increase information exchanges in individual concurrent
jurisdiction merger cases and, in turn, counteract the increasing likelihood of divergent
decisions caused by EI. In addition, by pursuing discretionary cooperation, agents expand
their independence and reduce the need for principal intervention (via formal approval)
that would be required to change the non-discretionary, domestic rules that govern
competition policy implementation. This pattern of behavior is reflected in the increasing
levels of information exchanges, notifications and coordination of remedies between EU
and US competition agents in individual cases of concurrent jurisdiction mergers (see
Chapter 5). Increases in such discretionary areas do not require formal approval from the
political principals.
Pattern 5: Following successful rule-making cooperation, EI prompts competition
agents to continue shirking (discretionary pursuit of their own preference to maximize
certainty and decision making authority) via attempts at exploratory institutional
cooperation to maximize their independence from political principals.
This pattern of behavior occurs because, by pursuing discretionary exploratory
institutional cooperation, agents expand their independence and reduce the need for
principal intervention (via formal approval) that would be required to change the non-
discretionary, domestic rules that govern the establishment of new and formal
international organizations. This pattern of behavior is reflected in the fact that the EU-
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US Mergers Working Group and the International Competition Network were established
as means to increase discretionary authority over information exchanges (see Chapter 5).
Pattern 6: Following successful rule-making cooperation, political principals will
continue to intervene in domestic agent attempts to shirk (increase discretionary
implementation and exploratory institutional cooperation) if the costs of not intervening
exceed the costs of intervening.
This pattern of behavior occurs because political principals resist domestic agent
attempts to shirk when those attempts are perceived as threats to national and/or
constituent interests. Again, this behavior is directly related to the principals’ interest in
maximizing their certainty and decision-making authority, given budgetary and other
resource constraints. This intervention occurs on a case-by-case basis and takes the form
of domestic control instruments that are embodied in the delegation of regulatory
authority. This pattern of behavior is reflected in numerous individual mergers and the
two cases of exploratory institutional cooperation (see Chapter 5).
VII. Methodology
The current study posits patterns of behavior based on a revised cross-level
approach to explaining international cooperation in competition policy. The patterns of
behavior are demonstrated in subsequent chapters with a qualitative case-study approach
designed to open new avenues of scholarly inquiry and to illustrate the utility of the
revised cross-level approach. Before empirically addressing the patterns of behavior in
subsequent chapters, it is necessary to identify the exact parameters of and reasons for
using this case study.
The case study begins with a historical background, starting in 1890 with the US
Sherman Antitrust Act, the first legislation establishing an antitrust (i.e., competition)
policy. Throughout most of the 1970-80s, the contextual factor of EI begins to change
transatlantic relations in competition policy. During this period, transatlantic competition
relations become increasingly adversarial and discordant in nature. Beginning in the
1990s, transatlantic relations experienced a seminal transition toward cooperation as
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negotiations commenced in earnest over the 1991 EU-US Bilateral Agreement. Thus, the
analytical portion of the case study focuses on the period from 1990-2001.82
While the methodology employed in this study is qualitative, it conforms to the
logic of inference suggested by King et al. (1994). Overall, the current study functions as
a disciplined-configurative case (Eckstein 1975, 99-104) of international cooperation.83
As discussed above, the current study investigated established theories for the purpose of
interpreting the transition in transatlantic competition relations from a reliance on
unilateral extraterritoriality to bilateral cooperation. Absent a satisfying explanation, the
current study “can impugn established theories if the theories ought to fit it but do not. It
may also point up a need for new theory in neglected areas” (Eckstein 1975, 99). The
deficiencies of established theories and the need for a new theory are reflected in the
revised cross-level approach developed above. It should be noted that due to the nature of
case study research, the current study does not claim to posit valid causal generalizations,
more frequent among larger-N studies (Lieberson 1992). Therefore, instead of generating
generalizable and testable hypotheses, the current study deduces patterns of behavior
from the revised cross-level approach and demonstrates them in subsequent chapters. As
a result, the current study suggests avenues for expanding and combining existing
theories to create a satisfying explanation for a case that comes from an area neglected by
political science—generally competition policy, and more specifically international
cooperation in competition policy.
Similarly, Odell (2001) labels this approach the disciplined-interpretive case
study, one in which the analyst applies an existing theory to interpret or explain a
particular new event. Such analyses often show that “one or more known theories can be
extended to account for a new event” (Odell 2001, 163). The disciplined-interpretive case
study is far from atheoretical because it forces the researcher to identify and apply central
analytical concepts and can “generate an additional type of contribution: new suggestions
for improving the theory” (Odell 2001, 163). The revised cross-level approach employed
herein suggests a new way for improving existing theories: relax the unitary actor
assumption of traditional IR theories and introduce a cross-level approach that explains
                                                
82 For more on determining the parameters of a case, see Ragin and Becker (1992).
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domestic politics as the strategic interaction among various domestic actors (including,
and especially, regulatory authorities) operating within causally significant domestic
institutional environments.
In addition, Odell (2001) also identifies the hypothesis-generating case study,
which can be complementary to the disciplined-interpretive case study. The current study
posits a number of patterns of behavior that are deduced from the cross-level approach.
These patterns of behavior are used to explain the different types and processes of
cooperation identified in the current study. After demonstrating the patterns of behavior
in subsequent chapters, general hypotheses may be posited regarding international
regulatory cooperation (see Chapter 6). As Odell argues, “One of the most valuable
contributions of any method would be the generation of a new hypothesis that turned out
to be valid or generated fresh lines of investigation” (2001, 165). This is an important
goal of the current study.
The current study focuses on the patterns of behavior of principals and agents in
bilateral competition policy. By focusing on the dynamics of regulatory control and
independence, the current study minimizes the role played by private actors demanding
regulations (e.g., firms, interests groups). The exclusion of private actors is preferable as
a means to simplify the analysis. Thus, the current study generally holds the influence of
firms as a given but analytically indeterminate factor; the influence of EI and the
domestic politics of regulatory control and independence are more important for
understanding EU-US cooperation in competition policy. It is worth noting, however, that
the influence of firms does enter the analysis as a function of EI: without firms changing
their business strategies in response to the stimulus of EI, it is doubtful that competition
regulators would perceive EI as challenging their ability to implement domestic
competition policies. In addition, as discussed in Chapter 5, merging firms may play a
more important role in determining transatlantic implementation—as opposed to rule-
making and exploratory institutional—cooperation in competition policy. In order to
address more fully the role of firms (and other societal influences), Chapter 6 provides a
discussion of the implications of minimizing their role in the current study and offers
                                                                                                                                                
83 Eckstein (1975) also identifies configurative-idiographic case studies, heuristic case studies, plausibility
probes and crucial-case studies. For more on the disciplined-configurative approach, see Verba (1967).
48
possible solutions for determining the different influences on political principals’
calculations of the costs of intervention.84
The current study relies on a number of more concise and temporally limited
cases to demonstrate the patterns of behavior for principals and agents. In Chapter 4, the
patterns of behavior in EU-US rule-making cooperation are demonstrated with specific
qualitative analyses of three cases of rule-making cooperation in the 1990s:
1. EU-US Bilateral Agreement (1991)
2. Positive Comity Agreement (1997)
3. Arrangements on Administrative Attendance (1999).
In Chapter 5, the study examines a number of individual cases of concurrent
jurisdiction mergers in which the EU and US competition agents cooperated during their
respective reviews. These cases demonstrate the patterns of behavior during
implementation cooperation. The cases of cooperation are then contrasted with two
“flawed” cases of EU-US implementation cooperation:
1. Boeing/McDonnell Douglas (1997)
2. GE/Honeywell (2001).
Chapter 5 also provides qualitative analyses of two cases of EU-US exploratory
institutional cooperation:
1. Mergers Working Group (2000)
2. Global Competition Forum (2001).
As with the cases of implementation cooperation, these two cases of exploratory
institutional cooperation demonstrate the patterns of behavior as suggested by the revised
cross-level approach.
The investigation of the broader case study and the concise, individual cases is
informed by the qualitative analysis of primary and secondary documents, speeches and
expert interviews with sixty individuals, including EU and US competition officials,
business representatives and competition lawyers. The research was conducted in
Brussels, Belgium; Washington, DC; and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, from 1999-2002.
                                                
84 See also, Damro (forthcoming 2003a).
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CHAPTER3: Historical Discord in Transatlantic Competition
Relations—Institutional Differences and Self-Interested Actors
“It is axiomatic that in antitrust matters the policy of one state may be to defend what it is
the policy of another state to attack.”
Lord Wilberforce, British House of Lords (1978)85
I. Introduction
This chapter begins with an overview of the historical foundations of competition
policy, in particular the US’s 1890 Sherman Antitrust Act and the similar, but much later,
laws establishing the competition regime in the EU. These institutional developments
provide the foundation for US and EU competition regulators’ discretionary authority and
the respective domestic constraints within which they operate. The next section outlines
the domestic control instruments and foreign intervention instruments available to EU
and US political principals. This section also discusses the establishment of
extraterritorial jurisdiction in antitrust law—initially and primarily by the US—which
was largely responsible for the adversarial nature of transatlantic competition relations
prior to the 1990s. After discussing these legal foundations, the chapter clarifies the
central actors (US and EU principals and agents) in competition policy and addresses
their potential relative influence. Next, the chapter discusses the different interests of the
EU and US that have led to historical adversity and discord in transatlantic competition
relations. Much of this part of the chapter focuses on transatlantic competition conflicts
from the 1950s through the 1980s. This section includes a brief discussion of the
limitations of early efforts at international cooperation in competition policy. The chapter
concludes with a summary of the findings.
                                                
85 Remark in the House of Lords judgment In re Westinghouse Electric Corporation Uranium Contract
Litigation [1978] A.C. 547, 617.
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II. Domestic Control Instruments in Competition Policy
The cross-level approach in Chapter 2 relies on domestic power-sharing
arrangements to understand the preferences of the relevant principals and agents.86 In the
US, these agreements date from the late nineteenth century, while they were established
much more recently in the EU. This section briefly introduces the domestic arrangements
(i.e., political institutions) that govern power-sharing between principals and agents in the
EU and US. Without these arrangements, no delegation of regulatory authority to the
agents would have occurred, and the agents would enjoy no discretion in competition
policy. In particular, the section emphasizes institutional developments since 1972, when
domestic power-sharing arrangements began to address the ability of competition
regulators to cooperate internationally.
A. US Institutions of Competition Policy, 1890-1990
The origins of contemporary competition policy are found in nineteenth century
US antitrust legislation.87 This legislation was borne out by the experiences of the US
economy with large interlocking trusts during the 1880s.88 While the US economic
system operated on the basis of market forces, it was also built on the notion that markets
should be competitive. The US Department of Justice (DoJ) and Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) describe the central value placed on competition in the US free
market: “For more than a century, the U.S. antitrust laws have stood as the ultimate
protector of the competitive process that underlies our free market economy. Through
this process, which enhances consumer choice and promotes competitive prices, society
as a whole benefits from the best possible allocation of resources” (1995, 1). The
                                                
86 The term “power-sharing arrangements” is adopted from Milner’s (1997) work to indicate relevant
domestic political institutions such as legislation and case law.
87 While the courts have played a large role in the development of US competition policy, this section of the
chapter focuses on the legislative foundations of antitrust. Noting the important role of the courts, Evans
argues “Although formally based on legislation, U.S. antitrust policy has generally followed the common-
law method, built on more than 100 years of precedent generated by federal and private lawsuits. This
approach has enabled U.S. courts to permit significant changes in laws in response to economic learning
and industry evolution, since cases and their circumstances change constantly” (2002, 16). For more on the
role of the courts in the development of US and EU competition policies, see below.
88 The emergence of these trusts was encouraged because “Severe business depression had brought about
pricing practices that were disastrous to firms in certain industries. To avoid this cutthroat competition,
trusts were formed in many industries, including petroleum, meat packing, sugar, lead, coal, tobacco, and
gunpowder” (Viscusi et al. 1996, 62).
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emergence of economic trusts in the nineteenth century challenged the notion that
markets were competitive and created a “big-is-bad” mentality among many US citizens
and politicians. These groups determined that a policy was needed to ensure that markets
remained competitive—a competition policy. The legislation that emerged was the
historic Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, which still serves as the basis of US antitrust
legislation today.
Most historians agree that the Sherman Act was passed in response to the US
populist movement of the late nineteenth century (Hofstadter 1965, Scherer 1980, 493).89
In particular, pressure emerged from the agricultural sector over “deflation, the depressed
agricultural economy, and the fear of monopolies and trusts” (Sullivan 1991, 7). More
specifically, Shughart recounts the traditional view of the circumstances surrounding the
Sherman Act:
Farmers, it is said, saw themselves being squeezed between
falling prices for their own produce on the one hand, and
rising prices for purchased manufacture articles and ever
higher railway rates for shipping agricultural goods to
market on the other. These complaints crystallized into the
populist Granger and Alliance movements which targeted
the great trusts as a major cause of the farmers’ economic
troubles. The Sherman Act is thus seen as an important
agrarian victory over the forces of industrial monopoly
(1990, 11-12).
The Sherman Act provides the legal basis for US antitrust powers. While trusts
were typically conglomerates with assets and interests in multiple sectors of the
economy, the Sherman Act sought to ensure competitive markets by eliminating all
monopoly activity, even that occurring within narrow markets. Generally, the Sherman
Act “prohibits agreements in restraint of trade and monopolization, attempted
monopolization, and conspiracies to monopolize” (Devuyst 2000, 128).
The Sherman Act’s use of the term “trade” refers primarily to commerce among
the individual states of the US. However, as with subsequent US antitrust law, the act’s
prohibition against contracts, combinations and conspiracies has a close relationship to
law covering trade with foreign states (Brand 2000, 1093). For example, Section 1
                                                
89 For similar arguments, see Fox and Pitofsky (1997), Viscusi et al. (1996, 62) and Fox and Sullivan
(1987). For alternative views on the origins of the Sherman Act, see Shughart (1990) and Stigler (1985).
For general background on the origins of the Sherman Act, see Boudreaux et al. (1995) and Dewey (1990).
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extends the prohibition to anticompetitive behavior “in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States or with foreign nations.” Moreover, Section 2 prohibits
monopolistic activity affecting “any part of trade or commerce among the several States
or with foreign nations.” Finally, Section 6(a) provides for US jurisdiction over non-
import foreign commerce (USDoJ/FTC 1995, 2).
The act placed final authority for determining anticompetitive activity in the
judiciary. However, the executive branch’s Department of Justice (DoJ) was given
investigatory and enforcement authority. The DoJ was vested with this authority because
the Sherman Act, as a criminal statute, requires both policy analysis and prosecution. The
DoJ prosecutes violations of the Sherman Act as either criminal or civil offenses.90 For
criminal violations, the act provides for fines and imprisonment.91 In civil proceedings,
injunctive relief and treble damages are available to the DoJ “if the U.S. government is
the purchaser of affected goods or services” (USDoJ/FTC 1995, 2).  If the government is
not the affected purchaser, private plaintiffs can also bring civil proceedings under the
Sherman Act through lawsuits for injunctions and treble damages.92 This and subsequent
provisions for treble damages are unique to US antitrust law (McNeill 1998, 453, note
240) and have been a source of considerable tensions with foreign governments (Brand
2000, 1103).
Within the DoJ, the Antitrust Division was assigned responsibility for overseeing
the enforcement of the Sherman Act. Because the Sherman Act requires policy analysis
and prosecution, the Antitrust Division is staffed with economists possessing policy
expertise and lawyers with prosecutorial skills.93 Thus, the DoJ’s Antitrust Division is
                                                
90 According to the DoJ and FTC,
Violations of the Sherman Act may be prosecuted as civil or criminal offenses. Conduct
that the Department prosecutes criminally is limited to traditional per se offenses of the
law, which typically involve price-fixing, customer allocation, bid-rigging or other cartel
activities that would also be violations of the law in many countries… In a civil
proceeding, the Department may obtain injunctive relief against prohibited practices
(1995, 2).
91 For more on the levels of fines and length of prison terms, see USDoJ/FTC (1995, 2).
92 This provision for antitrust enforcement through both governmental and private rights of action is not
found in most countries (Brand 2000, 1103). For example, the EU only provides for enforcement via
“governmental” acts.
93 In 1972, the US Attorney General initiated organizational changes to the DoJ’s Antitrust Division by
creating the Economic Policy Office (EPO). This change required that both attorneys and economists be
included in selecting which antitrust cases will be investigated. As a result, some argue that by creating the
EPO, the DoJ is more likely to take on cases that are less easily litigated, including large cases in multiple
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mandated and appropriately staffed to investigate possible statutory violations of the
Sherman Act. When a possible antitrust violation is uncovered, the Antitrust Division
must prepare a case to be tried before the judiciary. Following a final ruling, the Antitrust
Division is tasked with enforcing the decision of the court.
The Sherman Act alone did not completely resolve the concerns associated with
anticompetitive business behavior. As Viscusi et al. argue, “As a result of dissatisfaction
with the Sherman Act during the first few decades, two additional statutes were enacted”
(1996, 62). The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act of September 26, 1914, was the
first of these two major pieces of US antitrust legislation.94 Regarding anticompetitive
behavior, Section 5 of the FTC Act outlawed “unfair methods of competition in or
affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce.”95 The act also established the Federal Trade Commission but left ultimate
antitrust authority in the judiciary. Like the DoJ, the new FTC was granted antitrust
investigative and enforcement powers.96 Unlike the DoJ, the new FTC was established as
a regulatory body independent of the legislative and executive branches.97
Prior to the FTC Act, the DoJ’s Antitrust Division had been the sole antitrust
agent. However, this new act required a dual enforcement system in US antitrust. The
Sherman Act, which remained intact as a criminal statute, continued to be enforced by the
                                                                                                                                                
markets, without legal concern over multiple jurisdictions (Eisner and Meier 1990, 276-77). The EPO
continued to enhance the role of economists in antitrust through the 1980s.
94 For useful discussions of the FTC’s history and enforcement record, see Shughart (1990), Mackay et al.
(1987), Moe (1985; 1982), Katzmann (1980) and Henderson (1968).
95 The sense of “unfair” has changed since the FTC Act was originally promulgated. Today, “unfair” means
“unfair to consumers” (Himelfarb 1996, 934).
96 This mandate also requires a skilled staff trained in economic policy analysis and legal prosecution.
While originally staffed primarily with legal experts, today, “Both agencies have sizable staffs of well-
trained economists who examine the effects of business practices on consumers by using highly advanced
theoretical and empirical tools” (Evans 2002, 16). The FTC derives its powers from two acts of Congress:
the FTC Act and the Clayton Act. See below for more on the Clayton Act.
97 The emergence of independent regulatory bodies represented an important innovation in US regulation
(Yataganas 2001, 17-19, 23-24). Independent agencies “are an Anglo-Saxon, or more particularly
American invention” (Yataganas 2001, 22). While the EU has a growing array of independent regulatory
agencies, none deal directly with competition policy, such as the FTC does in the US. In general, these
bodies combine “legislative, judicial and executive functions (rule-making, adjudication and enforcement
in the terminology of American administrative law)” (Majone 1996a, 15). According to Yataganas, these
bodies “are independent administrative entities, incorporated by law, with a separate legal personality and
endowed with decision-making power of a regulatory (rule-making) or individual (adjudication) nature in a
specific area of activity” (2001, 22). As Majone adds, “Statutory regulation by independent boards or
commissions has a long tradition in the United States—at the federal level it goes back to the 1887
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DoJ (Devuyst 2000, 128).98 The FTC would share enforcement authority with the DoJ
under the Clayton Act (see below), particularly in merger review. In order to prevent
disputes over enforcement authority, the two agencies developed a case allocation system
“in which one agency grants ‘clearance’ to the other to pursue a particular investigation”
(Shughart 1990, 95). The DoJ and FTC signed a liaison agreement in 1948, to determine
which agency would have primary responsibility in certain cases. Generally, Wilke and
Gruley note that the DoJ “handled criminal matters and most regulated industries, such as
telecommunications, while the FTC traditionally handled retail, food and defense
matters” (1998, B4). Figure 2 lists the general responsibilities for investigating
anticompetitive behavior as provided in the original 1948 allocation system.
Figure 2: DoJ-FTC Case Allocation System of 194899
FTC DoJ Antitrust Division
 Brewing: monopolization, price discrimination
 Auto parts: monopolization, acquisitions
 Tires, batteries, and accessories: distribution
 Cement
 Shopping centers: trade restraints
 Department stores: acquisitions
 Health care
 Food and food distribution
 Petroleum: monopolization
 Copiers and business machines
 Franchising
 Textile mill products: acquisitions
 Dairy industry: acquisitions
 Brewing: acquisitions
 Auto industry: monopolization,
dealer relations
 Tires: manufacturing
 Steel
 Aviation
 Newspapers: acquisitions
 Aluminum
 Patents and know-how
 Communications
 Banking and securities
 Computers
 International agreements
Because new markets would emerge in the future due to new business practices,
products and technologies, the liaison procedure could not be a precise and rigid
framework. Rather, these new economic developments would require new procedures to
                                                                                                                                                
Interstate Commerce Act regulating the railways and setting up the corresponding regulatory body, the
Interstate Commerce Commission” (1996a, 10).
98 This is not to say that an activity falling under both the Sherman and Clayton Acts would automatically
be enforced by the DoJ. Rather, “the Commission may take administrative action against conduct that
violates the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act, as well as anticompetitive practices that do not fall within
the scope of the Sherman or Clayton Acts” (Brand 2000, 1096-97).
99 Source: David L. Roll (1975), “Dual Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws by the Department of Justice and
the FTC: The Liaison Procedure,” The Business Lawyer 31 (July): 2080, cited in Shughart (1990, 96).
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determine case allocation in the dual enforcement system. In new cases that raise
questions of primary responsibility, “consideration is usually given to prior experience
with the industry or firm in question, with the exception that criminal charges are handled
exclusively by the Justice Department” (Shughart 1990, 95).100 Reflecting new
technologies and changing markets, the original allocation system was reformed in 1963,
1993 and 1995.
Following the 1995 reform, the boundaries that separated individual sectors
according to the experience-based methodology of case allocation again began to blur “in
the face of rapid technological change, and as deregulation measures have allowed firms
to diversify” (USDoJ 2002, 2). As a result, in March 2002, the DoJ and FTC announced a
new clearance procedure to overcome delays associated with this experience-based
methodology.101 Figure 3 depicts the new case allocation system.102 The new system
respects the relative expertise of the agencies within specific sectors.103 Thus, the two
agencies continue to liaise in order to determine which one is the more appropriate and
capable to investigate the case.104
                                                
100 Wilke and Gruley agree: “In the past, whichever [agency] had the most institutional experience in a
given area would get the case” (1998, B4).
101 For more on the delays associated with the previous case allocation system, see USDoJ (2002).
102 The US Congress reviewed this new allocation system before its formal implementation. For
information on the congressional review, see USDoJ (2002). On the controversy surrounding input from an
AOL attorney in the drafting of the new system, see Kulish (2002).
103 The new agreement also provides for a dedicated clearance officer within each agency, a common
database to track Hart-Scott-Rodino (see below) filings and clearance matters, and weekly meetings and
reports to review the new system and “ongoing matters” (USDoJ 2002, 4).
104 However, former US Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust Joel Klein does note that there can be
competition between the two agencies to get high-profile cases, and FTC Chairman Robert Pitofsky admits
to “a friendly rivalry” in case allocation (Wilke and Gruley 1998, B1).
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Figure 3: DoJ-FTC Case Allocation System of 2002
FTC DoJ Antitrust Division
 Airframes
 Autos and trucks
 Building materials
 Chemicals
 Computer hardware
 Energy
 Grocery manufacturing
 Operation of grocery stores
 Healthcare
 Industrial gases
 Munitions
 Pharmaceuticals, biotechnology
 Professional services
 Operation of retail stores
 Satellite manufacturing and
launch vehicles
 Textiles
 Aeronautics
 Agriculture and associated biotechnology
 Avionics
 Beer
 Computer software
 Cosmetics and hair care
 Defense electronics
 Financial services, insurance, and stock,
option, bond, and commodity markets
 Flat glass
 Health insurance
 Industrial equipment
 Media and entertainment
 Metals, mining, and minerals
 Missiles, tanks, and armored vehicles
 Naval defense products
 Photography and film
 Pulp, paper, lumber, and timber
 Telecommunications services and equipment
 Travel and transportation
 Waste
Almost a month after passing the FTC Act, the US adopted its next major piece of
antitrust legislation. In response to growing concerns over the potentially anticompetitive
effects of mergers, the Clayton Act was signed on October 15, 1914. According to
Devuyst, the “US Congress adopted the Clayton Act as a means to protect opportunities
for small business” (2000, 128).105 This new statute lacked the penal provisions of the
Sherman Act, but introduced sections analogous to those contained in the FTC Act,
which authorized the FTC to issue restraining orders to prevent firms from engaging in
anticompetitive practices in their incipiency (Henderson 1968, 27).
Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits any merger or acquisition if its effect “may
be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.” In addition to
prohibiting mergers, acquisitions and joint ventures that may substantially reduce
competition, the Clayton Act also notably prohibits price discrimination, tie-in sales and
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exclusive dealing agreements and interlocking directorates.106 Thus, the Clayton Act
more clearly defined anticompetitive acts by listing a variety of prohibitions and
including merger review in US antitrust legislation (Viscusi et al. 1996, 62).
Like the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act’s Section 7 applies to foreign commerce
by prohibiting anticompetitive activity “in any line of commerce or in any activity
affecting commerce in any section of the country.” According to the USDoJ/FTC, the
Clayton Act’s reference to “commerce” includes “trade or commerce among the several
States and with foreign nations” (1995, 3, note 8).
The preceding discussion of the Sherman, FTC and Clayton Acts outlines the
original delegation of antitrust-specific authority in the US from political principals to
regulatory agencies. However, the US principals did not establish general guidelines for
the discretionary authority of agents until 1946. In that year, the US Administrative
Procedures Act (APA) set broad guidelines for regulatory discretion in making domestic
rules.107 Reflecting the assumptions of the principal-agent framework of delegation (see
Chapter 2), the APA’s provisions “rely wholly on the belief that the complexity of public
policy requires Congress to use the agencies as extensions for carrying out its legislative
functions. The point was to force administrators to adhere to legislative values when
making rules” (Rosenbloom 2001, 774).
Before the APA, general guidelines for domestic rule-making authority by agents
were non-existent: “Until 1946, rule-making procedures were not standardized. Some
rules were made with little or no public consultation. Many were not publicized and
existed only as letters or in mimeographed form as ‘mims’” (Rosenbloom 2001, 774).
                                                                                                                                                
105 This initial reason for signing the Clayton Act differs noticeably from current US implementation of
antitrust policy, which focuses on protecting consumers, not small businesses (Evans 2002). For more on
this distinction, see below.
106 Devuyst notes “two major amendments” to the Clayton Act since its adoption: “In 1936, the Robinson-
Patman Act elaborated the prohibition on price discrimination, again to protect small businesses. In 1950,
the Celler-Kefauver Act strengthened merger control by outlawing mergers or joint ventures whose effect
may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly” (Devuyst 2000, 128).
107 For a useful discussion of the politics surrounding Congress’s adoption of the APA, see Rosenbloom
(2001). The APA was embedded in a broader process that reflected the historical dominance of the
legislature in US policymaking. As Yataganas argues, “the US constitutional system, especially in the
beginning, was founded in a relatively weak executive, so that the first hundred and fifty years (until the
New Deal period) of the American republic saw policymaking dominated by the legislature” (2001, 17).
For similar assessments of the historical separation of powers in the US and congressional delegation to
regulatory agencies, see Epstein and O’Halloran (1999) and Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991, 9-12). For a
comparative discussion of US federalism and a potentially federal system in Europe, see Sbragia (1992).
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The formalized procedure under the APA required that “before promulgating a rule, the
agency must provide notice and opportunity for comments; when it promulgates the rule
it must supply a concise statement of the rule’s ‘basis and purpose’; the rule can be set
aside by a court only if it is ‘arbitrary, capricious, or abuse of discretion’” (Majone
1996a, 290).108
While the APA is not antitrust-specific, it does apply generally to the
discretionary authority of agents to make domestic rules governing the implementation of
the antitrust statutes, such as the DoJ-FTC case allocation systems discussed above. As
such, the APA provides an early example of congressional (i.e., political principal)
control exercised through regulatory oversight. While the APA focused on general,
discretionary authority in domestic rule-making, the act did not formally determine
guidelines for international rule-making.
The US regulatory agents began asserting their own authority over international
rule-making beginning in 1972. In that year, the discretionary authority of US
competition agents to enter into executive agreements with foreign governments was
clarified with the so-called Case-Zablocki Act (CZA).109 Previously, the precise legal
division of powers between the legislative and executive branches was unclear regarding
non-treaty agreements signed between the executive and foreign governments. In
comparison, the authority for treaty-making was more clearly elaborated in the US
Constitution, which stated that the President “shall have Power, by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present
concur…” (Art. II, section 2, clause 2).
While the domestic division of powers over non-treaty agreements was unclear,
such agreements signed between the executive branch and foreign governments before
the CZA were becoming common features of US foreign policy, often supplementing or
replacing treaties (Hyman 1983, 805).110 The increasing use of these executive
instruments of foreign policy prompted the US Congress to delineate more clearly the
                                                
108 For a discussion of the relationship between agency rule-making and adjudication versus court
adjudication, see Majone (1996a, 290-292). For a further description of the APA, see also Majone (2000b,
290-91, 293-95).
109 1 U.S.C. 112b (1997).
110 According to Hyman, “As of January 1, 1972, of the 5,306 treaties and other international agreements in
effect, 4,359 were executive agreements while only 947 were actual treaties” (1983, 805, note 5).
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division of international rule-making authority. Prior to World War II, inter-branch
relations were largely characterized by congressional accommodation of executive efforts
to increase foreign policymaking authority. However, “After World War II, this de facto
accommodation, which had suffered episodic stresses, began to disintegrate, with a series
of abortive war powers resolutions, increasing congressional efforts to assert control over
agreement making, and more direct intervention in diplomatic protection” (Reisman
1989, 781).
While the extent of treaty-making authority differs between the US House and
Senate, both agreed on the CZA as a means to “increase congressional control and
oversight of sole executive agreements” (Knaupp 1998, 260).111 The provisions of the
CZA require the executive branch to transmit any international agreements it signs to the
Congress within sixty days of the agreement’s entry into force.112 The Secretary of State
determines whether an executive agreement meets the transmittal requirements in the
CZA (Knaupp 1998, 261). The CZA does not authorize the Congress to alter or reject
these executive agreements.113
Due to executive non-compliance with the CZA, Congress clarified the Act with
two subsequent amendments (Hyman 1983, 837). In 1977, an amendment assured that
any US departments or agencies signing international agreements were required to
transmit that agreement to the Department of State within twenty days of its signing.114
                                                
111 According to Margolis, “There is substantial consensus that an executive agreement is an agreement
made by the president, or by a presidentially authorized individual, with the head (or an authorized
representative) of a foreign country, which has not been approved by the Senate before it goes into effect”
(1986, 25). More specifically, the US President can enter into three types of executive agreements: 1) sole
executive agreements for which the President has authority directly from the Constitution, 2) executive
agreements authorized by delegation of Congressional authority, and 3) executive agreements pursuant to a
treaty. (The author is grateful to Ronald A. Brand for pointing out this useful distinction.) The current study
is concerned primarily with the first type of executive agreement because this is the type of agreement that
initially concerned Congress enough to pass the CZA and was the type signed by the US as the Bilateral
Agreement in 1991 (see Chapter 4).
112 For more on the CZA, see Knaupp (1998) and Hyman (1983).
113 In 1976, the US Senate did attempt to pass the War Powers Resolution, “which would have reserved to
the Senate power to refuse to implement agreements that were not made in treaty form. With the exception
of the War Powers and the Case-Zablocki Act, most efforts in Congress to limit the scope of presidential
power in making sole executive agreements have not gained widespread acceptance” (Knaupp 1998, 249-
250).
114 These executive agreements with foreign governments must be approved by US State Department.
Parisi states that, regarding executive agreements, “Entry into such agreements by the FTC and DOJ on
behalf of the U.S. Government must first be authorized by the State Department under the terms of the
Case-Zablocki Act of 1972” (1999, 135).
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An additional amendment was made in 1978, introducing “more effective means of
inducing executive compliance” (Hyman 1983, 837), particularly more precise and
restrictive time limits for transmittal.115
In addition to a clarification of their discretionary authority in international rule-
making, US competition authorities also gained significant discretionary authority in the
1970s relating to merger review. The Hart-Scott-Rodino (HSR) Act of 1976 was a
significant development in the discretionary authority of US competition agents to
implement competition policy.116 In addition, the HSR would provide a basis for
international implementation cooperation in merger review.
Prior to 1976, competition investigations brought under Section 7 of the Clayton
Act were initiated after a merger or acquisition had been completed. If the competition
agents decided to pursue a post-merger challenge on the grounds that the transaction
threatened competition, the agents were required to bring the firms to court, typically
seeking a divestiture or similar remedy. These legal cases and subsequent appeals and
challenges often spanned many years, all the while allowing the newly merged firms to
reap profits from what might in fact be an illegal transaction.
One particular case that exemplified the potential pitfalls of the pre-HSR system
of merger review was the case of United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.117 After seven
years of legal proceedings, the Supreme Court ordered El Paso Natural Gas Co. to divest
its merger with Pacific Northwest Pipeline Corp. According to the ruling, the divestiture
was to occur “without delay.” Despite this court order,
Divestiture in the El Paso case took an additional ten years,
meaning that it took a total of 17 years before the
government could cure an anticompetitive acquisition. The
case went to the Supreme Court so many times some folks
lost count. It was estimated that El Paso derived profits of
$10 million for every year it retained the illegally acquired
company (Baer 1996, 2).118
                                                
115 These “more effective measures” may have fallen short. As Knaupp notes, “Despite the fact that the
Case Act is still in full force, since its enactment the Executive Branch has struggled to fulfill its
requirements and has rarely complied with the time restrictions imposed. Even more alarming, however, is
the fact that hundreds of agreements are never reported at all” (1998, 261).
116 As Carroll argues, “In enacting the HSR, Congress delegated broad legislative and administrative
authority to two agencies” (1983, 110), the FTC and the Antitrust Division of the DoJ.
117 United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co. 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
118 For more on the historical development of the HSR, see Baer (1996).
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In general, the HSR provides additional investigative tools for competition agents,
requires pre-merger notifications by merging firms and allows individual states to recover
monetary damages on behalf of citizens for violations of antitrust. The HSR’s Article II,
which deals with pre-merger notification authority, is most important for the current
study. According to Article II, firms meeting certain “size-of-party” and “size-of-
transaction” thresholds are required to notify their merger to the competition authorities
before it is implemented.119 More specifically, the HSR requirements for pre-merger
notification apply
if the firm making the acquisition has total assets worth
$100 million or more, or annual sales of at least $10
million, and the company to be acquired has at least $10
million in assets or annual sales. Any transaction meeting
these size limits is covered if the acquiring firm will gain
control of more than $15 million worth (or 15 percent) of
its merger partner’s stock or assets (Shughart 1990, 62).120
Due to the size of the firms involved, the internationally-oriented mergers investigated in
the current study tend to meet these HSR thresholds for pre-merger notification.
The HSR also established a 30-day deadline for a competition agent “to decide if
it will oppose the merger” (Shughart 1990, 62). During this period, the merging firms
must wait for a ruling from the regulators before they can implement the transaction. If
the competition authorities decide to oppose the merger, they make a Second Request to
acquire further information from the merging firms. Upon issuance of the Second
Request, the waiting period is extended another 20 days.121 Within these parameters, the
competition authorities have used their discretionary authority to promulgate “rules
implementing all phases of the preacquisition notification program (the Rules). The Rules
prescribe the information and documents that companies planning to effect transactions
covered by HSR must furnish the agencies to satisfy the notification requirement”
                                                
119 Firms that fail to meet this HSR obligation can be punished with “court-imposed civil penalties of up to
$10,000 for each day a violation continues. The court may also order injunctive relief to remedy a failure
substantially to comply with the HSR Act” (Brand 2000, 1098).
120 See also USDoJ/FTC (1995, 4) and Brand (2000, 1097-98, note 13)  for more on the specific thresholds.
121 For cash tender offers, the initial waiting period is 15 days, while the post-Second Request period is
extended for another 10 days.
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(Carroll 1983, 110).122 Firms may also ask the FTC for interpretations of their obligations
under the HSR.
While the HSR significantly increased the discretionary and non-discretionary
authority of the US competition authorities, political principals and various interested
constituents supported the measure as a useful correction to the pre-HSR system of
merger review. As ICPAC argues, the HSR made sense for US competition authorities,
consumers and political principals alike:123
Advance notice is viewed as useful to competition
authorities because it permits them to evaluate and either
prohibit or restructure potentially anticompetitive
transactions before the transaction is implemented. In this
way, competition authorities avoid the widely
acknowledged difficulties that accompany attempts to
restore competition by ‘unscrambling the eggs’ after
allegedly anticompetitive transactions have been
completed. The experience of the U.S. antitrust
enforcement agencies before 1976 illustrates that imposing
structural relief after a transaction has been consummated is
often difficult, if not impossible. Attempting to prevent
anticompetitive harm by relying on antitrust conduct cases
after an anticompetitive merger has been implemented,
according to the U.S. antitrust enforcement agencies, is a
poor substitute for preserving competitive structure in the
market in the first place. Even if postconsummation
remedies were effective, consumers would suffer the
harmful effects of the loss of competition during the
interim period before remedies were imposed. Indeed, the
                                                
122 For more on these rules, see USDoJ/FTC (1995, 4). According to Carroll, this discretionary authority is
authorized at 15 U.S.C. section 18a(d) (1976), while the rules are codified at 16 C.F.R. section 803 (1982).
Carroll also notes that some commentators have argued that the competition authorities have “drafted the
Rules so as to extend the coverage of HSR over as many transactions as possible” (1983, 110, note 12).
123 Some commentators have noted possible disincentives for firms to have originally supported the HSR.
Shughart argues that pre-merger notification requirements may impose subtle social costs because it
“imposes a duty on firms to announce publicly that they have discovered the existence of a previously
hidden profit opportunity… In cases where the proposed acquisition is delayed while the government seeks
additional information from the merger partners, other firms, which had been unaware of the existence of
undervalued assets, are given time to step forward with takeover offers of their own. The HSR process thus
allows these other firms to free ride on the information revealed by the premerger announcement” (1990,
62-63). Carroll also argues that the HSR “has given the antitrust agencies a significant degree of control
over one of the most important variables affecting the outcome of an attempted acquisition: the speed with
which the offeror can pay for tendered shares. Misuse by the agencies of the powers delegated by Congress
under HSR can harm a company’s legitimate business interests by unnecessarily prolonging the period
from the date the offer is made to the date of its closing. Delay increases the costs of and may be
instrumental in defeating attempts to acquire ownership of companies through tender offers” (1983, 108-
109).
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stated purpose of the U.S. Congress in enacting the
premerger notification regime embodied in the [HSR Act]
was to give the agencies ‘an effective mechanism to enjoin
illegal mergers before they occur’124 (ICPAC 2000, 89).
The HSR made it easier for US competition authorities to prohibit anticompetitive
mergers instead of having to “unscramble the eggs”. In doing so, the HSR has also
increased significantly the workload of these competition authorities. For example, Table
4 provides summary statistics on the workload increases associated with HSR
implementation during the 1990s.
Table 4: Merger Activity in the US, 1989-99125
1989 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99
HSR Filing/
Enforcement
Statistics
2883 2262 1529 1589 1846 2305 2816 3087 3702 4728 4679
Second
Request
Investigations
64 89 64 44 71 73 101 99 122 125 113
Merger
Challenges 33 60 37 23 32 50 61 58 54 83 76
As EI has increased since the 1970s, firms have increasingly pursued mergers as a
means to meet international competitive pressures. Whether the merging firms are
domestic or foreign, if they are active in the US market and meet the HSR’s notification
thresholds, the merger must be reviewed and pre-approved by the US competition
authorities. Thus, the increasing workload of US competition authorities under the HSR
reflects the increasing merger activity by both domestic and foreign firms. The pre-
merger notification authority of the HSR opened a new procedural avenue through which
the US competition authorities could potentially engage in international cooperation over
the implementation of competition policy. The possibility of increasing such
discretionary implementation cooperation was enhanced considerably by the CZA’s
clarification that competition authorities could engage in international rule-making
cooperation at their own discretion.
                                                
124 S. REP. NO. 94-803, at 72 (1976).
125 Source: ICPAC (2000, Annex 2-A).
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B. EU Institutions of Competition Policy, 1951-1900
The development of competition policy in Europe occurred much later than in the
US. It was not until the end of World War II that the major European states launched
competition initiatives. Many of these initiatives relied heavily on the legal and
institutional lessons learned in the US experience with antitrust. While a multi-sector,
Europe-wide competition policy was agreed to be a common policy for the entire EU in
1957, the actual implementation of the policy required piecemeal statutory advances and
court decisions. Indeed, as will be discussed below, merger review was not codified at the
European level until the Merger Control Regulation was implemented in 1990.
Following WWII, the US actively encouraged the development of antitrust
legislation in the major European states. The US position reflected its desire to establish a
liberal, international trading regime and encourage economic recovery in Western
Europe. This agenda would be threatened by the re-emergence of large European cartels
that dominated national economies and distorted world markets. Many such cartels,
originally formed after the Great Depression, had undermined liberal thinking in favor of
various mechanisms to plan economies and markets. It was during the inter-war years
that the “European economies experienced a double shift: a trend toward the formation of
cartels, and a trend toward autarchy. Cartels organized domestic production
noncompetitively by fixing prices and dividing market share and controlling exports and
imports” (Dumez and Jeunemaître 1996, 217). Following WWII, these cartels were also
seen by the US as a potential obstacle to peace in Europe. As Davis and Raghavan argue,
“Hoping to diminish the power of the industrial barons that had bankrolled the Nazi war
machine, the U.S. pushed for West Germany to establish an antitrust policy to make sure
that such industrial conglomerates couldn’t gain the kind of power they had accumulated
in the 1930s” (2001, A8).
These events prompted the US to support antitrust legislation as a means to ensure
that cartels did not become an obstacle to the European economic recovery, the creation
of a free trading system and the maintenance of European peace. As a result, the United
Kingdom promulgated antitrust legislation in 1948, France in 1953, and Germany in
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1957.126 However, these new competition policies were implemented with an
understanding by the US that rigorous antitrust enforcement in Europe would be
overshadowed by the need to rebuild national economies.127 It remained unclear exactly
how long such a transition period would last. Thus, while US pressure played a large role
in the creation of individual European competition policies, immediate convergence
toward a pan-European competition policy remained elusive. Such a convergence was
viewed simply as a goal: “Convergence became a goal for the future, as European
countries took full advantage of the duration and scope of the divergence margin they had
been allowed” (Dumez and Jeunemaître 1996, 218-19).
Despite these obstacles, the US remained undaunted and continued to support the
creation of a Europe-wide competition policy. The earliest effort at converging toward a
pan-European competition policy can be found in the Treaty of Paris establishing the
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951.128 In particular, Articles 65 and 66
provide the competition principles for the ECSC, which would also serve as a basis for
the competition policy included in the Treaty of Rome six years later. Article 65 of the
ECSC prohibits anticompetitive agreements, including cartels, which “would tend,
directly or indirectly, to prevent, restrict or distort the normal operation of competition
within the common market” (paragraph 1). Article 66 of the ECSC prohibits
“concentrations” (i.e., mergers) and “misuses” of economic power. In particular, the
article identified as anticompetitive those firms that “have or acquire… a dominant
position which protects them from effective competition in a substantial part of the
common market”. The ECSC also created a High Authority to oversee the functioning
and implementation of the Treaty provisions. This High Authority was granted sole
                                                
126 For more on the different historical experiences among the European states, see McGowan and Cini
(1999), Cini and McGowan (1998), Gerber (1998), Dumez and Jeunemaître (1996) and Bulmer (1994).
127 This understanding reflected a popular and recurring European approach to rebuilding national
economies through government support for cartel-like national champions. More recently, this approach is
found in Davis and Raghavan’s argument that “European countries promoted their so-called national
champions through technology grants and government contracts. Aircraft maker Airbus was the exemplar,
though at various times, Siemens of Germany, Renault of France and Philips of the Netherlands received
such treatment…” (2001, A8).
128 The US’s influence was also seen in this project. For example, speaking generally, Majone notes “It is
well known that the anti-cartel clauses of the ECSC Treaty… were significantly influenced by the
American model represented by the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act”
(1996a, 50). While Jean Monnet viewed the ECSC Treaty as the first European-wide antitrust legislation
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responsibility for enforcing Articles 65 and 66. However, competition decisions of the
High Authority could be appealed to the newly created European Court of Justice (Gerber
1998, 341).
The next step in creating a pan-European competition policy came with the
signing of the Treaties of Rome in 1957, and the creation of the European Economic
Communities.129 The provisions on competition policy in this treaty reflected the earlier
agreements in the Treaty of Paris. The relevant articles cover restrictive agreements
(cartels), monopolies and public sector firms, and state aids.130 However, the new treaty
did not include explicit provisions on merger control.
The Treaty created the initial framework for the free movement within the single
market of goods, services, capital and persons (i.e., labor). To create this single market,
Article 3(f) [3(g) TEU] strives to ensure that “competition in the Common Market is not
distorted”.131 This basic goal is then elaborated in Articles 85 and 86.132 Article 85 [81
TEU] follows the basic structure of Article 65 of the ECSC Treaty, prohibiting “all
agreements between undertakings which may affect trade between Member States and
which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition
within the common market”. Article 86 [82 TEU] addresses monopoly policy by
expanding on Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty to prohibit “any abuse by one or more
undertakings of a dominant position” in the single market. These articles placed authority
for competition policy in the newly-created European Commission. While these two
articles of the EEC Treaty were based on the earlier articles of the ECSC Treaty, it is
                                                                                                                                                
(Majone 1996a, 50), its implementation was restricted by sectoral limitations to cover only the coal and
steel markets.
129 Germany was instrumental in getting antitrust included in the Treaty (Devuyst 2001; Gerber 1998; and
Davis and Raghavan 2001).
130 More broadly, Fox argues that competition policy under the Treaty of Rome is carried out by six means,
including the basic framework of the six freedoms, Articles 85 and 86, Article 37, Article 90, Articles 92-
94, and general provisions requiring Member States to facilitate the achievement of common tasks and
objectives. Fox also notes that the later adoption of the Merger Control Regulation “rounds out the
competition rules” (1997a, 6-7).
131 The bracketed TEU citations refer to the new numbering system created by the Treaty of European
Union.
132 Article 90 also prohibits governmental restraints as a component of competition policy.
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notable that they are also analogous to sections 1 and 2 of the US Sherman Act (Brand
2000, 1105).133
While competition policy was agreed to be a common policy of the EEC, in
practice, the creation of a truly common competition policy required additional efforts by
the European Commission. At the time, Member States still had a patchwork of different
competition laws, some (e.g., Belgium) with none at all.134 Asserting its authority under
the Treaty, the Commission began pushing for a Community structure to implement
competition policy as a common policy. The Council of Ministers allowed the
Commission considerable discretion to prepare the institutional framework for
implementing Articles 85 and 86. This delegation of authority may not be as surprising a
development as it first appears. For example, as Gerber argues,
Given the lack of experience with competition law in the
Member States and the common assumption that
competition law would play the same marginal role in the
Community that it played in the Member States, it is not
surprising that Member State governments had little
interest in becoming directly involved in the structuring of
that system (1998, 349).
Following negotiations with the Council, the European Parliament and individual
national governments, the Commission issued Regulation 17 in 1962.135 This Regulation
created the institutional structure for the EEC’s competition policy and established
significant discretionary authority for the Commission. As Gerber argues, “Regulation 17
created a competition law system in which the enforcement and policy-making
prerogatives were centered in the Commission and the role of national legal systems was
marginalized” (1998, 349).
                                                
133 For core differences in approach to competition, see below and Himelfarb (1996, 934). On US
experience, see Cini and McGowan (1998, 6-7). In addition to the US, Cini and McGowan also elaborate
differences in the British and German experiences.
134 This is not to claim that the Member States generally resisted implementing competition policies.
Rather, following the signing of the EEC Treaty, the individual national competition authorities
implemented the provisions on competition policy, sometimes actively (Gerber 1998, 349).
135 Regulation 17/62, 1962 OJ 204. For more on this regulation, see Cini and McGowan (1998, 19-21). The
Commission’s recent White Paper on modernizing Regulation 17 calls for increased discretion, but also a
decentralization of authority. For an excellent analysis of the EU’s efforts at modernizing Regulation 17,
see Doleys (2000) and European Commission (2002). For a useful analysis of the discretionary impact of
Regulation 17 and the White Paper on Modernization, see Majone (2000b, 296-97).
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For example, Article 4(1) of the Regulation creates a notification system for EU
competition policy. Under this system, agreements that might violate Article 85 (i.e.,
restrictive agreements, not merger agreements) of the EEC Treaty must be notified to the
Commission. It was, however, unclear exactly what the Commission would do with such
notifications once received (Gerber 1998, 350). An additional centralizing measure of
Regulation 17 is found in Article 9(3), which requires national authorities to suspend
their competition investigations in cases in which the Commission begins an
investigation under the treaty. This provision reduced the incentive for Member States to
initiate competition investigations because they faced the possibility of having to
discontinue their enforcement activity if the Commission decided to open an
investigation (Gerber 1998, 350).
Regulation 17 also placed significant authority in the EU’s Competition
Directorate.136 Competition decisions taken by the Directorate must be sent to the
Commission for a final decision. In the negotiations leading up to Regulation 17, France
pushed for the creation of a committee of representatives from the Member States that
would first have to approve of the Directorate’s decision by a majority vote. This
committee would inject a political dimension into the Directorate’s decisions and reduce
the number of decisions sent to the Commission for final approval. Instead of adopting
the French proposal, Article 10(3) establishes an advisory committee of representatives
from the national competition authorities. This committee need only be consulted before
the Directorate sends its decision to the Commission, which greatly reduces the
possibility that the Directorate will formulate decisions based on political influence
exercised through the advisory committee (Gerber 1998, 350).
Finally, Regulation 17 increased the investigatory and enforcement authority of
the Commission. Specifically, Article 14 allows the Commission to conduct “dawn
raids”. Through these dawn raids, the Commission can “enter into any premises relevant
to an investigation for violation of the competition law provisions, to examine the books
and records of the firms involved, to make relevant copies and to interview personnel at
                                                
136 In 1962, the Competition Directorate was still known as Directorate-General IV, or DGIV. To avoid
confusion, DGIV will be referred to as the Competition Directorate throughout the current study, regardless
of the time period in question.
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the site of the investigation” (Gerber 1998, 351). This authority is much more commonly
used in non-merger cases, such as cartel investigations, than in merger review.
The Commission’s discretionary authority was further increased in 1965, when
the Council afforded it the power to grant group exemptions under Article 85(3) [81
TEU] without approval from the Council.137 Due to the notification procedure
implemented under Regulation 17, the Commission had been flooded with more
notifications than could be handled by its limited staff. To alleviate the backlog, the
Commission was allowed to grant block exemptions.138 In addition, Gerber notes, “the
Council included language in the Regulation indicating that it favored such delegation,
and it has since expanded the categories of cases in which the Commission may so
legislate” (1998, 351). As a result, in certain cases, the Commission will issue
exemptions of competition law to specific industries and markets. Once granted an
exemption, the targeted firms are not required to comply fully with the notification
requirements under Regulation 17.
The creation of the EU’s institutional framework for competition policy greatly
enhanced the discretionary authority of the Commission and the Competition Directorate.
As Gerber argues, the Competition Directorate
is the only directorate to have such [discretionary] power,
and some consider it unlikely that the Council would
initiate such a practice today. Nevertheless, what began as a
response to a specific and temporary need (to deal with a
flood of notifications) has come to play an important role in
the system, because it further shields [the Directorate’s]
decision-making authority from political interference.
The Community’s political institutions thus
constructed an institutional framework for competition law
that relied heavily on the initiatives and decisions of the
Commission. It centralized authority in the Commission
and minimized the role of national competition officials
and national courts, and on the Community level it helped
to protect [the Directorate] from political influences (1998,
351).
                                                
137 Regulation 19/65, 1965 OJ 533.
138 The Commission’s first block exemption came in the 1967 Exclusive Distribution and Purchasing
Regulation.
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While the Commission’s general “supranational” authority over competition
policy had increased significantly, the EU’s institutional framework still lacked an
explicit mechanism to review and control mergers in the single market. As Eleanor Fox,
an antitrust expert at New York University, argues, no central law or regulation emerged
to check the spread of mergers in the single market because there was a general belief
among European decision makers that such transactions “would be good for integration”
(cited in Davis and Raghavan 2001, A8). Therefore, the Competition Directorate had to
look to existing instruments as potential ways to control mergers.139
The ECJ appeared to support early Commission efforts to apply existing
regulatory instruments to potentially anticompetitive merger activity. For example, in its
1973 Continental Can judgment, the ECJ asserted “under certain circumstances, a firm
holding a dominant position could be regarded as abusing its position when taking over
or merging with a competitor” (McGowan and Cini 1999, 179).140 Thus, the Commission
and Court would be able to use the Article 86 [82 TEU] prohibition against abuses of
dominance to control merger activity.141 In addition, in the 1987 Philip Morris case, the
Article 85 [81 TEU] prohibition of agreements that prevent, restrict, or distort
competition was also applied to merger activity.142
Trying to capitalize on the ECJ’s apparent support for its position, the
Commission issued a draft merger control regulation in the same year as the Continental
Can decision (1973).143 This was followed by three more proposals for merger legislation
                                                
139 For example, according to McGowan and Cini, “in its 1966 Memorandum on the Problems of
Concentration in the Common Market, the Commission asserted that Article 86 [82 TEU] (abuse of a
dominant position) might be used to regulate concentrations [i.e., mergers]” (1999, 179).
140 It is notable that this case was transatlantic in nature. As Kerres describes, “In the Continental Can
Company case, an American company, which already owned a major German producer of metal tines, tried
to acquire control of a Dutch company that dominated the Benelux market in cans. The Commission argued
that the acquisition was an abuse of an already dominant market position as defined in Article 86 [82
TEU]” (1991 14).
141 As Kerres argues, “Article 86 [82 TEU] prohibits the abuse, but not the existence, of a dominant market
position within the Common Market, or any substantial part of it. Attempts to increase dominance over a
particular market may be judged to be an abuse by the Commission or the Court of Justice…” (1991, 7).
142 According to Kerres, “In the Philip Morris/Rothman case, British-American Tobacco and R.J. Reynolds
sued to prevent a partial merger between Philip Morris and Rothmans. The Court of Justice found that
Article 85 [81 TEU] could be applied to the proposed purchase of shares, as the reduced independence of
the two companies could lead to a reduction in competition. The deal was eventually approved after
restructuring” (1991, 14). According to Cini and McGowan (1998, 33), this case also contributed to the
eventual signing of the Merger Control Regulation.
143 McGowan and Cini note that the Commission submitted these proposals under its own authority under
Article 235 of the EEC Treaty: “if action by the Community should prove necessary to attain… one of the
71
in 1982 and 1984. All of these proposals failed, largely due to resistance in the Council,
especially from France, Germany and the United Kingdom (McGowan and Cini 1999,
179). However, changes were occurring that would eventually facilitate the establishment
of the Commission’s merger control authority.
The Commission’s various proposals for a merger control regulation gained
particular impetus during the 1980s from the negotiations over the Single European Act
and the approaching completion of the Single European Market (SEM) (Devuyst 2000,
13). During the 1980s, merger and acquisition activity in the EU was increasing
significantly. “According to Commission data, there were 115 mergers in 1982-83, 208 in
1984-5, 492 in 1988-89 and 622 in 1989-90” (McGowan and Cini 1999, 179).144
These changes in merger activity prompted business interests, in particular, to
pressure for a single pan-European merger regime.145 As McGowan and Cini argue, “It
was against this background that industry demands for the creation of a level playing
field and one-stop shop for merger control reverberated” (1999, 180). More specifically,
Kerres argues,
As time went on, pressure increased to pass a regulation
that dealt with merger control… Articles 85 [81 TEU] and
86 [82 TEU] are poorly suited to the task of merger control.
Moreover, national merger control laws vary considerably
amongst the members of the Community, from very strict
in Germany to practically nonexistent in Italy. Consistent
treatment of mergers and acquisitions throughout the
Community could only be assured by an EC regulation.
Merger and acquisition activity is on the rise in the
Community in anticipation of the creation of the single
market in 1992. Some analysts encourage this
concentration as a way of increasing the competitiveness of
Community exports, but further concentration could also
have a negative impact on competition within the
Community. For all these reasons, the Community finally
                                                                                                                                                
objectives of the Community and this Treaty has not provided the powers, the Council shall acting
unanimously on a proposal from the Commission… take the appropriate measures” (1999, 198).
144 For these measures, McGowan and Cini cite Tsoukalis (1993, 103). For similar measures, see Tsoukalis
(1997, 81-83).
145 Mergers increased so considerably in the SEM because, in response to greater competition, firms began
seeking economies of scale in a much larger European market. To deal with this increased competition, the
EU needed a pan-European merger control regulation. For an excellent and simple description of the
economics behind these changing business strategies and the EU responses to them, see Jacquemin (1990),
Fine (1989, 4) and van Mourik (1996, 20). Supporting statistics and discussions can also be found in
Sachwald (1994, esp. 19-20).
72
overcame its political reservations and passed the new
Merger Control Regulation (Kerres 1991, 8).
In 1990, the Commission implemented Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89, more
commonly known as the Merger Control Regulation (MCR).146 The MCR greatly
expanded the authority of the EU by shifting merger review authority from the individual
Member States to the Commission.147 Within the Union’s institutional structure, the
Commission is by far the dominant player in merger review, exercising comprehensive
supranational powers. Indeed, McGowan and Cini argue “in contrast to all other EU
policy areas, competition policy is unique, for both the Council of Ministers and the
European Parliament find themselves on the sidelines” (1999, 177). Within the
Commission itself, merger review is the domain of the Competition Directorate.148
The MCR requires mergers with a Community-wide impact to file pre-merger
notifications with the Commission. According to the regulation, the intent of this pre-
merger authority is to prevent the creation or strengthening of “a dominant position as a
result of which effective competition would be significantly impeded in the common
market or in a substantial part of it” (Article 2[2]). This notification authority closely
resembles that acquired by US competition authorities in 1976 under the HSR Act.149 The
                                                
146 On the politics behind the MCR, see Doleys (2001), Allen (1996, 169-175), Dumez and Jeunemaitre
(1996), Bulmer (1994), Pollack (1998), Waverman et al. (1997), Dickens and Hahn (1999), Eyre and Lodge
(2000), and Davison and Johnson (1999).
147 The need for a single authority in merger control was an important reason for the MCR. As Nicolaides
argues:
There are several reasons why common rules need to be administered by a single,
supranational authority. First, it can be given discretion to act independently so that it is
above political or corporate influence. Second, a supranational authority has the right to
fine firms in any country of the EC or request any of the Member-State governments to
stop anti-competitive action. Third, all firms in the EC can have access to that authority
for information or for lodging complaints against anti-competitive practices that affect
other countries. Fourth, a single authority is more likely to be consistent in the
interpretation and the enforcement of the rules. Fifth, rules on competition are never
absolute. They permit exceptions whenever the benefits, say, from cooperation between
firms outweigh the costs from any reduction in competition. Hence, it is necessary to
have a mechanism for controlling deviations from the rules, otherwise individual
governments could find excuses to support their own firms (1994, 14).
On the reasons for creating a supranational competition authority, see also Gatsios and Seabright (1989).
148 Highlighting the central role of this Directorate, Wilks and McGowan argue that its “rise to prominence
provides a spectacular case study in organizational success. In ten short years [the Competition Directorate]
had transformed itself from a sleepy, ineffectual backwater of Community administration into a formidable
machine for economic integration” (Wilks and McGowan 1996, 225).
149 Under the MCR, the Commission publishes notifications in the Official Journal upon receipt. This
differs from the US, where the HSR Act (15 USC Section 18A[h]) requires US authorities to keep
notifications confidential until, following a preliminary investigation, they decide to open an investigation.
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MCR also gives the Commission the quasi-judicial authority to impose administrative
fines on merging firms that are not compliant with the notification and other review
procedures. It is important to note that, unlike national European merger review regimes,
the MCR includes no blocking or clawback provisions (see below).
The regulation also established the Merger Task Force (MTF) within the
Competition Directorate. This unit takes action based on complaint or the initiative of the
Directorate. The MTF, which has “firmly established its reputation for fast and efficient
work” (O’Keefe 1994, 21),150 “is divided into four units, though there is no sectoral or
functional specialization between them. Merger officials are thus expected to operate on a
fast learning curve, picking up background information as they go along, and drawing on
sectoral expertise from outside their directorate” (McGowan and Cini 1999, 183). While
the MTF has primary responsibility for conducting merger reviews, the final decision on
mergers remains with the Competition Commissioner and/or the full College of the
Commission.151
The procedures for merging firms pursuing approval by the EU are explicit in the
regulation. Similar to the US’s HSR Act, the MCR sets clear thresholds at which the
Commission examines mergers.152 If the turnover of the merging firms does not meet
these thresholds, national European competition authorities are responsible for reviewing
and approving or prohibiting the merger.153 Proposed mergers exceeding these thresholds
are required to notify formally (via Form CO) their transaction to the MTF. The MCR
                                                
150 For a more detailed study of the MTF’s effectiveness, see Neven et al. (1993).
151 This institutional arrangement has led to concerns over the possible politicization of and lack of
transparency in the merger control decision-making process. For examples of such politicization, see Cini
and McGowan (1998, 126-131), McGowan and Cini (1999).
152 The EU’s thresholds were amended June 30, 1997 (Council Regulation [EC] No. 1310/97) to trigger
Union merger review when 1) the combined aggregate world-wide turnover of all the undertakings
concerned is more than ECU 2 500 million; 2) in each of at least three Member States, the combined
aggregate turnover of all the undertakings concerned is more than ECU 100 million; 3) in each of at least
three Member States included for the purpose of point #2, the aggregate turnover of each of at least two of
the undertaking concerned is more than ECU 25 million; 4) the aggregate Community-wide turnover of
each of at least two of the undertakings concerned is more than ECU 100 million; unless each of the
undertakings concerned achieves more than two-thirds of its aggregate Community-wide turnover within
one and the same Member State (ICPAC 2000, 90).
153 According to Article 9(3) of the MCR, the Commission may refer all or part of a merger case that
exceeds the thresholds to a national competition authority upon request of that Member State. This article is
the so-called “German clause” because it was added to the MCR on the insistence of Germany’s pro-
competition and efficiency approach. Alternatively, Article 23(3), known as the “Dutch clause”, allows
Member States to request the MTF to review a merger that does not meet the MCR thresholds (McGowan
and Cini 1999, 182).
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requires merging firms to file such notifications within seven days “after the conclusion
of the agreement, or the announcement of the public bid, or the acquisition of a
controlling interest. That week shall begin when the first of those events occurs” (Article
4[1]).154
By explicitly indicating time limits, the MCR’s strict deadlines reduce the
discretion of the MTF.155 However, this limitation has been partially offset by the ability
of the MTF to engage in pre-notification contacts (PNCs) with the merging firms. PNCs
occur before any formal steps are taken under the MCR. According to the Commission,
the MTF is
always prepared to discuss with the parties to mergers
proposed transactions which may be notifiable informally
and in confidence. Such prior contact is, in the
Commission’s experience, generally regarded as beneficial
to all concerned. In particular, it can reduce or remove the
risk of delay or other inconvenience arising from
submission of an incomplete notification or of notifying a
transaction to which the Regulation does not apply
(European Commission 1998, 13).
Because they allow a degree of agent control over the timetable, PNCs are quite possibly
the most important form of discretionary authority acquired by the EU competition
authorities. The importance of these pre-notification contacts is discussed in more detail
in Chapter 5 on the GE/Honeywell merger.
While the tight timetables of the MCR are generally followed, the Commission
did allow one late filing in 1999. The Commission is also known to reject requests for
late filings (European Commission 2000, 59). As Cini and McGowan argue, the tight and
transparent timetables reflect the Commission and Council’s appreciation “that the
benefits of a merger can be lost if a case is not dealt with quickly. Moreover, speedy
                                                
154 In the US, such notification “may be made as early as an agreement in principle is reached or a (non-
binding) letter of intent or contract has been signed” (ICPAC 2000, 110). For more on the EU and US
differences in these procedures, see Venit and Kolasky (2000, 88-90).
155 Details on such timetables are outlined in the Implementing Regulation on notifications, time limits and
hearings (EC No 447/98). This regulation was developed under the discretionary authority of the
Commission and established as a Commission Regulation. Recently, the Commission submitted a Green
Paper on the Merger Regulation that envisions extended timetables in merger review. However, as
Commissioner Monti notes, “in order not to eliminate one of the great advantages of the current merger
procedure, its limited time, the extension proposed would not be automatic but would only operate at the
request of the parties” (2002, 8).
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responses reduce the negative effects on share prices and minimize the likelihood of rival
and hostile take-over bids” (1998, 122).
Following PNCs and a formal notification, the merger review process
automatically initiates the first of two primary phases.156 Phase I includes the initial
assessment of the proposed merger, which may last no longer than one month.157 During
this period, the MTF collects information on the merging parties. Information is collected
from a variety of sources, including Form CO and confidential meetings attended by the
merging parties.158 This process is primarily conducted by those MTF case handlers and
managers assigned to review the merger. During Phase I, national competition authorities
remain in close contact with the MTF and, within three weeks of the formal notification,
may request a referral of the merger.159
At the end of this first phase, the MTF prepares a draft decision, which is sent to
the Competition Commissioner for approval. If the Commissioner does not take a formal
action on the case, the merger is considered approved. Alternatively, the Commissioner
may formally decide that 1) the merger does not fall within the jurisdiction of the MCR;
2) the merger does not raise serious doubts whether it will be compatible with the SEM;
or 3) the merger raises serious doubts whether it will be compatible with the SEM.160
As Cini and McGowan note, over 95 percent of proposed mergers are approved
during Phase I (1998, 123). However, those mergers deemed to raise serious doubts over
compatibility with the SEM enter Phase II of the merger review process, which lasts
another four months. The decision to move to Phase II proceedings is extremely
                                                
156 Throughout the remainder of the merger review process, the Commission’s Legal Service is consulted
by the MTF. The Legal Service must approve all substantive components of merger decisions. The Service
takes this function very seriously because it is responsible for arguing merger decisions appealed to the
Court of First Instance (CFI). Procedural decisions also must be run by the Service, even though such
matters do not require approval from the full College or the Member States.
157 If a merger is referred to a national competition authority, the duration of Phase 1 is extended to six
weeks. Phase 1 may also be extended to six weeks if the merging parties propose remedies designed to
address the concerns of the MTF.
158 The lengthy Form CO requires detailed information on the merging firms as well as the impact of the
proposed merger.
159 Article 9 of the MCR outlines the reasons why a Member State may request referral of a merger review.
In short, the article requires Member States to show that the resulting merger would significantly impede
effective competition “on a market within that Member State, which presents all the characteristics of a
distinct market” and/or “which does not constitute a substantial part of the common market” (2[a][b]).
160 It is at the Competition Commissioner’s discretion to decide whether or not to bring a Phase I case
before the full College of the Commission for approval. However, the decision to raise serious doubts
requires approval of the Competition Commissioner as well as the President of the Commission.
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significant for the merging firms, which will often and actively resist such a
development.161 The severe aversion to Phase II derives from the time sensitivity of
mergers; once a merger has moved to Phase II, a final decision is delayed even further.
Phase II proceedings include a more detailed investigation of the proposed merger.
Following this more detailed investigation, the MTF considers conditions, or remedies
(e.g., divestments), that will be required of merging firms if they are to gain approval.162
These conditions can be harsh enough that merging firms actually will decide to abort a
proposed merger rather than implement the necessary remedies.
During this phase, oral hearings are conducted by the MTF with the merging
firms and interested, relevant third parties. Oral hearings are subject to the guidelines
established in the Implementing Regulation on notifications, time limits and hearings (EC
No 447/98).163 The hearings have been described as “quasi-court-like but closer to an
arbitration style of examination” (Doern 1995, 205). The hearings, which typically last
two to three days, are attended by representatives of the merging parties (usually top
lawyers and senior company officials), Commission rapporteurs, the MTF official in
charge of the case, the Commission’s Legal Service, translators and representatives of the
Member States (typically officials from their competition and industry departments).
While the MTF relies heavily on merging firms and third parties for the information
needed to conduct its review, it does cross-check submissions—acquired from the Form
CO and oral and written testimony—for veracity.164
                                                
161 See Chapter 5 on the role of firms in the merger review process.
162 The merging parties themselves are responsible for proposing remedies to meet the competition
concerns of the MTF. In the EU, typical remedies consist of structural requirements, such as divestitures,
termination of exclusive agreements, provision of access to necessary infrastructure or key technology, and
provision of network access or access to specific content (see the Commission’s Notice on Remedies). The
EU tends to prefer structural commitments instead of behavioral commitments because the former “would
require monitoring on the part of the [resource-strapped] Commission” (European Commission 2000c, 2).
In April 2001, the EU established an Enforcement Unit within the Competition Directorate. This unit,
which works with the case-teams in individual mergers cases, is responsible for advising merging firms on
the acceptability and implementation of remedies. Following implementation, the Enforcement Unit also
“pays attention” to how the remedies work in practice, however, the remedies “should not require
additional monitoring once they have been implemented” (Monti 2002, 2).
163 For more on the dynamics surrounding the oral hearing, see Chapter 5. See Doern (1995, 205-206) and
Johannes (1990) for excellent accounts of the oral hearings.
164 For more on the role of competitors in the EU’s merger review process, see Chapter 5.
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The oral hearing is managed by a Hearing Officer (HO).165 The HO is
independent from the Commission, “and is not subordinate to one of the directorates. He
or she has a special right of access to the commissioner if the hearing officer feels his or
her views are not being addressed” (Doern 1995, 205).166 Following a hearing, the HO
writes a report to the Competition Commissioner and Director-General. The HO can
suggest that the report be given to the entire College of the Commission. Occasionally
there are recommendations attached to these reports, but most simply report on the
content of the oral hearing.
During Phase II proceedings, the Commission issues a formal Statement of
Objections. Statements of Objections outline the Commission’s conditions for approval
or reasons for prohibition of the proposed merger. The merging firms, as well as third
parties, are then given two weeks to respond to the statement. Responses by the merging
firms typically include measures designed to remedy any problems raised by the MTF.
The merging firms then have the right to reply in writing to the objections and to request
another formal oral hearing.
Prior to issuing a final decision, the Commission consults the Advisory
Committee on Concentrations, which is comprised of competition authorities from the
Member States (MCR Article 19). The Advisory Committee delivers a non-binding
opinion on each merger case in Phase II, prior to the Commission’s final decision. Each
Member State in the ACC is afforded one vote. The MCR requires the Commission to
ask the ACC for its advisory opinion on Phase II merger cases. Typical ACC opinions are
unanimous, but some express a majority (or minority) opinion.167 In the event that the
opinion is not unanimous, no identification is made of individual, dissenting Member
States. Also, the Commission maintains the right to decide whether or not to publish the
ACC opinion, which it usually decides to publish.
                                                
165 The EU typically employs two Hearing Officers, one responsible for merger review and one for
antitrust. HOs are typically respected officials with long careers in the Competition Directorate, many close
to retirement. Their interests are the same as the merging firms: get the information out quickly and in an
organized fashion.
166 For more on the HO, see Gilchrist (2000/2001) and Johannes (2000, 1990).
167 The ACC opinion rarely, if ever, challenges basic MTF rulings, choosing rather to focus on issues such
as the scope of market definitions and exact level of fines being considered, not typically theoretical tools
of economic analysis like “bundling”.
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For a final decision, the entire College of the Commission declares the merger 1)
compatible with the SEM, 2) incompatible with the SEM or 3) compatible with the SEM
based on conditions and obligations imposed on the merging firms. Any final
Commission decision on a proposed merger can be appealed to the European Court of
Justice. Such appeals are submitted to the Court of First Instance (CFI). When merger
cases are appealed, the court will make its decision based on the substance of the facts at
the time of the proposed merger. Thus, there is little concern about the market changing
during an appeal and the MTF decision losing its relevance. In addition, appeals take a
significant amount of time, especially considering the time sensitivity of mergers. This
time lag has lead commentators to decry a “lack of appeal” in the EU merger review
system. The implications of this time lag are considered in greater detail below in Section
IV, B.
As merger review institutions and law have developed in the EU, so too have
mergers increased. The escalation in merger activity has dramatically increased the
workload of the MTF case teams. For example, Table 5 depicts the increasing mergers
and subsequent MTF activity in the SEM from 1994-1999.
Table 5: Merger Activity in the SEM, 1994-99168
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Merger
notifications
received
95 110 131 172 235 272
Total cases
closed by
final
decision169
91 109 125 142 238 270
The preceding discussion focuses on the institutional and legal structure of the EU
merger review process. These structures suggest an influential role for the Commission as
the dominant supranational EU actor in competition policy. However, Member States and
firms are also active in the process. In addition, within the Commission itself, a complex
relationship exists among the MTF, Competition Directorate, Commission’s Legal
                                                
168 Source: European Commission (2000, 368).
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Service, College of the Commission and the Advisory Committee on Concentrations.
These different actors provide a system of checks and balances and will be discussed
below in Section IV.
III. Foreign Intervention Instruments
The history of transatlantic competition relations is largely one of adversarial
extraterritoriality. Extraterritorial behavior occurs when a country attempts to enforce its
laws outside its domestic jurisdiction. Such enforcement typically induces strong political
reactions in the jurisdiction targeted by extraterritoriality because it challenges the notion
of national sovereignty. As a result of the legally and politically contentious nature of
extraterritoriality, the outcome of such behavior is often much less predictable than the
domestic enforcement of law. This unpredictability frequently leads to the creation of
countermeasures designed to block extraterritorial activity. This section discusses the
legal institutional basis of US and EU extraterritoriality.170
A. US Legal Basis of Extraterritoriality
While the Sherman Act and FTC Act provided for a degree of extraterritoriality,
the US Supreme Court did not always support the extraterritorial jurisdiction of US legal
enforcement.171 In the early twentieth century the court was clearly hesitant to assert
extraterritorial jurisdiction.172 The first US Supreme Court case dealing with the
extraterritoriality of the Sherman Act was the American Banana Co. decision (1909), in
which the Court resisted the application of the Act outside the jurisdiction of the United
States.173 In its judgment, the court decided that
it was the general and almost universal rule that… the
character of an act as lawful must be determined wholly by
the law of the country where the act is done… For another
                                                                                                                                                
169 Total cases closed by final decision are generally lower than the notifications received because some
cases are referred to Member States and/or the merger proposal may be withdrawn by the merging firms.
170 For useful works that discuss both EU and US extraterritoriality, see Griffin (1999), Parisi (1999),
Kiriazis (1998), Torremans (1996), Ham (1993).
171 Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act address commerce “with foreign nations”, while Section 5 of the
FTC Act addresses unfair methods of competition “affecting commerce” (Griffin 1999, 160,  note 1).
172 For a history of US extraterritoriality in the context of competition policy, see Peritz (1996), Sullivan
(1991).
173 American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 355 (1909).
80
jurisdiction, if it should happen to lay hold of the actor, to
treat him according to its own notions rather than those of
the place where he did the acts, not only would be unjust,
but would be an interference with the authority of another
sovereign, contrary to the comity of nations, which the
other state concerned justly might resent (cited in Devuyst
2000, 130).
Despite this initial reluctance, the judiciary soon recognized that the US could
claim jurisdiction over foreign firms (“undertakings”) when a direct effect on US
commerce and some conduct within US borders could be shown (Devuyst 2000, 130).174
One such case was the landmark 1945 Alcoa decision in which the US Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit asserted US extraterritorial jurisdiction.175 In this decision, the
Court developed the “effects test” of subject matter jurisdiction for competition policy.
According to Judge Learned Hand, “it is settled law… that any state may impose
liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, of conduct outside its borders that
has consequences within its borders which the state reprehends” (cited in Devuyst 2000,
130). In other words, if an activity of a foreign actor has consequences (i.e., “effects”) in
the US, that activity is subject to US legal sanction, regardless of where the actor is
located or resides.
Any remnants of legal reticence on extraterritoriality that might have remained
from the American Banana decision were finally and formally removed in the 1962
Continental Ore v. Union Carbide judgment. In this decision, the Supreme Court applied
the effects doctrine and ruled “a conspiracy to monopolize or restrain the domestic or
foreign commerce of the US is not outside the reach of the Sherman Act just because part
of the conduct occurs in foreign countries”.176 Thus, US extraterritorial jurisdiction was
clearly and firmly established in competition matters. The unilateral application of this
extraterritorial jurisdiction would generate significant retaliation from foreign
governments (see below).
                                                
174 Devuyst cites US v. American Tobacco, 1911; US v. Sisal Sales, 1927.
175 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 [2d Cir. 1945]. The US Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit acted for the Supreme Court because the higher court could not achieve a quorum due to
the number of disqualified justices (Griffin 1999, 160, note 2).
176 Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 US 690, 704 (1962). See also, Devuyst
(2000, 130).
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The extraterritorial jurisdiction of US antitrust laws was partially obstructed due
to events in private antitrust litigation in the 1970s and early 1980s. During the 1970s, a
number of US courts tried to temper the extraterritorial enforcement of US antitrust
(Griffin 1999, 161). In particular, the courts began to incorporate a notion of comity into
their method for determining extraterritorial jurisdiction.177 The landmark private
antitrust case, which has been called a “high-point” for comity (Waller 2000, 564), was
the 1976 Timberlane decision.178 In the decision, the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit determined that the effects test developed under the Alcoa decision was “by
itself… incomplete because it fails to consider other nations’ interests. Nor does it
expressly take into account the full nature of the relationship between the actors and this
country” (cited in Griffin 1999, 161). Similar notions of comity were subsequently
adopted by the Third, Fifth, and Tenth Circuit Courts (Griffin 1999, 161).179 This
decision to incorporate comity considerations was not merely altruistic, but rather
reflected a reality of antitrust enforcement in private cases: “The need for comity in this
context arose primarily because private litigants otherwise lacked the incentive to
consider the broader national interest in deciding whether to bring treble damages or
injunctive actions against foreign defendants” (Waller 2000, 568). In other words, private
litigants were unlikely to consider the broader international political ramifications when
filing suits against foreign defendants.
The Timberlane decision had essentially injected comity considerations into the
determination of jurisdiction for antitrust enforcement (Ham 1993, 593). Yet the principle
of comity alone is unclear in determining the relative weights of multiple interests in the
determination of jurisdiction. In this regard, Timberlane is frequently cited as an
“interest-balancing” approach in which the court introduced a three-stage test for
determining jurisdiction: “there had to be some effect on the foreign commerce of the
United States and that effect had to be sufficiently large to present a cognizable injury,
and a balancing had to be made of the interests of the United States vis-à-vis those of
other nations to justify an assertion of extraterritorial authority” (Ham 1993, 593). The
                                                
177 For a more detailed discussion of comity, see Chapter 4.
178 Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
179 However, the D.C. and Seventh Circuit Courts “questioned their validity” (Griffin 1999, 161).
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court noted that this balancing of interests should take into account a number of factors
that typically will invoke political intervention (see Figure 4).
Figure 4: Timberlane Interest-Balancing Considerations180
The court’s support for comity considerations would continue until 1993, when the
Supreme Court weighed in on the matter. However, before discussing the change to
Timberlane’s interest-balancing approach, it is useful to address related developments
regarding comity considerations in the US Congress and the competition agencies.
The establishment of US extraterritoriality has not occurred exclusively through
the common-law method. For instance, in 1982, the US Congress weighed into the debate
over extraterritoriality, passing a “convoluted statute” (Fox 1997a, 10), the Foreign Trade
Anti-trust Improvement Act (FTAIA).181 The FTAIA expanded the potential for
extraterritorial enforcement of antitrust beyond cases in which external business activity
has a negative effect (i.e., an effects test) on the US market or US consumers. Instead, the
Act raised the possibility of extraterritorial enforcement to external anticompetitive
conduct that harms US exporters.
                                                
180 Source: 549 F.2d at 614 (cited in Griffin 1999, 161).
181 Regarding Congressional motivations, Fox argues that Congress was concerned because “U.S. courts
tended to incur the wrath of trading partners by not applying comity principles in antitrust cases” (1997a,
10). In addition, Fox argues, “Congress gave as a major reason for this legislation that the law of our
trading partners offers export exemptions and that therefore US antitrust law (which was ambiguous in its
external coverage) was handicapping US business” (Fox 2001, 355). As a result, the “main effect” of the
FTAIA for US firms was “to make clear that U.S. law does not follow U.S. firms into foreign markets”
(Fox 1997a, 10).
 The degree of conflict with foreign law or policy
 The nationality or allegiance of the parties and the locations or principal
places of business of corporations
 The extent to which enforcement by either state can be expected to achieve
compliance
 The relative significance of effects on the United States as compared with
those elsewhere
 The extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect American
commerce
 The foreseeability of such effect
 The relative importance to the violations charged of conduct within the
United States as compared with conduct abroad
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Not surprisingly, this provision greatly alarmed the US’s trading partners because
it suggested that US antitrust laws could be applied extraterritorially to “correct” overseas
barriers to trade.182 According to the FTAIA, activities carried out abroad are subject to
the Sherman and FTC Acts when the conduct has a “direct, substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable” effect on US export trade or export commerce with foreign nations (Griffin
1999, 162).183 The FTAIA was not intended to prevent or encourage judicial application
of comity in international antitrust enforcement (Griffin 1999, 162). Nor did the FTAIA
directly address the court’s interest-balancing tests.184
Contrary to the effects doctrine (i.e., extraterritorial applicability arises from
behavior that affects the US market), the FTAIA made clear that US antitrust laws were
“not limited to cases in which external conduct caused a negative effect on the US
market” (Devuyst 2001, 131). Rather, the enforcement of US antitrust laws would be
expanded to apply extraterritorially to behavior that had a “direct, substantial, and
reasonably foreseeable effect” on US exports and exporters, regardless of where that
behavior took place. This congressional intervention in the debate over comity further
exacerbated international tensions over US competition and trade policies.
Clearly, the courts (and Congress to a lesser degree) have played a very important
role in determining the parameters of extraterritorial jurisdiction and the incorporation of
comity considerations in the implementation of US competition policy. However, the
regulatory agents have not sat idly by as these principals intervened. For example, the
determination of extraterritoriality appeared prominently in the 1955 Report of the
Attorney General’s National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws.185 In this report, the
US DoJ began asserting its discretionary authority in competition policy by noting that
                                                
182 As Fox argues, “the real beneficiaries of the [FTAIA] are not the United States’ foreign friends at all,
but American businesses doing business abroad” (1987, 581).
183 See also Ham (1993, 592) and Fox (1987, 579-581).
184 In 1987, the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States did include specific
requirements for determining jurisdiction, which resembled a “Timberlane-like balancing test” (Griffin
1999, 162). See specifically sections 401 (a-c), 402, 403, and 415 of the Restatement. This Restatement
was drafted and completed by the American Law Institute (Fox 1987). For a more recent attempt by the US
competition agents to clarify these requirements, see the USDoJ and FTC’s 1995 Antitrust Enforcement
Guidelines for International Operations, section 3.2.
185 As Waller states, “Extraterritoriality was a significant part of the international section of the [Report].
Extraterritoriality was the first and primary of the three international topics dealt with in the report with the
Committee ultimately recommending that the Sherman Act only apply to conduct abroad by foreign
nationals that produced substantial anticompetitive effects in the United States” (Waller 2000, 576).
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the Sherman Act could be applied to foreign nationals if they produced substantial
anticompetitive effects in the US.
Using its discretionary authority to implement US competition policy, the DoJ
also has issued a number of non-binding guidelines (some in conjunction with the FTC)
for enforcing US antitrust laws on international business activity.186 These guidelines
have consistently addressed the means by which competition agents determine
extraterritorial jurisdiction in US antitrust enforcement. For example, reflecting the Alcoa
and Continental Ore decisions, a set of US DoJ Guidelines asserted in 1977 that, “When
foreign transactions have a substantial and foreseeable effect on U.S. commerce, they are
subject to U.S. law regardless of where they take place” (USDoJ 1977, 6).
Under the Reagan Administration, the DoJ issued another important set of
guidelines in 1988. These guidelines challenged the FTAIA’s assertion that antitrust laws
should be enforced to protect US exporters.187 Specifically, the guidelines reflected the
influence of the Chicago School in the Reagan Administration’s antitrust policy, and,
therefore, limited enforcement of competition policy to activity that harms US
consumers. This policy shift was reflected in the now-famous “Footnote 159” in the
guidelines, which states
Although the FTAIA extends jurisdiction under the
Sherman Act to conduct that has a direct, substantial, and
reasonably foreseeable effect on the export trade or export
commerce of a person engaged in such commerce in the
United States, the Department is concerned only with
adverse effects on competition that would harm U.S.
consumers by reducing output or raising prices (USDoJ
1988, 21).
                                                
186 These guidelines are non-binding and discretionary. As Stark discusses,
The U.S. antitrust agencies from time-to-time issue ‘guidelines.’ Other examples include
the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines that were issued jointly by the Justice Department
and the Federal Trade Commission, and the draft Guidelines for the Licensing and
Acquisition of Intellectual Property…
Guidelines are statements of enforcement policy. They are issued to advise the
business and legal communities and others of the antitrust agencies’ policies and methods
of analysis. Although the agencies naturally intend these Guidelines to be an accurate
reflection of law and policy at the time they are issued, the Guidelines themselves are not
binding on the courts, private parties, or the agencies themselves (Stark 1994, 5).
187 See Ham (1993, 592) for more on how the FTAIA relates to the 1977 and 1988 DoJ Anti-trust
Guidelines.
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The different guidelines issued by the DoJ raise an interesting question: Why
would a regulatory agent assert its discretionary authority over determining
extraterritorial jurisdiction in this manner? The answer to this question is particularly
important because, by asserting its discretionary authority through the subsequent non-
binding guidelines, the agent, in effect, shirks and discounts the judiciary (Timberlane)
and legislature’s (FTAIA) approaches to determining jurisdiction. Noting concern over
the judiciary’s approach to determining jurisdiction, Griffin argues
American and foreign judges, as well as commentators,
question the competence of judges to evaluate the
diplomatic, national security, and international economic
issues raised by the factors… many agree with the court of
appeals in Laker [see below] and believe that even if judges
are competent to make such evaluations, the proper method
of resolution is intergovernmental consultation and
negotiation (1998, 72).
From the perspective of the US competition agents, judges are ill-suited for
determining extraterritorial jurisdiction. In addition, the alternative—intergovernmental
consultation and negotiation—reflects the competition agents’ concern that the legislature
is also ill-suited for determining extraterritorial jurisdiction. Rather, the competition
agents only feel comfortable with “intergovernmental consultation and negotiation,”
which explicitly means the executive branch and implicitly means the agencies
responsible for implementing competition policy. Thus, while comity-like interest-
balancing might be permitted in determining extraterritorial jurisdiction, the guidelines
make it clear that any interest-balancing should be conducted under the discretion of the
competition agent, not the courts or legislature. This position is reflected in the EU-US
Bilateral Agreement and Positive Comity Agreements discussed in Chapter 4.
While this chapter is particularly interested in the changes that occurred in
transatlantic competition relations before 1990, it is useful to note at this point three
additional domestic developments in the US regarding extraterritoriality and comity that
occurred during the 1990s. These developments, initiated by the US competition agents
and the judiciary, further complicated US competition relations with foreign governments
but have been largely overcome in the transatlantic marketplace by the EU-US rule-
making, implementation and exploratory institutional cooperation that are investigated in
subsequent chapters herein.
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First, under President George H. Bush, the DoJ made a significant revision to its
guidelines for international enforcement in 1992, when it removed Footnote 159. This
action limited the previous discretionary policy that US antitrust would only be applied
extraterritorially to anticompetitive behavior that harmed US consumers, not US
exporters.188 Thus, in effect, by repealing this footnote, the Bush Administration
“restored the Antitrust Division’s mandate under the FTAIA to prosecute foreign
anticompetitive practices that injure US exports” (Devuyst 2001, 131).189 Janow
describes this change in policy:
This famous footnote in U.S. antitrust policy can be
summarized as follows. As a matter of prosecutorial
discretion, the Justice Department during the Reagan
administration chose to enforce actions against those export
restraints that harmed only U.S. consumers and not those
that harmed only U.S. exports. In 1992, during the Bush
administration the Antitrust Division of the Justice
Department repealed footnote 159 (which had expressed
this policy). In so doing, James F. Rill, assistant attorney
general for antitrust, also made clear the Justice
Department’s intention to undertake enforcement action
restraining U.S. export commerce, if the conduct was
having a ‘direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable
effect’ upon U.S. exports. In other words, direct consumer
harm was not going to be the only focus of Justice
Department enforcement action. A number of foreign
officials voiced their concern regarding this shift in policy
and expressed opposition to U.S. assertions of
extraterritorial jurisdiction (2000, 31-32).
This change in the 1992 Guidelines did not directly address the interest-balancing
(comity) approach advocated in the 1976 Timberlane decision, but it maintained the
position of the US competition agents that if any balancing of interests was to occur, it
should be conducted by the competition agents themselves.
Second, shortly after the repeal of Footnote 159 had alarmed foreign
governments, the US judiciary re-entered the debate over comity in US antitrust
enforcement. Because the 1976 Timberlane decision had not come from the Supreme
Court, “courts and commentators endlessly debated whether comity was an appropriate,
                                                
188 Fox argues that the Bush Administration shifted this position in response to a trade disagreement with
the Japanese Government (1997a, 11).
189 For more on the removal of this footnote, see (Shank 1996), Pitofsky (1998) and Tritell (1999).
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required, or optional aspect of the assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction and precisely
what factors should be included in the analysis” (Waller 2000, 569). This would change
in 1993, when the US Supreme Court set a precedent by issuing its Hartford Fire
decision.190 The Hartford Fire decision, which dealt comity a “near death blow” (Waller
2000, 564), reinforced the extraterritoriality of the Sherman and FTC Acts by limiting the
use of the interest-balancing approach promoted in the Timberlane decision. In short, the
Supreme Court decided that “a defendant must demonstrate a ‘true conflict’ before the
court would balance any conflict between foreign interests and policies against those of
the United States. The majority [of justices] only accepted as a true conflict those rare
situations where the foreign government actually required what United States law
forbade” (Waller 2000, 569).191 As a result of Hartford Fire, the US courts not only
restricted the use of interest-balancing tests to determine jurisdiction but also eliminated
comity as a meaningful restraint on unilateral extraterritoriality (Waller 2000, 569).
Following the Hartford Fire decision, US courts resisted incorporating comity
considerations in a number of other antitrust cases. As Waller argues, “Even if a full
comity interest balancing approach was the best approach from a theoretical perspective,
the United States courts have proved incapable of applying such a test in a consistent and
principled manner” (Waller 2000, 570).192 For example, in 1997, a federal appellate court
supported extraterritorial jurisdiction in the United States v. Nippon Paper Industries (1
Cir. 1997) decision. In the Nippon Paper decision, the court “upheld the Department of
Justice’s ability to use the criminal provisions of the Sherman Act to prosecute
anticompetitive conduct outside the United States by non-U.S. citizens that directly and
substantially affect U.S. commerce” (Devuyst 2000, 322).193 This case demonstrates the
limits of comity, but it is noteworthy that the firm involved was Japanese, not European.
Nevertheless, commentators cite Nippon Paper and other examples as evidence that
“U.S. authorities have continued to be zealous in their assertions of extraterritorial
                                                
190 Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 509 US 764 (1993). Griffin argues “The Supreme Court in
Hartford Fire did not resolve the existing conflict among the courts of appeals over the proper application
of comity in antitrust cases” (1999, 188). For a much more detailed case study of this legal decision, see
Griffin (1999, 163-168).
191 For more on the determination of and debate surrounding “true conflict”, see Griffin (1999, 192-195).
192 For examples of such cases, see Waller (2000, 570-572).
193 For more on this case, see Sulcove (1988).
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jurisdiction under the antitrust laws, and comity considerations appear to have had little
impact on outcomes” (Griffin 1999, 168).194
The third significant change to US antitrust enforcement occurred in 1995 when
the DoJ and FTC jointly released their “US Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for
International Operations”.195 While these guidelines were released in 1995 (four years
after the beginning of EU-US cooperation in competition policy), it is useful to provide a
brief discussion of them here to highlight the continuing tensions in relations between the
US regulatory agents and the judiciary.
Much to the chagrin of the US’s trading partners, the 1995 revision reaffirmed
that competition authorities would enforce competition policy against anticompetitive
business activity that harmed US exports. According to McNeill, “The [1995] Guidelines
were met with significant criticism from the international trading community: DOJ
enforcement actions might be limited only by how far American exports flowed in the
international stream of commerce” (1998, 451), not by jurisdiction established by courts.
According to Griffin, “Unlike the situation in the EU, the 1995 International Guidelines
made it clear that the U.S. enforcement agencies will utilize the Hartford Fire decision to
vigorously enforce the effects theory of jurisdiction” (1999, 187).
These 1995 Guidelines reflect another attempt by the DoJ/FTC to assert their
authority and limit judicial intervention. According to Griffin,
The 1995 International Guidelines take the position that
courts should not engage in comity analysis in antitrust
actions brought by the U.S. Government.196 Those
Guidelines thus reaffirm a similar statement in the 1988
International Guidelines,197 which was justified by one
official as follows: ‘[F]ederal judges should [not] assume a
role as mini-diplomats every time they consider an antitrust
case with an international flavor. The judicial branch is
independent of foreign policy coordination; giving the
judiciary unlimited discretion under the guise of
‘international law’ or other equally amorphous notions to
consider and resolve trade frictions created by antitrust
suits would do more harm than good (Griffin 1999, 189).
                                                
194 Griffin lists a number of other cases supporting this position (1999, 168, note 52).
195 U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for
International Operations (April 1995), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rpt. (CCH) 13,107.
196 “1995 International Guidelines, section 3.2” (Griffin 1999, 189, note 136).
197 “1995 International Guidelines, at 20,612  n. 167” (Griffin 1999, 189, note 137).
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Griffin argues against the legality of this “broad assertion of executive power by the U.S.
antitrust enforcement agencies” (1999, 190).198 But, nevertheless, the 1995 Guidelines
again show that the regulatory agents wanted to avoid judicial intervention in the
extraterritorial enforcement—in particular in the determination of the extent of
jurisdiction and the consideration of comity—of US antitrust laws. It should be noted that
the guidelines do not prevent an interest-balancing approach in determining
extraterritorial jurisdiction. As a former FTC Commissioner argues, the 1995 Guidelines
respect the authority of foreign enforcement agencies over
matters that may also fall within US jurisdiction. The
International Guidelines declare that the agencies do, and
will, cooperate with foreign authorities in the enforcement
of competition policy.199 While some continue to object to
the fact that US antitrust law seeks to stop conduct abroad
that harms US commerce,200 the International Guidelines
make it clear that the US agencies consider international
comity in deciding whether to pursue a matter and that they
will seek the assistance of foreign authorities in dealing
with the matter201 (Varney 1996, 18).
In short, the 1995 Guidelines again asserted that competition agents might use an interest-
balancing approach to determine extraterritorial jurisdiction in competition cases.
However, such interest-balancing should be conducted by the competition agents, not by
the judiciary. Of course, this assertion is limited by the fact that private plaintiffs can still
bring antitrust cases before the courts and thus, shift interest-balancing from the
competition authorities to the courts.
The future of comity remains unresolved by the US courts, legislature and
executive; this ongoing debate reflects the struggles over legal competence that are
inherent in the US’s system of checks and balances at the federal level.202 The Supreme
                                                
198 See Griffin (1999, 190-192) for further discussion of this debate and similar criticism by the American
Bar Association of the assertion of executive power. For a discussion of this problem of institutional
competence in the US, see Mehra (1999).
199 See International Guidelines, 1, 2.9.
200 See, e.g., Comments of the Government of the United Kingdom, submitted for the Public Record on the
then-proposed International Guidelines, December, 1994.
201 International Guidelines, Illustrative Examples C (note 59), D, and H; 3.2.
202 The unsettled nature of the Hartford Fire case within the judiciary itself is clear: “The application of
comity with respect to application of the antitrust laws to conduct outside the United States remains an
unsettled area of law after the most recent Supreme Court ruling in the area, Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v.
California, and lower federal U.S. courts have recently come to different interpretations of the holdings in
this case” (ICPAC 2000, Annex 1-C, ii).
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Court has historically supported extraterritoriality. While the 1909 American Banana
decision and 1976 Timberlane decision on interest-balancing were exceptions to this
general rule, the 1993 Hartford Fire decision led to what some commentators in the US
have referred to as the “death of comity” (Waller 2000). In addition, the US legislature
and competition agents have also expanded the potential use of extraterritoriality to
address overseas behavior that might harm US exporters.
Despite these apparent obstacles to international cooperation in competition
policy, it is important to note that these changes continue to reflect the desire of the
competition agents to reduce the likelihood of intervention by principals. This desire is
simultaneously reflected in the 1992 and 1995 Guidelines and the 1991 EU-US Bilateral
Agreement. The 1992 and 1995 Guidelines allow for extraterritoriality. Making such an
allowance does not challenge the authority of the courts or the legislature, but it
demonstrates that the competition agents prefer being responsible for conducting interest-
balancing. Likewise, prognostications about the death of comity seem misplaced as
comity remains a central component of the 1991 Bilateral Agreement and does not
require approval from the court in this regard. By using the provisions in the Bilateral
Agreement, the US competition agents are able to conduct interest-balancing at their own
discretion, which satisfies their preference to avoid intervention from principals. This
behavior supports the claim in Chapter 2 that the US competition agents do not simply
pursue international cooperation for the sake of cooperating. Rather, they prefer avoiding
intervention from principals (including the judiciary), which is maximized by the pursuit
of international cooperation.
B. EU Legal Basis of Extraterritoriality
For its part, the EU’s jurisdictional tests for extraterritoriality were developed
much more recently than those in the US.203 In contrast to the US, the EU’s development
of extraterritoriality has not reflected an explicit desire to protect European exporters but,
rather, has focused on threats to the EU market and consumers.
                                                
203 For general discussions of the development of EU extraterritoriality, see Cini and McGowan (1998),
Devuyst (1998), Goyder (1998).
91
The EU entered the game of extraterritoriality in 1988.204 In that year, the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) issued its Wood Pulp decision, which established
extraterritorial jurisdiction for the Union.205 In the Wood Pulp decision, forty-one, non-
EU producers of wood pulp and their US and Finnish trade associations were accused of
fixing prices for wood pulp in the Single European Market (SEM).206 The final result of
the Wood Pulp decision confirmed the Commission’s authority to apply Article 85 [81
TEU] of the Treaty of Rome to the alleged price-fixing, regardless of where the
defendants were located (Lange and Sandage 1989).
In the Wood Pulp case, the non-EU producers argued that the Union lacked
jurisdiction over them because they were not located inside the SEM (Griffin 1999, 174).
Thus, in order to deliver a decision in the case, the ECJ first had to establish its
jurisdiction over the defendants. In doing so, the court found that the “decisive factor” for
determining jurisdiction over anticompetitive behavior was “the place where it is
implemented” (Lange and Byron Sandage 1989, 146), not the place where its effect
occurred. As a result, the Wood Pulp case was not actually an “effects” test.207 Rather,
EU jurisdiction would cover “non-EU firms outside the EU if they ‘implement’
anticompetitive agreements reached outside the EU by selling their products to
purchasers inside the EU” (Devuyst 2000, 323). Thus, the ECJ avoided having to decide
whether there was an effects doctrine in EU law. Rather, because the price-fixing
agreement in Wood Pulp had been “implemented” within the EU, “jurisdiction could be
asserted on the basis of the territoriality principle without having to have recourse to the
                                                
204 It should be noted that individual Member States had extraterritorial laws before the EU established its
extraterritorial jurisdiction. For example, “Laws such as the British Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 1956
and the German Law of 1957 against Restraints on Competition created antitrust laws that in many ways
were every bit as extraterritorial in their language as that of the United States” (Brand 2000, 894-895).
205 A. Ahlström Osakeyhtiö v. Commission, Cases 89/85, 104/85, 114/85, 116-17/85, and 125-29/85, [1988]
ECR, 4 Common Market Report (CCH), paragraph 14,491 (September 27, 1988).
206 On the Wood Pulp decision, see Whish (1996, XII/25-26), Lange and Byron Sandage (1989) and Van
Gerven (1990).
207 EU Competition Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan went to great lengths to show that the EU did not use
the effects doctrine in the Wood Pulp decision, even stating that use of the effects doctrine would have
created greater controversy (1990, 9). On the debate over the effects doctrine between Brittan and the US
Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust Charles F. Rule, see Griffin (1999, 186-187). For a useful
discussion of the potentially different outcomes that can follow from the effects doctrine and the
implementation doctrine, see Griffin (1998, 67-69).
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effects doctrine” (Whish 1996, XII/24). In short, extraterritorial jurisdiction had been
asserted with an implementation test instead of an effects test.208
It was not until the 1999 Gencor case that the ECJ’s Court of First Instance
explicitly allowed for an effects test to establish extraterritorial jurisdiction of EU
antitrust law.209 In this merger case, the CFI found that extraterritorial application of the
MCR “is justified under public international law—even in cases between non-EU
companies—‘when it is foreseeable that a proposed concentration will have an immediate
and substantial effect in the Community’” (Devuyst 2000, 323).210 As a result of the
Wood Pulp and Gencor decisions, “The European Union applies its own version of
extraterritoriality, using slightly different terminology” (Waller 2000, 574). While the
terminology may differ slightly, the practical effect is the same as the US’s
extraterritorial jurisdiction: while legally justified, the extraterritorial exercise of foreign
intervention instruments creates very real challenges to political sovereignty, which, in
turn, increases tensions in transatlantic competition relations.
IV. US and EU Actors in Merger Review
It is now useful to look more closely at the actors in US and EU competition
policy in order to identify the principals and agents. This section summarizes the
principals and agents involved in transatlantic competition relations. Unlike most PAF
studies that focus on the US Congress as the sole principal, the principals in the current
study are drawn from executives, legislatures and judiciaries. The agents include
                                                
208 For court decisions prior to 1988 that reflected an “effects doctrine”, see Griffin (1999, 173-174, note
75), Brittan (1990) and Lange and Sandage (1989). For example, in the 1972 Imperial Chemical Industries
Ltd. v. Commission (Dyestuffs) case (Case 48/69, [1972] ECLR 610), the Commission, arguing against the
British firm ICI, asserted that “jurisdiction of the Community is justified by reason of economic effects that
claimant’s conduct produced in the Common Market” (Griffin 1999, 174, note 75). Some commentators
cite the ICI v. Commission case, which used the “economic entity doctrine” instead of an effects test, for
first testing the EU’s extraterritorial jurisdiction (Cini and McGowan 1998, 201; Miles 1995, 111).
Accordingly, Wood Pulp was merely a reaffirmation of extraterritoriality and, more importantly, a rejection
of comity (Cini and McGowan 1998, 201-202). On the legal development of the different tests for EU
extraterritoriality, see Whish (1996) and Lange and Sandage (1989).
209 Judgment of the Court of First Instance (Fifth Chamber, Extended Composition) in Case T-102/96, 25
March 1999, par. 90. On Gencor, see Bavasso (1999).
210 The Commission had acted on a similar principle prior to the Gencor decision when it ruled on the 1996
Ciba-Geigy/Sandoz merger and the 1997 Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger (Devuyst 2000, 323).
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regulatory authorities in the US and EU. The US and EU principals and agents in merger
review are summarized in Table 6.
Table 6: US and EU Principals and Agents
Political Principals Regulatory Agents
US
Congress
White House
Courts
Federal Trade Commission
Department of Justice,
Antitrust Division
EU
Council of Ministers
Politicians in member states
European Parliament
College of Commission
Courts
Competition Commissioner
Competition Directorate
(including Merger Task Force)
A. US Principals and Agents in Merger Review
Within the US, the political principals are the Congress, the White House and the
courts.211 Legislative control of domestic regulatory agents is discussed in Chapter 2 and
will not be recapitulated here. While studies employing PAF typically focus on the ability
of Congress to control regulators, more recent studies include the President (and
Administration) as a principal.212 The current study adopts this approach, simplifying the
executive principal as the White House. This simplification of the US executive excludes
a number of actors in the executive branch as political principals. As such, the White
House is conceptualized primarily as the President, the Vice President and the Executive
Office of the President.213 It should be noted, however, that this conceptualization is
frequently blurred as other members of the Administration, such as cabinet secretaries,
can wield foreign intervention instruments as a form of political pressure (see Chapter 5).
Executive control of domestic regulatory agents can be applied through a variety
of domestic institutional control instruments including the power of appointment and
removal, administrative reorganization, and managerial pressure through the Office of
Management and Budget (Majone 1996a, 38). Legislative and executive principals share
                                                
211 For a discussion of the analytical issues arising from multiple principals, see Majone (1996a, 37-40).
212 According to Thatcher and Stone Sweet (2002), much of the literature on PAF still focuses on Congress-
regulator relations in the US. Majone agrees that many such studies are weakened because they focus on
congressional control without considering the role of the Presidency (1996a, 38-39). Wood and Waterman
(1991) provide a notable exception to this oversight. For useful reviews of the literature, see Huber and
Shipan (2001) and Bendor at al. (2001). 
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similar features in that they both frequently intervene in the activities of regulatory agents
and have made a conscious delegation of authority to the agents.
The third US principal, the judiciary, is not frequently considered in the relevant
literature because it has not made a delegation of authority to the agent. However, the
judiciary is empirically and theoretically important to understanding transatlantic
cooperation in competition policy. While the judiciary is not a traditional principal in the
sense that it has delegated authority to the agents, it still exercises judicial review over
many decisions made by regulatory agents.214 This judicial review can occur across all
three processes of international cooperation considered in the current study.
In rule-making and exploratory institutional cooperation, the courts can intervene
based on the complaint of other actors that the agents have overstepped their
discretionary authority. Thus, the role of the judiciary as a principal in these two
processes of international cooperation is limited by the desire of other actors (both private
and public litigants) to seek its active engagement in the process. As discussed in
Chapters 4 and 5, the US judiciary does not appear to have played a significant role in the
cases of rule-making and exploratory institutional cooperation discussed in the current
study.
In implementation cooperation, the role of the courts is so potentially important
that US regulatory agents have consistently tried to reduce intervention by the judiciary
in internationally-oriented competition cases. Tensions between the US judiciary and
regulatory agents are discussed above in more detail. These tensions revolve around the
role of the judiciary in determining the extent of extraterritorial jurisdiction and interest-
balancing comity considerations in the implementation of US competition policy. In
addition, judicial review is a common feature of competition cases in the US. The HSR
established an advance-notice system that allows competition authorities to approve
conditions for mergers before taking the merging firms to court.215 However, if the
                                                                                                                                                
213 See Meier (2000) for a useful discussion of the organization of the executive branch.
214 Majone argues that much of the relevant literature overlooks the potentially important instrument of
judicial review (1996a, 38-39). Bendor (1990) provides a notable exception to this oversight.
215 The HSR does not explicitly allow judicial review for the discretionary rules developed by the
competition authorities for implementing the Act. As Carroll argues,
Congress did not expressly provide for judicial review of the agencies’ administration of
the preacquisition notification program. A company seeking review of agency action
pursuant to HSR therefore would proceed under the generally applicable chapter seven of
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merging firms and regulatory agents cannot come to an agreement, both the DoJ and the
FTC must bring their individual cases before the courts. Therefore, the regulatory agents
are always aware that they must prepare strong legal cases based on economic analysis or
face an unfavorable court decision. The institutionally mandated role for judicial review
in the implementation of US competition policy, which differs significantly from that
found in the EU, obligates the current study to consider, at least preliminarily, the courts
as a political principal.
In US competition policy, regulatory agents play an extremely important role.
This is particularly evident in the degree of discretion enjoyed by competition agents in
comparison to other policy areas. For example, as Shughart argues, “Antitrust is unique
among federal government policy programs in terms of the degree to which it is
administered by autonomous bureaus” (1990, 94).
For the current study, two actors are identified as the primary agents in the US.
First, the US DoJ is an agent within the executive branch. Second, the FTC is an agent
that functions as an independent regulatory agency. While located in different parts of the
government, the agents still share the same interest in avoiding political intervention. The
US regulatory agents are notably different from those found in the EU. While the EU has
a growing array of independent regulatory agencies (Yataganas 2001, 24-26), none deal
directly with competition policy, such as the FTC does in the US.
While individual states within the US can investigate competition cases, they are
largely irrelevant to the current study because the size of internationally-oriented mergers
typically meet the HSR thresholds and, thus, require DoJ/FTC review. Likewise,
although sectoral regulators (e.g., FCC) can be involved in competition cases, they are
not considered relevant agents because the DoJ and FTC are the agents actually engaged
in cooperation with their EU counterparts.216
                                                                                                                                                
the Administrative Procedure Act (the APA). By its enactment of chapter seven,
Congress affirmed its approval of the developing common law presumption of judicial
review for one ‘suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or
aggrieved by agency action’ (1983, 113-114).
216 Devuyst does note that the EU is open to increasing cooperation with sectoral regulators:
The current cooperation agreements provide for a framework between the European
Commission on the one hand and the Department of Justice and the FTC on the other
hand. The same framework of cooperation does not exist with the Federal
Communications Commission and the Department of Transportation, while both agencies
also have important antitrust powers in their specific area of competence. The
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B. EU Principals and Agents in Merger Review
In the EU’s competition system, the principals are the fifteen Member States.
Through the MCR, these sovereign European states have delegated regulatory authority
for merger control to the European Commission. The Member States may act
individually as national politicians and/or political bodies. They may also act collectively
as the Council of Ministers and/or the European Council.
The role of the Member States is pervasive in Commission decision-making. The
Commission must constantly consider the impact of its decisions on the Member States
and the reaction of the Council of Ministers. This ever-present concern means that
Member States are a ubiquitous principal in EU policymaking.
The European Parliament and the College of the Commission also function as
principals in the sense that the agents prefer avoiding their intervention. In reality,
however, the Parliament has a marginal role to play in EU competition policy. As
evidence below suggest, the European Parliament does not present a significant threat of
intervention to the agents.217 As discussed above, the College of the Commission (all
twenty Commissioners deliberating together) is required, under certain circumstances, to
approve final decisions on competition cases. When a decision of the Competition
Directorate is brought before the College, Commissioners can obstruct final approval
based on their national sympathies or portfolio demands. While not a common
occurrence in competition cases, the possibility of such politicization in the College of
the Commission exists and must, therefore, be considered.
It should be noted that the national competition agencies in the EU’s fifteen
Member States do not function as political principals. This is so for two reasons. First, the
current study investigates cases of mergers that typically meet the thresholds established
in the MCR. Therefore, the majority of these mergers fall under the jurisdiction of the
Commission, not national competition agencies. Second, national competition agencies
do have a degree of input into the Commission’s merger review, in particular through the
Advisory Committee on Concentrations in Phase II (see above). However, this body is
                                                                                                                                                
Commission and the two US agencies have, at the highest levels, been actively exploring
ways to better structure their mutual cooperation (2001, 148).
217 On this point, see also McGowan and Cini (1999, 177).
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only authorized to advise the Competition Directorate in individual cases. It does not
exercise any binding authority over competition decisions in the EU system. As a result,
the competition agencies in the EU’s Member States function as a “third-party”
regulatory agent with little or no capacity to control the Commission in the current study.
Similar to the institutional system in the US, the EU’s judiciary also must be
considered when identifying the Union’s principals. As such, the Court of First Instance
(CFI) and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) are identified as political principals. In
contrast to the domestic institutions in the US, however, differences in the role of
judiciary do exist.218 These differences are particularly notable in, and important for,
implementation cooperation and will be discussed in more detail in Chapters 5 and 6. In
contrast to the US system, the EU’s MCR does not require competition agents to prepare
and try their cases in court. Rather, courts in the EU are less involved because they only
entertain appeals from merging firms after the regulators have issued a final decision.
The courts can provide an additional, objective judgment on the final decision of the
regulatory agents. However, an appeal to the CFI requires a considerable amount of
resources and, more importantly, may take as long as two to three years.219 Thus, due to
the time sensitivity of mergers, judicial appeal is often an unrealistic option in the EU. In
fact, it is unlikely that firms will appeal conditions set by the MTF unless there is a
significant point of principal that may affect their future, long-term business
considerations. As competition authorities are aware, firms essentially have to “take what
they get” in the EU merger review process.
These institutional limitations on judicial review and the level of discretionary
authority exercised by the Competition Directorate have led commentators to declare the
EU’s regulatory agents as “effectively investigator, prosecutor, jury, judge and
executioner in its own cause” (Gilchrist 2000/2001, 3). However, it should be noted “the
European Court of Justice has tended to confirm rather than constrain the discretionary
capacity of the Commission…” (Cini and McGowan 1998, 215). In addition, this limit on
judicial review speaks only to the role of courts in implementation cooperation, not rule-
                                                
218 On general judicial enforcement of competition policy, see OECD (1997).
219 A new appeal procedure has been instituted in the CFI for time-sensitive cases, such as mergers. But,
even this new “fast-track” procedure can take one year. Thus, even if individual cases may be expedited, it
is unlikely that firms will appeal because there is a perception that no appeal exists for merging firms.
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making cooperation. The important role of the EU’s courts in such rule-making
cooperation is discussed in Chapter 4.220
Similar to the US competition agents, the EU’s competition agents enjoy a higher
degree of discretion than other EU regulatory agents (McGowan and Cini 1999, 177). In
competition policy, the regulatory agent is the European Commission, or more precisely,
the Competition Commissioner, Competition Directorate and Competition Directorate’s
Merger Task Force (MTF). Within the Commission, it is crucial to isolate the
Competition Directorate because other Directorates often have different interests and may
try to intervene in competition cases.221 When other Directorates do try to intervene, they
play a role similar to political principals, except no actual delegation has occurred and
they, of course, possess fewer control instruments than the principals.
The MTF is a separate unit within the Competition Directorate, having primary
responsibility as the regulatory agent in charge of merger review across the SEM. The
MTF is subject to a number of formal institutional checks on its regulatory authority.222
The Competition Commissioner enters the process after the MTF has completed its Phase
I analysis. This Commissioner is bound to enforce EU merger review in accordance with
the same statutory objectives as the MTF.223 As such, the Competition Directorate and
Competition Commissioner are empirically distinct from the MTF, but are assumed to be
analytically similar to the MTF as agents resisting the intervention of principals.
Combining the legal foundations of EU and US competition policy with the above
discussion of the principals and agents reveals the parameters of the discretionary
authority of EU and US competition authorities to cooperate internationally before 1991.
Table 7 summarizes the discretionary authority of EU and US agents before 1991 across
the three processes of international cooperation currently under investigation.
                                                
220 Similar to the case in the US, the EU’s courts do not appear to have not played a direct role in
exploratory institutional cooperation, as discussed in Chapter 5.
221 As Majone notes, “…the directorates for industrial and for social policy frequently take positions at
odds with those of the competition regulators (Laudati, 1996)” (cited in 2000b, 285).
222 However, MTF case handlers are relatively insulated from political intervention. This insulation arises
from the organizational structure of the MTF. Unlike the rest of the Competition Directorate, MTF case
handlers are not organized hierarchically or sectorally, even though they do begin to specialize in certain
sectors after a period of time. This organizational structure may allow MTF case handlers greater autonomy
than that found in other parts of Commission.
223 The Commission’s Legal Service enters the merger review process much earlier and also shares the
same statutory objectives as the MTF.
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Table 7: Pre-1991 Competition Agents’ Authority to Cooperate Internationally
PROCESS of COOPERATION
Rule-Making Implementation ExploratoryInstitutional
EU Competition
Authorities
Non-discretionary,
but untested
Discretionary, but
limited
Non-existent
(Untested)
US Competition
Authorities
Discretionary under
CZA
Discretionary, but
limited
Non-existent
(Untested)
Unlike Table 2 in the first chapter, the current chapter reveals a different (pre-
1991) historical framework for discretionary authority to engage in international
cooperation. A simple comparison with Table 2 reveals three important insights.
First, before 1991, the EU’s authority in rule-making cooperation was non-
discretionary, but untested. However, as will be discussed in Chapter 4, this authority was
ambiguous enough to lead to the discretionary signing of and political challenge to the
Bilateral Agreement. Second, in implementation cooperation, the regulatory agents had
only limited discretionary authority before 1991. Their discretionary authority to
cooperate while implementing competition policy on concurrent jurisdiction mergers was
largely based on a series of non-binding OECD Recommendations (see below). The
limits of this discretionary authority did little to limit unilateral extraterritoriality and
were a contributing factor to the discord that historically characterized transatlantic
competition relations (see below). Third, Table 7 shows that before 1991, the regulatory
agents had no real discretionary authority to cooperate in exploratory institutional
situations simply because this process of cooperation had not yet been attempted. In other
words, the discretionary authority of regulatory agents in exploratory institutional
cooperation was non-existent and, as a result, untested—it was not certain how the
political principals would react to this new process of international cooperation.
While not the primary purpose of the current study, the findings herein may shed
light on the conditions under which some of the multiple principals and agents discussed
in this section are more or less influential. In particular, variations in influence may occur
systematically across the different conditions present in the three processes of
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international cooperation: rule-making, implementation and exploratory institutional
cooperation. This issue is taken up in Chapter 6.
V. Adversity and Discord in Transatlantic Competition Relations
The preceding discussion of the legal bases of US and EU extraterritoriality is
closely linked to the adversity and discord historically characterizing transatlantic
competition relations. The domestic institutions of US and EU competition policy reflect
different regulatory objectives and views of extraterritoriality that, at times, appear
inconsistent and irreconcilable. In particular, the exercise of extraterritoriality by the US
and EU have, at least partially, led to the promulgation of national countermeasures to
limit jurisdictional claims. This section discusses the EU and US’s different approaches
to competition policy and the history of US unilateralism and European retaliation with
domestic institutional countermeasures. The section concludes with a discussion of the
early attempts at international cooperation in competition matters.
A. Different Approaches and Different Interests
This subsection addresses the different objectives of US and EU competition
policy.224 The initial reasons for creating competition policies were different in the EU
and US. While the US promulgated the 1890 Sherman Act to protect individual
entrepreneurs from large trusts, the EU developed competition policy as a way to
encourage economic integration and to create a single market.225 In practical terms, the
US typically looks more closely at the impact of a merger deal on customers (i.e.,
increased choices, decreased prices) while the EU looks more closely at the impact of a
deal on competitors.226 Today, these different regulatory objectives reflect the different
“national” (and constituent) interests of the US and EU—protecting consumers vs.
market integration.227 These simplified objectives suggest divergent US and EU national
                                                
224 For more on the different objectives of EU and US merger control, see Graham (2000).
225 On historical differences between US and EU antitrust thought, see Leary (2001).
226 As discussed above, since 1992, the US also considers the impact of anticompetitive business activity on
exporters.
227 Charles Stark, former DoJ official and lawyer at Wilmer Cutler & Pickering, offers a sports analogy to
describe this diffence:
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interests in competition policy and, as a result, resemble Keohane’s situation of “discord”
rather than “harmony”.228
The US approach to competition policy did not always focus on consumers.
Throughout the early part of the twentieth century, US antitrust analysis focused on the
size of an economic concentration and how it affected competitors. If firms grew too
large, it was feared that they could force smaller competitors out of (or prevent them from
entering) the market. The inevitable result of such anticompetitive behavior was a firm
engaging in monopolistic activity. This early foundation of antitrust analysis resembles
the current EU approach, known as a market dominance test.229 The “big-is-bad” thinking
in the US began to change in the 1970s. Mirroring the ascent of the Chicago School of
antitrust, the transition to a new competition objective was completed during the so-
called Reagan revolution in antitrust.230 The Reagan revolution
reflected a broad new American belief in the power of
markets to make better decisions than social engineers or
regulators. Influenced heavily by conservative economic
and legal thinkers mainly at the University of Chicago, the
U.S. began to focus on the effect a merger would have on
prices, innovation and product development, rather than the
fate of the companies left to compete with the new entity…
                                                                                                                                                
The European Union’s antitrust cops prefer a world that resembles the National Football
League: many closely matched teams, battling year after year for dominance. U.S.
regulators are comfortable with the New York Yankees model: a powerhouse dynasty
free to use its might to acquire players and invest in team development—provided the
fans are still getting to see good baseball at a reasonable price (Davis and Raghavan
2001, A1-A8).
228 According to Keohane, international cooperation must be distinguished from “harmony”, which refers to
“a situation in which actors’ policies (pursued in their own self-interest without regard for others)
automatically facilitate the attainment of others’ goals” (1984, 51). Harmony is then distinguished from
“discord”: “a situation in which governments regard each others’ policies as hindering the attainment of
their goals, and hold each other responsible for these constraints” (1984, 52).
229 “Early U.S. trustbusters weren’t concerned so much with mergers but with something that is prominent
in today’s European worries: interlocking trusts, in which a single company can dominate not just one
market niche but several” (Davis and Raghavan 2001, A8).
230 These changes to antitrust policy were attributed to President Ronald Reagan’s Administration, under
which “major monopoly cases such a AT&T and IBM were abandoned; multibillion-dollar mergers in oil,
transportation, and other industries were permitted; and price-fixing conspiracies became the major concern
of the antitrust agencies” (Eisner and Meier 1990, 269). However, while it is known as the Reagan
revolution, the shift may have been more a result of changes within the US regulatory agencies, instead of
simply a new Presidential Administration. As Eisner and Meier argue, the antitrust “policies of the Reagan
administration were nothing more than an extension of earlier policies originating in the antitrust
bureaucracy” (1990, 269). For studies to the contrary that argue the Reagan revolution was more a
reflection of presidential control, see (Anderson 1986) and Mueller (1986). Similar studies that suggest a
predominant role for principals over the FTC include Moe (1982; 1985) and Kovacic (1987). For a brief
discussion of these studies, see Majone (1996a, 37).
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The focus became how a merger affected the consumer, not
how it affected the competitive balance between business
rivals (Davis and Raghavan 2001, A8).
This major change in antitrust objectives shifted the analysis of anticompetitive behavior
from competitors to consumers. Such a shift is significant because final competition
decisions can differ dramatically depending on whether the analysis is based on
protecting competitors or consumers.231 Unless overseas competition authorities employ a
similar objective, the likelihood of divergent (both inconsistent and conflicting) decisions
increases significantly in cases of concurrent jurisdiction.
The regulatory objectives are quite different in the EU. The Union’s competition
objectives reflect the practicalities of Europe’s evolving Single European Market (SEM).
In contrast to US competition objectives, the EU’s Group of Experts argues that the
purpose of Union competition law is
not only to increase the efficiency of firms or to improve
the allocation of resources, but also to bring about the
integration of the internal market. The latter concern is not
so pressing or non-existent in the United States. This results
in a different approach, for example, to vertical restraints or
the abuse of a dominant position (1995, 9).
In order to understand fully the objectives of EU competition policy, it is useful to
provide a brief historical recapitulation of EU competition policy.232 At the European
level, the 1957 Treaty of Rome reflects the EU’s initial competition objective of market
integration. Article 3(f) provides for “a system ensuring that competition in the common
market is not distorted”. This principal was translated into a preference for the largest
number of competitors across the individual national markets—a maximum-competitors
approach. Thus, freed from border constraints, competition from one national market
                                                
231 While the EU promotes a different regulatory objective in its competition policy, it should be clarified
that consumer welfare is not completely dropped from economic analyses in Union merger review. As
Monti argues, consumer interests are ultimately a goal of EU competition policy: “Competition should lead
to lower prices, a wider choice of goods, and technological innovation, all in the interests of the consumer”
(Monti 2001b, 2). Also, “we are not against mergers that create more efficient firms. Such mergers tend to
benefit consumers, even if competitors might suffer from increased competition. We are, however, against
mergers that, without creating efficiencies, could raise barriers for competitors and lead, eventually, to
reduced consumer welfare” (Monti 2001b, 2). For an argument that challenges Monti’s position, see Evans
(2002).
232 See Section II, B above for more on the historical development of the EU’s competition policy. 
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would spur competition in another national market, which would increase competition
within the entire SEM.233
In the 1960s and 70s, European views of competition began to change. During
this period, Europeans embraced a “cartel-oriented” approach to managing markets that
departed significantly from the maximum-competitors approach. As a result, European
countries began promoting national champions. This period of “big-and-publicly-owned-
is-good” thinking gradually changed in Europe through the 1980s. Faith in large, cartel-
like, national champions began to weaken at the same time that competition was
increasing in the international economy and the Reagan revolution in antitrust was
occurring in the US. As Davis and Raghavan describe, this transition returned European
competition objectives to a maximum-competitors approach:
By the late 1980s, however, European leaders had come to
believe that these industrial giants had failed to produce
economic growth and still lagged behind in competition
with the U.S. and Japan. The new approach was to use
antitrust policy to assure more competition, in the belief
that this was the only way for Europe to stay healthy in
global economic fights. Antitrust thinking moved back
closer to its postwar roots. ‘Today, the people in charge of
antitrust policy are taking an aggressive position on
competition because they believe in the bankruptcy of
national champions,’ says Harvard Business School
Professor David Yoffie. In short, European thinking
became: Keep as many competitors on the field as possible,
and the economy will benefit (Davis and Raghavan 2001,
A8).
Thus, EU competition policy is now an outgrowth of the same anti-cartel policy
that had characterized early US competition policy. The crucial difference in today’s
regulatory objectives is that the US has departed from the initial objectives of its antitrust
policy. These differences in regulatory objectives largely reflect simple differences in the
                                                
233 Similarly, the West German national antitrust system, which
became the bedrock of European antitrust thinking, had strict legal prohibitions against
abuses of dominant position, but the German approach also held that competition was
defined by the absence of restrictions on economic freedom. In practical terms, this
meant that antitrust policy should be geared toward keeping markets open and allowing
as many competitors as possible, even if that reduced efficiency (Davis and Raghavan
2001, A8).
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stage of economic/market integration in the EU and US.234 In practical terms, these
differences in regulatory objectives (competitors vs. consumers) can then be translated
into different economic analyses in competition cases, which increase the likelihood of
divergent decisions between the EU and US. Fox summarizes the differences in
implementation that can follow from these different regulatory objectives:
Principally, U.S. antitrust law proscribes only that which
artificially lowers output and raises price (with a few
exceptions); even a dominant firm has the right to compete
hard and may do so even if it excludes competitors. EC
competition law, among other things, protects small and
middle-sized business from unfair exclusions and has a
broader sweep against abusive practices (1997a, 12).
The different objectives of US and EU competition policy are further complicated
by different institutional mechanisms for conducting merger review. Such differences
have led to frequent claims that EU and US competition authorities are institutionally
limited in their ability to cooperate.235 Commonly identified institutional obstacles
include different evidence-gathering tools, different roles played by courts and different
statutory objectives of competition policy, especially the existence of “public interest”
concerns like employment, regional development and R&D in the EU (Cini and
McGowan 1998, 195). In addition, language in the Merger Control Regulation allows EU
competition authorities to consider “technological and economic progress” when
determining whether behavior is anticompetitive (Article 2[1] b).236 Procedural
differences—such as different timetables—and substantive differences—whether
                                                
234 The US addressed the need for market integration early in its history with the Constitution’s Commerce
Clause, which prohibited state discrimination in interstate commerce and provided a basis for relatively
unimpeded commerce in the national US market.
Perhaps it is worth commenting in this context that our Constitution's Commerce Clause
functioned much like a trade law by eliminating governmental barriers between states.
Consequently, when Congress passed our antitrust laws a century later, those laws simply
had to insure that private barriers did not replace the prohibited state barriers. The EU's
national boundaries and barriers have proven far more enduring and thus even
competition law is enlisted to remove those barriers (Valentine 1997, 3-4).
235 See Majone (2000b, 279), Cambell and Trebilcock (1997), Doern and Wilks (1996, 328-334), Laudati
(1995), and Doern (1995).
236 It does not appear that the EU has yet based a competition decision on this specific language. However,
if the EU would do so, it could be challenged in the courts, which would require the ECJ to deliver a final
interpretation of “technological and economic progress”.
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defining markets, calculating market power,237 or applying different economic
theories238—between EU and US merger review may also create problems for
transatlantic cooperation. These institutional differences are outlined in Appendix 1.
How can EU-US cooperation be explained given the preponderance of these
institutional differences in domestic competition policy? Chapter 5 provides evidence
from multiple merger cases (in particular Boeing/McDonnell Douglas and
GE/Honeywell) that suggests ways in which competition agents can overcome these
institutional obstacles by pursuing discretionary implementation cooperation.
B. Discord in Transatlantic Competition Relations: A History of Unilateralism and
Retaliation
Through domestic legislation and subsequent court rulings, the US asserted its
extraterritorial jurisdiction over the objections of numerous foreign governments.
Because extraterritorial enforcement is seen as a threat to national sovereignty, other
countries frequently responded with their own extraterritoriality and/or
countermeasures.239 Such a tit-for-tat should not be particularly surprising because, as
Lord Wilberforce of the British House of Lords argues, “It is axiomatic that in antitrust
matters the policy of one state may be to defend what it is the policy of another state to
attack.”240 Lord Wilberforce’s claim suggests a very high probability of different states
pursuing different interests and creating discord in international competition relations—
“a situation in which governments regard each others’ policies as hindering the
attainment of their goals, and hold each other responsible for these constraints” (Keohane
1984, 52). This subsection discusses the adversity and discord that arose in transatlantic
                                                
237 In the EU, “50 percent and sometimes 40 percent of a market means dominance, especially if the next
largest company is far behind. The United States, on the other hand, measures market power and its
possible increase microeconomically, by considering the various relevant factors in the specific context”
(ICPAC 2000, 48).
238 Different theories of economic analysis—such as “bundling”, which was used by the EU in the
GE/Honeywell merger but has been largely rejected by the Chicago School approach in the US (see
Chapter 5)—increase the likelihood of divergent decisions on either side of the Atlantic.
239 As ICPAC argues, “Historically, concerns by nations over issues of sovereignty have led to some
combination of legal, practical, and political impediments to such enforcement aims. Some nations
introduced a variety of legal obstacles to stymie other nations in their efforts to prosecute international
antitrust matters, and of course, affected parties often take their own evasive measures” (2000, Annex 1-C,
i).
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competition relations as the result of a political tit-for-tat based on unilateral
extraterritoriality and retaliatory countermeasures.
1. The 1950s-1980—The Entrenchment of a Discordant Relationship
The US is not alone in asserting extraterritorial jurisdiction in competition cases.
However, it was US extraterritorial assertions of jurisdiction from the 1950s through the
1980s that particularly angered foreign governments as threats to sovereignty.241 Griffin
(1999, 160; 1998, 70-71) provides useful examples of what he calls “aggressive”
assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction in US antitrust enforcement during this period:242
 Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 US 593 (1951)
 United States v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co., 92 F. Supp. 947 (D.
Mass. 1950)
 United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504
(S.D.N.Y. 1951)
 Holophane Co. v. United States, 352 US 903 (1956)
 United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Centre, Inc., 1963
Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), order modified, 1965 Trade Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 71,352 (S.D.N.Y. 1965)
 Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980)
 Ocean Shipping Antitrust Litigation, 1980-1981 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 63,630
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 1980)
 United States v. Atlantic Container Line, Ltd., Crim. No. 79-271 (D.D.C. filed
June 1, 1979)243
The backlash against US unilateral extraterritoriality was witnessed in the
codification of various national countermeasures by foreign governments. As discussed
                                                                                                                                                
240 Parisi introduces this comment as “the obligatory footnote in a paper on this subject,” citing Lord
Wilberforce’s remark in the House of Lords judgment In re Westinghouse Electric Corporation Uranium
Contract Litigation [1978] A.C. 547, 617.
241 See especially Griffin for a discussion of states reacting “with vehemence towards the extraterritorial
enforcement of U.S. antitrust laws” (1998, 64). In addition, ICPAC argues, “For much of the postwar
period, extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws had been a significant source of tension between
the United States and its trading partners” (2000, Annex 1-C, ii). See also Fox (2001), Devuyst (2000, 323),
Griffin (1998), Baker et al. (1997, 443) and Price (1995).
242 It should be noted that the US expressed similar concerns over the EU’s proceedings against IBM in
1981 (Griffin 1998, 71).
243 US extraterritoriality also has increased tensions in non-competition areas, including securities trading,
taxation, narcotics, boycott and corrupt practices (Demaret 1986, 126). These transatlantic tensions were
embedded in a broader economic relationship known for numerous disputes, such as the 1963 “Chicken
War”; EC compensatory taxes on imports in 1972; French, Belgian and Dutch income tax practices in
1973; EC minimum import prices in 1976; US countervailing duty actions in 1978; US import duties in
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in Chapter 2, these national countermeasures now function as foreign intervention
instruments and
They tend to escalate rather than reduce system friction.
More important, they throw up roadblocks to effective
enforcement action against anti-competitive activity which
has an international dimension… Successful enforcement
harmonization would entail replacing sovereignty-oriented
blocking statutes with strengthened comity commitments
and closer collaboration on information gathering and
exchanges. This can be expected to be politically
difficult… (Baker et al. 1997, 443).
These sovereignty-oriented, national countermeasures were institutionalized as
retaliatory statutes, official protests, practical non-assistance and counter actions by
foreign courts. Table 8 lists the countermeasures commonly employed as retaliation for
US unilateral extraterritoriality in competition relations.
                                                                                                                                                
1981; EC export subsidies in 1982; US import restrictions on printed matter in 1983; US bans on steel pipe
and tube imports in 1984; etc (see Baldwin et al. 1988, 52-53).
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Table 8: Common National Countermeasures to Unilateral Extraterritoriality244
Countermeasure Description
Blocking Statutes Prevent the US from collecting evidenceand testimony on foreign soil245
Clawback Statutes
Authorize the filing of local suits to recover
multiple damages already paid in
connection with a foreign judgment246
Diplomatic notes of protest247
Official Protests Filing of amicus curiae briefs in connection
with ongoing US litigation248
Practical Non-Assistance
Reservations against providing
investigative or judicial assistance under
bilateral or multilateral treaties
                                                
244 Source: ICPAC (2000, Annex 1-C, ii-iii).
245 Devuyst notes that a number of traditional allies of the US have enacted blocking statutes: the United
Kingdom, Germany, Netherlands, France, Canada and Switzerland (2000, 323). Ham adds to the list
Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Australia (1993, 573). According to Griffin, the first statute
blocking discovery “was enacted by the Parliament of Ontario in response to a U.S. investigation of the
Canadian newsprint industry in 1947” (1998, 64, note 3). More recently, Griffin notes the British Protection
of Trading Interests Act 1980 (1999, 160, note 7), and Baker et al. note the Canadian Foreign
Extraterritorial Measures Act (1997, 481). See also Price (1995).
246 Clawback statutes followed the earlier blocking statutes. As Griffin argues, clawback statutes are
“legislation creating a statutory cause of action to recover damages paid in satisfaction of U.S. antitrust
judgments” (1998, 64), in particular responding to treble damages provided for in US legislation. Examples
of such clawback statutes include a 1980 French law that criminalized requests for certain types of
information located in France, and the 1980 British Protection of Trading Interests Act (POTIA) (Griffin
1998, 64). According to Whish, the clawback remedy (Section 6) of the POTIA provides “an absolute
right” for qualifying defendants “to recover the non-compensatory portion of any damages paid by him,
from the plaintiff, by an action in the UK courts” (1996, XII/47).
247 For example, ICPAC cites “Note No. 187, of 5 August 1977, from the Government of the United
Kingdom to the United States Government (Department of State) concerning the extraterritorial reach of
the 977 amendments to the Export Administration Act. Reprinted in Lowe, EXTRATERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION: AN ANNOTATED COLLECTION OF LEGAL MATERIALS (Grotius Pub. Ltd.,
London 1983), 147-149” (2000, Annex 1-C, ii, note 3). In addition, Griffin cites “Diplomatic Notes,
reprinted in A.V. Lowe, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: An Annotated Collection of Legal Materials (1983);
G.W. Haight, Extracts from Some Published Material On Official Protests, Directives, Prohibitions,
Comments, etc., in Report of the 51st International Law Association Conference 565-92 (1964); Joel
Davidow, Extraterritorial Antitrust and the Concept of Comity, 15 J. World Trade L., 500, 508 (1981);
Michael L. Weiner, Remedies in International Transactions: A Case for Flexibility, 65 Antitrust L.J. 261
(1996)” (1999, 161).
248 For example, ICPAC cites “Brief of amicus curiae of the Government of Japan, United States v. Nippon
Paper Industries Co., No. 96-2001 (1 Cir., filed Nov. 18, 1996) in which the Government of Japan argued
among other things that application of the Sherman Act to conduct by Japanese corporations occurring
wholly within Japan is not valid under principles of international law and international comity, and that
under well-established canons of construction, U.S. antitrust laws do not apply to conduct occurring wholly
within another country. See also, e.g., In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 473 F.Supp. 382 (N.D. Ill. 1979)
(No. 76-C-3830), Brief of Amicus Curiae The Government of Australia, Brief of Amicus Curiae The
Government of Canada, Brief of Amicus Curiae The Government of The United Kingdom” (2000, Annex
1-C, ii-iii, note 4).
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Unwillingness to recognize and enforce
acts of US courts or extradition requests
upon conclusion of antitrust litigationCounter Actions by Foreign Courts249 Limits recognition and enforcement of
foreign court orders, particularly those for
multiple damages
Summing up the volume and impact of these national countermeasures, Griffin cites a US
antitrust enforcement official who, in 1981, claimed that “there have been five diplomatic
protests of U.S. antitrust cases for every instance of express diplomatic support, and three
blocking statutes for every co-operation agreement” (1998, 64). These national
countermeasures were intentionally crafted to “impede U.S. investigatory efforts to
compel production or gain access to information or witnesses located abroad” (2000,
Annex 1-C, ii). According to ICPAC, “Sovereignty and consequent jurisdictional issues
are among those that historically have elicited the most objections from other
governments to U.S. antitrust enforcement efforts and, accordingly, led to the
implementation of protective measures that bar efforts by U.S. litigants to obtain
information for use in their domestic actions” (2000, Annex 1-C, i). Thus, such measures
reduce the availability of information that is vital to the enforcement of US competition
policy (see Chapter 2).250
2. The 1980s—The Relationship Becomes More Discordant
While the period before the 1980s was notable for the proliferation of
countermeasures, limited transatlantic dialogue did occur between US and European
competition authorities. However, when conflicts occurred, comity considerations were
typically jettisoned in favor of the political expediencies of protecting national and
constituent interests. For instance, as Fox argues, “In this period, before the end of the
1980s, the preferred way to resolve conflicts, if they were to be resolved, was respect and
                                                
249 Griffin notes the “British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. V. Imperial Chem. Indust., Ltd., (1953) 1 Ch. 19 (Eng.
C.A. 1952). See also O. Kahn-Freund, English Contracts and American Antitrust Law: The Nylon Patent
Case, 18 Mod. L. Rev. 65 (1955)” (1999, 161).
250 Regarding the importance of information, ICPAC also argues that “When engaging in this
extraterritorial enforcement, U.S. antitrust authorities need to overcome sovereignty concerns that arise
when they seek to obtain information and testimony from non-U.S. citizens located overseas; successfully
meet jurisdictional requirements, including establishing personal jurisdiction and subject matter
jurisdiction; and render valid service of process” (2000, Annex 1-C, i).
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retreat in the interests of comity (negative comity). After balancing interests, however,
the United States virtually never respected or retreated” (2001a, 244).251 This perception
and the likelihood of similar conflicts increased significantly in the 1980s as EI increased
the incentives for internationally-oriented merger activity.
A commonly cited example of transatlantic tensions in competition relations
during the 1980s is the Laker Airways case.252 As EU Competition Commissioner Sir
Leon Brittan claims, “No doubt the high point of this debate [over extraterritoriality],
which at times reached the proportions of a dispute, was marked, and epitomized, by the
Laker Airways saga of measure and counter-measure across the Atlantic” (1992a, 49).
This complex case began with insolvency proceedings for Laker Airways
Limited, a failed, low-cost British airline. In a bid to protect assets, Laker’s liquidators
filed a suit in US district court against four US defendants and eight foreign airlines,
including two other British Airlines. Due to the very nationality of the many defendants
named in the suit, the case was sure to be contentious in terms of extraterritorial
jurisdiction. The liquidators of Laker Airways claimed that the defendants had colluded
to monopolize the air routes between New York and the United Kingdom. This alleged
violation of US antitrust law had been an attempt to drive Laker out of business. As Fox
describes, a British court then
ordered Laker Airways’ liquidator (hereinafter Laker) not
to proceed against the British defendants.253 Laker, in
response, brought a motion in the U.S. district court to
enjoin defendants Sabena, the Belgian airline, and KLM,
the Dutch airline, from coat-tailing on the British court
action.254 The U.S. court, by Judge Malcolm Wilkey,
declared that the various interests of the parties and nations
could not be balanced. Judge Wilkey granted Laker’s
motion on grounds that important interests of U.S.
consumers were at stake so that the U.S. court clearly had
                                                
251 As Fox argues, “Until the end of the 1980s, diverse attitudes towards competition itself created
animosities, especially towards US extraterritorial enforcement when it collided with other nations’
decisions about how to organize their economies” (Fox 2001, 350).
252 For example, Brittan argues, “Probably the most celebrated antitrust case is the Laker saga” (1990, 30).
253 British Airways Bd. v. Laker Airways Ltd., 1984 Q.B. 142 (C.A. 1983). The injunction was later
dissolved by the British House of Lords, which observed that the U.S. court was the only forum in which
Laker could seek relief. British Airways Bd. v. Laker Airways Ltd., 1985 A.C. 58 (1984).
254 731 F.2d at 945-52.
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prescriptive jurisdiction and ought to exercise it255 (Fox
1987, 576).
The Laker case was particularly significant because it exposed the limits of applying
comity (i.e., interest-balancing) and the escalation of political tensions that can occur in
transatlantic competition relations. In particular, the case witnessed the contentious nature
of extraterritoriality and the threat and actual exercise of unilateral countermeasures.256
While the Laker case exemplifies the suspicions and obstacles to cooperation in
transatlantic competition relations, additional domestic events in the 1980s in the US and
Europe compounded the historical discord and tensions in this policy area. These
domestic events are also discussed in Chapter 4 (section II, G) in the context of the
signing of the 1991 Bilateral Agreement.
For the EU, suspicions were linked to an increasingly activist and unilateral
extraterritorial US competition policy due to posturing by George H. Bush’s
Administration (Brittan 1990) and the US Congress, such as Section 301 and the Exon-
Florio Amendment of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (Garbus
1991, 64; Miles 1995, 120).
Section 301 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (which
amended Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act) was a particular concern for the EU. This
legislation
…enables the U.S. trade representative to take unilateral
action against ‘the toleration by a foreign government of
systematic anticompetitive activities by private firms or
among private firms in the foreign country that have the
effect of restricting… access of Unites States goods to
purchasing by such firms.’ This provision of the Trade Act
pressured the Japanese government to participate in the
Structural Impediments Initiatives (SII)—an attempt by the
Bush administration to tackle competition-related trade
barriers in Japan (Devuyst 2000, 322).
US-Japanese relations served as a prism through which the EU could gain insights
into the expected behavior of the US: “From the European perspective, a simplistic view
of the U.S.-Japan relationship might be heralded as a positive development, since the
U.S. may be successful in opening market opportunities for EU goods and services. The
                                                
255 Id. at 948-55.
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Commission does not share this view and most observers register concern over…
whether the strategy might also be turned against the EU” (Mathis 1996, 129-130).257
In addition to Section 301, another component of the 1988 Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act spurred fears in Europe about the possible exercise of control
instruments by the US President—the so-called Exon-Florio Amendment in Section
501.258 Under Exon-Florio, the President
is authorized to prohibit or suspend acquisitions, mergers,
or takeovers by foreign persons or persons engaged in
interstate commerce in the United States if the President,
after investigation, finds credible evidence that such foreign
persons might take action that threatens to impair the
national security of the United States and that other
provisions of existing law do not provide adequate
authority to protect national security (Garbus 1991, 64).
In fact, Exon-Florio was shown to be more than a threat as it was actually used against
European firms (Garbus 1991, 70; Kang 1997).259
                                                                                                                                                
256 For a more detailed discussion of this case and legal decision, see Meessen (1984).
257 The US’s use of competition policy as a “market opening” instrument against Japan similarly
contributed to EU suspicions. Mathis details these market opening instruments:
the United States has engaged a number of strategies to ‘force open’ markets which are
alleged to be closed by the use of restrictive business practices. Most of these efforts have
concentrated on Japan via a series of bilateral negotiations over ten years, commencing
with the MOSS (market oriented sector selective) talks in 1985, followed by the Strategic
Impediments Initiative (SI, 1989-1992) and now by the current ‘United States-Japan
Framework for a New Economic Partnership’ (1993)… A series of complementing
policy instruments are employed to strengthen the U.S. hand in dealing with Japan,
including the threat of unilateral sanctions Section 301 provisions of the Trade Act of
1988. Likewise, the U.S. has officially enhanced its capacity to employ a form of ‘true
extraterritoriality’ in citing as unfair practices other countries’ antitrust policies which do
not equate to an adequate level of domestic enforcement (1996, 129).
258 For more on politics surrounding and the functioning of the Exon-Florio amendment, see Kang (1997,
303-305).
259 Garbus goes on to discuss Exon-Florio in much more detail, including its past use for political purposes.
This behavior by the US contributed to European fears that Exon-Florio would be used to as a control
instrument against their interests:
On 16 March 1990, BTR PLC commenced an unsolicited tender offer for Norton
Company, a New York Stock Exchange firm which is headquartered in Worcester,
Massachusetts [p. 68]… The BTR-Norton battle also reflects the use of Exon-Florio as
part of a ‘political’ attack to fend off the prospect of a foreign takeover of a ‘good United
States local corporate citizen.’ United States Senators Kennedy and Kerry (both from
Massachusetts) rushed to the defense of Norton and urged CFIUS and President Bush to
push the parameters of Exon-Florio to include consideration of the well-being and
livelihood of the 3,000 employees in Massachusetts and the impact of Norton on the local
community during the past century, in addition to its top-secret technical contracts and
retaining for the United States Norton’s ‘competitive’ position in the abrasives and
plastics industries (Garbus 1991, 70).
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For the US, similar fears were generated by the European Court of Justice’s (ECJ)
apparent willingness to expand the EU’s jurisdictional reach during the 1980s. In
particular, the US believed the ECJ’s 1988 Wood Pulp decision portended a new activism
on the part of the Commission (Miles 1995, 120). This ruling addressed a competition
case that affected North American firms, demonstrating that the EU was not likely to shy
away from extraterritorial confrontation over competition issues with the US.
In addition to EU extraterritorial jurisdiction, domestic institutional developments
also suggested a maturation of the Union and its potential willingness to exercise
extraterritorial jurisdiction in competition matters. To be sure, the US was still concerned
about the potential use of national blocking and clawback statutes by the EU’s member
states. However, a more pressing matter was the Union’s signing of the 1990 Merger
Control Regulation as a component of the broader SEM project. The MCR bound the
Commission to enforce Union merger control, even extraterritorially, if the merging firms
met specific thresholds. The implementation of the EU’s MCR held a very real potential
to threaten US interests. As former EU Competition Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan
admits:
The possibility of conflict arising as a result of concurrent
enforcement activities between the Commission and the
competition authorities of its main partners in international
trade and investment was considerably increased as a result
of the long-awaited adoption… of [the Merger Control]
Regulation calling for the prior notification and vetting of
large mergers of ‘Community dimension’ by the
Commission… the Commission has turned its attention to
competition in such sectors as international air transport,
postal and telecommunications services, all areas in which
its jurisdiction is liable to come into contact with that of
competition authorities in other countries (1992a, 40-50).
The Wood Pulp decision, the emergence of the SEM and the pending
implementation of the MCR contributed significantly to EU-US tensions in competition
policy. In addition to the changes being wrought by EI’s impact on business activity, they
                                                                                                                                                
Garbus also discusses the extraterritorial exercise of US federal securities law during the 1980s. As Garbus
argues, “the increased use of Exon-Florio as a defensive weapon against foreign takeovers of United States
firms and the extra-territorial reach of the Federal securities laws under Consolidated Goldfields provide
warning signs of potential dangers to foreign companies seeking to effect acquisitions in the United States”
(Garbus 1991, 80).
114
magnified the challenge facing EU and US competition agents to limit political
intervention. During the 1980s, the trend of historical transatlantic adversity and discord
in competition relations showed few signs of abating. Rather, EI was increasing the
pressures for firms to engage in cross-border mergers and simultaneously increasing the
likelihood of concurrent jurisdictional merger reviews. Based on historical experience
and domestic institutional developments in the US and EU during the 1980s, the resulting
jurisdictional overlaps would likely increase disagreements and political brinkmanship in
transatlantic competition relations. To avoid such an outcome, new methods of
cooperation would have to be devised.
C. Limited Efforts at International Cooperation in Competition Policy
In the early twentieth century, states initiated efforts to increase cooperation in the
international prohibition of anticompetitive (or restrictive) business practices. As Fox
argues, this behavior should not be surprising because
In modern times, market conduct has nearly always had
transnational dimensions. Trading nations have discussed
the possibility of world disciplines against restrictive
business practices since the mid- to late-1940s, when they
contemplated and nearly adopted the Havana Charter.
Thereafter, nations formulated voluntary codes and
principles in the context of the United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) (2001, 350).260
The OECD in particular provided an intergovernmental forum for increasing voluntary
international cooperation among developed countries in competition matters.
As firms and markets rapidly began to globalize in the 1970-80s, the number of
firms merging across national borders and the number of foreign mergers affecting
domestic US and EU commerce increased considerably (see Chapter 1 and Chapter 2).
As a result, cooperation with overseas competition regulators became more pivotal to
ensuring the smooth functioning of national merger review processes. Between the US
and Europe, such cooperation began largely under a series of non-binding OECD
                                                
260 For a discussion of international cooperation on restrictive business practices beginning in 1927, see
Ham (1993, 572-573).
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Recommendations on Restrictive Business Practices Affecting International Trade.261
These non-binding recommendations were initiated by OECD members who noted that
they had increasingly similar competition laws and would face increasingly similar
problems as the global economy liberalized (OECD 1998, 7). In general, the
recommendations encouraged informal contacts, mostly for the purposes of discretionary
consultation and information sharing on specific competition cases.
For example, in 1967, the first OECD Recommendation called for mutual
notification between competition regulators and discouraged retaliatory unilateralism. As
the history detailed above suggests, this recommendation did little to discourage political
retaliation in competition matters. Due to shortcomings, the original recommendation was
revised a number of times. A subsequent 1973 Recommendation called for consultation
between competition authorities during the review processes. The 1967 and 1973
Recommendations were then combined in a 1979 Recommendation, which allowed
countries to request (positive comity) consultation when their significant interests were
threatened. Next, the 1986 Recommendation included “Guiding Principles,” which called
on countries to consider taking remedial action in response to a notification from a
foreign competition authority. The most recent version of the OECD Recommendation
came in 1995, well after the EU and US launched their system of bilateral cooperation.262
The record of the OECD Recommendations does provide empirical evidence of
international cooperation in competition policy. For example, under the 1979 OECD
Recommendation, Ham notes that from 1980-85, OECD members notified 587
competition cases to each other. In particular, the US notified 361 (almost two-thirds of
total) cases to OECD members. During the same period, the European Commission
notified 57, Germany notified 40, Canada notified 39, and Sweden notified 25 (Ham
1993, 574).263
                                                
261 On pre-OECD activities and comments on each of the Recommendations, see OECD (1999a, 7-9). See
Cini and McGowan (1998, 197-98) and especially (Doern 1996, 277-79) for OECD background.
262 The 1995 OECD Recommendation was signed to encourage cooperation but made no substantive
changes to the 1986 Recommendation itself (OECD 1998). Compared to the first recommendation, the
1995 Recommendation “contains a considerably greater emphasis on encouraging countries to assist each
other’s enforcement proceedings (‘investigative assistance’), and to conduct their own proceedings to halt
anti-competitive conduct in their territories that is having adverse effects in other countries (‘positive
comity’)” (OECD 2000a, 3).
263 Statistics are reported in OECD (1984), “Competition Law Enforcement,” p. 72.
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However, the voluntary framework developed through the OECD
Recommendations is notably different from the more binding EU-US cooperation that
emerged with the 1991 Bilateral Agreement. Because the OECD recommendations are
non-binding and only call for voluntary discretionary cooperation, they did not require
political intervention for effect.264 Likewise, they did little to allay the growing fears of
US and EU competition agents who saw overseas institutional developments as likely
indicators of increasing extraterritoriality and political intervention.
In addition to the multilateral OECD Recommendations, the US engaged in
limited forms of bilateral cooperation prior to 1990, with individual members of the
OECD.265 As Fox argues, “antitrust clashes of the 1970s, and particularly the perception
that the US agencies and courts had exceeded jurisdictional bounds and tread on other
nations’ sovereignty, led to the negotiation and adoption of three memoranda of
understanding (MOUs)” (2001a, 244).266 The MOUs to which Fox refers were signed
between the United States and Germany (1976),267 the United States and Australia
(1982),268 and the United States and Canada (1984, superseded by an expanded
agreement in 1995).269 Under US law, these MOUs are actually formal and binding
executive agreements. However, they were not ratified by the US Senate as treaties and,
                                                
264 Such a distinction is very important because if the recommendations had been binding on the respective
competition authorities, they would have ultimately required approval of the respective principals (i.e.,
political intervention) in the EU, just as was the case in the Bilateral Agreement.
265 Stark notes the limited EU-US cooperation in competition policy before 1990:
Cooperation between the U.S. and the EU did not start with the two jurisdictions’ 1991
agreement, but contact before then was sporadic. Interestingly, the only instances up to
that point in which the U.S. had asked for consultations with a foreign antitrust authority
in connection with a foreign antitrust case against U.S. companies had both involved the
EU. These consultations involved the Commission’s actions in the early 1980s against
IBM and the Pulp, Paper and Paperboard Export Association, a U.S. Webb-Pomerene
association (2000, 4).
266 For a longer discussion of these “MOUs”, see Ham (1993, 576).
267 See Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the
Federal Republic of Germany Relating to Mutual Cooperation Regarding Restrictive Business Practices,
June 23, 1976, United States-Federal Republic of Germany, 27 U.S.T. 1956, T.I.A.S. No. 8291, reprinted
in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶13,501.
268 Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Australia
Relating to Cooperation on Antitrust Matters, June 29, 1982, United States-Australia, T.I.A.S. No. 10365,
reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶13,502.
269 Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of Canada as to Notification, Consultation, and Cooperation with Respect to the Application
of National Antitrust Laws, March 9, 1984, United States-Canada, reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
¶13,503A; Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of
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therefore, do not override any inconsistent provisions of US law (ICPAC 2000, Annex 1-
C, v).270 As such, the MOUs represent early and limited discretionary efforts at
international cooperation in competition policy.271 Similarly, as EI was increasing and the
EU’s maturation was becoming evident through the Wood Pulp decision, the SEM and
the MCR, it soon became clear that the US would have to pursue a new agreement with
the Union.
In addition to the MOUs signed between the US and individual OECD members,
the US also pursued other methods to increase bilateral cooperation in competition
policy. These efforts are largely outside the scope of the current study because they were
enacted after 1991, do not address formal cooperation with the EU, and are generally
more applicable to non-merger cases. Such efforts include agreements signed under the
International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act (IAEAA) of 1994 and a number of
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs).
The US Congress passed the IAEAA “To address statutory limitations on the
ability of U.S. antitrust authorities’ to request assistance in obtaining access to and
otherwise exchanging confidential information among other things” (ICPAC 2000,
                                                                                                                                                
Canada Regarding the Application of their Competition and Deceptive Marketing Practices Laws, August
3, 1995, reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶13,503.
270 As ICPAC argues, the negotiation and signing of these three MOUs reflected the “specific bilateral
concerns and history from which the agreement emerged” (2000, Annex 1-C, v):
For example, the German agreement is focused predominantly on law enforcement
cooperation, reflecting the strong post-World War II German antitrust enforcement
tradition. As the earliest of these agreements, it is the least detailed. By contrast, the
1982 Australian and 1984 Canadian agreements centered more on conflict avoidance,
which point of emphasis grew out of differences between the U.S. and these other
governments over the Uranium antitrust litigation of the late 1970s and early 1980s in
U.S. courts. Similarly, in the early 1980s, the United States and Australia were in
heated dispute over a U.S. antitrust investigation involving ocean shipping in the U.S.-
Australia/New Zealand trade. In negotiating these agreements, typically the United
States had been concerned about preserving its ability to apply its antitrust laws to
harmful anticompetitive conduct affecting U.S. commerce. The foreign government
concern had been typically over ensuring that when its interests were affected, it
would have advance notice and an opportunity for consultation and, further, that its
interest would be considered in any enforcement action the U.S. might then undertake.
While this is no longer a central concern in the negotiation of bilateral agreements
today, it does apply in particular to earlier agreements” (2000, Annex 1-C, v).
A more detailed investigation of the role of EI (if any) and the domestic politics at play in Germany,
Australia and Canada during the signing of these agreements may provide useful comparative insights for
the current study. However, such an endeavor is outside the scope of the current study and, rather, will be
pursued as part of a future research agenda.
271 In 1999, the US also signed similar MOUs with the governments of Israel, Japan and Brazil (ICPAC
2000, Annex 1-C, iv).
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Annex 1-C, vii).272 The IAEAA is antitrust-specific in its application to both civil and
criminal investigations. More precisely, the IAEAA
authorizes the FTC and DOJ to enter into bilateral antitrust
mutual assistance agreements with foreign governments
that will allow the FTC and DOJ to share otherwise
confidential antitrust evidence on their position with
foreign antitrust authorities; use their respective
investigative powers (sub poena, CIDs273) to gather
antitrust evidence for use by foreign antitrust authorities;
and withhold from public discloser any antitrust evidence
obtained from foreign antitrust authorities (Parisi 1999,
135).
In passing the 1994 IAEAA, the US legislature clearly increased the authority of
competition regulators over international cooperation in the enforcement of competition
policy.274 However, limitations to the use and utility of IAEAA agreements do exist.
In 1999, the US signed its first IAEAA Agreement with Australia, which raises
the question as to why the US has not signed a similar agreement with the EU. ICPAC
provides two institutional reasons why the US was more likely to enter into an IAEAA
Agreement with Australia than other countries, including the EU:
From a U.S. perspective, it was feasible to enter into such
an agreement with Australia because of two features of the
Australian system. First, Australia has a strong regime of
confidentiality laws that will protect nonpublic information
                                                
272 Public Law 103-438, published at 108 Stat. 4597, and codified at 15 U.S.C., section 6201-6212. For
more on the IAEAA, see Parisi (1999) and ICPAC (2000, Annex 1-C, v-viii).
273 CIDs are civil investigative demands. ICPAC addresses the difference between sub poenas and CIDs
thusly:
In civil matters, where information-gathering occurs routinely in both the investigation
and pre-trial phases, the government is authorized to exercise its compulsory powers by
issuing civil investigative demands (CIDs) to persons located abroad as well as
domestically. CIDs are used during the pre-filing stage of civil matters, and can be served
internationally pursuant to U.S. law. Section 3 of the Antitrust Civil Process Act, 15
U.S.C. §1312. In criminal matters, grand jury subpoenas, in contrast, may not be served
outside the territories of the United States unless directed at U.S. citizens. Nonetheless,
valid service is recognized under U.S. law when it is made on a person within the United
States, even if it compels production of information located abroad, e.g., service of a
grand jury subpoena upon a U.S. subsidiary of a non-U.S. corporation for information in
the possession of the foreign parent is recognized as a valid exercise of compulsory
power (2000, Annex 1-C, iii).
274 However, as ICPAC argues, “In a concession to concerns about protections for business confidential and
privileged information raised by business and legal groups during hearings on the IAEAA, the law specifies
that its provisions for sharing information do not apply to confidential information obtained in a Hart-Scott-
Rodino premerger notification process” (2000, Annex 1-C, vii-viii). See Section 5(1) of the IAEAA, 15
U.S.C. §§ 6204(1).
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obtained from U.S. companies. Second, [Australia’s] laws
authorize entry into agreements under which such
information may be exchanged in antitrust matters (ICPAC
2000, Annex 1-C, vii).
Thus, US competition authorities are not likely to pursue an IAEAA Agreement
with EU competition authorities because the EU’s system for protecting confidential
information may be weaker than that of Australia. If the US competition authorities were
to pursue an IAEAA with the EU, they would likely face higher costs than they did with
Australia because domestic US political principals (including the judiciary) would likely
perceive the EU’s protection of confidential information as weaker than that of
Australia.275 In addition, “A precondition to entering into an agreement under the IAEAA
is that the potential partner antitrust authority be empowered to provide reciprocal
assistance to U.S. antitrust authorities in response to a similarly qualified request”
(ICPAC 2000, Annex 1-C, viii). Domestic law in the EU does not allow the Commission
to engage in such reciprocal assistance because it cannot exchange confidential
information. As a result, on the EU side, an IAEAA Agreement is unlikely to be a high
priority for competition agents because current EU law would have to be changed.
Acquiring the necessary political support to enter into such an agreement or trying to
change the current legal restrictions on discretionary authority over confidential
information is too costly (in terms of political intervention) for the EU competition
authorities to consider.
In addition to the IAEAA, US competition authorities have other instruments for
engaging in international cooperation over antitrust enforcement. Chief among these are
MLATs. As former head of the DoJ’s Antitrust Division Joel Klein discusses, MLATs
are not antitrust-specific (Klein 1999). Rather, MLATs are broader treaties covering
mutual legal assistance in criminal matters. As ICPAC describes them,
In criminal antitrust matters, U.S. antitrust authorities also
may make use of non-antitrust-specific channels for
enforcement cooperation through the network of bilateral
mutual legal assistance treaties (MLATs) that the United
                                                
275 Should US political principals miss this observation regarding the EU system, business interests are
always prepared to remind them: “The business community, insisting on its right to have information given
to either competition agency duly protected, seems to remain opposed to the idea of EC-US negotiations for
a new agreement, making it possible to share confidential information” (Devuyst 2001, 148). On business
opposition to sharing of confidential information, see also Schaub (1998, 5-6).
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States has ratified since the mid-1970s. In contrast to the
antitrust-specific cooperation agreements [i.e., IAEAA
Agreements], the parties to these MLATs obligate
themselves to assist one another in a variety of criminal
matters—in many instances, although not always, including
antitrust crimes such as price-fixing—by obtaining
evidence located in one country for the benefit of the other
country’s law enforcement investigation (ICPAC 2000,
Annex 1-C, ix).
MLATs are a common type of US international agreement.276 However, similar to
the situation over the IAEAA, the US competition authorities have not signed an MLAT
with the EU. From the US perspective, pursuing an MLAT with the EU competition
authorities is not particularly attractive. Such a move would not produce significant
benefits because, unlike other MLAT signatories, antitrust violations are not dealt with as
criminal cases in the EU’s competition system (ICPAC 2000, Annex 1-C, ix, note 18). As
a result, it is not clear that an MLAT with the EU could even be implemented in practice.
For the EU’s political principals, authorizing the Union to enter into an MLAT
would give the Commission, and particularly the Competition Directorate, a significant
(and excessively costly in terms of sovereignty) expansion of competency into a new
policy area—international cooperation in judicial affairs. This competency would not be
antitrust-specific, but rather, would apply more generally to cooperation in criminal
matters. In order to implement such an expansion, the EU’s political principals would
have to reconsider the division of institutional competencies currently embodied in the
EU treaties (i.e., Justice and Home Affairs) and then negotiate and sign a treaty with the
US. According to the patterns of behavior discussed in Chapter 2, EU competition
regulators are not likely to pursue such a drastic strategy due to their preference to avoid
political intervention. Similarly, EU political principals are not likely to support such a
strategy because of the excessive costs associated with transferring sovereignty over
politically sensitive criminal matters to the supranational Union level.
                                                
276 According to ICPAC, “The United States has also entered into 30 MLATs and has signed at least 21
others that are awaiting ratification by the U.S. Senate or equivalent approval from the relevant foreign
legislature before entering into force” (ICPAC 2000, Annex 1-C, ix, note 18).
121
VI. Conclusions
Based on the preceding discussion, a transition to cooperation in transatlantic
competition relations appeared very unlikely through the 1980s. Any such transition had
to overcome the historical record of discord. This was not a simple matter. As this
Chapter argues, the history of transatlantic discord in competition relations is based in
different domestic power-sharing arrangements and political institutions, which are
reflective of different national interests and circumstances.
Early rule-making attempts at overcoming these differences proved insufficient
for prompting a transition to bilateral cooperation in competition policy. The pre-1991
framework (based largely on OECD Recommendations and three MOUs) was inadequate
for encouraging EU-US cooperation in competition policy. This pre-1991 framework also
did little to allay the growing fears of US and EU competition agents who saw overseas
institutional developments as likely indicators of increasing extraterritoriality and
political intervention. In particular, institutional developments in the 1980s—the US’s
Section 301 and Exon-Florio amendment and the EU’s Wood Pulp decision, the
emergence of the SEM and the pending implementation of the MCR—contributed
significantly to increasing EU-US uncertainty and tensions in competition relations. In
addition, domestic attempts by US competition agents to limit judicial intervention in
interest-balancing (i.e., the 1992 and 1995 Guidelines) did nothing to ease the fears of EU
competition agents. Rather, these attempts reaffirmed the position that US agents were
intent on applying their antitrust laws to activity that harmed US exports. This position
significantly limited confidence-building measures and reflected a nagging imbalance in
transatlantic competition relations.
To overcome these varied obstacles to cooperation, the EU and US would have to
engage in new efforts at international rule-making in order to develop a framework that
provided greater certainty in transatlantic competition relations. However, a framework
based on MLATs and IAEAA agreements was inappropriate due to the constraints
imposed on cooperation by the differing EU and US domestic institutional environments.
The new framework would also have to address obstacles to cooperation in the
implementation of competition policy, such as different regulatory objectives (protecting
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consumers vs. market integration) and a preponderance of institutional differences in
domestic competition policy that reflected the different interests of the US and EU.
Complicating matters further, EI was increasing in the 1980s. The resulting
changes to business activity magnified the challenges facing the EU and US. During the
1980s, the trend of historical transatlantic adversity and discord in competition relations
showed few signs of abating. Rather, the discord and the likelihood of future discord
increased due to the impact of EI. EI was increasing the pressures for firms to engage in
cross-border mergers and simultaneously increasing the likelihood of concurrent
jurisdictional merger reviews. Based on historical experience and domestic institutional
developments in the US and EU during the 1980s, the resulting jurisdictional overlaps
would likely increase disagreements and political brinkmanship in transatlantic
competition relations.
Many of the obstacles to cooperation that existed before 1991 continue to act as
potential sources of transatlantic discord in competition relations. Even today the foreign
intervention instruments (domestic legislation and court rulings) that provide the bases
for US, European and EU extraterritoriality and retaliation remain in place and serve as
powerful reminders of the past hostility and ever-present potential for transatlantic
discord in competition relations. To avoid a return to such discordant competition
relations, new methods of cooperation would have to be devised. These new methods of
cooperation—discretionary rule-making, implementation and exploratory institutional
cooperation—are discussed in the subsequent chapters and evaluated in terms of the
revised cross-level approach introduced in Chapter 2. It is through these three
discretionary processes that EU-US competition relations have transitioned to
cooperative bilateralism.
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CHAPTER 4: Transatlantic Rule-Making Cooperation—Formal
Initiatives for Dispute Prevention
I. Introduction
This chapter demonstrates patterns of behavior in EU-US rule-making
cooperation. The content of three EU-US competition agreements are analyzed in light of
the revised cross-level approach introduced in Chapter 2. The domestic politics
surrounding the signing of the Bilateral Agreement, the Positive Comity Agreement and
the AAA are a central part of the analysis of rule-making cooperation. These initial rule-
making steps established the framework for transatlantic cooperation and provide the
basis for subsequent implementation and exploratory institutional cooperation. The
efforts at rule-making cooperation resemble a conscious attempt to design a system of
dispute prevention by regulatory agents over dispute resolution by political principals. In
particular, the chapter considers how these processes of cooperation in an EI environment
are determined by the interaction of domestic preferences and institutions in the EU and
US. According to the patterns of behavior (P1, P2 and P3) posited in Chapter 2, the
process of rule-making cooperation is characterized by agent attempts to reduce
information asymmetries through shirking (pursue their own preferences via
discretionary authority), and principal attempts to intervene in that shirking when the
costs of not intervening exceed the costs of intervening. 
II. The 1991 Bilateral Agreement277—Dispute Prevention over Dispute Resolution
A. Origins of the Bilateral
The basic cooperative framework between the EU and US was established
through the 1991 Bilateral Competition Agreement.278 This agreement formalizes a
process of competition policy coordination between the world’s two largest industrialized
                                                
277 The Bilateral Agreement was actually signed between the European Communities (EC) and the US. The
exact title is the “Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Commission of the European Communities Regarding the Application of their Competition Laws”.
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markets. The European Commissioner for Competition, Sir Leon Brittan,279 launched the
initiative for a formal EU-US agreement on competition policy during his now-famous
Hersch Lauterpacht Memorial Lecture at Cambridge University in February 1990
(Devuyst 1998, 465). Known in Europe for his pro-market orientation, the British
member of the Commission spoke of changing jurisdictional issues in the EU’s
competition law and the implications for international competition relations. Taking the
“most likely example,” Brittan warned that due to changing jurisdictional issues, the US
and the EU “may well one day soon take different views of a competition case” (1990,
28).280
This perception of pending confrontation was reinforced by the EU’s concern that
the Bush Administration was showing signs of more active antitrust enforcement on cases
with jurisdictional overlap (1990, 28; Devuyst 2001, 135). However, instead of seeking to
enhance the Union’s capacity for extraterritorial retaliation (e.g., pursuing EU-level
blocking statutes and/or clawback statutes), Brittan decided to pursue a new framework
for dispute prevention. In order to avoid jurisdictional conflict, Brittan realized that
conflicts had to be prevented from occurring in the first place. Thus, the objective was to
design a framework for dispute prevention, not dispute resolution (European Commission
1994, Annex I, 2). By preventing international disputes from occurring, competition
authorities could preempt intervention by political principals and reduce the likelihood of
reciprocal, extraterritorial retaliation that traditionally characterized dispute resolution in
transatlantic competition relations. Brittan determined that this change was best done by
formalizing relations so that “wherever possible, only one party should exercise
jurisdiction over the same set of facts” (1990, 32).281
                                                                                                                                                
278 EU-US cooperation had occurred under the OECD Recommendation as discussed in Chapter 3. See
below for a discussion of the differences between the OECD regime and the cooperative framework that
emerged under the Bilateral Agreement.
279 At the time, Brittan was also a Vice-President of the Commission of the European Communities.
280 Brittan speculated that if confrontation did not first occur with the US, then it would be Switzerland,
Sweden, Canada, Australia or Japan.
281 Also, then, mutual assistance and ongoing cooperation in concurrent competition cases would be
necessary for achieving convergent decisions: “If the parties do exercise jurisdiction concurrently, they
should both take account of each other’s concerns and seek to adapt remedies accordingly” (Brittan 1990,
33). Thus, the principles found in the Bilateral arise from these two concerns: Urging of exclusive
jurisdiction and management of concurrent jurisdiction as ways to avoid jurisdictional conflict.
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Noting the increasing interdependence of the global economy and the EU’s
coming of age in competition matters, Brittan urged negotiations on dispute prevention
with Europe’s major trading partners. In particular, Brittan targeted the US:
I personally favour, to start with, a treaty between the
European Community and the U.S.A… a party with
jurisdiction should be ready not to exercise it in certain
defined circumstances, while the other party, in its exercise
of jurisdiction, should agree to take full account of the
interests and views of its partner. If the parties do exercise
jurisdiction concurrently, they should both take account of
the interests and views of its partners… [and] take account
of each other’s concerns and seek to adapt remedies
accordingly (1990, 32-33).
Brittan’s comments are particularly notable when compared to the substance of
the actual agreement that emerged. Also noteworthy is Brittan’s desire to begin with a
treaty on transatlantic competition relations. At the time of the speech, bilateral
agreements, and particularly treaties, covering competition policy were rare (see Chapter
3). Brittan was careful to state explicitly that none of these existing agreements “should
be taken as a model” for an EU-US agreement (1990, 31).282 Rather, the transatlantic
relationship required something new.
B. Negotiating the “Soft” Bilateral Agreement
By the end of 1990, the US had taken up Brittan’s suggestion and launched
negotiations with the Commission on a possible bilateral competition agreement.283
However, Brittan’s initial desire for a transatlantic treaty on competition relations soon
encountered political reality. During the subsequent negotiations, competition officials
from both sides of the Atlantic determined that pursuing a treaty would impose the
                                                
282 While neither a treaty nor an explicit model, the Commission did acknowledge that the 1986 OECD
Recommendation served as “a frame of reference for the definition of some of the issues relating to the
extra-territorial application of the rules of competition which frequently arose between the United States
and the EEC” (ECJ 1993, 3644). In fact, all subsequent EU-US bilateral agreements have followed “the
pattern of the OECD-Recommendations i.e. they provide for notification, exchange of information,
coordination of action and consultation” (Ham 1993, 575-76). Instances of exactly corresponding language
can be found in the OECD Recommendation and the Bilateral Agreement (Ham 1993, 584). Also,
according to the Bilateral Agreement’s preamble, the initiative was predicated on previous experience
under the 1986 OECD Recommendation and the 1990 Transatlantic Declaration.
283 The effort gained particular momentum after Brittan raised the proposal in a meeting with former US
Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust Jim Rill (James 2001, 4).
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excessive costs associated with lengthy and complex domestic approval processes.284
More specifically, the DoJ negotiators resisted pursuing a treaty because the requirement
of congressional ratification would be “too burdensome”.285 On the EU side, the
Commission revised the initial proposal for a treaty after the Commission’s Legal Service
advised the Brittan Cabinet that drafting and signing a treaty would take approximately
two years.286 This timetable was untenable, especially considering the increasing
pressures of EI and Brittan’s own belief that transatlantic confrontation over competition
matters was pending in the near future.287 Thus, the competition agents opted to pursue
discretionary rule-making cooperation fully cognizant that an attempt to increase non-
discretionary rule-making cooperation via a treaty would have required the undesirable
intervention of political principals delaying the process.
Not surprisingly, the EU and US negotiators of the agreement—who were the
competition agents themselves—decided to pursue a different strategy that would not
require changes to their respective non-discretionary, statutory law. The negotiators
decided that “cooperation should occur on the basis of current statutes”.288 As such, the
negotiators began crafting a “soft” agreement that would expand only discretionary
cooperation as a means to pursue their statutorily mandated responsibilities.289 Based on
the Case-Zablocki Act, the US competition agents had clear statutory authority to enter
into an executive agreement at their own discretion.290 Such an agreement would not
require congressional approval. It was less clear whether the EU competition officials
could exercise similar rule-making authority at their own discretion. Nevertheless, the
Commission decided to pursue a binding transatlantic competition agreement via
discretionary rule-making cooperation. The decision to proceed was based on a belief that
                                                
284 Indeed, Brittan himself foreshadowed this conclusion when he found “it hard to believe that the US or
the EC would be willing to give up the opportunity of having the last word about fundamental aspects of
market behaviour and structure in their respective territories” (1990, 33).
285 Interview with official in EU’s Competition Directorate, February 2001.
286 Interview with former member of Brittan Cabinet, March 2001.
287 In addition, Brittan may have been motivated to finalize an agreement because his tenure as Competition
Commissioner was due to expire in approximately two years.
288 Interview with official in EU’s Competition Directorate, February 2001.
289 Some commentators label such agreements “soft”—“All of these agreements are ‘soft’ agreements—
‘soft’ in the sense that they are executive agreements that are subordinate to and don’t change or override
the existing laws of either party—including, in particular, confidentiality laws that restrict the sharing of
information” (Stark 2000, 10).
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even if the Commission’s competence were challenged, it could still present a position
that was legally arguable.291
With surprising speed, the US DoJ, FTC and European Commission negotiated
and finalized a draft text of the bilateral in July 1991. The Commission forwarded this
draft to the national competition officials in each Member State along with an
Explanatory Note that highlighted the need for a “legally binding document rather than a
non-binding recommendation.”292 This Explanatory Note was designed to alleviate any
potential fears political principals by suggesting that the draft agreement was an
“administrative” arrangement intended to cover cooperation in discretionary matters.
While this administrative arrangement would be binding on the EU and US, it would not
change or override national and European legislation already in place in the Member
States. Such an administrative agreement would enter into force upon signature of the
competition agents because it would not require a domestic ratification procedure.
Prior to the negotiations over the Bilateral Agreement, limited international
cooperation was occurring among competition agents. These contacts occurred within the
informal and non-binding framework of the 1979 OECD Recommendation (as amended
in 1986). Unlike the previous OECD regime, a formal and binding “soft” agreement was
preferred over an informal recommendation so that the rules of cooperation would be
transparent and unequivocal (Schaub 1996).293 In comparison, the desire of EU and US
competition officials for a binding act was “dictated by the intention of going beyond the
recommendations of the OECD, not only by envisaging more far-reaching forms of
cooperation and coordination but also, and above all, by providing for fixed and
obligatory forms of conduct in a legally binding act” (ECJ 1993, 3653).
As an executive agreement, the bilateral would be legally binding in US law, but
would not override domestic law. However, the bilateral was an asymmetrical agreement.
While it would be a legally binding administrative agreement in the Union, the bilateral
                                                                                                                                                
290 For a useful history and analysis of the different types of executive agreements, see Margolis (1986).
See also Knaupp (1998), Brand (1990), Reisman (1989) and Hyman (1983).
291 See Commission’s legal arguments in French Republic v. Commission of the European Communities,
Case C-327/91.
292 The short note is officially known as the “Explanatory Note on the Draft Agreement between the
Government of the United States and the Commission of the European Communities Regarding the
Application of their Competition Laws.”
293 Cited in Cini and McGowan (1998, 202).
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would not bind the EU’s courts and political principals. Rather, it would bind the
competition agents and be limited to questions falling within their competence (Ham
1993, 571).294 The distinct legal classification of the bilateral as an executive agreement
in the US and an administrative agreement in the EU reflect the different domestic
institutional environments in which the respective competition agents were operating.
While the distinctions are subtle, they emerge from a mutual belief by EU and US
competition officials that a legally binding bilateral of some variety was an improvement
over the completely non-binding OECD Recommendation under which they had
previously tried to coordinate cooperation.
In the US, the agreement was negotiated under the discretionary authority of the
DoJ and FTC without intervention by political principals.295 Negotiations on the
agreement came to a head in the EU in September 1991. On September 5, the
Commission organized a meeting with national competition officials from the Member
States in order for them to make comments and observations on the draft bilateral
agreement. At this meeting, certain Member States—notably France—raised concerns
over the legal basis of and Commission’s competence to sign such a binding international
agreement. The Member States also expressed their desire that a negotiating brief be
obtained from the Council of Ministers before the Commission proceeded. Finally, the
Member States raised questions regarding the protection of confidential business
information submitted to the Commission and the precise procedures for consultation
between the EU and US competition officials. Because of these concerns, the Member
States requested that another meeting be held with the Commission after a working group
of national experts was convened to discuss the bilateral agreement in more detail.
Sensing a possible derailment of the internal negotiations, Commissioner Brittan
ruled that no future meeting would address matters of principle related to the agreement.
In particular, Brittan was determined to prevent any discussion over “whether it was
advisable to conclude a cooperation agreement with the United States in the chosen
form” (ECJ 1993, 3644). Given the opportunity, the Member States might decide that
                                                
294 For a very useful discussion of the legal effects and binding nature of international agreements signed by
the EU, see Macleod et al. (1996, 122-141).
295 Per the Case-Zablocki Act, the competition agents also had to acquire legal approval from the US
Department of State.
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only the Council of Ministers was competent to sign the transatlantic competition
agreement, or worse yet, that a treaty was the more appropriate form for such a bilateral
agreement with the US. Brittan did finally agree to convene another meeting on
September 9. However, he restricted the agenda to less-contentious technical aspects of
the agreement, such as procedures for consultation and protection of confidential
information.
Following this meeting and seeking to continue on its momentum, the College of
the Commission was convened on the next day. At this meeting, minutes indicate that the
Commission “approved the draft agreement and authorized its vice-president [Sir Leon
Brittan] to draw up the final act and to sign and conclude the Agreement itself on behalf
of the institution” (ECJ 1993, 3645). Acting quickly, the final text was prepared by the
US and EU competition officials and signed in Washington, DC, on September 23. The
DoJ’s Assistant Attorney-General for Antitrust and the Chairman of the FTC signed on
behalf of the US. Competition Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan signed on behalf of the
Commission. As agreed by the competition agents, the Bilateral entered into force upon
signature because it did not require ratification in either jurisdiction.
C. Provisions of the Bilateral Agreement
The actual substance of the Bilateral Agreement addresses most of Brittan’s
proposals in the initial Hersch Lauterpacht Lecture. Generally, the Bilateral Agreement
governs formal and informal transatlantic cooperation and has a much more operational
and binding character than the previous OECD Recommendations (Devuyst 2000, 324).
The central components of the Agreement include
1. Notification when competition enforcement activities may affect the
“important interests” (Art. 2, Para. 1) of the other party,296
2. Exchange of non-confidential information,
3. Coordination of action,
4. Conduct of enforcement activities, “insofar as possible” (Art. 4, Para. 3), that
are consistent with objectives of the other party, and
5. Consultation.297
                                                
296 FTC General Counsel Debra A. Valentine clarifies when notifications are made: “the EC notifies us
whenever it reviews a merger involving US firms, assets or markets. We notify the EC whenever we begin
investigating a merger involving an EU firm, whenever the EU's important interests are involved or
whenever we seek documents or testimony from EU persons or entities” (1997, 6).
297 For a thorough analysis of the content of the Bilateral Agreement, see Ham (1993).
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The Bilateral Agreement reduces the potential for EU-US jurisdictional conflict
by formalizing the exchange of information at multiple stages of the merger review
process. The agreement emphasizes mutual notification by competition authorities during
the initial decision-making process in individual competition cases. In merger review,
this first step to transatlantic cooperation occurs when one competition authority
officially notifies the other that it is reviewing a merger.298 Acting as an alert system,
such notifications are made “far enough in advance… to enable the other Party’s views to
be taken into account” (Article 2). After the initial notification, further cooperation can
take numerous forms and avenues in the investigatory and remedial phases of a
competition case (see Chapter 5). Generally, “the two sides try to synchronize their fact-
finding actions and coordinate their respective approaches on the definition of relevant
markets, on points of foreign law relevant to the interpretation of the case, and on
possible remedies to ensure they do not conflict” (Devuyst 2001, 324).
To preempt the concerns of political principals in an EI environment, the Bilateral
respects national sovereignty and is flexible enough to allow for the use of
extraterritoriality in cases of concurrent jurisdiction. The agreement protects national
sovereignty because it does not challenge domestic US and EU legislation already in
force nor does it separate jurisdictions (Fidler 1992, 577). If the Agreement did separate
jurisdictions, it would challenge not only national sovereignty, but also the constitutional
authority of the respective judiciaries. Specifically, the competition agents agreed that
“Nothing in this Agreement shall be interpreted in a manner inconsistent with the existing
laws, or as requiring any change in the laws, of the United States of America or the
European Communities or of their respective States or Member States” (Article IX). The
Bilateral is also flexible enough to allow for the use of extraterritoriality in cases of
concurrent jurisdiction. Regarding extraterritoriality, the bilateral stipulates that “Nothing
in this Article… precludes the notifying Party from undertaking enforcement activities
with respect to extraterritorial anticompetitive activities” (Article V), regardless of action
or inaction by the notified party. In other words, EU and US political principals maintain
                                                
298 Merging firms must also officially notify the competition authorities. In the US, such notification “may
be made as early as an agreement in principle is reached or a (nonbinding) letter of intent or contract has
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the right to intervene in cases in which they perceive national and/or constituent interests
as being threatened.
D. Comity
Possibly the most unique and interesting component of the Bilateral Agreement is
the introduction of the international principle of comity. Comity relates directly to
Keohane’s definition of international cooperation because it requires a “state” to consider
the important interests of other “states” when enforcing its domestic laws. Thus, comity
serves as a foundation for actors to “adjust their behavior to the actual or anticipated
preferences of others, through a process of policy coordination” (Keohane 1984, 51).
Comity can be distinguished as two distinct types: traditional and positive. These
two types of comity are frequently confused, even by practitioners of international law
(OECD 1999a; OECD 1998). A basis for traditional comity in international competition
relations can be found in the non-binding OECD Recommendations. However, moving
beyond the OECD’s non-binding regime, the 1991 Bilateral Agreement embodied both
variants of comity for the first time in a binding agreement relating to competition
matters (Ham 1993, 594).299
Traditional comity300 (Article VI) requires a party conducting a merger review to
consider the important interests of the other party to the agreement.301 This principle has
inspired intensive daily cooperation between EU and US competition officials. As former
EU Competition Commissioner Karel Van Miert acknowledged,
We are for instance within the realm of traditional comity
when we cooperate in a certain case to bring our respective
positions and remedies closer to each other in order to
avoid creating a harmful effect to the market of the partner.
We may draw the attention of the partner to our concerns in
a certain case. This may open a new trail for his
                                                                                                                                                
been signed” (ICPAC 2000, 110). In the EU, such notifications “can be made only after the signing of a
definitive merger agreement, acquisition of control, or announcement of a public bid” (ICPAC 2000, 111).
299 The OECD agrees that the EU-US Bilateral was the “first modern bilateral agreement—and the first
agreement related exclusively to competition law—to include positive comity” (1999a, 10). 
300 Traditional comity is also sometimes referred to as “negative” comity. See ICPAC (2000, 226-240),
Kiriazis (1998) for more on traditional comity. On the history of comity, see Ryan (2000), OECD (1999a).
301 The reference to “important interests” is ambiguous, but Ham argues “Important interests are taken here
to mean those interests which represent competition issues. It would seem that the comments made would
not lead to another conclusion where the important interest would be of another nature, e.g. political
interests” (Ham 1993, 586, footnote#39).
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investigation and lead to a final result taking our interests
into consideration in a more appropriate way (1998, 2).
This daily cooperation is discretionary in nature.
While the term “positive comity” cannot be found in the Bilateral Agreement, the
legal principle is clearly articulated in Article V. Positive comity differs from traditional
comity in that it allows one party to request that the other party open an investigation into
a competition case—located outside the first party’s jurisdiction—that affects the first
party’s important interests.302 In such cases, the requested party would inform the
requesting party whether they plan to initiate an investigation. Should the requesting
party be satisfied with the decision of the requested party, the requesting party would
normally, but not necessarily, “refrain from pursuing its own enforcement activity with
respect to the allegedly anticompetitive conduct, at least pending the outcome of the
requested investigation” (Ryan 2000, 33). Significantly, the Bilateral does not require
such a deferral by the requesting party.303 If an investigation is initiated, the Bilateral
does require the requested party to update the requesting party on the investigation and
inform them of any relevant decisions taken in the resulting investigation.
The crucial distinction between the two types of comity is that traditional comity
requires parties to consider each other’s important interests when conducting competition
investigations, and positive comity allows one party to request that the other party
investigate a competition case that adversely affects the important interests of the first
party. By allowing one party to request an investigation of activity that occurs outside its
jurisdiction, the positive comity provision of the Bilateral reduces the need for the
requesting party to enforce its domestic competition law extraterritorially. In addition, by
refraining from conducting a simultaneous investigation, the requesting party reduces the
likelihood that a conflicting decision will be reached.
Of course, positive comity requests require at least a minimal degree of credibility
in the commitment made by the requested party. As the OECD argues, “One country
might in some circumstances request another to investigate a matter despite concerns
about the latter’s ability to remedy the situation. However, unless the requesting country
                                                
302 A legal distinction may also be made between a request that a foreign jurisdiction open or expand an
investigation and a request for assistance in a foreign jurisdiction’s investigation, see OECD (1999a, 3).
See also OECD (1999a, 5-6) for a treatment of further definitional issues of positive comity.
133
has continuing confidence in the requested country’s legal tools, commitment, and
independence, it is unlikely to defer or suspend it own proceeding during any proceeding
by the requested country. Absent deferral or suspension, some of the potential benefits of
positive comity will not be fully realised.” (OECD 1999a, 13).304 Thus, for positive
comity to function properly, requesting parties must have confidence in the competence
of the requested party to carry out enforcement activities and regularly provide updates
(i.e., information) on the investigation.
EU and US competition agents employ this legal principle to increase the
likelihood of resolving disagreements during the merger review process. This cooperation
limits the intervention of those domestic actors that are more reliant on unilateral
extraterritoriality to resolve disputes. Even in an EI environment, the competition
officials can overcome national jurisdictional limitations through international
cooperation—sharing information at the early stages of the review process, adjusting
remedial and other decisions to accommodate the interests of the other party, and
cultivating long-term relationships based on credible and reciprocal commitments
between the regulatory agents.305 Therefore, the comity provisions in the Bilateral may
strengthen the cooperative relationship by increasing the credibility of the commitments
made between the competition agents who work together daily on technocratic issues in
the merger review process.
E. A Political Challenge to the Bilateral Agreement
Without comprehensive and precise legal boundaries for the authority of the EU’s
separate institutions, the Commission’s competence to sign the Bilateral Agreement was
not clear. Nevertheless, the Commission skillfully steered the draft Bilateral Agreement
through its uncertain domestic institutional landscape. In fact, the Commission was so
successful and expeditious that it was able to approve and sign the agreement before
significant opposition could be mounted in the Council of Ministers. This success,
however, would prove illusory.
                                                                                                                                                
303 The possibility of deferral is discussed more in the section below on the Positive Comity Agreement.
304 On the importance of credible commitments in relation to the Bilateral, see ICPAC (2000, 238-39.).
305 It should be noted that much skepticism surrounds the actual employment of positive comity. For
discussions of the limitations, see below and Waller (2000), Janow (2000, 41) and Ham (1993, 595).
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Shortly after the Commission’s Director-General of Competition sent the final
text to the national competition authorities in each Member State on October 7, 1991,
national complaints began to emerge.306 Concerns were expressed that the Commission
had overstepped its authority to enter into agreements with foreign governments, a
significant power not readily relinquished by the sovereign EU Member States. Certain
Member States were determined to bring the case to court in order to clarify the domestic
power-sharing arrangements that governed the ability of the Commission to engage at its
own discretion in rule-making cooperation.
On the other side of the Atlantic, the DoJ and the FTC decided to begin
cooperating in accordance with the procedures agreed in the Bilateral Agreement. The
mounting European concerns did not change the US view that the Bilateral was a useful
way to facilitate cooperation with the maturing EU. Even if the legality of the Bilateral
Agreement was going to be challenged in the EU, the US competition officials still
considered the procedures a practical and useful framework for reducing the likelihood of
divergent decisions on cases with concurrent jurisdiction.307
The first official challenge to the agreement came from the French Government
(supported by the Netherlands and Spain), which formally filed a complaint with the ECJ
to annul the Bilateral Agreement. The primary accusation was that the Bilateral was
unlawful because the Commission had breached its authority to conclude international
agreements, as stipulated in Article 228 of the Treaties of Rome (ECJ 1993, 3646).308 In
addition, the complaint noted concerns over the protection of confidential information
during exchanges with the US.309 The legal challenge is also reported to have reflected a
French frustration over a perceived lack of consultation with the Council of Ministers
before the Commission approved the Bilateral Agreement.310 Finally, in 1991, the French
                                                
306 Interview with former member of Brittan’s Cabinet, March 2001.
307 Interview with official in DoJ’s Antitrust Division, December 1999.
308 The French argument rested on Article 33 of the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty and the
first paragraph of Article 173 of the European Economic Community Treaty.
309 Specifically, “The French and Spanish Governments have also alleged the infringement of Article 20 of
Regulation No 17, which enshrines the principle of secrecy for the protection of the interests of individual
with regard to information acquired by the Commission in connection with its proceedings” (ECJ 1993,
3664). In the Advocate General’s opinion, Mr. Tesauro supports the French claim, stating that Articles 8
and 9 of the Bilateral Agreement do not resolve the problem of confidentiality. As a result, the Commission
concentrated on the protection of confidential information in its Corrigendum to the Council.
310 Interview with official in EU’s Competition Directorate, February 2001.
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also viewed Commissioner Brittan with suspicion as a pro-market Anglo-Saxon who
would push for increasingly close cooperation on competition issues and sharing of
confidential information with the US. Such an individual was sure to threaten the
priorities of French industrial policy.311
The French legal challenge delayed the official implementation of the Bilateral
Agreement in the EU. On December 16, 1993, the ECJ’s Advocate General Tesauro
delivered a preliminary opinion supporting the French challenge to the Bilateral
Agreement. About eight months later, on August 9, 1994, the ECJ delivered its final
judgment in the case.312 The decision found in favor of the French argument and ordered
the Commission to pay the legal fees associated with the case (ECJ 1994).313
The Commission had attempted to sign, via its discretionary authority, what it
labeled an “administrative” agreement on competition policy. However, according to the
ECJ, the Commission acted ultra vires because signing such an international agreement
was beyond the scope of its discretionary authority (Cini and McGowan 1998, 202). In
effect, the ECJ decision had clarified the EU’s principal-agent power-sharing
arrangement over rule-making cooperation in all policy areas (see below).
F. Re-Negotiating the Bilateral Agreement
With the Bilateral Agreement declared void by the ECJ, the Commission began
an earnest campaign to gain the Council’s approval of the agreement. On October 12,
1994, the Commission presented a request to the Council for a decision on the Bilateral
Agreement.314 In this communiqué, the Commission made its case for the Bilateral,
which is surprising in its candor regarding the need to limit political intervention. The
                                                
311 Interviews with official in EU’s Competition Directorate, February 2001; and former member of
Brittan’s Cabinet, March 2001.
312 See Case C-327/91 France v. Commission [1994] ECR I-3641.
313 For a discussion of the ECJ’s judgment on the annulment of the Bilateral, see Riley (1995).
314  The Commission sent a formal communiqué to the Council asking for approval of the Bilateral
Agreement (European Commission 1994). In 1995, under the consultation procedure, the European
Parliament approved the Commission’s proposal to the Council for the Bilateral (OJ C 043, 20/02/1995 p.
0126). However, under a renewed consultation, the Parliament approved the decision contingent upon two
amendments: removal of Art. 235 reference in preamble, second citation; and deletion of Recital 1 (OJ C
089, 10/04/1995 p. 0233). That same year, the Parliament reiterated support for keeping competition
authority under the purview of the Commission because “it is the sole institution directly under the
democratic control of the European Parliament” (EP Res on the XXIIIrd Competition Report from the
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Commission argued that current EU rules (including the Wood Pulp doctrine of
extraterritoriality) were insufficient to deal with the competition problems arising from
the increasingly international nature of business activity (1994, 2). In short, cooperative
arrangements were necessary for “an effective solution to be found to the problems
encountered, while at the same time avoiding the conflicts that may arise from a
unilateral reaction based on extraterritoriality. It is for this reason that the Commission
considers that cooperation agreements must be concluded between competition
authorities” (italics added) (1994, 2). The communiqué is also noteworthy for its
insistence that the Bilateral would limit the US extraterritorial intervention in European
competition matters because it incorporated “a number of principles established by US
case-law in order to restrict excesses in the extraterritorial application of US competition
rules (negative comity) and by developing for the first time the concept of positive
comity” (1994, 2).
These internal Union negotiations resulted in the exchange of a short Interpretive
Notice between the EU and US.315 It was during this period that the Council of Ministers
raised concerns over the protection of confidential information. Much of the Council’s
concern, as with businesses, was over the US’s criminal sanctions in cartel cases and the
use of confidential information.316 Put simply, the Council and European business
interests did not want European citizens (i.e., businesspeople) to be subject to
incarceration in US prisons.317 Here the EU’s political principals exercised their oversight
control instruments over the competition officials. Not wanting to challenge domestic
                                                                                                                                                
Commission, OJ C 089, 10/04/1995, p. 0146). Noteworthy, the Parliament also calls for the Commission to
investigate ways to decentralize competition policy in same resolution.
315 OJ L 131 of 15.6.95, pp. 38-39.
316 The rapid pace at which the agreement was initially drafted and signed not only limited review by and
input from political principals in the Council of Ministers, but also limited influence by interest groups, in
particular business. According to interviewees, the protections for confidential information that appeared in
the final agreement were inserted due to the need to satisfy current EU and US domestic law, not as a result
of pressure from business interests. For more on the role of business interests, see Chapter 6.
317 In 1994, business interests actively lobbied for guaranteed protection of confidential information. This
was due to the fear of such information being exchanged in cartel, anti-trust, etc. cases, which could then
put European executives in US prisons. There was also the legal question of whether information obtained
under domestic law could be shared internationally—some businesses argued that the procedures and
substance of EU and US competition law were too different to guarantee the proper sharing of such
information. The EU member states agreed with businesses on this point and presented these concerns to
the Commission. The Commission, not wanting to challenge domestic law, provided further guarantees for
the protection of confidential information, which appear in the Interpretive Notice and the “Statement on
Confidentiality of Information” (see below).
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legislation, the competition officials succumbed to the institutional constraints by which
they were bound to protect confidential information. In particular, the Commission
readily acknowledged that it
was bound by the obligations laid down in the Treaty and
in the regulations adopted by the Council. This constraint is
of particular importance here because of the confidentiality
requirement imposed on the Commission under Regulation
No 17 (First Regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86
of the EC Treaty), a requirement from which it could not
derogate (European Commission 1994, 2).
As a result, the Commission presented a “Statement on Confidentiality of Information” to
the Council, which guaranteed that only non-confidential information would be
exchanged with US competition officials (European Commission 1998a, 4-5). Exchanges
of confidential information can be made if the businesses concerned waive their rights to
confidentiality (see Chapter 5).
The Commission also issued to the Council a “Statement on Transparency” that
further clarified cooperation with the US. This statement asserted that EU Member States
would be informed of ongoing cooperation that may affect their national interests, in
particular when a notification is made to or received from the US competition officials
(European Commission 1996).318 It was also agreed that the Commission would report
annually to the Council and the European Parliament on the implementation of the
Bilateral Agreement.319 The Notice did not change the core provisions of the Bilateral
Agreement that strengthened cooperation between EU-US competition agents.
Following the internal negotiations and exchange of interpretive letters with the
US competition officials,320 the Council and the Commission promptly issued a joint
decision on April 10, 1995.321 The Joint Decision officially approved and implemented
                                                
318 These assurances are embodied in the Commission’s “Statement on Transparency” (European
Commission 1998a, 6). “The assessment of which Member State should be notified is made on the basis of
the Commission’s statement to Council of 10 April 1995, which largely reproduces the provisions of
Article II.2 of the Agreement. In most instances, the US authorities also notify the Member States directly,
under the OECD Recommendation” (European Commission 1996).
319 The first such report was presented by the Commission on October 8, 1996. The report covered the
period since the approval of the Agreement in April 1995, through June 30, 1996. For more on these
reports, see Chapter 5.
320 Two interpretive letters were exchanged between the US and EU on May 31 and July 31, 1995. These
interpretive letters clarified the treatment of confidential information. See OJ L 131 of 15.6.95, pp. 38-39.
321 OJ 1995 L131/38. Or OJ L 95 of 27.4.95, pp. 45-46.
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the Bilateral Agreement, noting “The Agreement shall apply with effect from 23
September 1991” (Article 2), the date the Bilateral was originally signed by the
Commission. The Commission was included in this Joint Decision because it was legally
required to sign the Bilateral as the competent authority of the ECSC. Otherwise, the
ECJ’s judgment had basically removed the Commission from the final rule-making
equation. But, the fact that the Commission first tried to sign the Bilateral under its own
discretionary authority shows its preference to avoid political intervention.
While the agreement was not officially recognized in the EU from 1991-95, it was
implemented on an informal basis, with EU-US notifications of merger reviews occurring
at an increasing rate each year.322 The smooth and productive functioning of this
“unofficial” implementation cooperation from 1991-95 helped to allay earlier French
fears about Commissioner Brittan’s plans for closer cooperation with the US. After four
years of court deliberations and internal negotiations, the unofficial implementation of the
Bilateral had been successful enough that the EU’s political principals no longer viewed
it as a threat to their national and/or constituent interests. The Commission’s original
strategy to circumvent the political principals and to approve quickly the Bilateral had
ultimately succeeded—the Commission had its binding agreement with the US, which
would allow the competition agents on both sides of the Atlantic to pursue discretionary
implementation cooperation.
The ECJ judgment against the Bilateral clarified the limits of the Commission’s
authority to engage in discretionary rule-making cooperation. Essentially, the
Commission has no discretionary authority to engage independently in rule-making
cooperation that results in binding international agreements. However, to a certain
degree, the ECJ’s judgment did establish discretionary authority for the Commission in
rule-making cooperation. Accordingly, as long as the Commission engages in non-
binding rule-making cooperation, such as the AAA (see below), it can do so at its own
discretion.
                                                
322 While notifications were suspended under the Bilateral Agreement pending the outcome of the French
legal challenge, notifications were still made in accordance with the 1986 OECD Recommendation
(European Commission 1996).
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G. Reasons for Signing the Bilateral Agreement
The Bilateral Agreement signaled a shift from traditional transatlantic competition
relations that relied on dispute resolution (via international political intervention) to a
new framework for dispute prevention. This agreement would move transatlantic
competition relations beyond the informal cooperation embodied in the OECD
Recommendations. The US and EU competition agents shared similar incentives for
signing the Bilateral Agreement. Both competition agents desired a formal, binding
agreement that would address the new competition challenges emanating from an
international system being changed by EI. These challenges to domestic competition
policy were given urgency because increasing EI encouraged private firms to escalate
internationally-oriented merger activity—much of which would have to be reviewed
concurrently by US and EU competition officials. In addition to the systemic-level EI, the
institutions and strategic interaction among actors in domestic politics also contributed to
the signing of the Bilateral Agreement.
Clearly both competition agents viewed the agreement as a way to reduce the
likelihood of domestic and international political intervention in concurrent jurisdiction
merger cases. The structure of information exchanges in the Bilateral is conducive to
decreasing the likelihood of divergent decisions in merger reviews, which decreases the
likelihood of political intervention. By providing for the exchange of only non-
confidential information, the agreement also avoids requiring principal intervention (e.g.,
changing existing or creating new domestic law) while still allowing the exchange of
enough non-confidential information to reduce the likelihood of divergent decisions. This
arrangement reduces the likelihood that foreign and domestic political principals will
intervene in concurrent jurisdiction mergers.
Interestingly, it also appears that competition agents signed the agreement in order
to reduce the likelihood of their foreign counterparts intervening extraterritorially in
competition cases. As such, the US and EU competition agents negotiated the Bilateral
out of self-interest, not some shared conception of a common interest. In order to
understand the motivations of the competition agents, it is useful to consider the domestic
developments that shaped their respective incentives. The following discussion expands
on the domestic events detailed in Chapter 3.
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For the US competition agents, cooperating within the framework of the Bilateral
would reduce the likelihood of intervention by European political principals and
competition agents in concurrent jurisdiction mergers. US competition officials feared the
possibility of increased intervention by the EU because the Union was seen as
“maturing”. This maturation came in the form of new domestic and international control
instruments, which, according to Janow, were becoming evident through three interlinked
events: the Wood Pulp doctrine of extraterritoriality, the completion of the single market
and the signing of the Merger Control Regulation (2000, 30-31).323
First, the 1988 Wood Pulp decision was especially important for changing
transatlantic relations because it established the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the EU.
This decision reinforced the international reach of control instruments exercised by the
EU. Second, the completion of the EU’s single market added further evidence that the
Union was maturing. As Stark argues, the single market program “was in full swing,
bringing with it an increase in the powers and visibility of the Commission” (Stark 2000,
4). The completion of the single market suggested that the EU was becoming an
emerging and significant international economic actor. From the US perspective, this new
actor was likely to possess more resources for non-punitive control instruments and was
more likely to use them. Third, specific to competition policy, this new activism was
reflected in the implementation of the MCR in 1990. Not only did the MCR designate the
Commission as the lead agency for merger review in the Union, it also created a new
Merger Task Force with pre-merger notification authority that could be applied to the
behavior of US firms. The MCR contained specific thresholds above which the
Commission would investigate anticompetitive behavior. Because many US firms
engaging in mergers in the EU were large corporations, their activity would almost
certainly meet these thresholds. Thus, the MCR was believed to increase the potential
extraterritorial threat to US firms and interests in an increasing number of sectors within
the single market.
                                                
323 Janow’s inventory of the three factors motivating the US signing the Bilateral is confirmed by domestic
competition officials. For example, see Charles A. James, current Assistant Attorney General of the DoJ’s
Antitrust Division (2001, 4); Charles S. Stark, Chief, Foreign Commerce Section in the DoJ’s Antitrust
Division (2000, 4); and former FTC Commissioner Janet D. Steiger (1995, 4). See also Miles (1995, 120).
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In short, these three factors endowed the EU with additional foreign intervention
instruments in competition policy. Specifically, the EU’s competition agents could now
exercise their merger review extraterritorially and impose remedies on US firms even if
the US competition authorities disagreed. The US competition agents viewed such
behavior as an unacceptable imbalance that was sure to increase the likelihood of US
political intervention. The combination of these new foreign intervention instruments
(non-punitive measures and extraterritorial remedies) necessitated negotiation of the
Bilateral if US competition agents were to decrease the likelihood of divergent decisions
that would prompt political intervention.
The EU competition agents also had a significant self-interest in negotiating the
Bilateral. The Commission negotiated the Bilateral conscious of the various foreign
intervention instruments available to the US competition agents (e.g., extraterritorial
remedies) and political principals (e.g., Section 301, Exon-Florio) as well as their
willingness to use them. By reducing the likelihood of divergent decisions in competition
matters, the Commission could reduce the likelihood of US political principals
intervening with foreign intervention instruments. By entering into a binding agreement,
the Commission also could create a more balanced transatlantic relationship with US
competition agents. While cooperation had occurred under the non-binding framework of
the OECD Recommendation, the EU perceived this regime as unbalanced. The imbalance
could advantage the US because it was more experienced and historically more willing to
use the numerous foreign intervention instruments at its disposal. By binding the US
competition agents into a formal agreement, the Commission could balance out the US’s
experience and availability of and willingness to use foreign intervention instruments.324
The EU was also aware of its own rapid maturation in competition policy and conscious
that such domestic changes could precipitate conflict in transatlantic competition matters
as well as other policy areas (Brittan 1992a, 49). Although the EU was maturing, the fact
that it was largely untested in international competition disputes and lacked significant
foreign intervention instruments to counter unilateralism (e.g., blocking and clawback
statutes) increased the incentive to cooperate administratively with the US competition
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agents. Of course, the individual EU Member States could still exercise their respective
foreign intervention instruments against the US, but this was an undesirable recourse to
dispute resolution through political intervention. Rather, the Commission needed a
method to reduce the likelihood of conflicting decisions without increasing the likelihood
of political intervention. The discretionary pursuit of rule-making cooperation was the
most appealing avenue open to the Commission.
An important but unexpected finding of this case is that competition agents pursue
discretionary rule-making cooperation not only to maximize their independence from
political principals, but also to reduce the likelihood of unilateral extraterritoriality by
foreign competition agents—EU and US competition officials were both motivated to
sign the Bilateral by the need for balance with their foreign counterparts. When
competition agents act extraterritoriality (e.g., require divergent remedies in a foreign
jurisdiction) they increase uncertainty for their foreign counterparts and increase the
likelihood of political intervention. Thus, cooperation between competition agents is not
a simple dynamic of agents versus principals. Rather, EU and US agents appeared fearful
of each other’s extraterritorial reach at the start of this cooperation. Through the 1990s,
these agents continued to pursue rule-making cooperation to reduce further the likelihood
of political intervention and any need of their foreign counterparts to act extraterritorially.
III. The 1998 Positive Comity Agreement—Furthering Dispute Prevention
The Bilateral Agreement launched formal, binding cooperation between the EU
and US competition authorities. Most cooperation that followed from the Bilateral
developed on the basis of traditional comity and was implemented as daily and
discretionary contacts between EU and US case handlers (see Chapter 5). While the
Bilateral was hailed on both sides of the Atlantic as a breakthrough, the competition
authorities were simultaneously taking steps to clarify precise implementing procedures
for making positive comity requests. This need for clarification ultimately materialized in
                                                                                                                                                
324 Previous efforts by the EU’s Member States to address this imbalance had resulted in the promulgation
of retaliatory measures, such as blocking and clawback statutes, which were unavailable to the
Commission.
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the form of a new effort at transatlantic rule-making cooperation—the Positive Comity
Agreement (PCA) of June 4, 1998.325
The success of the Bilateral Agreement had increased significantly the volume of
contacts between EU and US competition officials. In addition to the discretionary
contacts occurring among case handlers, meetings between the high-level competition
officials also became regular occurrences. One such meeting between the EU’s
Competition Commissioner (Karel Van Miert) and the heads of the DoJ’s Antitrust
Division (Joseph Klein) and the FTC (Robert Pitofsky) occurred in Washington, DC, on
October 16, 1996. Among other issues, the participants discussed the possibility of
drafting a new transatlantic competition agreement (European Commission 1997). Both
sides agreed that it would be useful to move forward on a new and separate agreement
that would elaborate when positive comity ordinarily would be applied and what specific
procedures would be employed for such a request.
A. Negotiating the PCA
In the US, work on this new and separate agreement again proceeded in
accordance with the domestic power-sharing arrangements established for rule-making
cooperation under the Case-Zablocki Act. These discretionary procedures required
negotiation and agreement between the DoJ and FTC. As long as the two competition
agents were able to agree on the substance of the agreement, their work did not require
approval of the political principals. Ultimately, the only other US actor whose
involvement would be required was the Department of State (DoS). The DoS’s legal
approval would be necessary to make sure that the US was not signing a binding
international agreement that conflicted with current domestic law. By 1997, the US
competition officials moved beyond internal negotiations and began exchanging drafts of
the new agreement with their counterparts in the EU.
In the EU, the internal negotiations were more complex. Due to the power-sharing
parameters established by the ECJ ruling on the Bilateral, the Commission followed a
very different procedure for negotiating the PCA. Within the Commission itself, the
                                                
325 The official name of the PCA is the “Agreement Between the European Communities and the
Government of the United States of America Regarding the Application of Positive Comity Principles in
the Enforcement of their Competition Laws.”
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Competition Directorate was primarily responsible for drafting the agreement, with
opinions, comments and other support added by the Directorate for External Affairs.326
Outside the Commission, the Council of Ministers (CoM) was involved very early. The
CoM adopted a negotiating brief for the Commission on October 14, 1996, two days prior
to the initial meeting in Washington at which the new agreement was to be discussed.327
The brief allowed the Commission
to open negotiations with the US authorities  with a view to
strengthening certain provisions contained in the [Bilateral]
Agreement… The new Agreement envisages introducing a
procedure for determining, in certain cases falling within
both parties’ jurisdiction, whether one party should suspend
or defer initiating its procedures in order to allow the other
party to undertake investigations on its own and to apply, if
necessary, appropriate measures (Council of Ministers
1996).
Because the intended agreement would be binding on the signatories, the EU
political principals remained involved in this case of rule-making cooperation. On June
18, 1997, the Commission formally adopted and submitted a proposal for the new
agreement to the Council. The short proposal notably highlighted that the new agreement
represents a commitment on the part of the US and EU “to cooperate with respect to
antitrust enforcement rather than to seek to apply their antitrust laws extraterritorially”
(European Commission 1997a).328 The Commission also submitted the proposal to the
individual Member States, the European Parliament, industry and other interested parties
for opinion (Commission 1997).329 Shortly thereafter, the Commission received the
Council’s approval to enter into the agreement. On June 4, 1998, the Council and the
Commission signed the final agreement on behalf of the EU. The DoJ’s Antitrust
Division and the FTC signed on behalf of the US.
                                                
326 For example, the Directorate for External Affairs helped to set up meetings between EU competition
officials and their US counterparts.
327 According to the Commission (1997), the Council formally authorized the Commission to negotiate this
new agreement on October 25, 1996.
328 The Commission reiterates this belief in its annual 1998 report to the Council and the European
Parliament (European Commission 1999,5).
329 Starek (1997) also notes that the Council had to wait for the European Parliament to review the proposal
before it could take final action.
145
B. Provisions of the PCA
The primary intent of the PCA is to clarify how positive comity will work in
practice. As such, the agreement explicitly mentions the principle of positive comity and
asserts that “The competition authorities of a Requesting Party may request the
competition authorities of a Requested Party to investigate and, if warranted, to remedy
anticompetitive activities in accordance with the Requested Party’s competition laws”
(Article III). These requests will typically be made when one competition authority is
better placed to acquire the necessary information to conduct an investigation. In such a
case, the PCA creates the presumption that the competition authorities of a Requesting
Party “will normally defer or suspend their own enforcement activities in favor of
enforcement activities by the competition authorities of the Requested Party” (Article
IV).
Specific conditions are provided under which a positive comity deferral will be
made. For example, deferrals will normally be made when the anticompetitive activities
in question do not have a “direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable impact on
consumers” in the Requesting Party’s territory (Article IV). In other words, if one party
feels the anticompetitive behavior is seriously detrimental to its domestic consumers, that
party has the right to conduct a simultaneous investigation of its own. This decision to
conduct a simultaneous investigation is discretionary and is in no way abrogated if the
party has made a positive comity request. The provisions for deferral are not applicable to
mergers (see below).
The PCA procedures increase implementation cooperation by requiring the
Requested Party—“on request or at reasonable intervals”—to inform the Requesting
Party of the status of the investigation. Should the Requested Party be unable to deal
“actively and expeditiously” with or update the other party on a positive comity request,
the Requesting Party is free to initiate its own investigation. Updates of ongoing positive
comity investigations must conform to the domestic statutory requirements of the
respective parties for protecting confidential information (Article V).
146
C. Avoiding Political Intervention in the PCA
While negotiating the PCA, EU and US competition agents pursued rule-making
cooperation always conscious of the constraints imposed by their respective domestic
institutional environments. In accordance with their domestic power-sharing
arrangements, the US competition officials were again able to negotiate this executive
agreement without political intervention. The EU competition officials, having learned
their lesson from the ECJ ruling on the Bilateral Agreement, enjoyed comparatively less
discretionary rule-making authority. As a result, the EU competition agents coordinated
with their political principals throughout the negotiation process in accordance with their
domestic power-sharing arrangements. Despite this constraint, the EU competition agents
still pursued the agreement as a means to enhance and clarify their cooperation with US
competition agents.
In an effort to avoid political intervention, the US and EU competition agents
were careful not to insert language into the draft agreement that would require changes to
domestic law. Such changes would have necessitated principal involvement as politicians
amended and/or drafted new legislation. This approach was unacceptable because it
would have increased considerably the costs of negotiating and reduced the likelihood of
finalizing the new agreement. To make the point as clear as possible, the competition
officials inserted Article VII: “Nothing in this Agreement shall be interpreted in a manner
inconsistent with the existing laws, or as requiring any change in the laws, of the United
States of America or the European Communities or of their respective states or Member
States.” This provision assured that domestic legal protection for confidential business
information would be respected.
Another example of the competition agents’ preference to avoid political
intervention relates to mergers. Upon signing the PCA, the competition agents
emphasized the supremacy of domestic legislation, explaining that the agreement does
not cover merger reviews (Parisi 1999, 136) because the domestic EU and US merger
control laws and pre-merger notification rules take precedence over certain PCA
provisions. While the PCA “is not applicable to mergers… the broader, more general
positive comity provisions of the 1991 Agreement remain in effect and would in theory
permit a positive comity request in a merger case” (OECD 1999a, 10). However, in
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practice, the PCA encounters clear statutory obstacles to positive comity requests in
merger review. First, under the EU’s MCR and the US’s HSR Act, domestic
investigations of mergers cannot be suspended or deferred to foreign competition
authorities.330 Any such suspension or deferral would directly contradict domestic law
that charges competition agents with responsibility for merger control. Second, positive
comity requests in merger reviews would be largely unnecessary. A competition agent
could request that their foreign counterpart open an investigation into a specific merger,
but due to pre-merger filing requirements, such an investigation would have already been
opened once the merging firms had submitted their notification to merge.331 Thus,
positive comity requests would be redundant and unnecessary in merger review. Third,
the statutory timetables contained in the MCR and HSR would make it very difficult for
the US and EU competition agents to apply positive comity to their respective merger
reviews. A positive comity request and subsequent deferral may extend the merger
review process beyond the limits that are statutorily allowable. Thus, the provisions in the
PCA show that the competition agents again consciously decided that cooperation should
occur on the basis of current statutes.
D. EU and US Reasons for Signing the PCA
Similar to the Bilateral, the PCA furthered the creation of a transatlantic
framework based on dispute prevention by competition agents instead of dispute
resolution by political principals. Again, the PCA would address the new competition
challenges raised by the interaction of the systemic-level EI and competition cases in
overlapping jurisdictions. While the applicability of the PCA is limited to non-merger
cases, it does offer useful insights into the strategic interaction that occurs between EU
and US competition agents. In particular, the PCA not only reduces the likelihood of
political intervention in non-merger cases, but also preempts extraterritoriality by
competition agents.
                                                
330 The competition officials acknowledged that their domestic institutional environments “leave little
discretion to exercise the kind of deference that ‘positive comity’ implies” in merger review (Parisi 1999;
135, note 15).
331 Merging firms must officially notify the competition authorities. In the US, such notification “may be
made as early as an agreement in principle is reached or a (nonbinding) letter of intent or contract has been
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The PCA facilitates future implementation cooperation by reducing the likelihood
that EU and US competition laws will be applied extraterritorially in transatlantic cases.
In such cases, the competition agents will normally suspend or defer their own
investigation instead of exercising their laws extraterritorially. As Van Miert asserts, the
PCA “represents a commitment on the part of each party to cooperate with respect to
antitrust enforcement, rather than to seek to apply its antitrust laws extraterritorially”
(1998, 9). This suppression of extraterritoriality reduces the likelihood that political
principals will view the actions of foreign competition agents as threats to national and/or
constituent interests.
By clarifying the procedures for positive comity requests, the PCA decreases the
likelihood of competition agents reaching divergent decisions in concurrent jurisdiction
cases. As Devuyst argues, “The application of positive comity not only represents a
commitment to cooperate rather than seek to apply antitrust laws extraterritorially; it also
reduces the possibility of conflicting decisions being made by different competition
authorities” (2001, 136). This reduction occurs because agents will simply request that
their foreign counterparts open an investigation into possibly anticompetitive activity
instead of opening their own investigation that could result in a divergent decision. By
reducing the likelihood of divergent decisions, the PCA contributes significantly to
limiting political intervention.
Both the US and EU competition agents viewed the PCA as a way to reduce the
likelihood of unilateral extraterritoriality. The desire to reduce the likelihood of
extraterritoriality via a binding agreement becomes particularly evident in the EU
position.332 The Commission’s position was largely informed by a report from its Group
of Experts, which cited positive comity as an untapped resource for increasing
cooperation and raised concerns over US extraterritoriality (Devuyst 1998):
…it appears that the ambitious provisions of the existing
[Bilateral] Agreement have not (yet) been fully exploited.
In particular it still remains to be seen how far the ‘comity’
procedures are really likely to influence competition
authorities’ natural propensity not to be concerned with the
                                                                                                                                                
signed” (ICPAC 2000, 110). In the EU, such notifications “can be made only after the signing of a
definitive merger agreement, acquisition of control, or announcement of a public bid” (ICPAC 2000, 111).
332 Devuyst argues that the EU essentially wanted the PCA as a means to limit US extraterritoriality (1998,
467). On this point, see European Commission (1997b, 3).
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external effects of their decisions. Despite recent court
decisions333 and views expressed some months ago by the
United States competition authorities, it is important to
avoid an unduly restrictive interpretation of the concept of
comity which would make it applicable only in the (rare)
cases of ‘pure conflict’ of law, i.e., when a firm cannot
comply with the requirements imposed by one jurisdiction
except by infringing the law of another jurisdiction (Group
of Experts 1995, 9).
The US court decision that concerned the Group of Experts was the Hartford Fire
Insurance Co. decision. This 1993 decision by the US Supreme Court “dealt comity a
near death blow… by limiting comity considerations in most situations to those conflicts
where one sovereign has compelled the very conduct which the other sovereign forbids”
(Waller 2000, 564). For more on this decision, see Chapter 3.
In signing the PCA, the EU was clearly concerned by the potential extent of US
extraterritorial jurisdiction. As Competition Commissioner Karel Van Miert claimed, this
concern was a major factor motivating the EU’s signing of the PCA:
As the Community has never formally claimed territorial
jurisdiction as extensive as that which is claimed by the
US, this situation was viewed as an imbalance in our
bilateral relations and an obstacle to any further deepening
of these relations. For this reason we have decided to
negotiate a strengthening of the positive comity instrument.
We believe that the new draft agreement which the
Commission adopted last July, and which will soon be
concluded, will be a significant contribution to rebalancing
relations in this respect (Van Miert 1997, 7).
This need for balancing reveals the EU competition agents’ concern over the
extraterritorial jurisdiction of the US. Because the EU’s legal basis and exercise of
extraterritorial jurisdiction was more recent and less established than that of the US (see
Chapter 3), the EU had not formally claimed extraterritorial jurisdiction as extensive as
the US.334 As a result, the EU saw the PCA as a way to rebalance the transatlantic
relationship (Rakovsky 1997). This speaks directly to the fear regulatory agents have of
intervention by foreign regulatory agents.
                                                
333 Cf. for example the 1993 judgment of the United States Supreme Court in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v.
California, 113 S.Ct. 2909.
334 As noted in Chapter 3, this would change with the 1999 Gencor decision that allowed for an effects test
to determine jurisdiction.
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The future benefits following from the application of positive comity should not
be exaggerated.335 Due to the success of the Bilateral Agreement, recourse to the safety-
valve of positive comity has been reduced. As Claude Rakovsky, member of EU’s
Competition Directorate, argues, the Bilateral “may have been a source of inspiration in
daily co-operation,” and this co-operation may have been so good that “it is not normally
necessary to activate formally the (positive or negative) comity procedures” (cited in
OECD 1999a, 11).336 Evidence of the limitations of positive comity can be found in the
fact that, to date, there has been only one formal request for an investigation under the
PCA: the Sabre/Amadeus case.337 As noted in Chapter 2, this case provides evidence of
the US competition agents using the PCA in a self-interested strategic manner. In
Sabre/Amadeus, the US competition agents requested that the Commission investigate
the allegedly anticompetitive behavior of a French firm.338 Ultimately, the Commission
decided against the French firm, a decision that irritated the French Government. In
effect, the US competition agent had used the Commission in an instrumental fashion to
challenge the French firm. As a result, the US agents achieved their interests—the
anticompetitive behavior of the firm was remedied and they avoided infuriating French
politicians who instead directed their anger toward the Commission.
The PCA case indicates that the competition agents were so eager to clarify
procedures of positive comity—in order to the reduce likelihood of political
intervention—that they went ahead with binding rule-making cooperation (including the
EU working within its more restrictive and higher-cost institutional framework) even
though the resulting agreement promised little in the way of increasing further discretion.
For example, the principle of positive comity is not frequently used and the PCA does not
even apply to mergers, the area in which most transatlantic competition relations occur.
This limitation is a direct result of the competition agents’ preference to avoid political
                                                
335 See Waller (2000) and Griffin (184-185).
336 Waller agrees, arguing “At one level, comity is no longer important because its advocates won. The
United States government now acts cautiously, and considers foreign interests before it seeks to investigate
or challenge conduct abroad by foreign nationals that allegedly produces anticompetitive effects in the
United States” (2000, 565).
337 While only one formal notification has occurred under PCA, Janow notes three other informal
notifications that resemble the principle of positive comity: AC Nielsen, Parma Ham, and Marathon Oil
(2000, 38-39).
338 For more detailed discussions of Sabre/Amadeus, see Devuyst (2001, 140-42), Janow (2000, 39-40) and
Griffin (1999, 184-185).
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intervention by not pressing for changes in domestic competition laws on merger control.
Thus, the signing of the PCA reflects the concern of competition agents to reduce foreign
political intervention and avoid domestic political intervention by requiring politicians to
change domestic laws.
The PCA also reflects the concern of competition agents to preempt
extraterritoriality by their fellow competition agents. In particular, this fear of
intervention by foreign regulatory agents is witnessed in the EU’s desire to “rebalance”
the relationship. For the US competition agents, the Bilateral Agreement had largely
addressed their earlier concerns over balancing—concerns that had emerged from the
Wood Pulp decision, the SEM and the MCR. However, negotiating and signing the PCA
was still in the interests of the US competition agents because it offered the potential of
reducing the likelihood of political intervention and could be used strategically as in the
Sabre/Amadeus case.
IV. The 1999 Administrative Arrangements on Attendance—Non-Binding Dispute
Prevention
In addition to the binding Bilateral Agreement and the PCA, the EU and US
competition authorities have also engaged in non-binding, rule-making cooperation. On
March 31, 1999, the EU and US competition agents signed the Administrative
Arrangements on Attendance (AAA).339 This formal agreement was designed to enhance
implementation cooperation in competition matters. As such, it formalizes procedures for
competition authorities to attend (on a reciprocal basis) hearings held during each other’s
merger review processes. Because the AAA is non-binding, both competition agents were
able to negotiate and sign the agreement entirely at their own discretion. As such, the
AAA represents the only time when the Commission was able to engage in transatlantic
rule-making cooperation entirely at its own discretion. This feature of the AAA case
provides useful comparative insights into the Commission’s ability to engage in rule-
making cooperation despite domestic power-sharing arrangements that limit its ability to
negotiate and sign binding agreements.
                                                
339 See Bulletin EU 3-1999, Competition (18/43).
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A. Origins of the AAA
When conducting their respective merger reviews, EU and US competition agents
frequently meet with the merging firms and third parties as a way to increase their
information on the likely impact of the merger.340 These meetings are known as “oral
hearings” in the EU and “pitch meetings” in the US. As provided for in the EU’s MCR,
oral hearings are held by the Merger Task Force and conducted by an independent
Hearing Officer. In the US, the DoJ’s Antitrust Division and the FTC hold their own
respective pitch meetings. The AAA allows representatives of foreign competition agents
to attend these discretionary meetings in cases of mutual interest (i.e., concurrent
jurisdiction mergers).
In 1997, prior to negotiating the AAA, the US DoJ and FTC issued requests to
attend oral hearings being conducted by the EU’s Competition Directorate (European
Commission 1998a, 12). After reviewing these requests, the Directorate (specifically, the
Hearing Officer) invited officials from the US competition agents to take part as
observers in the oral hearings. These invitations were specific to reviews being conducted
for three separate merger cases: Boeing/McDonnell Douglas, Guinness/Grand
Metropolitan and WorldCom/MCI (Devuyst 2001, 136). Because the US officials
attended the hearings as observers, they were not authorized to participate or intervene in
the proceedings.
The Commission’s decision to accept the US’s requests for attendance “took into
account that the US authorities were examining the same transactions and that attendance
in the hearings could improve cooperation and coordination of enforcement activities”
(Devuyst 2001, 136). Based on this experience, the EU believed that further attendance at
foreign hearings could prove very beneficial to the analysis of concurrent jurisdiction
mergers (i.e., reduce the likelihood of divergent decisions). As a result, the Commission
“proposed an exchange of letters” with the US competition authorities in order “to
establish a clear framework for such requests and to ensure their reciprocal nature”
(Devuyst 2001, 136). The call for reciprocity in such a framework again reflects the
desire of the EU competition agents for balance in their relations with the US competition
agents.
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B. Negotiating the AAA
Not surprisingly, the US competition agents were able to negotiate these new
administrative arrangements entirely at their own discretion. Careful to highlight its
discretionary authority to sign the formal AAA, the Commission noted that “Neither
these administrative arrangements, nor the letters exchanged between the Commission
and the US competition authorities, outlining and confirming a common understanding of
the said arrangements, constitute a binding international agreement” (European
Commission 2000a, 5). Because the AAA would not be binding, the Commission was not
constrained by the ECJ’s 1995 decision on the Bilateral Agreement. Thus, the EU
Competition Directorate was able for the first time to pursue discretionary rule-making
cooperation unabated by the domestic power-sharing arrangements that had required
intervention by the CoM in the Bilateral Agreement and the PCA.341
C. The AAA in Practice
Based on the AAA, reciprocal exchanges of attendees have now become a
common feature of the review process for concurrent jurisdiction mergers. Before the
AAA, requests for attendance were dealt with on a case-by-case basis. Now, the
procedure to gain attendance has been regularized. As the EU’s Competition
Commissioner Mario Monti argues “it has now become standard practice for
representatives of the antitrust agencies to attend oral hearings in cases involving close
EU-US cooperation—a virtually unprecedented step forward in EU-US regulatory
cooperation” (2001a, 3). By simplifying the procedure for attendance into a standard
practice, cooperation has been enhanced, which, at least marginally, reduces the
likelihood that competition agents will reach divergent decisions.
Exactly who will be allowed to attend these hearings is determined exclusively at
the discretion of the competition agents.342 The DoS is not involved on the US side, and
neither is the CoM, Directorate for External Affairs or the individual Member States on
                                                                                                                                                
340 The AAA also applies to non-merger cases.
341 In addition, because the agreement was simply a non-binding administrative arrangement, the
Directorate for External Affairs was not closely involved either. Interview with official in EU’s Directorate
for External Affairs, May 2001.
342 In the EU, this decision is made by the Hearing Officer.
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the EU side. Before an arrangement for attendance is completed, the host competition
agents will typically consult with the merging firms. When requests for attendance are
granted, the prevailing laws protecting confidential information in the host jurisdiction
apply to the guest agents. Unless the merging firms have agreed to waive their right to
confidentiality, guest competition agents are asked to exit the meeting when confidential
information is being discussed. As such, the AAA does not threaten domestic laws on
confidential information. It is possible that a request for attendance could be denied. The
AAA mentions that attendance will be granted for “appropriate” cases. Thus, a
competition agent can “decline to invite attendance by the requesting competition
authority, if it believes that the other’s attendance would adversely affect the proceedings
or would otherwise be inconsistent with important interests” (Devuyst 2001, 137).
The AAA further decreases the likelihood that competition agents investigating
concurrent jurisdiction mergers will reach divergent decisions because it reduces the
information asymmetries between the agents. However, reciprocal attendance does not
guarantee convergent decisions. The BOC/Air Liquide merger in December 1999 was
one such case. Following a request by the FTC to attend the EU oral hearing, this merger
represented the first time the AAA was formally invoked. While the FTC attended the
EU’s hearing, the competition agents ultimately ended up in “disagreement” over the
merger case (Commission 2000a, 5-6).343 Thus, cooperation under the AAA does not
change the underlying domestic laws upon which the two respective competition agents
analyze mergers. Indeed, the competition agents are unlikely to request such changes to
domestic laws.
While the AAA has its limits, the agreement does contribute to transatlantic
cooperation in the implementation of competition policy. First and foremost, the
agreement reduces information asymmetries that can increase the likelihood of divergent
decisions. By reducing the likelihood of divergent decisions, the AAA (like the Bilateral
and PCA) reduces the likelihood of political intervention via domestic control and foreign
intervention instruments. The exchange of attendees and information also reduces the
likelihood that foreign competition agents will extraterritorially impose divergent
remedies.
                                                
343 For more on the BOC/Air Liquide case, see Chapter 5.
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V. Conclusions
The preceding analysis suggests the means by which transatlantic competition
relations have unexpectedly transitioned from an adversarial relationship of unilateral
extraterritoriality to one of cooperative bilateralism. In short, the three formal agreements
investigated herein are examples of rule-making cooperation that were consciously
designed to encourage dispute prevention by regulatory agents instead of dispute
resolution by political principals. This transition was a response by regulatory agents to
the common stimulus of EI and has occurred through largely discretionary processes that
reflect their similar preferences, despite the constraints of different domestic institutional
environments. The discretionary processes of rule-making cooperation in competition
policy suggest that EU and US regulatory agents consciously increase shirking in order to
decrease the likelihood of political intervention.
This chapter also implicitly examines a counterfactual. Without competition
agents pursuing their preferences to maximize certainty and decision making authority,
political principals could have been expected to respond to the new stimulus of EI and the
increasing likelihood of divergent decisions by creating new foreign intervention
instruments to pressure foreign regulatory agents or by entering into non-discretionary
rule-making cooperation via treaties. Neither of these outcomes occurred. Rather, the
competition agents pursued rule-making cooperation via discretionary means in order to
create a framework for reducing information asymmetries.
The preceding analysis clearly demonstrates the patterns of behavior discussed in
Chapter 2 (i.e., P1, P2 and P3). The primary purpose of the three formal agreements was
to reduce information asymmetries between the EU and US regulatory agents (P1).
Increases in information exchanges between the regulatory agents decrease the likelihood
of divergent decisions, which, in turn, reduces the likelihood of political intervention.
Under the cooperative framework established by the three formal agreements, EU and US
regulatory agents now share information at all stages of the merger review process (see
Chapter 5). By decreasing the likelihood of divergent decisions and political intervention,
the competition agents pursued their preference for maximizing their own certainty and
decision-making authority in subsequent policy implementation. Similarly, the political
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principals also pursued their preference to intervene with control instruments when the
perceived costs of agent shirking in rule-making cooperation exceeded the costs of not
intervening (P3).
Despite different domestic institutional environments that imposed different
constraints, the agents were able to achieve their strategic goal of rule-making
cooperation. Based on their domestic power-sharing arrangements, the US competition
agents enjoyed comparatively more discretionary authority to engage in rule-making
cooperation (per the CZA). Even though the EU competition agents enjoyed less (or less
clear) discretionary authority to engage in rule-making cooperation, they nevertheless
decided to negotiate and sign the Bilateral Agreement at their own discretion (P2).
The case of the Bilateral Agreement demonstrates the domestic constraints on the
Commission’s discretionary authority to engage in rule-making cooperation. The French
decided to intervene in this case because the costs of not intervening were excessive (P3).
These costs were excessive because failure to intervene would have essentially granted
the Commission discretionary authority to negotiate and sign binding agreements. From
the perspective of the EU’s principals, such a de facto delegation of authority to the
Commission would have allowed the agent to sign binding international agreements in
other policy areas—an unacceptable transfer of sovereignty within the EU system. After
finalizing the Bilateral Agreement in 1995, the Commission remained conscious of its
political constraints and conformed to the de facto power-sharing arrangement—rule-
making cooperation that results in binding agreements cannot be conducted under the
Commission’s sole discretionary authority—established by the ECJ’s decision.
The PCA and AAA were negotiated to clarify the procedures for discretionary
EU-US implementation cooperation. The US competition agents were able to negotiate
and sign both agreements under their discretionary rule-making authority. However,
because the PCA is a binding agreement, the Commission lacked equivalent discretionary
rule-making authority and, rather, conformed to its new, non-discretionary power-sharing
arrangements for rule-making cooperation. Because the AAA was non-binding, the
Commission was able to negotiate and sign the agreement solely under its discretionary
rule-making authority.
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Throughout the three cases analyzed, it becomes apparent that the EU and US
competition agents carefully avoided cooperating in ways that would require changes to
domestic legislation (P2). Because the Bilateral Agreement is not a treaty, it does not
change existing domestic law. While the Bilateral explicitly allows for extraterritoriality,
more importantly, it reduces the likelihood of such unilateral behavior by increasing
discretionary implementation cooperation between agents through notifications,
exchanges of information, coordination of remedies and new measures like comity. This
cooperation does not eliminate the possibility of differing analyses in individual merger
cases, but it does reduce the likelihood that divergent decisions will occur. Similarly, both
the PCA and the AAA carefully avoided mandating changes to domestic law: the PCA
respects confidentiality of information and does not apply to merger review, and the
AAA also protects confidentiality of information. Neither of these agreements prohibits
principals and/or agents from acting extraterritoriality. But they both contribute to
implementation cooperation by establishing discretionary mechanisms for reducing the
likelihood of such unilateral behavior.
Competition agents clearly prefer avoiding both domestic and foreign political
intervention. However, an unexpected and important finding of the preceding analysis is
that the agents also prefer avoiding extraterritorial intervention by foreign competition
agents, such as the imposition of divergent remedies in concurrent jurisdiction cases. In
order to reduce the likelihood of such interventions, the agreements were negotiated in an
attempt to encourage “balance” in transatlantic competition relations. During the 1980s,
EU and US competition agents perceived a number of overseas domestic developments
as likely indicators of greater foreign activism and unilateralism. In an attempt to remedy
this perceived imbalance, both the EU and US competition agents decided that binding
their foreign counterpart into a cooperative framework was the best solution. Even the
non-binding AAA is explicit in its call for balance because it asserts the need for
reciprocity in allowing attendance.
The need for balance suggests that the EU and US competition agents behave as
self-interested, utility-maximizing actors. Despite their desire to cooperate, they remain
suspicious of each other’s commitment to cooperation and are not acting on some shared
conception of a common interest. The reason for this appears simple: if one agent were to
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act extraterritorially, they would threaten the other agent’s preference to maximize their
own certainty and decision-making authority. This preference is further threatened
because political principals perceive foreign agents acting extraterritoriality as a likely
threat to national and/or constituent interests, which increases the likelihood that the
principals will intervene. Thus, the three agreements are designed to reduce the likelihood
of extraterritorial actions by agents. This, in turn, reduces the likelihood of political
intervention. This finding suggests that, when applied to international regulatory
cooperation, the principal-agent insights of PAF must be expanded to cover the patterns
of behavior that emerge from agent-agent dynamics.
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CHAPTER 5: Transatlantic Implementation and Exploratory
Institutional Cooperation—The Practical and Exploratory Dynamics of
Dispute Prevention in Competition Policy
I. Introduction
This chapter investigates the EU-US implementation and exploratory institutional
cooperation that has followed from the process of rule-making cooperation. The chapter
begins by discussing the reasons why competition agents pursue implementation
cooperation. Next, the chapter outlines four different stages of implementation
cooperation in merger review: initial contacts, notification contacts, review process
contacts and remedial contacts. The implications of EU-US cooperation in each of these
stages is demonstrated through the analysis of selected merger cases. While the cases
suggest that discretionary cooperation generally functions without direct principal
intervention, two instances are also analyzed in which EU-US cooperation failed to
prevent intervention: the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger and the GE/Honeywell
merger. Both of these cases require more in depth analysis to understand where and why
flaws occurred in the different stages of implementation cooperation. The chapter then
details two efforts at exploratory institutional cooperation: the EU-US Mergers Working
Group and the International Competition Network. These two cases reveal concerted
attempts by EU and US competition agents to increase bilateral and multilateral
cooperation in competition policy through discretionary means.
II. Implementation Cooperation—Cooperative Merger Review in Practice
In its most basic conceptualization, EU-US implementation cooperation is a
device designed to meet the new challenges of an external stimulus (EI) in competition
policy. According to the revised cross-level approach, EI increasingly challenges the
enforcement of domestic competition policy, especially over anticompetitive business
activity originating from abroad. Due to this international stimulus, domestic competition
authorities will likely find that internationally-oriented merger activity is increasingly
threatening to outpace their legal and administrative resources to enforce competition
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policy. More importantly, because EI increases the number of internationally-oriented
mergers, it also increases the likelihood of divergent decisions between EU and US
competition authorities. In cases of divergent decisions, EI also challenges conventional
notions of jurisdiction based on sovereign territory. Thus, EI changes the context in
which regulators act by increasing their need to enforce domestic competition policy
extraterritorially. Without international cooperation, the result is an increase in the
likelihood of political intervention.
John Parisi, Counsel for European Union Affairs in the International Antitrust
Division of the FTC, succinctly explains the nature of the problem and the intent of the
solution:
Co-operation among antitrust authorities facilitates the
effective and efficient enforcement of antitrust laws and
thus the maintenance of competition in markets. That is not
an expression of economic theory, but rather a fact of life.
As business concerns have increasingly pursued foreign
trade and investment opportunities, antitrust compliance
issues have arisen which transcend national borders and
have led antitrust authorities in the affected jurisdiction to
communicate, co-operate, and co-ordinate their efforts to
achieve compatible enforcement results (1999, 133).
According to Parisi, in today’s EI environment, international cooperation is the
preferred way to assure that competition is maintained in domestic markets. The
challenges of EI and the cooperative response are clear to competition agents who wish to
avoid political intervention. This preference is reflected in the desire “to achieve
compatible enforcement results” (i.e., convergent decisions).
Parisi’s claim benefits from further clarification of the precise reasons why, in an
EI environment, EU and US competition authorities will choose to pursue
implementation cooperation. As Youri Devuyst, administrator in the International Unit of
the EU’s Competition Directorate, argues, there are three central reasons that “given the
globalization of the economy—cooperation is to be preferred over unilateralism to
enhance the effective enforcement of antitrust rules” (2000, 323).344 At the bilateral level,
                                                
344 Devuyst notes that these reasons are supported by the European Commission (1996, 4-5), Parisi (1999)
and Melamed (1999).
161
this “enforcement of antitrust rules” speaks directly to EU-US implementation
cooperation in competition policy.
First, competition authorities will cooperate internationally when implementing
competition policy in order to increase information acquisition. As Devuyst argues,
“even if a competition agency is ready to use its antitrust rules extraterritorially,
information central to the investigation is often located outside the jurisdiction of the
competition authority using the extraterritoriality principle and is thus beyond its reach.
Without the necessary proof, competition authorities are unable to take remedial action”
(2000, 323). The problems created by information asymmetries in internationally-
oriented merger cases present real challenges to the “effective enforcement” of domestic
competition policy in an EI environment. This reason for cooperation echoes the crucial
role for information exchanges in competition policy that is suggested in the patterns of
behavior for agents (P1) posited in Chapter 2. Implementation cooperation is
fundamentally concerned with increasing information exchanges as a means to reduce the
likelihood of divergent decisions.345
As discussed below, information exchanges are crucial to regulatory cooperation
and central to each stage of implementation cooperation. In addition, the centrality of
information provides merging firms with an opening to influence implementation
cooperation to a greater extent than rule-making and exploratory institutional
cooperation. Domestic EU and US laws create this opening by providing for the
protection of confidential business information in the merger review process. If firms do
not waive their rights to confidentiality in merger cases, cooperative analyses can be
seriously hindered. Citing the obstacles created by domestic confidentiality provisions,
ICPAC argues
                                                
345 It is also possible that regulatory agents will reach divergent decisions having nothing to do with
information asymmetries: “Sometimes two authorities looking at the same transaction should come to
different results because the transaction will in fact have differing impacts on different markets… [such as
in the] Ciba-Geigy/Sandoz case” (Valentine 1997, 3). However, information exchanges in such cases can
still assure convergent remedies and, thus, these cases do not typically trigger political intervention. If the
remedies were divergent, political intervention would be much more likely. Thus, due to post-decision
information exchanges “even if the transaction needs to be addressed somewhat differently on both sides of
the Atlantic because of differing market conditions and competitive realities, we reach solutions involving
divestitures and licensing that neither conflict nor force firms to choose between complying with US or EC
law” (Valentine 1997, 6). Valentine goes on to demonstrate this argument with an example of the
Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger case.
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These laws have a particularly significant impact on the
merger review process, because much of the information
used to analyze a proposed transaction comes from
extremely sensitive, confidential information relating to the
companies’ strategies, investment plans, and marketing
goals and methods. It is this information that frequently
proves most useful in analyzing a proposed transaction
(2000, 65).346
The 1991 Bilateral Agreement, PCA and AAA explicitly recognize and respect these
domestic laws; doing otherwise would have prompted undesirable political
intervention.347 As a result, competition regulators must obtain waivers from the merging
firms before sharing confidential information with their foreign counterparts. Indeed,
competition agents must often obtain multiple waivers to cover different types of
information and different stages of the review process.348
Due to these legal provisions, merging firms may generally play a larger role in
implementation cooperation than in rule-making or exploratory institutional cooperation.
However, even in implementation cooperation, competition agents have devised
discretionary means through which to address the obstacles created by confidentiality
provisions (see below). In addition, waivers of confidentiality have become routine in
EU-US implementation cooperation in merger review (European Commission 2000a, 3;
ICPAC 2000). This is so because, by waiving rights of confidentiality, firms expedite the
review process and increase the likelihood of convergent decisions (Parisi 1999, 140).349
Merging firms generally prefer avoiding delays in the review process due to the time
sensitivity of the transaction (Damro forthcoming 2003a).350 Similarly, merging firms
                                                
346 See Majone (2000b, 279), Pitofsky (1998), Starek (1997) and Group of Experts (1995, 7) for similar
arguments that measures preventing the exchange of confidential information present a major obstacle to
close cooperation between EU and US competition agents.
347 The EU and US deal differently with confidential information: “Although the end result may be much
the same, information gathered in the US tends to be automatically treated as confidential. Under the
European system, those supplying information must request such confidentiality” (Devuyst 2001, 147).
Ham provides a very useful list of the domestic legal constraints in both the EU and US that protect
confidential information. These include the EU’s Regulation 17, parts of the US Code and the FTC Act
(Ham 1993, 588).
348 On the different types of information potentially exchanged (agency info vs. business info), see Parisi
(1999, 137-138). For the benefit of merging firms, Parisi also discusses the pros and cons of waiving
confidentiality rights (1999, 138-140).
349 See Parisi (1999, 139) for a list of four reasons why firms might be reluctant to waive rights to
confidentiality. See also Damro (forthcoming 2003a).
350 Measurements of corporate desire for expediency in the merger reviews are elusive because “no
comprehensive data are available that quantify the overall public and private costs imposed by compliance
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generally prefer convergent decisions on remedies (if any remedies are necessary)
because disagreements over such matters can delay the implementation of the merger.
Because merging firms are increasingly waiving their rights to confidentiality, their
ability to influence implementation cooperation in the merger review process is limited in
practice.351 As a result, firms are not considered analytically necessary actors (see
Chapter 2) for demonstrating the revised cross-level approach and the patterns of
behavior.352 However, as discussed below in reference to the GE/Honeywell case, firms
can occasionally play important roles in determining the likelihood of transatlantic
cooperation in competition policy. This issue is addressed in greater detail in Chapter 6.
The second reason why competition authorities will cooperate internationally
when implementing competition policy is to reduce the likelihood of divergent decisions.
This reason is linked directly to and follows from the increasing information exchanges.
As Devuyst argues,
                                                                                                                                                
with multijurisdictional merger notification and review requirements” (ICPAC 2000, 91). However,
corporate desire for efficiency in the merger review process is reflected in a recent ICC policy statement:
“Companies have an interest in reducing the administrative burden, costs and delays resulting from multi-
jurisdictional  merger reviews. They also have an interest in ensuring that the decisions given by different
competition authorities are consistent” (1999). The corporate desire for expediency is also supported by
research interviews.
In addition to expediting the merger review process, waiving rights of confidentiality may make
the merging firms appear more cooperative in the eyes of the competition authorities. Merging firms admit
to the need to appear cooperative in the eyes of the competition authorities. This image can be important to
the outcome of the immediate merger and any future merger proposals. Firms prefer that competition
authorities trust and come to them before approaching their competitors for information. If competition
authorities feel merging firms are being uncooperative, they are capable of increasing the pressure on the
firms. For example, merger regulators can issue requests for large amounts of information on short
deadlines. The regulators know how many people a firm has working on each case, which makes it easy to
determine when and what kind of information requests will be a problem for the merging firms. The intent
of most merging firms is to avoid such situations by developing good relations with the competition
authorities from the outset of the review process. Once a cooperative reputation has been established, legal
counsels then can more easily opt to make deals.
351 This is not the case in monopoly and cartel cases where firms still actively resist waiving their rights to
confidentiality, which increases their opportunities to influence cooperation in such cases. Firms are also
limited in their influence in merger review because they lose the threat of “exit” commonly employed to
increase pressure on political and regulatory decision makers. Exit is not an option for these firms in
merger review because, if they are large enough to meet the thresholds for review in the US and EU, they
are dependent on those respective markets for such a large amount of business that they cannot realistically
exit in order to save a merger that is challenged by the US and/or EU competition agents. For an example
of this occurring in the GE/Honeywell merger, see Evans (2002, 15).
352 Rather, firms are more likely to be important actors in non-merger cases, such as anti-cartel
investigations, where they are less likely to waive their rights to confidentiality (Stark 2000, 7). As Devuyst
argues, “In merger cases, companies… are generally willing to cooperate by giving waivers. The problem
lies with the cases of antitrust infringements such as cartels, where the necessary goodwill to grant waivers
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there is a need to avoid conflicts of law and remedies to
international cases. As international business arrangements
may face examination by different authorities at the same
time, divergences in the laws applicable to the same set of
facts may result in conflicting conclusions as to the legality
of the behavior under review. Even where a common view
exists among competition agencies as to the
anticompetitive nature of the conduct, the remedies
imposed in each jurisdiction may be incompatible.
Cooperation is thus seen as necessary to reduce the
likelihood of such conflicts (2000, 323).353
Before moving on to Devuyst’s final reason why competition authorities will
cooperate internationally, it is important to distinguish between two possible types of
divergent decisions: inconsistent and conflicting. Inconsistent decisions occur when
“authorities who have chosen to take no action or to impose a ‘lesser’ remedy against a
proposed transaction generally do not feel aggrieved by actions taken in other
jurisdictions” (ICPAC 2000, 52). Inconsistent decisions do not challenge the ability of an
agent in one jurisdiction to implement its statutory mandate and require no further work
to reconcile the inconsistencies (ICPAC 2000, 41 and 52). However, as will be discussed
below, inconsistent decisions can still prompt political intervention. Regulatory agents,
therefore, will strive to avoid inconsistent decisions because they are often perceived by
political principals as threats to national sovereignty and/or their domestic constituents’
interests.
Divergent decisions can also be conflicting. This occurs when merging firms are
unable to comply simultaneously with the decisions reached in two different jurisdictions.
In such a case, the remedies imposed by one jurisdiction may “impact the remedies
available to another jurisdiction. This is particularly problematic in largely global
transactions where the impact of various remedies may differ from jurisdiction to
                                                                                                                                                
is almost by definition nonexistent, unless the companies are willing to cooperate in order to get a more
lenient treatment…” (2001, 148).
353 Notably, Devuyst does not link this need to avoid divergent decisions to a preference to avoid political
intervention. This position, however, is not in direct conflict with the argument advanced in the current
study. Rather, the current study posits an argument that incorporates and expands on Devuyst’s position:
regulatory agents will prefer avoiding divergent decisions precisely because they ultimately prefer avoiding
the increasing likelihood of political intervention that is correlated with the increasing occurrence of
divergent competition decisions. In short, regulatory agents will react to EI by trying—through largely
discretionary avenues—to reduce information asymmetries and, in turn, reduce the likelihood of divergent
decisions, which, in turn, reduces the likelihood of political intervention.
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jurisdiction” (ICPAC 2000, 52-53, note 38). Regulatory agents strive to avoid conflicting
decisions because of the perception they create for political principals.354 As with
inconsistent decisions, political principals are likely to perceive conflicting decisions as
threats to national sovereignty and/or their domestic constituents’ interests. Challenges of
this type can lead to very real international conflicts (i.e., “discord”), including trade
wars.355
Thus, both types of divergent decisions—inconsistent and conflicting—can
prompt political intervention (Schaub 2002, 11; Monti 2000b, 2). As Charles S. Stark,
Chief of the Foreign Commerce Section in the US Department of Justice’s Antitrust
Division, argues:
And in cases in which the U.S. and EU are reviewing the
same transaction, both jurisdictions consider themselves as
having a stake in reaching, insofar as possible, consistent,
or at the very least non-conflicting, outcomes. The reasons
for this should be evident. Divergent antitrust approaches to
the same transaction undermine confidence in the process;
they risk imposing inconsistent requirements on the firms,
or frustrating the remedial objectives of one or another of
the antitrust authorities; and they may create frictions or
suspicions that can extend beyond the antitrust arena—as
we witnessed in the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas matter
(2000, 5).
According to Devuyst, the third reason why competition authorities will cooperate
internationally when implementing competition policy is to reduce duplication. As
Devuyst argues, “cooperation would help to avoid unnecessary duplication of work and
costs, both for the competition authorities involved and for the businesses whose conduct
is subject to review” (2000, 323). While an important motivation for international
cooperation, this reason is less important in merger cases than in non-merger cases
(Devuyst 2001, 140).356 In merger cases, duplication of work (i.e., various investigative
                                                
354 The EU’s Director-General for Competition notes this linkage: “When divergences do occur, we must
learn to manage them and avoid that they escalate into high-profile transatlantic political disputes” (Schaub
2002).
355 As ICPAC argues, “When divergence [in decisions] occurs, it is the agencies that must often explain and
at times attempt to reconcile their differences. Clashes also may lead to trade wars” (2000, 41). On the
possibility of trade wars, see also Karpel (1998, 1067).
356 For a useful discussion of two non-merger cases (1996 AC Nielsen/IRI and 1998-2000 Microsoft) in
which implementation cooperation between the EU and US competition authorities reduced the duplication
of work, see Devuyst (2001, 140).
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efforts) in the review process is mandatory due to domestic law requiring each authority
to act under certain circumstances (see Chapter 3). The competition agents are not
allowed to determine at their own discretion whether or not they will initiate a particular
merger review. Rather, they are statutorily required to open investigations when a
transaction meets thresholds established by the US’s HSR and the EU’s MCR. As soon as
proceedings have been opened, duplication of work becomes apparent as, for example,
the competition agents seek a considerable amount of identical information through their
respective HSR filing and Form CO.
In summary, the primary reasons for competition agents to cooperate in the
implementation of merger review are to increase information exchanges and to reduce the
likelihood of divergent decisions. Devuyst’s third reason—to reduce duplication of
work—is less important in merger review due to domestic laws requiring EU and US
competition agents to review the same merger. These insights reflect the agent patterns of
behavior posited in Chapter 2. In addition, they also support the revised cross-level
approach’s depiction of the causal stimulus of EI and the contention posited in the fourth
pattern of behavior (P4) that competition agents pursue their desire to maximize certainty
and decision-making authority via discretionary implementation cooperation. The next
section demonstrates these insights in different stages of implementation cooperation in
practice.
A. The Practical Stages of Implementation Cooperation in Merger Review
Following rule-making cooperation, the process of implementation cooperation
can be further disaggregated into additional stages: initial contacts, notification contacts,
review process contacts and remedial contacts. Each of these stages is discussed in detail
below, with supporting evidence drawn from specific merger cases. Analysis of the
different stages of implementation cooperation is used to demonstrate the patterns of
behavior for agents (P4) and principals (P6) posited in Chapter 2. In particular, this
section illustrates the reasons for increasing implementation cooperation between EU and
US competition agents as witnessed by increasing levels of information exchanges,
formal notifications and coordination of remedies in individual concurrent jurisdiction
merger cases.
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Across each of these stages of implementation cooperation, the EU and US
competition authorities are engaging in behavior designed to reduce the likelihood of
divergent decisions in individual merger cases. This behavior reflects the concern of the
agents that such decisions are typically perceived by political principles as likely to affect
adversely their national and/or constituent interests. If principals form this perception in
individual merger cases, their likelihood of intervening increases. The competition agents
prefer avoiding such an outcome.
In general, the record of individual merger cases suggests that EU-US
implementation cooperation has met the challenge of EI. Official commentators on both
sides of the Atlantic frequently declare the successes of EU-US implementation
cooperation. For example, as former FTC Commissioner Robert Pitofsky argues,
it is hard to imagine how day-to-day cooperation and
coordination between enforcement officials in Europe and
the United States could be much improved. Within the
bounds of confidentiality rules, we share, on a regular and
continuing basis, views and information about particular
transactions, coordinate the timing of our review process to
the extent feasible, and almost always achieve consistent
remedies (2000).
Parisi agrees with this general assessment of EU-US implementation cooperation: “These
efforts succeed in the vast majority of cases, despite differences in laws, procedures, and,
sometimes, the interests of the affected countries” (1999, 133).357
Despite these claims of success, it is useful to describe EU-US implementation
cooperation in greater detail in order to demonstrate the patterns of behavior suggested by
the revised cross-level approach. The following stages reflect a process-oriented
approach to analyzing the practical implementation of EU-US cooperation in competition
policy. The process-oriented approach follows from and disaggregates further Keohane’s
definition of international cooperation as a process of policy coordination.
1. Initial Contacts
The current study investigates those individual concurrent jurisdiction merger
cases that meet specific statutory thresholds found in the US’s HSR and the EU’s
                                                
357 For similar arguments, see Devuyst (2001), Monti (2001a) and Van Miert (1998).
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MCR.358 When mergers meet these thresholds, the firms must notify both the US and EU
competition authorities of their intent to merge.359 Most EU-US implementation
cooperation occurs after the competition authorities have received such formal
notifications from the firms. However, EU-US implementation cooperation may begin
even before merging firms submit a formal notification to the respective competition
authorities.360 This subsection discusses the causes and effects of competition authorities
engaging in such informal initial contacts before receiving the formal notification of a
proposed merger.
Initial contacts occur under the discretionary authority of the competition agents.
The domestic statutes governing EU and US merger review do not directly address these
initial contacts. Like the other stages of implementation cooperation discussed below,
these initial contacts emerged under the framework of the Bilateral Agreement. After
signing the Bilateral, EU and US competition authorities devised, under their
discretionary authority, a variety of ways to formalize their cooperation in practice. Such
initial contacts, while not explicitly mentioned in the Bilateral, are one example of the
agents increasing their discretionary means to pursue implementation cooperation.
EU and US competition authorities are in contact with each other on a daily
basis.361 As former FTC Chairman Robert Pitofsky noted, “Our staffs are on the phone
with each other day in and day out” (Pitofsky and Klein 1998, 1). This is particularly true
of lower-level case managers and handlers who focus on the economic and legal analysis
                                                
358 Because the current study investigates implementation cooperation in merger review, the analysis does
not consider cases brought under the Positive Comity Agreement (PCA). Due to domestic laws that require
merger reviews under certain circumstances, the PCA does not apply to merger review. This limitation does
not diminish the insights possible from the current study. Rather, the majority of EU-US implementation
cooperation occurs in merger cases, making this area of competition policy particularly useful for analyzing
questions about international cooperation. In addition, only one case has been formally brought under the
PCA (i.e., Sabre/Amadeus).
359 In the US, such notification “may be made as early as an agreement in principle is reached or a
(nonbinding) letter of intent or contract has been signed” (ICPAC 2000, 110). In the EU, such notifications
“can be made only after the signing of a definitive merger agreement, acquisition of control, or
announcement of a public bid” (ICPAC 2000, 111).
360 Prior to submitting their formal notification, firms may also engage in so-called “pre-notification
contacts” with the respective competition authorities. For a discussion of the importance of pre-notification
contacts between firms and competition authorities, see Chapter 3 and the discussion of the GE/Honeywell
merger below. Once the merging firms submit a formal notification, a strict timetable is set in motion in the
EU. This timetable has implications for subsequent implementation cooperation that are discussed below.
361 Research interviews confirm these close and daily contacts.
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of the merger review process.362 During the course of daily contacts, individual case
managers and handlers may, and often do, discuss pending mergers that have not yet been
formally notified to one or both of the competition authorities—the beginning of the
initial contacts stage. The agents can sometimes be alerted to pending mergers simply by
reading financial newspapers or through informal discussions with firms. In such cases,
the merger may not have been formally notified, but the competition agents can bring it
to the attention of their foreign counterparts and discuss its implications in a hypothetical
sense. These discussions must remain hypothetical and avoid concrete details because the
regulators take great care not to broach confidentiality requirements during such informal
initial contacts.
Initial contacts can function as an “early warning” system for possibly divergent
analyses between EU and US competition agents. For example, in order to respect
confidentiality requirements, EU and US competition authorities frequently engage in
hypothetical discussions over market definitions and other analytical concepts of merger
review that may apply to individual merger cases soon to be notified. In such cases,
competition agents may speak in loose terms about, for example, a pending notification
that is expected from “some firms in the telecoms market”. Thus, while respecting
confidentiality requirements, regulatory agents are able to make informal initial contacts
as the first stage of implementation cooperation. By discussing market definitions and
analytical concepts, even hypothetically, before receipt of the formal notification, the
agents can alert each other to the potential use of different approaches to evaluating a
merger that could lead to divergent decisions. Of course, if the firms proposing a merger
agree to waive their rights to confidentiality, initial contacts need not be limited to
hypothetical discussions.
                                                
362 High-level contacts among EU and US competition authorities may also be considered “initial contacts”,
but they occur outside the process currently under investigation. The Commission reports annually on these
high-level contacts. For example, the following high-level contacts were reported in 2001:
There were numerous bilateral contacts between the Commission and the relevant US
authorities during the course of 2001. Commissioner Monti paid a visit to Washington in
March, and used the occasion to meet, among other persons, key members of the
administration. On 24 September, he met in Washington the newly appointed heads of
the US antitrust agencies, Assistant Attorney General Charles James of the [DoJ] and
Chairman Timothy Muris of the FTC, for the annual bilateral EU/US meeting. The
meeting coincided with the 10th anniversary of the EU/US bilateral agreement on
competition policy (European Commission 2002, 116-117).
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The European Commission provides a useful example of the fruits of cooperation
that can follow from informal initial contacts:
Bilateral cooperation was particularly intensive with regard
to the large oil merger cases, most notably with regard to
the Exxon/Mobil merger. Informal contacts between the
FTC and the Commission started soon after the
announcement of the Exxon/Mobil transaction (December
1998), long before the formal notification occurred in May
1999. This allowed the EU and US authorities to discuss
the particular competition concerns for future oil and gas
output which they feared might stem from the creation of
so-called ‘super majors’ (European Commission 2000, 99).
Thus, in the Exxon/Mobil merger case, informal initial contacts reduced the likelihood of
divergent decisions because EU and US competition agents were able to discuss the
parameters of relevant product markets (oil and gas), the identification and characteristics
of possibly dominant positions (super majors) and the future market impact of the
transaction. All of these cooperative exchanges of information occurred under the
discretionary authority of the agents and were initiated approximately five months prior
to the receipt of formal notification of the merger. As a result, the competition agents
were able to discuss in detail important aspects of the merger and coordinate their
approaches long before the statutorily mandated timetables were set in motion by the
formal notification.
Initial contacts can significantly expand the competition agents’ discretion
because they allow information exchanges prior to opening the formal procedures for
cooperation under the terms of the Bilateral Agreement. Because competition agents can
discuss expected mergers and exchange information prior to the firms’ formal
notification, initial contacts also increase discretionary flexibility regarding the strict
statutory procedures (including formal deadlines) embodied in the HSR and MCR.
2. Notification Contacts
The next stage of implementation cooperation is characterized by notification
contacts. These notifications contacts are formal, written exchanges between the
competition agents. As such, they should not be confused with the formal notifications
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that merging firms are required to submit separately to the competition agents pursuant to
the HSR and MCR.
Notifications occur when one competition authority informs the other that it is
initiating a competition investigation that may affect interests in the foreign jurisdiction.
These notification contacts are explicitly outlined in the 1991 Bilateral Agreement.
According to the framework established under the agreement, this stage of
implementation cooperation is triggered when merger review (or other non-merger
proceedings) by one jurisdiction may affect the “important interests” of the other
jurisdiction. Article II.2 of the Bilateral includes a number of circumstances that
ordinarily trigger implementation cooperation, and “thereby give each party the
opportunity to determine the extent to which its important interests might be affected”
(Parisi 1999, 136).363
Due to differences in domestic legislation, the EU and US deal with these
notifications differently. The Commission notes differences in notification procedures
that arise from EU and US domestic legislation and summarizes the EU-US notification
process as follows:
on receipt of a notification [from the merging firms], the
Commission publishes a notice of the fact of the
notification [from the merging firms] in the Official
Journal. Thus the proposed merger is made public at the
outset and all mergers meeting the criteria for notification
to the US are notified, even where, on subsequent
examination, they do not raise competitive concerns. The
corresponding US legislation364 requires that the fact of a
merger filing, as well as its content, remain confidential.
Thus the US authorities notify the Commission only when,
after a preliminary examination, they decide to open an
investigation into the proposed merger (1996, 3.1).
                                                
363 This list of triggering circumstances includes matters that
 are relevant to enforcement activities of the other party;
 involve anti-competitive activities (other than a merger or acquisition) carried out in significant
part in the other party’s territory;
 involve a merger or acquisition in which one or more of the parties to the transaction, or a
company controlling one or more of the parties ot the transaction, is a company incorporated or
organized under the laws of the other party or one of its states or member states;
 involve conduct believed to have been required, encouraged or approved by the other party; or
 involve remedies that would, insignificant respects, require or prohibit conduct in the other party’s
territory (Parisi 1999, 1136).
364 Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, 1976, 15 U.S.C.§ 18A(h).
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The procedures established under the Bilateral for formal EU-US notification of a
merger have also influenced the internal discretionary procedures followed by
competition agents. For example, the Bilateral led directly to the creation of new,
discretionary procedures by the Competition Directorate (i.e., DGIV):
The first practical step taken by DG IV was the elaboration
of a set of guidelines for its case handlers, identifying the
criteria which would trigger notification [to the US] and the
stages in the procedure when notification [to the US]
should be made. These guidelines have now been inserted
in DG IV’s internal manual of procedures (European
Commission 1996, 3.2).
As the revised cross-level approach in Chapter 2 suggests, EI contributes to an
increasing volume of internationally-oriented merger activity, which, in turn, increases
notification contacts between the EU and US. The European Commission suggests such a
linkage between EI and the increasing levels of EU-US notification contacts in 2001:
During 2001, the Commission continued its close
cooperation with the [DoJ and FTC] in an ever greater
number of cases. The trend towards the globalisation of
markets continued apace during the year, as most vividly
illustrated by the record number and scale of transnational
mergers: the year 2001 saw a notable increase in the
number of transactions notified to both the Commission
and the US antitrust agencies (2002, 116).
Table 9 illustrates the increasing number of total EU-US competition notifications
and merger notifications since implementation cooperation began in 1991. The increasing
levels of notifications since 1991 are positively correlated with the increasing number of
concurrent jurisdiction competition cases caused by EI since 1990 and the commitment of
the EU and US competition agents to coordinate their competition investigations in such
cases.
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Table 9: EU and US Notifications, 1991-2000365
US Competition Notifications Merger Notifications
Year
EU
Competition
Notifications366 FTC DoJ Total EU US
1992367 26 20 20 40 11 31
1993 44 22 18 40 20 20
1994 29 16 19 35 18 20
1995 42 14 21 35 31 18
1996 48 20 18 38 35 27
1997 42 12 24 36368 30 20
1998 52 22 24 46 43 39
1999 70 26 23 49 59 39
2000 104 26 32 58 85 49
Table 9 also suggests no systematic variation in EU-US implementation
cooperation between cases investigated by the FTC or DoJ. Majone argues that the
effective control of regulatory agents may vary depending on whether they are located
within the executive branch or independent regulatory commissions (1996a, 38). For
                                                
365 Source: European Commission (2001a), Report to the Council and European Parliament, p. 8. The
figures reported in Table 9 require two stipulations. As the Commission notes, “Under Article II of the
Agreement, notifications are made at certain stages of the procedure and so several notifications may be
made concerning the same case. For instance, in the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas case the Commission sent
seven notifications to the US authorities and received six notifications from the FTC on the same case”
(European Commission 1998a, 5.1). However, the figures given in the table represent the number of cases
in which one or more notifications took place and not the total number of individual notifications. In
addition,
The cases listed below are those which fall directly under the EC/US Agreement and are
dealt with in the US by either the US DoJ or the FTC. Some competition cases are dealt
in the US by other agencies, for instance the US Department of Transportation (DoT), the
Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) or the US Department of Commerce (DoC). These
agencies do not formally cooperate with the Commission directly, but do so indirectly,
mostly through the DoJ. There are therefore informal contacts between the Commission
and these agencies. These cases are not discussed in this report [and are therefore not
included in Table 9] (European Commission 1999, 4).
366 The numbers reported for EU and US “Competition Notifications” include both merger and non-merger
notifications. Table 9 separates out merger notifications in the last two columns to demonstrate that they
account for the bulk of all competition notifications.
367 Notifications since 23 September 1991.
368 The Commission explains the slight decrease in the number of total notifications from 1994-1997 by the
circumstances created by the ECJ’s decision in August 1994 on the Bilateral Agreement. As the
Commission argues,
the limited scope of cooperation during the period prior to 10 April 1995 has meant that
the information available for that period does not provide a good basis for comparison. In
particular, during the period following the judgment of the Court of Justice, notifications
under the Agreement were suspended pending approval of the Agreement by the Council.
Notifications were made nonetheless, in accordance with the 1986 OECD
Recommendation (1996, 1).
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example, the FTC is dependent on Congress for its budget. Due to this dependence on
Congress, the DoJ may be more independent than the FTC even though the former is part
of the executive branch. Despite this possible variance in regulatory independence, as
Table 9 and research interviews indicate, the number of notifications to the EU does not
vary significantly or systematically between the FTC and DoJ. This supports the claim in
Chapter 3 that, while located in different parts of the government, the DoJ and FTC still
share the same preferences and are not subject to different degrees of control in their
respective pursuit of implementation cooperation with the EU.
3. Review Process Contacts
Following the receipt of a formal EU-US notification, the competition agents
engage in a variety of cooperative contacts during their respective review processes.
These review process contacts “can focus on any or all of the main issues likely to arise
in the context of a merger investigation” (Monti 2001a, 2). During the merger review
process, such contacts can occur via telephone calls, faxes, emails and even face-to-face
interactions during oral hearings and pitch meetings (as provided for under the AAA).
Review process contacts include a variety of exchanges of information designed
to reduce the likelihood of divergent decisions. More specifically, review process
contacts frequently target substantive issues such as the definition of relevant product and
geographic markets369 and the assessment of the likely competitive effects of the
proposed merger on the relevant markets (European Commission 2000a, 3). However,
even the use of similar market definitions does not always guarantee convergent
decisions because of differing market conditions and competitive realities in the EU and
US (Janow 2000, 44).
Review process contacts occur under the discretionary authority of the regulatory
agents. However, information exchanged during these contacts must respect the rights of
confidentiality afforded to firms by domestic law. In fact, competition agents are very
careful to conform to this constraint on their discretionary authority for fear of violating
relevant domestic statutes, which, in turn, are likely to prompt principal intervention. This
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feature of the institutional landscape of EU and US competition policies opens a potential
avenue for firms to exert influence in concurrent jurisdiction merger reviews. However,
as discussed above, most firms waive their rights to confidentiality in merger cases in
order to facilitate EU-US implementation cooperation and expedite the review process. In
fact, competition agents explicitly encourage merging firms to waive their rights to
confidentiality as a way to increase the effectiveness of cooperation and the likelihood of
consistent decisions.370 As discussed below, divergent decisions are not necessarily
inevitable when firms refuse to waive their rights to confidentiality. 
EU and US competition agents do not typically make public comments regarding
their respective review processes or transatlantic review process contacts. Rather, they
prefer (and in some cases are legally required by domestic law) that their respective
review processes and transatlantic review process contacts remain confidential until they
are prepared to announce publicly whether or not to oppose a proposed transaction.
Similarly, the competition agents prefer that other actors not publicize ongoing cases.371
Such publicity can lead to a politicization of the merger review process. Demonstrating
this aversion to publicity during the review process, Parisi argues an important point for
the current chapter that
trying the case in public is of little utility. The U.S.
agencies normally keep silent during the course of an
investigation—even where the press reports on it.372 And
                                                                                                                                                
369 Markets are defined in the US by specific guidelines in the “DOJ and FTC Horizontal Merger
Guidelines. The EC has adopted a notice on market definition that in many ways is very similar to the
market definition section of the U.S. merger guidelines” (ICPAC 2000, 50).
370 As the Commission notes, “The Commission has begun to take the initiative in suggesting to notifying
parties a ‘standard form’ waiver, which they are invited to sign, and hence to minimise the time spent on
negotiating the terms” (1999, 4.2). The Commission describes the benefits of these waivers during review
process contacts:
It is becoming more common for case handlers to ask for waivers on a routine basis in
order to enable the agencies to exchange confidential information between one another.
Frequently the main benefit of this is not so much the information which might be
exchanged, but the removal of constraints which prevented the agencies from having a
free and unfettered dialogue. For example, such exchanges prevent misunderstandings
which might otherwise arise owing to an imperfect understanding of the position or
intentions of case handlers in the other jurisdiction. And where co-operation is carried
into the investigation stage, a co-ordinated approach can reduce the burden on the
notifying parties and third parties (European Commission 1999, 4.2).
371 For an example of firms attempting to publicize a merger review and reactions by competition agents,
see the GE/Honeywell case discussed below.
372 FTC policy does permit public confirmation of the existence of a merger or non-merger investigation
under certain circumstances, particularly where the subjects of the investigation themselves have disclosed
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FTC Commissioners are constrained by judicial decisions
limiting their utterances while an action is pending, lest
their decision be tainted with prejudice.373 Suffice it to say
that trying to use the press as a separate front for advocacy
of your case is a diversion from the necessary task of
dealing effectively with the enforcement agency on the
merits of the case. The same can be said for ‘politicizing’
the matter by appeals to parliamentarians or officials of
other government agencies (1999, 141).
Review process contacts occur in most internationally-oriented merger cases that
are simultaneously investigated by EU and US competition agents. Unfortunately,
systematic and consistently reliable reporting of these intensive and sometimes mundane
and technical contacts is not available. Therefore, the current study cannot provide a
qualitative analysis of each of the nearly six hundred mergers notified between the EU
and US between 1991-2000.374 However, selected evidence of close and “effective” (i.e.,
contributing to convergent decisions) implementation cooperation is documented and
made regularly available in a variety of forms. For instance, such references are
ubiquitous in speeches made by EU and US competition officials.375
                                                                                                                                                
the existence of the investigation to the public. See FTC Policy Concerning Disclosures of Non-merger
Competition and Consumer Protection Investigations, 63 Fed. Reg. 219 (Nov. 13, 1998).
373 See Texaco, Inc. v. FTC, 336 F.2d 754 (1964); Cinderella Career and Finishing Schools, Inc., et al. v.
FTC, 425 F.2d 583 (1970).
374 In this regard, the opportunity for quantitative analysis is also limited. Early research efforts in the
current study attempted to construct a database of EU-US implementation cooperation that could be used to
evaluate statistically the patterns of behavior and to engage in subsequent hypothesis testing. However,
much of the information in individual merger cases that would be necessary to assess cooperation and
answer the research question presented in the current study was either inconsistently reported by multiple
sources (e.g., EU, US, firms, international organizations, media outlets) or unavailable due to
confidentiality restrictions. Examples of such information that would be useful for operationalizing
potentially important explanatory variables include the number and nature of:
 waivers granted by firms
 EU-US notifications
 jobs jeopardized by merger
 market shares effected
 expected impact of merger on markets
 degree of public ownership and/or contracts of merging firms
 comity considerations of “important interests” by competition agents.
Despite the obstacles to acquiring this information, future research plans include continued efforts to
compile such relevant information. 
375 For example, Monti uses examples of EU-US cooperation in specific merger cases (2001a). On the US
side, see Parker (1999) and Starek (1997).
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More formally, the European Commission reports annually to the European
Parliament and CoM on bilateral cooperation with the US competition authorities.376
These reports showcase and provide brief descriptions of competition cases in which EU-
US review process contacts are particularly effective or ineffective.377 This series of
reports is used in the current study to identify a specific population of individual
concurrent jurisdiction mergers.378 The selected mergers are not intended to be a
representative sample. Rather, they are used to illustrate how review process contacts
generally contribute each year to EU-US implementation cooperation. The cases also
provide empirical insights that are useful for evaluating the patterns of behavior posited
in Chapter 2.
Table 10 lists all of the merger cases that have been highlighted in the
Commission’s annual reports and the significance (according to the Commission) of
each. Further details of those mergers that provide useful insights for the current study
are discussed below on a case-by-case basis. The table is limited to merger activity since
1995, because the Commission’s first report was mandated only after the ECJ’s ruling on
the 1991 Bilateral Agreement. Some of the merger cases are also notable for the
implementation cooperation that occurred in the remedial contacts stage, which will be
discussed in the next subsection.
                                                
376 These reports are available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/international/bilateral/. The reports
on bilateral activity are typically included in the general reports the Commission submits on competition
policy across the entire Single European Market. The reports on bilateral activity with the US originated in
1995 following the ECJ’s decision on the 1991 Bilateral Agreement. The Commission and CoM jointly
agreed that the Commission should submit annual reports evaluating the implementation of cooperation to
the CoM and European Parliament. The US DoJ and FTC do not offer a similar compilation of transatlantic
competition cases. Beginning in 2000, the Commission’s annual report on cooperation with the US also
included, but keep separate, bilateral cooperation with Canada. Cooperation with Canada was included
because the EU signed a bilateral competition agreement with Canada on June 17, 1999.
377 Two merger cases that are examples of ineffective cooperation—Boeing/McDonnell Douglas and
GE/Honeywell—are discussed in detail below.
378 This method of case selection is imperfect. For example, due to confidentiality restrictions, the reports
contain discussions of some mergers without naming the firms involved. Such discussions are used simply
to illustrate points made in the reports. The reports do include lists (as annexes) of all merger and non-
merger (including joint ventures) notifications made. However, these lists typically do not include cases
that were ongoing at the time of publication. Rather, such cases appear in the annual report that follows
closure of the case.
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Table 10: Selected EU-US Merger Cases, 1995-2000
Year Merging Firms Significance
Kimberley-Clark/Scott Paper Inconsistent, but not
conflicting remedies
Glaxo/Wellcome
Hoechst/Marion Merrill Dow
Upjohn/Pharmacia
Prompted EU and US to
exchange general views on
product market analysis in
pharmaceutical sector
Shell/Montecatini Global geographic market, but
EU and US concentrated on
effects in their respective
domestic markets
Lockheed Martin/Loral EU identified global market;
US identified national market
1995-1996
(April 10, 1995-
June 30, 1996)
BT/MCI (I) Cooperation limited by lack of
waiver of confidentiality
Sandoz/Ciba-Geigy Cooperation defining product
and geographic markets and
terms for approval; overcame
different timetables as firms
waived confidentiality 
1996
(July 1-December 31, 1996)
Baxter/Immuno Overcame different timetables
Boeing/McDonnell Douglas Agreed on product and
geographic markets but not
final decision; displayed
elements of comity
BT/MCI (II) Cooperation in refining new
product market definitions
Guinness/Grand Metropolitan Cooperation defining product
markets led to compatible
remedies
1997379
(January 1-
December 31, 1997)
Dupont/ICI Cooperation defining product
markets
WorldCom/MCI Example of “best-practices”
for cooperation; US agents
attended EU oral hearings;
extensive remedy discussions;
cooperated on implementation
of undertakings offered
Price Waterhouse/Coopers &
Lybrand
“Headline case”380; substantial
cooperation during review
process; required clearance by
competition agencies other
than EU and US
1998
(January 1-
December 31, 1998)
Travelers Group/Citicorp “Headline case”; limited EU-
US cooperation
                                                
379 The Commission notes that this report does not cover a number of aviation merger cases (1998a, 5).
380 The Commission refers to these mergers as “headline cases” due, in large part, to the high announced
value of the merger (European Commission 1999, 4.2).
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BP/Amoco “Headline case”; limited EU-
US cooperation
Exxon/Mobil (I) “Headline case”
SBC/Ameritech “Headline case”
Daimler Benz/Chrysler “Headline case”; limited EU-
US cooperation
AHP/Monsanto “Headline case”; conditions of
competition different in
Europe and US
KPMG/Ernst & Young “Headline case”
Hoffman-La
Roche/Boehringer Mannheim
Conditions of competition
different in Europe and US;
cooperation on remedies
Halliburton/Dresser Cooperation on remedies and
their implementation
Wolters Kluwer/Reed Elsevier Substantial cooperation in
review process
Exxon/Shell Substantial cooperation in
review process and remedies
Marsh & McLennan/Sedgwick Substantial cooperation in
review process
Exxon/Mobil (II)381 Multi-stage cooperation with
EU agents visiting FTC
BP Amoco/ARCO Substantial cooperation
between EU and FTC
Allied Signal/Honeywell Multi-stage cooperation
between EU and DoJ;
overcame different timetables
1999
(January 1-
December 31, 1999)
BOC/Air Liquide US’s first use of AAA
Time Warner/EMI US agents attended EU’s oral
hearings; cooperation in “new
economy” market analysis;
merger terminated and
notification withdrawn
MCI WorldCom/Sprint EU’s first use of AAA; US
agents attended EU’s oral
hearings; cooperation in “new
economy” market analysis;
first merger involving US
company to be prohibited by
Commission
AOL/Time Warner US agents attended EU’s oral
hearings; cooperation in “new
economy” market analysis
2000
(January 1-
December 31, 2000)
Boeing/Hughes Substantial EU-FTC
cooperation
                                                
381 This merger appears in two separate reports because it was announced December 1998, but notified May
1999.
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Astra Zeneca/Novartis Substantial EU-FTC
cooperation; firms offered EU
and US same remedies to
solve competition concerns in
different regional markets
Alcoa/Reynolds Substantial EU-DoJ
cooperation; EU cooperation
with Canadian and Australian
competition authorities
Table 10 suggests a variety of reasons for, modalities of, and obstacles to EU-US
implementation cooperation. A number of insights from Table 10 are particularly useful
for demonstrating certain patterns of behavior posited in Chapter 2 (i.e., P4 and P6). The
following discussion of review process contacts reveals the lessons from selected merger
cases included in Table 10 and relies heavily on the descriptions provided in the
Commission’s bilateral reports. Table 10’s insights into the remedial contacts stage are
discussed in the next subsection.
Under the report covering 1995-1996, one merger in particular exemplifies the
role of information exchanges in implementation cooperation. The Lockheed
Martin/Loral merger is an example of how EU-US information exchanges can provide
competition agents with previously unknown information from a foreign jurisdiction that
is necessary for reviewing a concurrent jurisdiction merger. The Commission notes the
importance of such information exchanges: “Early in the investigation, the FTC was able
to draw the Commission’s attention to information filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission and thus on public record in the US. This proved helpful in evaluating the
effects of the merger on the satellites market” (European Commission 1996, 4.3).
In 1997, the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger prompted a considerable degree
of transatlantic attention. The cooperative problems encountered during this merger
review are discussed in greater detail below. However, it is useful to note at this point
that the merger did display some elements of comity. In particular, after transatlantic
exchanges of information, the US requested comity considerations by the EU. As a result,
the EU decided not to rule on the defense-related portion of the merger because it was
considered an “important interest” of the US.
The BT/MCI (II) merger reveals the importance of cooperation during the review
process for mergers that effect changing and/or new product markets. These contacts
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were also notable because they occurred during face-to-face meetings held in both the EU
and the US, meetings held prior to the AAA. As the Commission reports,
There were frequent contacts between EC officials and the
Department of Justice in the course of the investigation of
the then proposed BT/MCI merger. Meetings between the
two sides were held in both Washington and Brussels.
Because the case required assessment of product markets
related to the offering of transatlantic telephony services,
and in particular consideration of the impact of the merger
against the background of international accounting rate
arrangements, the discussions between the two sides were
helpful not only in terms of refining market definitions, but
also in pooling knowledge about the regulatory background
on each side of the Atlantic (European Commission 1998a,
5.2.b.i).
The Guinness/GrandMetropolitan merger case displayed clear evidence of the
benefits of cooperation during the remedial contacts stage, as discussed in the next
subsection. Regarding review process contacts, this merger also provides a pre-AAA
example of a competition agent attending another’s proceedings: “Following requests put
forward by the Federal Trade Commission, officials from the US authority were
authorised by the Hearing Officer to take part as observers in the public hearings held
pursuant to the EC Merger Regulation in the framework of the examination of the
Guinness/Grand Metropolitan merger” (European Commission 1998a, 5.2.b.vii.).
A number of mergers in 1998 show the increasing levels and benefits of
implementation cooperation between the EU and US competition agents. In particular,
the WorldCom/MCI merger is frequently cited as an example of “best practices” in
implementation cooperation because of the extensive contacts during the merger review
process. As the Commission argues,
An example of best cooperation practices is set by the
WorldCom/MCI case, where the two case-teams worked
smoothly together. Indeed, joint negotiations were
undertaken between the parties and the US DoJ and the
European Commission, as a result of which the parties
agreed to find a buyer and to divest MCI’s Internet
activities prior to completing the merger” (European
Commission 1999, 2.1).
The success of the cooperation in the WorldCom/MCI merger review has been attributed
to the lessons learned in the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger, as discussed below.
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A series of mergers listed in Table 10 suggests that the size of a merger is not
directly correlated with the extent and intensity of EU-US implementation cooperation.
One reason for this is that large mergers that meet EU and US notification thresholds may
not have a significant and equivalent competitive impact in both jurisdictions. The
Commission provides three examples of such mergers in 1998:
It might be thought that large mergers would normally
require more extensive cooperation simply because of their
scale, but this is not necessarily true. While some relatively
large cases fell technically within the EC jurisdiction, they
had little or no competitive impact in Europe. This might
be because the main focus of activity is outside Europe,
such as in the Travelers Citicorp case, or because the
merging parties were coming together from home positions
in their respective territories and the competitive impact of
the overlap was minimal. In the Daimler Benz/Chrysler and
BP/Amoco cases each party was active principally in its
respective home continent, but absent or not substantially
present in the territory of the other, hence overlaps were
marginal or non-existent. In such cases co-operation will be
limited, and typically involve case handlers in the EC and
US respectively making contact with one another, keeping
each other informed about their respective timetables, and
perhaps discussing product and geographic market
definitions (1999, 4.2).
Similar to the informal initial contacts discussed above, review process contacts
encourage competition agents to reach similar product and geographic market definitions.
This cooperation is useful for reaching convergent decisions, especially when the merger
in question is global or transatlantic in nature. The Commission notes such cases:
More substantial co-operation in the assessment phase may
arise where the geographic extent of the product or service
markets is either world-wide, or covers both the United
States and Europe. In these cases both agencies have an
interest in ensuring consistency of product and service
market definition, and in knowing whether the other
believes there is a substantial competition issue. In Price
Waterhouse/Coopers & Lybrand, WorldCom/MCI, Wolters
Kluwer/Reed Elsevier, Exxon/Shell and Marsh &
McLennan/Sedgwick, discussions took place about product
market definition and geographic extent, with a view to
confirming each agency’s analytical approach (1999, 4.2).
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When competition agents do use different market definitions, they typically
analyze different market conditions, which can increase the likelihood of divergent
decisions. However, the EU and US competition agents may use different market
definitions and still benefit from implementation cooperation. For example, EU and US
competition agents may adopt different definitions of relevant markets,
but find co-operation helpful in establishing why those
differences exist, and to satisfy themselves that they are
comfortable with their own reasoning. American Home
Products/Monsanto, and Hoffmann-La Roche/Boehringer
Mannheim, were cases where the conditions of competition
were different in Europe from those in the US. Even if the
product or geographic markets and hence the competition
analysis differ, there may still be cases where a certain co-
ordination of treatment of remedies is desirable (1999, 4.2).
Thus, implementation cooperation encourages the review and self-evaluation of market
definitions employed by competition agents. As the discussion suggests, competition
agents are able to overcome the possible pitfalls (i.e., divergent decisions) associated with
analyzing different product and/or geographic markets. While their definitions of relevant
markets may diverge, they can still reach convergent decisions on remedies, which
ultimately reduces the likelihood of political intervention during the later stages of
implementation cooperation.
Prior to 1999, the EU and US competition agents attended certain stages of each
other’s review process on a case-by-case basis. However, general procedures for such
attendance on a reciprocal basis were formalized in the AAA (see Chapter 4). These
attendance exchanges are designed to increase the exchange of information in individual
merger reviews. However, such exchanges of information do not guarantee the
competition agents will reach convergent decisions during or at the conclusion of their
review process contacts.  The first case of attendance under the AAA suggests such
limitations. The EU and US competition agents cooperated closely on the 1999 BOC/Air
Liquide merger, with the FTC attending the EU’s oral hearing. Despite the close
cooperation and information exchanges provided during their review process contacts,
the EU and US competition agents pursued divergent remedies (Monti 2001a, 4).382
                                                
382 However, it should be noted that the remedies were inconsistent, not conflicting.
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The Commission’s report on bilateral cooperation with the US in the year 2000
reflects the increasing number of internationally-oriented mergers and the complications
of mergers in “new” sectors (i.e., those requiring new market definitions for analysis).383
A series of large mergers in the multimedia sector demonstrate such complications. The
Commission describes these mergers and notes the benefits of implementation
cooperation in reviewing them:
Transatlantic co-operation during 2000 was particularly
intensive with regard to the big ‘new economy’ and
multimedia merger cases, notably in the AOL/Time Warner,
Time Warner/EMI and MCI WorldCom/Sprint merger
cases… Representatives from the DoJ (MCI
WorldCom/Sprint) and the FTC (AOL/Time Warner, Time
Warner/EMI) attended the oral hearings of the parties
intending to merge, and there were regular telephone calls,
e-mails, exchanges of documents, and other contacts
between the case teams.
In the AOL/Time Warner and Time Warner/EMI cases,
discussion between staff on both sides focused most closely
on the assessment of the effects that the proposed
transactions would be likely to have on competition in the
music markets (e.g. recorded music, music publishing and
on-line distribution through Internet). Ultimately, in the
light of the objections advanced by the Commission to the
proposed transaction, the Time Warner/EMI deal was
terminated and the parties withdrew their notification…
In MCI WorldCom/Sprint, the Commission quickly reached
the conclusion that this proposed merger between two US
telecommunications companies would have worldwide
effects. The Internet is global in nature; Internet access and
service providers, Internet content providers, end-
customers, all demand universal connectivity to the
worldwide web. The Commission had found already in
1998, when it investigated the merger between WorldCom
and MCI, that there is a global market for top-level
(universal) Internet connectivity and that the impact of this
merger between these two US companies affected not only
US consumers but also inter alia European Union
consumers… MCI WorldCom/Sprint was the first merger
                                                
383 For a useful recent discussion of the challenges facing competition agents trying to regulate “new”
industries, see Walker (2002).
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involving a US company to be prohibited by the
Commission384 (European Commission 2002a, 1.2.1).
As the preceding excerpt suggests, final decisions can vary considerably between mergers
in the same sector. Yet, the EU and US competition agents cooperated closely via
discretionary review process contacts and were able to avoid divergent—in particular,
conflicting—decisions.
4. Remedial Contacts
Remedial contacts occur when EU and/or US competition authorities determine
that certain conditions will have to be met before final approval is granted to a proposed
merger.385 The consideration of remedies, which are submitted by the firms, is part of the
overall merger review process. However, this is considered a separate stage of
implementation cooperation for the current study because, while competition agents may
agree throughout the review process contacts, they may disagree on the precise nature of
the remedies necessary for approval. Like the other stages of implementation
cooperation, remedial contacts occur under the discretionary authority of the EU and US
competition agents.
As the Commission argues, EU-US cooperation via remedial contacts is
specifically in the interest of the firms involved: “co-operation in the devising of
remedies can help the notifying parties avoid ‘double-jeopardy’ whereby they are
required to negotiate remedies sequentially, and thus have to make further concessions to
the second agency to secure the clearance of a deal which has already received the
blessing of the first” (European Commission 1999, 4.2).386 While remedial contacts are
important for merging firms, their importance for competition agents is fundamentally
based in the fact that disagreements over remedies can lead to divergent decisions, which,
in turn may prompt principal intervention. As discussed below, remedial contacts have
evolved to include discretionary cooperation in market testing and implementation of
                                                
384 This merger appears to be only the third case in which the EU investigated two US firms. According to
EURECOM: “this is the first instance where the Commission has blocked a merger by two firms not based
in the EU” (2000, 1) even though the DoJ had issued an earlier decision that it would block the merger,
which prompted the firms to announce the withdrawal of the merger notice.
385 For more on the types of remedies typically employed in merger reviews, see Chapter 3.
386 See also Parisi (1999, 141) for a similar argument.
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remedies, two practical areas of merger review not explicitly identified in the Bilateral
Agreement.
Again, the current study does not provide a qualitative analysis of the remedies
reached in each of the nearly six hundred mergers notified between the EU and US
competition agents. Rather, qualitative evidence is drawn from the Commission’s reports
on bilateral cooperation with the US as well as commentaries by EU competition
officials. Specific merger cases selected from Table 10 are used to reveal the general
benefits and implications of remedial contacts.
The Commission’s description of the Guinness/Grand Metropolitan merger
indicates the benefits that may follow from firms waiving their rights to confidentiality
during the remedial contacts stage. As the Commission argues,
In the Guinness/Grand Metropolitan case the parties were
prepared, once negotiations had reached a certain point, to
allow discussions to take place between the antitrust
authorities on the proposed remedies. This was valuable in
ensuring an element of coordination which might not
otherwise have been possible. In particular it ensured that
the remedies finally agreed upon in each of the jurisdictions
were consistent with one another (1998a, 5.2.b.v.).387
The Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger reveals the role of comity during the
consideration of remedies for a merger on which the EU and US disagreed:
Although the FTC was not concerned about remedies in the
Boeing/MDD case, as they would eventually clear the
merger, the Commission, which was looking very closely at
some form of divestiture of DAC,388 informed the FTC of
such a possibility. However, as the FTC expressed
reservations on the feasibility of such a remedy, and given
that the Commission’s enquiry showed that there was no
potential buyer for DAC, the Commission informed the
                                                
387 Devuyst agrees, arguing
The merger of 1997 between the UK-based groups Guinness and GrandMetropolitan,
both active in the production and distribution of whisky and other spirits, is an example
of a large merger involving separate national markets. The economic analysis of both the
European and US spirits markets revealed variations in consumption patterns from one
country to another. Although EC and US regulators used different product and
geographic market definitions for their respective assessments, they nevertheless needed
cooperation to understand each other’s thinking… The remedies adopted by the
Commission, which involved the divestment of particular brands, were closely
coordinated with the remedies adopted by the FTC to ensure consistency as regards both
content and timing (2001, 139).
388 Douglas Aircraft Corporation.
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FTC that it would take into account its concerns and would
therefore abandon the idea of DAC’s divestiture (European
Commission 1998a, 5.2.b.v.).
The “best practices” merger of 1998, WorldCom/MCI, also presents examples of
close cooperation during the remedial contacts stage. The Commission’s report reveals
the extent to which remedial contacts can occur, including cooperation in market-testing
and assuring the implementation of remedies. Through market-testing, competition
agents determine whether the remedies offered by merging firms will satisfactorily
address their competition concerns. One means by which competition agents engage in
market-testing is to ask for comments from third parties (e.g., relevant market players,
including consumers, producers, competitors) on the likely impact of the proposed
remedies. Once competition agents accept a package of remedies, they then must ensure
that the newly merged firm implements the measures, whether they are behavioral or
structural. Due to fewer personnel resources, the EU may be at a disadvantage compared
to the US ensuring that firms implement the agreed remedies. The practical impact of this
limitation is discussed below in relation to the GEH merger.
The Commission’s report is also useful for comparing remedial contacts in the
best practice WorldCom/MCI merger with experiences in Exxon/Shell and
Halliburton/Dresser:
In WorldCom/MCI and Exxon/Shell cases the cooperation
which had begun during the assessment [review process
contacts] stage was continued when discussions of
remedies began. In WorldCom/MCI trilateral remedy
negotiations were conducted between the notifying parties
and the two agencies. In addition, the [DoJ] and the
Commission jointly conducted the market testing of a first
set of remedies. This included the presence of one person
from DG IV case team in the DoJ premises to take part to
the DoJ market testing. In Exxon/Shell, the remedy was
extensively discussed between the US and EC agencies
before either agency came to a final view.
There are as yet few cases on record where co-operation
has taken place regarding the implementation of
undertakings [i.e., remedies] offered, but this may be an
area of growth in the future. In WorldCom/MCI there was
an exchange of letters between the EC and the US DoJ
where the Commission requested the DoJ’s co-operation
regarding the undertakings which were mutually offered by
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the parties to both the Commission and the DoJ. The DoJ
confirmed that it would take whatever steps are necessary
and appropriate to evaluate, and if it found them to be
sufficient, to seek the effective implementation of these
undertakings.389 In a good example of such co-operation,
the Halliburton/Dresser case was cleared within the first
Phase in the EC, but in the US it took somewhat longer
because of several serious problems identified there. One of
the problem areas found related to the market for drilling
fluids. Although this was of concern to the European
Commission as well as to the DoJ, the US Antitrust
Division as considered to be better placed to deal with it, as
it involved divestitures of assets located in the US.
Therefore, the Commission kept in close contact with its
US counterparts, and relied on their pursuing the required
divestiture as an element in deciding to clear the case at
Phase 1. Subsequently, the US Antitrust Division kept the
Commission fully informed throughout the divestiture
process (European Commission 1999, 4.2).390
This description of cooperation through remedial contacts shows that implementation
cooperation has evolved to include market-testing and the implementation of remedies.
These two developments increase further the likelihood of the competition agents
reaching convergent decisions on remedies. And, notably, coordination of market-testing
and implementation of remedies represents a discretionary increase in cooperation not
originally envisioned in the Bilateral Agreement.
The next important example of EU-US remedial contacts comes from the Astra
Zeneca/Novartis merger in 2000. This merger case is a unique example of competition
agents agreeing to the same remedies despite focusing on different regional markets and
operating under different timetables for their respective reviews:
The Commission co-operated closely with the FTC in the
treatment of the AstraZeneca/Novartis merger case, in
particular so to a find a common solution to the problems
identified in the markets for cereal fungicides and maize
herbicides. Co-operation proved particularly useful for both
authorities because they had been offered the same
commitment [i.e., remedy] in order to solve competition
                                                
389 As Devuyst argues, “The two authorities continued to cooperate until the undertakings were fully
implemented and exchanged formal letters to this effect” (2001, 139).
390 ICPAC provides similar evidence: “rather than negotiating separate undertakings with the merging
parties, the EC relied on the provisions of a U.S. consent decree to satisfy its concerns regarding a
perceived global problem in drilling fluids” (ICPAC 2000, 76).
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concerns on different regional markets. In this particular
case of world-wide divestitures of both Novartis’
strobilurin business and AstraZenaca's acetochlor products,
co-operation between the authorities was needed to ensure
that the final commitments accepted were not contradictory
and that the buyer would be acceptable to both authorities.
In fact, in view of the FTC’s request to have a ‘buyer
upfront’ for these businesses before approving the deal, the
parties had already started to implement the commitment of
looking for a buyer before the commitment could be finally
accepted by the Commission (European Commission
2002a, 1.2.1).
As this description suggests, the competition agents engage in remedial contacts in order
to reduce the likelihood of “contradictory” (i.e., conflicting) decisions. This evidence is
consistent with claims made throughout the current study that agents cooperate in order
to avoid divergent decisions.
Table 10 is limited to merger activity from 1995-2000. However, in a speech at
France’s the Centre d’économie Industrielle, Ecole Nationale Supérieure de Mines, EU
Competition Commissioner Mario Monti discussed two examples of merger cases in
2001, in which EU-US discretionary remedial contacts contributed to overall
implementation cooperation:
In the Metso/Svedala case, close co-operation between the
Commission and the FTC took place not just during the
Commission’s investigative period, but also during the
implementation phase of the remedies, after the
Commission’s decision had been issued. Indeed, due to
different time constraints in the two jurisdictions, the FTC
investigation continued after the Commission’s
investigation had been concluded.
Thanks to this very close co-operation, the Commission
and the FTC were able to request very similar undertakings,
in the form of divestiture of various rock-crushing
businesses, and to approve at the same time the buyer for
the business to be divested. The difference of timing
allowed the approval to take place at the same time, even
when the FTC had adopted an up-front solution.
The Nestlé/Ralston Purina case is another example of
enhanced co-operation, in this case a tripartite one, between
the European Commission, the FTC and the Canadian
Competition Authority.
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In this case, the affected markets were of a national
dimension, and, therefore, the competition problems
examined and the remedies adopted by each authority had
to be different. However, the authorities discussed their
respective cases in detail, in particular market definition, as
well as the principles they intended to apply to find
appropriate solutions.
Finally, the Commission approved the acquisition, subject
to divestitures of plants and brands in Spain, Italy and
Greece. The remedial action chosen by the FTC with regard
to the US market is also very similar. The only element of
distinction [i.e., inconsistency] between the two remedies
packages is that, while the brand divestiture was permanent
in the US, the Commission accepted a licensing of the
divested brand for a limited period of time combined with a
re-branding by the proposed buyer in order to avoid a
situation where the ownership of some pet food brands
would be permanently split in different parts of the
Community (Monti 2002, 6-7).
Monti’s description reveals a potentially important insight into EU-US cooperation. The
fact that the EU and US reached inconsistent, but not conflicting, decisions in the cases
suggests that inconsistent decisions may not be as likely to prompt political intervention
as conflicting decisions. This finding remains inconclusive, however, as the BMD and
GEH merger cases discussed below provide contrary insights. This issue is addressed in
greater detail in Chapter 6.
Remedial contacts represent the last practical stage of EU and US competition
agents engaging in implementation cooperation. Based on the data provided in the
Commission’s annual reports and the commentaries of EU officials, remedial contacts
provide another means by which EU and US competition agents reduce the likelihood of
divergent (especially conflicting) decisions. In addition, the preceding discussion of
remedial contacts reveals areas in which the EU and US competition agents are
increasing their implementation cooperation through their discretionary authority—
market-testing and implementation of remedies.
B. Flawed Cases of EU-US Implementation Cooperation
The preceding analysis suggests that EU-US implementation cooperation
functions smoothly and tends to reduce the likelihood of divergent decisions. If
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competition agents have reduced the likelihood of divergent decisions, then political
intervention should be unlikely in individual concurrent jurisdiction merger cases. In fact,
this is what appears to have happened. However, political intervention, while infrequent,
does still occur. While implementation cooperation has contributed to depoliticizing
transatlantic competition relations by reducing the likelihood of divergent decisions,
competition policy—especially international cooperation in competition policy—remains
susceptible to politicization.
Signs of politicization are particularly witnessed in two concurrent jurisdiction
merger cases: the 1997 Boeing-McDonnell Douglas (BMD) merger and the 2001
GE/Honeywell (GEH) merger. EU and US competition agents regard implementation
cooperation to have been particularly “flawed” in these two cases. The current study uses
the term “flawed” to indicate an outcome that deviates from the preferences of the
competition agents. Such deviations display significant levels of political intervention in
and/or public challenges by private actors to the merger review process despite
implementation cooperation. Based on their preferences and the cooperative framework
created by the regulatory agents, such political intervention and public challenges are
undesirable outcomes. From the perspective of the competition agents, the occurrence of
such undesirable outcomes suggests a flaw in the framework or in the way in which it
was implemented in these two cases. Therefore, both of these cases require more in depth
analysis to understand where and why flaws occurred in the different stages of
implementation cooperation.
1. The Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Merger of 1997
The Boeing/McDonnell Douglas (BMD) merger was the first significant flawed
case of EU-US implementation cooperation since the Bilateral Agreement first
established a cooperative framework for transatlantic competition relations. The case
provoked considerable public and private attention because it involved a merger between
two large US firms that was challenged in the EU but approved in the US. The EU’s
divergent decision and the subsequent US reaction surprised many observers in Brussels
and Washington and contributed to the high-profile of the case.  Due to the intransigent
positions of the EU and US, the case “took the United States and European Union to the
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brink of a trade war” (Evenett et al. 2000, vii).391 However, according to the patterns of
behavior posited in Chapter 2, the flawed nature of this case appears to be rather easily
explained. The escalation of the case should not surprise observers because such a
divergent decision by competition agents is likely to be perceived as a threat to national
and/or constituent interests and, therefore, should prompt political intervention. In the
end, the BMD merger was particularly significant not because of the escalation of
political intervention, but because it served as a valuable learning experience on a number
of fronts for both EU and US competition agents.
The intent of the current discussion is to draw out lessons from the BMD case that
demonstrate the revised cross-level approach and reflect specific patterns of behavior
(i.e., P4 and P6) posited in Chapter 2. Therefore, the current study provides only a brief
overview of the merger case. More detailed reports of the substantive issues of the
merger and the divergent analyses taken by the EU and US can be found elsewhere.392
This case began when the Boeing Company and the McDonnell Douglas
Corporation (MDC), two US aerospace companies, announced plans to merge on
December 15, 1996.393 In accordance with the provisions of the Bilateral Agreement, and
following the receipt of formal notification from the merging firms, the EU and US
competition agents notified each other that they were both opening their own
investigations into the BMD case.
Following a preliminary investigation in Phase I, the Commission announced its
intent to open an in-depth Phase II investigation on March 17, 1997. The Commission
was concerned that Boeing already enjoyed a dominant position in the global market for
aircraft over 100 seats—a position that would be strengthened by adding MDC. More
specifically, the deal would have increased Boeing’s share of the market in aircraft over
100 seats from 64 to 70 percent and left Airbus as the only other competitor in that
product market. In addition, the Commission was concerned that the merger would
                                                
391 For similar claims, see ICPAC (2000) and Coleman (1997).
392 For example, see Damro (2001), Boeder (2000), ICPAC (2000), Van Miert (2000), Karpel (1998), Peck
(1998) and Snyder (1997).
393 According to the agreement, Boeing would purchase McDonnell Douglas for $13.3 billion.
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increase significantly Boeing’s defense and space business.394 In early May, the EU’s
Competition Commissioner Karel Van Miert also expressed his concerns about Boeing’s
twenty-year exclusive supply agreements with American Airlines and Delta Airlines,
declaring them “totally unacceptable” (Morrocco 1997, 24).395
On May 21, the Commission issued its formal Statement of Objections. The
statement outlined the EU’s concern that the merger would strengthen Boeing’s existing
dominant position. According to the MCR, such a transaction would be
anticompetitive.396 At this point, the US’s FTC was unable to comment on the merger
because its review was still ongoing (White House 1998a).
The EU’s Statement of Objections included concerns over the impact of the
merger on competition in the defense industry. However, following a communiqué from
the US requesting comity considerations, the Commission agreed not to investigate the
defense related portions of the merger. In accordance with the Bilateral Agreement, the
Commission’s decision reflected a determination that this aspect of the merger
represented an “important interest” of the US. The fact that the EU dropped its defense
related complaints suggests that the Commission calculated that including such a
politically sensitive subject as defense would have increased significantly the likelihood
of political intervention by the US principals (i.e., White House and Congress).
On July 1, it became apparent that the decisions of the EU and US competition
agents were significantly diverging. On that day, the FTC approved the BMD merger.
According to the FTC’s analysis, the merger would not raise significant competition
concerns because MDC was no longer competitive in the commercial transport market
(Sparaco 1997, 67). Because the FTC approved the merger, remedial contacts between
the US and EU competition authorities were necessarily limited.
In the hopes of gaining similar approval in the EU, BMD submitted a new
package of remedies to the Commission. This package was rejected by the Commission
                                                
394 The Commission was concerned that “Whilst Boeing’s commercial aircraft operations have usually
accounted for 70% to 80% of its total business, around 70% of MDC’s total business is related to the
defence and space center” (1997c).
395 These agreements would have locked the airlines into purchasing arrangements requiring them to buy
from only the newly merger BMD for twenty years.
396 Under the MCR, the Commission is mandated to prevent the creation or strengthening of “a dominant
position as a result of which effective competition would be significantly impeded in the common market
or in a substantial part of it” (Article 2[2]).
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after closed-door negotiations on July 16. According to Boeing, the Commission’s
rejection was based on lingering concerns over BMD’s dominant position and the
exclusive supply agreements (Boeing 1997a).
Facing an intransigent Commission and with a final decision in the case scheduled
for July 23, US political principals began to intervene in the process with threats of
retaliation. These threats of retaliation took the form of numerous foreign intervention
instruments. Once it became clear that the EU would not approve the merger without
remedies (i.e., a divergent decision), the White House intervened with President William
J. Clinton stating that he might consider a complaint to the WTO or retaliatory tariffs if
no resolution was reached.397 The US legislature also intervened in the review process.
Both the House of Representatives and the Senate passed resolutions opposing EU
“interference” in a US business transaction.398 On July 16, the US Senate unanimously
approved a resolution that condemned the EU for its intentions (Wolf 1997).
Roberto provides a useful summary of the political intervention that occurred in
the BMD case as well as the Commission’s reaction:
Congress, led by legislators from Boeing’s home state of
Washington, quickly responded. In its July 23, 1997
resolution chastising the EC’s actions, the U.S. House of
Representatives said the EC was ‘apparently determined to
disapprove the merger to gain an unfair competitive
advantage for Airbus Industries, a government-owned
aircraft manufacturer; and… this dispute could threaten to
disrupt the overall relationship between the EU and the
United States which had a two-way trade in goods and
services of approximately $366 billion in 1996’.399
Furthermore, resolutions passed in both the House and
Senate vowed that any disapproval by the EC of the
Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger ‘would constitute an
unwarranted and unprecedented interference in a United
States business transaction that would threaten thousands of
American aerospace jobs’.400 In addition, reports circled
that the Clinton administration threatened to challenge
government subsidies to Airbus Industries before the WTO
                                                
397 Clinton stated that “we have a system for managing this through the World Trade Organization and we
have some options ourselves when actions are taken by Europe in this regard” (White House 1998b).
398 H.R. Res. 191, 105th Cong. (1997), 143 Cong. Record 5550 (1997); S. Res. 108, 105th Cong. (1997), 143
Cong. Record 7609 (1997).
399 H.R. Res. 191.
400 H.R. Res. 191 and S. Res. 108.
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or to impose taxes or penalties on Airbus-manufactured
planes sold in the United States.401 The FTC was in turn
accused of trying to protect a ‘national champion’ by
approving the merger402… Meanwhile, Van Miert insisted
that the EC was not out to protect Airbus403 (1998, 598-
599).
For their part, Boeing and MDC continued to resist the demands of the
Commission despite a fast-approaching MCR deadline for a final decision. Finally,
facing the reality that the EU was not going to change its decision, the merging firms
contacted the Commission with an eleventh-hour solution on July 23. Boeing Chairman
and CEO, Philip Condit, argued that BMD’s concessions were made due to a fear that the
newly merged company would have faced “large fines and potential harm to our
customers” without EU approval (Boeing 1997b, 1). The Commission accepted the final
package of remedies offered by BMD, which addressed each of the EU’s competition
concerns.404 Formal authorization of the merger as compatible with the SEM came on
July 30. The newly-merger BMD began operating on August 4 as the largest aerospace
company in the world (Damro 2001, 215).
The BMD case provides a clear instance of divergent decisions and political
intervention.405 As such, the case reveals useful insights for the current study. The case
supports claims that political principals are likely to perceive divergent decisions as
                                                
401 …Vice President Al Gore stated that the United States would act quickly if a U.S. company were put at
an ‘unfair competitive disadvantage because of an improperly motivated regulatory decision of a foreign
country.’ See Stanley Holmes and Michele Flores, “Boeing Deal Tussle About Trade,” Seattle Times, May
15, 1997, at D1.
402 See Boeing v. Airbus: Peace in Our Time, Economist, August 1, 1997, at 59, 61.
403 See Emma Tucker, Editorial, Van Miert’s Finest Hour, Fin. Times, July 24, 1997, at 11.
404 For the exact remedies, see BMD (1997b).
405 The BMD case may also suggest that elements of “balancing” were at work (see Chapter 4).
Commenting after the merger review, the EU’s Director-General of Competition Alexander Schaub
suggested possible reasons why the Commission appeared so intransigent in its position:
the Commission, often perceived in the US as a ‘junior partner,’ emerged stronger from
this case… it must be noted that the credibility of the Commission in Europe was
reaffirmed. We have proven our capacity to withstand pressures and we were able to
obtain from Boeing concessions that no Member State could have obtained on its own
(Schaub 1998, 4).
Thus, in addition to the EU’s legitimate competition concerns, the Commission’s behavior in the BMD case
may have reflected a desire to increase its credibility in the US and among its Member States (Damro
2001). By standing firm in its position, the Commission may have seen itself as balancing its relations with
the more experienced US competition agents—no longer would the Commission be perceived as a “junior
partner” to the DoJ and FTC. Likewise, by standing firm in its position, the Commission may have seen
itself as increasing its credibility in the eyes of its Member States as capable of representing and standing
up for EU interests in international relations.
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threats to national and/or constituent interests. Based on this perception, US principals
decided to intervene in the case with a variety of foreign intervention instruments.
In addition, this flawed case served as a valuable learning experience for many
actors involved in the merger review process.406 While the Bilateral Agreement had been
signed six years prior, the competition agents’ experience at cooperating under the
provisions was still limited. As Parisi argues “Unfortunately, despite the enforcement
agencies’ best efforts to explain the Agreement and operations under it, some
misunderstandings of the Agreement were reported, particularly during the course of the
Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger case” (1999, 137).407 Charles S. Stark, Chief of the
Foreign Commerce Section in the DoJ’s Antitrust Division, makes clear the valuable
lessons learned from BMD:
Divergent antitrust approaches to the same transaction
undermine confidence in the process; they risk imposing
inconsistent requirements on the firms, or frustrating the
remedial objectives of one or another of the antitrust
authorities; and they may create frictions or suspicions that
can extend beyond the antitrust arena—as we witnessed in
the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas matter. The
Boeing/McDonnell Douglas experience led the agencies on
both sides to draw a deep breath and commit themselves to
extra and sustained efforts to make the coordination
process work as well as it possibly can (italics added)
(Stark 2000, 5).
Interviewees familiar with the BMD case agree that the merger showed
competition agents that they should share more information in the early stages of their
respective review processes in order to reduce the likelihood of surprising their foreign
counterparts with an analysis that will likely result in a divergent decision. This lesson
was not lost on subsequent EU-US implementation cooperation. In fact, after BMD, the
US and EU competition agents began exchanging and discussing mergers much sooner in
their respective review process (i.e., initial contacts) and more intensively. Indeed,
research interviewees agree that the lessons learned from the BMD merger contributed to
the success of the “best practice” case of WorldCom/MCI a year later.
                                                
406 For an argument on the lessons of BMD, see Fox (1997b).
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2. The GE-Honeywell Merger of 2001
The 2001 GE/Honeywell (GEH) merger is another flawed case of EU-US
implementation cooperation in competition policy. Like the BMD merger, the case
provoked considerable public and private attention because it showcased a merger
between two large US firms that was challenged in the EU but approved in the US. As
discussed above, such an outcome should certainly prompt political intervention. Unlike
the BMD case, GEH ended with the firms abandoning the merger instead of agreeing to
implement the remedies required by the EU.408 If the BMD merger case served as a
valuable learning experience for the EU and US competition agents, how and why did the
GEH merger case become flawed? Did the competition agents forget the lessons learned
from BMD?
The following discussion of the GEH merger again focuses on the insights that
demonstrate the revised cross-level approach and the help to illustrate the patterns of
behavior posited in Chapter 2 (i.e., P4 and P6). More detailed discussions of the GEH
merger and the divergent analyses taken by the EU and US are reported elsewhere.409 The
following analysis of the merger focuses on the behavior of the EU competition agents as
the regulators who withheld approval of the merger.410
On October 22, 2000, two US firms—the General Electric Company (GE) and
Honeywell International Inc. (Honeywell)—entered into an agreement under which
“General Electric 2000 Merger Sub, Inc.”, a wholly owned subsidiary of GE, would be
merged with Honeywell. As a result, Honeywell would become a wholly owned
subsidiary of GE.411 While GE’s diversification strategy had included a number of prior
mergers, the transaction with Honeywell was its largest ever.
                                                                                                                                                
407 “One such misconception was the assertion that, in a merger notified to both parties, one party ‘goes
first’ while the other defers. This is clearly wrong… (Parisi 1999, 137).
408 As the Commission notes, the GE/Honeywell merger “is only the 15th time the Commission has blocked
a merger since September 1990, when it became the one-stop shop for mergers and acquisitions requiring
regulatory approval in the European Economic Area – the 15 European Union states plus Norway, Iceland
and Liechtenstein. And it is only the second time it prohibited a merger involving only American firms”
(2001c, 2). In MCI/Sprint, both the EU and US blocked the merger between only American firms.
409 For example, see Burnside (2002), Evans (2002), European Commission (2002, 72-73) and Pflanz and
Caffarra (2002).
410  For more on the US DoJ’s review of the GEH merger and differences with the EU, see Evans (2002).
411 GE and Honeywell are very diversified industrial firms. According to the European Commission, GE is
“active in fields including aircraft engines, appliances, information services, power systems, lighting,
industrial systems, medical systems, plastics, broadcasting (through the NBC media channel), financial
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On February 5, 2001, the Commission received the formal notification of the
proposed merger pursuant to Article 4 of the MCR. Proposed as the largest industrial
merger in history and active in the SEM, the GE/Honeywell merger easily met the
thresholds in the MCR for MTF review and fell within the EU’s jurisdiction.412 At the
time, GE’s CEO Jack Welch announced publicly “This is the cleanest deal you’ll ever
see… Every single activity, there is no product overlap… Everything is complementary.
That’s not a speech for the antitrust people, that’s fact” (Murray et al. 2001, A1).
However, on March 1, 2001, the Commission took an alternative view and decided to
initiate Phase II proceedings in the case. 
On May 8, 2001, the Commission released a Statement of Objections identifying
competition concerns surrounding the proposed GE/Honeywell merger. According to the
Commission’s press release,
GE alone already had a dominant position in the markets
for jet engines for large commercial and large regional
aircraft. Its strong market position combined with its
financial strength and vertical integration into aircraft
leasing were among the factors that led to the finding of
GE’s dominance in these markets. The investigation also
showed that Honeywell is the leading supplier of avionics
and non-avionics products, as well as of engines for
corporate jets and of engine starters (i.e., a key input in the
manufacturing of engines). The combination of the two
companies’ activities would have resulted in the creation of
dominant positions in the markets for the supply of
avionics, non-avionics and corporate jet engines, as well as
to the strengthening of GE’s existing dominant positions in
jet engines for large commercial and large regional jets.
                                                                                                                                                
services and transportation systems” while Honeywell is “an advanced technology and manufacturing
company serving customers worldwide with aerospace products and services, automotive products,
electronic materials, specialty chemicals, performance polymers, transportation and power systems as well
as home, building and industrial controls” (2001b, 2).
412 Due to confidentiality provisions, the exact numbers for GE and Honeywell turnover are not available.
According to the Commission,
The undertakings concerned have a combined aggregate worldwide turnover of more
than EUR 5 000 million (for the full year 1999, EUR [...] * for GE and [...]* for
Honeywell). Both GE and Honeywell have a Community-wide turnover in excess of
EUR 250 million (for the full year 1999, [...]* for GE and [...]* for Honeywell), but they
do not achieve more than two-thirds of their aggregate Community-wide turnover within
one and the same Member State. The notified operation therefore has a Community
dimension” (European Commission 2001b, 3).
The parts of this text that are enclosed in square brackets and marked with an asterisk were edited to ensure
that confidential information was not disclosed.
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The dominance would have been created or strengthened as
a result of horizontal overlaps in some markets as well as
through the extension of GE’s financial power and vertical
integration to Honeywell activities and of the combination
of their respective complementary products. Such
integration would enable the merged entity to leverage the
respective market power of the two companies into the
products of one another. This would have the effect of
foreclosing competitors, thereby eliminating competition in
these markets, ultimately affecting adversely product
quality, service and consumers’ prices (European
Commission 2001c, 1-2).
In its objection, the Commission clearly stated its concerns over GE’s existing
dominant position in specific relevant markets. According to the MCR, a merger that
strengthens such a dominant position is likely to be anticompetitive and, therefore, should
not be approved.413 However, the EU’s objections were also based on the use of an
analytical tool in merger review known as “bundling” (Pflanz and Caffarra 2002). The
economic theory of bundling suggests that competition may be undermined if a firm
“bundles” its products from different markets because the combined range of products
would give it “undo power” (Murray et al. 2001, A4). Reflecting this concern over
bundling, an EU competition official in the MTF, Enrique Gonzalez Diaz, “argued that
by buying Honeywell, GE could parlay its powerful position in the large jet-engine
market into possible dominance of a related industry, avionics, which produces crucial
flight equipment. Honeywell is one of the strongest players in this market” (Murray et al.
2001, A4). Thus, a central problem with the proposed GEH merger was that GE could
abuse its dominance in the future by bundling aircraft engines with flight equipment.
Because bundling relies on a prediction of the future structure of the market(s)
and behavior of the firm, analysis of dominance may be particularly problematic when
combined with or replaced by concerns over “bundling”. On this basis, GE rejected the
Commission’s use of the economic theory of bundling from the beginning of the review
process. In the US, the DoJ did not use bundling in its analysis.414 This divergence in the
                                                
413 Under the MCR, the Commission is mandated to prevent the creation or strengthening of “a dominant
position as a result of which effective competition would be significantly impeded in the common market
or in a substantial part of it” (Article 2[2]).
414 The Chicago School was largely “responsible for discrediting the theory of ‘bundling’ in the US”
(Hargreaves and Spiegel 2001, 4). In addition, US commentators have argued “Although often applied in
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analytical concepts used by the EU and US agents might have been overcome by closer
cooperation at an earlier stage. However, as discussed below, initial contacts between the
two competition agents were limited due, in part, to the speed with which the merger
agreement had been reached between GE and Honeywell and the firms’ reluctance to
authorize pre-notification contacts between its legal counsel and the Merger Task Force.
After months of contentious negotiations, on June 14, 2001, GEH submitted a
proposal to address the Commission’s concerns about the proposed merger. While this
submission came before the MCR’s formal deadline, GEH made it clear to the
Commission that this was its “last offer” (European Commission 2001d, 1). As the
Commission notes,
GE submitted a proposal for a package of undertakings to
address the competition concerns identified by the
Commission in its Statement of Objections of 8 May 2001.
The proposal comprised structural undertakings relating to
avionics- and non-avionics products, engine starters, small
marine gas turbines, large regional jet engines and
behavioural undertakings concerning corporate jet engines,
the commitment not to engage in bundling practices and
GECAS (2001b, 112).
The role of GECAS (GE Capital Aviation Services) would become a prominent
point of contention between the merging firms and the Commission.415 In particular,
GEH’s dominant position could be used to leverage GECAS—“the largest purchaser of
aircraft, ahead of any airline” (EU Press Release 2001)—into purchasing and/or leasing
only planes with GEH aircraft engines and flight equipment.
On the same day that GEH submitted its “last offer”, the Commission announced
that the proposal was insufficient to remove the competition problems identified in the
Statement of Objections (European Commission 2001c, 2). The Commission also noted
that it was regretful that GEH’s proposal did not reflect remedies that the Commission
had suggested earlier in the review process. These remedies were structural commitments
that would have addressed the Commission’s concerns over GECAS:
In particular, we have explored with the parties
commitments which would not have entailed further
                                                                                                                                                
the computer industry, the bundling theory isn’t widely accepted in aerospace… where sophisticated
buyers, not consumers, choose among a relative handful of players” (Murray et al. 2001, A4).
415 GE Capital is GE’s financial arm, while GECAS is GE Capital’s aircraft leasing unit.
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divestments in the aerospace industry but rather a structural
commitment to modify the commercial behaviour of
GECAS. We regret that this avenue has not been pursued.
Unless the merger notification is formally withdrawn, the
Commission will continue with the review procedure
(European Commission 2001d, 1).
GEH did not withdraw the merger notification, and the Commission continued its
review in accordance with the procedures established under the MCR. In response to the
Commission’s rejection of the offer, GE’s Jack Welch declared publicly “You are never
too old to get surprised… The European regulators’ demands [for divestitures] exceeded
anything I or our European advisers imagined and differed sharply from antitrust
counterparts in the US and Canada” (Hargreaves and Spiegel 2001, 1).
Following the EU’s rejection, negotiations continued between the Commission
and the firms. However, by this time, political principals in the US began intervening in
the merger review process. For example, US Attorney General Ashcroft dispatched a
senior political appointee, Deborah Herman, to meet with EU officials to explain why the
DoJ had approved the merger. In addition, “On June 15th, [President] Bush said he was
‘concerned’ about the European position” (Economist 2001, 5). Finally, Senator Jay
Rockefeller wrote a letter to the Commission supporting the merger (Sorkin 2001, C9).
This political pressure was likely supported (if not initiated) by GEH. As Hill
reports, “‘At the time, we thought it would be impossible that the Europeans would try to
block a U.S.-U.S. deal that had been given the go-ahead by Washington,’ said an
executive close to G.E. who spoke on the condition of anonymity. ‘The conventional
wisdom was that the political pressure would be too great’” (2001, C4).
In addition to the increasing political intervention by US principals, GEH also
stepped up its publicity campaign to increase pressure on the Commission. This strategy
of publicity and any belief that political pressure might change the Commission’s
decision were clearly not informed by the lessons of the BMD merger five years earlier.
Rather, such a strategy reflects a lack of knowledge about the Commission’s commitment
to resist external threats to its basic interest in regulatory independence. For example, in
response to the publicity campaign, Monti deplored GEH’s attempts at politicization as
unjustified because the Commission had not yet issued its final decision in the case: “I
deplore attempts to misinform the public and to trigger political intervention. This is
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entirely out of place in an antitrust case and has no impact on the Commission
whatsoever. This is a matter of law and economics, not politics” (European Commission
2001e). A US competition agent himself, John Parisi (Counsel for European Union
Affairs in the International Antitrust Division of the FTC) provides a similar argument:
trying the case in public is of little utility. The U.S.
agencies normally keep silent during the course of an
investigation—even where the press reports on it.416 And
FTC Commissioners are constrained by judicial decisions
limiting their utterances while an action is pending, lest
their decision be tainted with prejudice.417 Suffice it to say
that trying to use the press as a separate front for advocacy
of your case is a diversion from the necessary task of
dealing effectively with the enforcement agency on the
merits of the case. The same can be said for ‘politicizing’
the matter by appeals to parliamentarians or officials of
other government agencies (1999, 141).
Undaunted, and perhaps emboldened, by the political and public challenges to the
EU’s merger review process, Commissioner Monti reiterated the Union’s opposition to
the merger on June 18, declaring that it
would combine GE’s strong position in the aircraft engine
markets with Honeywell’s similarly strong position in
avionics and non-avionics such as weather turbulence
detection products, collision avoidance and flight
management systems and so-called black boxes. To this
powerful combine, one must also add GE’s leasing and
financial arms, respectively GECAS, the largest purchaser
of aircraft, ahead of any airline—and GE Capital. This
could lead to less competition in the engine and in the
aerospace sectors and result in higher prices for customers
in the medium term (European Commission 2001e).
On June 26, 2001, the EU’s Member States entered the merger review process. In
accordance with the MCR, the representatives of the fifteen national competition
authorities convened as the Advisory Committee on Concentrations (ACC) and endorsed
                                                
416 FTC policy does permit public confirmation of the existence of a merger or non-merger investigation
under certain circumstances, particularly where the subjects of the investigation themselves have disclosed
the existence of the investigation to the public. See FTC Policy Concerning Disclosures of Non-merger
Competition and Consumer Protection Investigations, 63 Fed. Reg. 219 (Nov. 13, 1998).
417 See Texaco, Inc. v. FTC, 336 F.2d 754 (1964); Cinderella Career and Finishing Schools, Inc., et al. v.
FTC, 425 F.2d 583 (1970).
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the Commission’s draft decision to block GE/Honeywell merger.418 Before the ACC
decision, GE initiated extensive lobbying efforts in the Member States (Sorkin 2001,
C9).419 This strategy was not likely to be useful because the ACC is simply advisory, it
cannot reject or amend such reports. In any event, the ACC’s endorsement of the
Commission’s draft decision suggests that GEH’s lobbying efforts had little effect on the
Member States.
The Commission’s final decision was scheduled for June 30, 2001. Despite
having submitted its “last offer”, GE re-entered negotiations with the EU on July 27. This
reversal of position may have been the result of the original GEH merger agreement that
required GE to make its “best effort” to pursue regulatory approval of the merger (Sorkin
2001, C9). Under the terms of the merger agreement, had GE not re-entered negotiations
with the Commission, Honeywell may have taken them to court and GE could have faced
penalties.
During the renewed negotiations, GE did propose additional remedies, which
were submitted to the Commission on June 28, 2001. According to the Commission,
At a very late stage in the procedure… the parties withdrew
the package of undertakings submitted on 14 June 2001 and
proposed a new and substantially modified set of
undertakings. The new proposal relates to the sale of a
minority interest in GECAS to third parties selected by GE
combined with the behavioural commitments already
submitted concerning GECAS’s conduct in its dealings
with Honeywell. In parallel, the parties reduce their
proposed divestitures of Honeywell aerospace products
(European Commission 2001b, 122-123).
However, the Commission remained unconvinced by the new offer, arguing that “In the
present case the proposed undertakings are insufficient, they do not allow sufficient time
for consultation and in any event they do not solve the competition problems identified”
(European Commission 2001b, 125).
In the US, political attention remained focused on the case. For example, Paul H.
O’Neill, US Secretary of the Treasury “attacked the European Commission, saying that it
                                                
418 The exact voting in the ACC is not publicly available. However, leaks to the press suggest that only two
members did not support the draft: Greece was not present and Ireland abstained from the vote (Sorkin
2001, C9).
419 For more on these national lobbying efforts, see Meller (2001).
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would be ‘off the wall’ for European regulators to block the deal, which American
regulators have already approved” (Sorkin and Meller 2001, C1). Mr. O’Neill also
intervened publicly stating
that the European Commission had too much power. ‘They
are the closest thing you can find to an autocratic
organization that can successfully impose their will on
things that one would think are outside their scope of
attention,’ he said. ‘When I see things like this, they’re
irritating,’ Mr. O’Neill added, ‘and yes, I’d like to say they
need to stop, but they will stop in time’ (Sorkin and Meller
2001, C2).
For its part, GEH began to view its proposed merger as a lost cause. In candid terms,
GE’s soon-to-be chairman and CEO Jeffrey Immelt revealed the dire circumstances when
he admitted “We [GEH and the Commission] are so far apart that this is not a place
where we would use political pressure” (Sorkin 2001, C9). Immelt’s comments are
notable for their implied understanding that political pressure was viewed as a possible
(but no longer useful) option for winning regulatory approval of a concurrent jurisdiction
merger.
Despite the publicity and political pressure, the EU regulatory agents stood firm
on their economic analysis of the proposed merger. On what would this time be GE’s
actual last offer, the Commission remained unconvinced for a number of reasons:
On 28 June 2001, two weeks later and well beyond the
deadline for the submission of undertakings, GE proposed a
new set of remedies. Apart from the fact that these
remedies were not adequate to deal with the competition
concerns, they were submitted at a very late stage in the
procedure and continued to present a series of technical
shortcomings. Indeed, according to the Commission’s
Notice on remedies acceptable under the Merger
Regulation, the Commission can only accept modified
commitments when these solve the competition concerns in
a clear and straightforward manner without the need for a
further market test. The offer submitted by GE on 28 June
did not meet this condition. The remedies proposed post-
deadline were not sufficiently clear-cut to solve the
identified competition concerns in a straightforward
manner and could therefore not be accepted (Giotakos et al.
2001, 12-13).
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The formal rejection of this final offer came on June 30, 2001, when the EU
declared the merger incompatible with the SEM.420 While the decision ended EU-US
implementation cooperation in this specific case, the GEH merger saga is not over yet.
Feeling aggrieved and particularly concerned about the possibility of similar EU
economic analyses in future merger reviews, “Both GE and Honeywell appealed against
the prohibition decision before the Court of Justice in September” (European
Commission 2002, 72). The ECJ’s final decision is still pending.
On its own, the GEH merger case is significant because, as Monti acknowledged,
“this was the first time the European Union and U.S. antitrust agencies have looked at the
same facts in the same market and gone different ways” (Lawsky 2001, 1). Like the
BMD merger case, GEH also provides lessons for implementation cooperation. For the
competition agents, information asymmetries may have contributed to the divergent
analyses, in particular the likelihood of using the economic concept of bundling.421
Despite the lessons of BMD, the agents’ ability to engage in extensive initial and review
process contacts was limited in this case by the speed with which the original merger
agreement was reached between the firms (see below). In addition, the GEH case reveals
how tenaciously competition agents (in this case, the Commission) will resist external
threats to their basic interest in regulatory independence. The external threats came in the
form of political pressure and publicity campaigns, both of which challenged the agent’s
                                                
420 For more on the EU’s reasons for blocking the merger, see Pflanz and Caffarra (2002) and Giotakos et
al. (2001).
421 The EU’s readiness to use bundling may also reflect the fact that the Commission has fewer resources
and legal opportunities to review market-distorting behavior after a merger has been approved. According
to this argument, in the US, less emphasis is put on predicting the future implications of a merger because
the competition agents can more easily police the post-merger behavior of the newly-merged firms. In
comparison, the EU lacks the resources necessary to continue such policing of post-merger dominance;
they simply do not have the staff resources. In addition, the US regulators can rely on private litigants to
assist in the policing of post-merger dominance. This role for private litigants does not exist in the EU. The
EU also appears to have fewer legal opportunities to impose remedies after a deal has been approved. As
Raghavan and Davis argue, “European antitrust regulators don’t have post-merger behavioral and structural
remedies that they can resort to if a deal turns anti-competitive… meaning that regulators can’t impose
remedies after a deal is approved. The lack of that option tends to make them scrutinize merger deals more
aggressively at the outset” (2001, A11). The Economist agrees that EU has fewer legal opportunities to
intervene after mergers have been cleared and, “Hence, they reckon they need to be more vigilant to
market-distorting problems that might arise in the future” (Economist 2001). Due to these limitations on the
policing of post-merger dominance, merger review in EU is likely to be more concerned about the future
implications of bundling.
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own preference to maximize certainty and decision-making authority, and, therefore,
were resisted.
For the US political principals, the EU’s divergent decision—blocking a merger
between two US firms that, at the time, was the largest industrial merger ever and was
approved by the US competition agents—was perceived as an unequivocal threat to
national and/or constituent interests. In conformity with their preferences and patterns of
behavior, the US principals found that the costs of not intervening in this major case
exceeded the costs of intervening and acted accordingly. The precise intervention cost
calculations of the principals and the role of the merging firms in agitating for political
intervention are addressed more fully in Chapter 6.
The GEH case also provides lessons for firms engaging in concurrent jurisdiction
mergers. Up to this point, the current study has emphasized the fact that merging firms
can exert influence in implementation cooperation by exercising their rights to
confidentiality of sensitive business information. However, the GEH merger case
provides additional insights into how firms can influence the merger review process.
These lessons are based on (mis)calculations made by the merging firms in the merger
review process, not necessarily on the general process of implementation cooperation.
Nevertheless, they reveal additional means by which the likelihood of political
intervention may be increased significantly in the merger review process.
The first lesson concerns the speed by which the merger was originally agreed.
The GEH deal was notable for being “negotiated over a three-day weekend, too fast for
the company to even consult its outside antitrust counsel or notify regulators” (Murray et
al. 2001, A1).422 GE itself admitted that the deal had been reached too quickly to engage
actively in pre-notification contacts with the European Commission. As Hill argues,
Mr. Welch’s first mistake on the Honeywell deal was
apparent the day he announced it. ‘We haven’t touched
every base,’ he said when asked whether G.E. and
Honeywell had contacted regulators in the United States
and Europe, as is often the case on big transactions. Indeed,
the deal was negotiated in only 72 hours by Mr. Welch,
who rushed to break up a planned merger between
Honeywell and United Technologies, an old-style
                                                
422 In addition, “GE conceded yesterday that the Honeywell deal came together too quickly for it to consult
its European merger lawyers” (Murray et al. 2001, A4).
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conglomerate that makes Pratt & Whitney aircraft engines
and Otis Elevators (2001a, C4).
While Welch was renowned for his decisiveness, the decision to proceed quickly
with the merger created early problems with the regulators: “Mr. Welch’s decisiveness…
led him to put the deal together in just a few days without sounding out regulators. And
when they balked, he refused to make enough concessions to satisfy them” (Sorkin
2001a). As a result of these limited contacts with the regulators, “It was more than two
months before Mr. Welch realized that the deal could face serious obstacles in Europe,
executives close to him said” (Hill 2001a, C4). Thus, regarding the initial merger
agreement, the preceding analysis suggests that no matter how quickly a merger deal is
agreed, legal counsel in Brussels and/or Washington should be consulted immediately.
GE’s problems in this regard appear to have emerged because of the firm’s desire to sign
a merger agreement as quickly as possible (72 hours) in order to beat United
Technologies to the punch.
A separate but related lesson from the GEH merger relates to pre-notification
contacts (PNCs) between the merging firms and the EU’s Merger Task Force (MTF).
PNCs occur under the discretionary authority of the MTF as confidential meetings and
other less formal contacts arranged between the merging firms and competition
authorities prior to formal notification of a merger deal.423 At these meetings, MTF case
handlers usually inquire about what markets will be involved, what the current market
                                                
423 The EU’s MCR requires merging firms to file a notification within seven days “after the conclusion of
the agreement, or the announcement of the public bid, or the acquisition of a controlling interest. That week
shall begin when the first of those events occurs” (Article 4[1]). While not formally mentioned in MCR,
first contacts between regulators and firms are often taken prior to this seven-day period, during a so-called
pre-notification phase. Once merging firms have notified formally the MTF of their plans to merge, a strict
timetable is set in motion.
There is a great deal of variation in duration of PNCs because merger agreements are constructed
in very different ways. The actual process by which firms agree to a merger can begin as a “golf-course”
agreement or a formal Memo of Understanding between the firms. As an agreement is being reached, the
merging firms generally will contact their legal counsel (whether in-house or a private practice law firm) to
inquire about regulatory requirements. (Sometimes firms notify their lawyers of a merger at the same time
the news is made publicly available. When this happens, the firms must meet the seven-day deadline for
filing a completed Form CO. In such cases, lawyers have been known to ask for additional time, arguing
that the Form CO cannot be completed by the deadline. When an incomplete Form CO is submitted, the
MTF is required to ask for another filing, which further delays the entire merger review process. Thus, such
firms are occasionally granted extensions beyond the deadline.)The legal counsel in Brussels then typically
contacts the Head of the MTF, explaining that a merger filing is expected. Usually that same day, the legal
counsel is informed of which MTF case manager to contact. Within a few days, the legal counsel has
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shares are of the merging firms and what the future market position will be of the merged
firm.424 The Competition Directorate publicly advocates the use of PNCs, which are
becoming increasingly viewed as standard operating procedures (see Chapter 3).425
Indeed, some Commission officials estimate that 90-95 percent of mergers involve such
discretionary and confidential contacts. Because they occur prior to the formal
notification of the merger, PNCs are a crucial part of the merger review process where
firms begin making their arguments for approval of a proposed merger before the tight
statutory deadlines are set in motion. In addition, PNCs function as an early warning
system through which merging firms can be alerted to potential problems the
Commission may have with a proposed merger.
Despite the benefits and growing use of PNCs, the sense of urgency in the GEH
merger case limited their utility. GE and Honeywell did not authorize their legal counsel
to engage in active and vigorous PNCs with the Commission. Had the firms done so, they
would have been alerted that the MTF had problems with the merger and, possibly even
that it was considering the use of the economic theory of bundling. Armed with this
information, GE and Honeywell would have had more time to formulate and press their
arguments and/or adjust their deal accordingly.
Another lesson for merging firms relates to GEH’s strategy of generating
publicity to challenge the EU’s opposition to the merger. Put simply, this case suggests
that agitating for media exposure does not increase the likelihood that the MTF will
approve a merger. Such efforts simply challenge and irritate the Competition Directorate.
Therefore, a media campaign may actually make the Commission less likely to change its
position on a merger. Similarly, the Commission is challenged and irritated when
merging firms attempt to generate political intervention through the Member States of the
EU. In the GEH case, the firms lobbied in the national capitals prior to the ACC meeting.
                                                                                                                                                
organized a PNC meeting and submitted a memo—about five pages detailing which firms, sectors and
markets will be involved in the proposed merger.
424 PNCs are usually attended by the case manager, two handlers, representatives of the parties and their
outside counsel. The actual negotiators of the merger are often advised by their legal counsel to be present
as the representatives of the merging firms.
425 Such contacts are in the interest of MTF case teams because by the time the formal notification is
received, they are already familiar with the merger case, accelerating the decision-making process by
reducing considerably the learning curve of these resource-strapped individuals. PNCs also are generally in
the interest of the merging firms because they allow firms to begin testing their arguments and can delay
the onset of the strict timetables in the MCR.
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However, as mentioned above, the Member States are not particularly productive targets
for such influence because the ACC is simply advisory and operates according to a
majority decision-making rule. The only clear impact of these strategies is that they raise
the suspicions of the Commission that the merging firms have something to hide.
These lessons are valuable not only for firms engaging in concurrent jurisdiction
mergers but for all firms considering mergers that will meet the MCR’s thresholds for
review. In short, this case suggests that the EU is better consulted than challenged. But,
what does the analysis reveal about why the GEH merger case became flawed? The
divergent decision appears to be a central cause of the political intervention—politicians
and commentators alike were surprised that the EU could block a merger between two
US firms that had been approved by the US competition agents. However, had the EU
and US competition agents engaged in initial contacts, they might have avoided the
divergent decisions, including the EU’s use of bundling.426 Based on the BMD merger,
the competition agents should have been aware of this fact. So, what happened to flaw
their cooperative system? It appears that the merging firms are responsible for the flaw:
the speed with which the merger agreement was reached and the resulting decision not to
engage in PNCs severely limited the ability of the EU and US competition agents to share
information and reach a convergent decision. In addition, the merging firms’ media
campaign and efforts to generate political pressure only reduced the likelihood that the
Commission would change its decision to one that was convergent with the US
competition agent’s decision.
The preceding discussion of implementation cooperation reveals the means by
which EU and US competition agents are pursuing cooperative bilateralism in practice on
a general and case-by-case basis. This implementation cooperation occurs simultaneously
with additional efforts to expand discretionary EU-US cooperation in competition
policy—exploratory institutional cooperation. Two recent examples of exploratory
institutional cooperation are discussed in the next section. The final section of this
                                                
426 It is useful to point out that the divergent decisions were inconsistent, not conflicting. While the US
approved and the EU prohibited the merger, the EU’s demands did not include remedies with which GE
and Honeywell would have been unable to comply simultaneously in both jurisdictions (see Chapter 2).
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chapter summarizes the findings on both implementation and exploratory institutional
cooperation.
III. Exploratory Institutional Cooperation—Enhancing Bilateral and Multilateral
Dispute Prevention
After successful rule-making cooperation, informal efforts at exploratory
institutional cooperation emerge as new ways to review and evaluate international
cooperation in competition relations. This exploratory institutional cooperation, which
can occur bilaterally and/or multilaterally, is the most recent and experimental process of
EU-US cooperation in competition policy. This section investigates the causes and effects
of EU-US exploratory institutional cooperation in competition policy with two case
studies: the bilateral EU-US Merger Working Group (MWG) and the multilateral
International Competition Network (ICN).
According to the fifth pattern of behavior (P5) posited in Chapter 2, EI will
prompt competition agents to continue shirking via attempts at exploratory institutional
cooperation. The agents’ intent is to maximize their independence from political
principals. By pursuing discretionary cooperation, competition agents expand their
regulatory independence and face fewer veto points (via domestic oversight) than they
would changing the non-discretionary, domestic rules that govern the establishment of
new international institutions. In addition, exploratory institutional cooperation reduces
the likelihood of divergent decisions in individual merger cases, which, in turn, reduces
the likelihood of political intervention. However, according to the sixth pattern of
behavior (P6), political principals continue to intervene in domestic and foreign agent
attempts to shirk if the costs of not intervening exceed the costs of intervening. Therefore,
the following analysis should reveal examples of political intervention if and when the
costs of not intervening in exploratory institutional cooperation exceed the costs of
intervening.
                                                                                                                                                
Had the remedies demanded by the EU impacted the remedies available in the US, the decision would have
been the first concurrent jurisdiction merger in which a conflicting decision occurred.
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A. The 1999 Mergers Working Group—An Institution for Exploring Bilateral
Convergence
Transatlantic competition relations are further enhanced by efforts at exploratory
institutional cooperation. In 1999, the EU and US competition agents began engaging in
exploratory institutional cooperation when they established the EU-US Mergers Working
Group (MWG).427 The bilateral MWG is an ad hoc forum mandated to study different EU
and US approaches to the formulation of remedies and the scope for convergence of
merger analysis and methodology. The MWG was initiated entirely under the
discretionary authority of the EU and US competition agents in a manner that did not
require direct review and approval by the respective political principals.
The MWG was launched during an annual bilateral meeting on October 5, 1999,
when the European Commission, the US FTC and the US DoJ agreed to create a new
working group to address common problems created by concurrent jurisdiction
competition cases (European Commission 2000a, 6). At this meeting, the top EU and US
competition agents discussed how to achieve the “best remedies” in merger cases.428 As
the Commission reports, EI played a significant role in the competition agents’ decision:
“It was felt that, while EU/US cooperation in merger cases is very successful, there is still
scope for improvement, particularly in view of the current merger wave and the
exponential increase in large-scale cross-border transactions” (italics added) (European
Commission 2000a 6). Following the meeting, the Financial Times reported an EU-US
agreement to set up a “joint committee to discuss how to intensify their co-operation in
policing mergers that require approval on both sides of the Atlantic” (Hargreaves 1999).
This so-called “joint committee” was actually the very informal and ad hoc EU-US
MWG. In fact, the MWG was not established by a formal agreement. However,
according to Assistant Attorney General Joel Klein, the group “will attempt to fomalise
some of the lessons learned over the last few years” (Hargreaves 1999).
The competition agents established the MWG under two provisions of the 1991
Bilateral Agreement: the general provisions in Article III for increasing information
exchanges and Article VII on consultations. The agents decided early that they wanted
                                                
427 For more on the MWG, see Damro (forthcoming 2003a).
428 Interview with US State Department official, May 2001.
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the group to be informal and flexible. As one US official familiar with this group asserts,
the competition agents wanted to avoid setting up a new formal structure, because “we
seem to have enough of those.” Ad hoc flexibility was also a priority because EU and US
competition agents “are very busy people working daily on cases with limited time
available in their schedules.”429 Such people had little patience for tying themselves to a
regularized schedule of additional transatlantic meetings.
Competition officials on both sides of the Atlantic are quick to point out that the
MWG is not a formal group—the MWG is not a new institution that would require
approval of or report to political principals. Obscuring the MWG further, the group has
no fixed membership and none of its work is made publicly available. The membership is
reported to be “senior officials” (Hargreaves 1999). More specifically, the MWG
functions as an analytical dialogue for those EU and US competition agents most
involved with transatlantic cooperation, including individuals from both competition
authorities and occasionally officials from the EU and US diplomatic missions. While the
group does generate working papers and shared notes, all are considered internal
documents.430
The MWG has been likened to a useful and low-pressure “brainstorming” session.
Officially, the group was mandated to explore new ways to expand cooperation in
discretionary areas like the determining market definitions and analyzing collective
dominance and oligopolies.431 More specifically, the MWG’s mandate focuses on
(1) an in-depth study of the respective EU and US
approaches to the identification and implementation of
remedies (in particular, divestitures), and to post-merger
                                                
429 Interview with US State Department official, May 2001.
430 Interview with US State Department official, May 2001; interview with EU Merger Task Force official,
September 2001.
431 EU Competition Commissioner Mario Monti explains the problems raised by oligopolistic dominance:
The phenomenon of oligopolistic dominance is, in my view, of particular pertinence in
the examination of global markets. While a finding of single firm dominance is in most
instances unlikely in such markets, theses markets can often be characterized by the
presence of a small number of globally active companies. Such a market structure can be
the result of a wave of concentration in a particular sector, such as the one that has
recently occurred in the oil industry. In order to be able to address—in the merger control
context—the potential competition problems that may arise in such oligopolistic markets,
it is necessary to develop a concept of collective dominance; such a concept is now well
established in EC law (2001a, 5).
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compliance-monitoring;432 and (2) the scope for further
convergence of analysis/methodology in merger cases
being dealt with in both jurisdictions, particularly as
regards the respective EU and US approaches towards
oligopoly/collective dominance (European Commission
2001, 118).433
In 2000, the MWG finished its work on remedies in merger cases. According to
EU Competition Commissioner Mario Monti, the MWG focused its discussions on
how remedies should be designed; the suitability of various
types of remedies in addressing different problems; how
they should be structured and market-tested; how
purchasers should be identified; and so on. Satisfactory
progress is being made, and both sides are finding these
discussions enlightening and useful (Monti 2000b, 5).
The MWG’s work in the area of remedies has produced practical results that
suggest a limited degree of convergence. The European Commission noted the MWG’s
productivity in this area:
During the course of last year (2000), there were extensive
tri-partite (Commission/DoJ/FTC) discussions, including a
meeting and a number of tele/video-conferences. The
deliberations have been mutually beneficial to all three
authorities, and were particularly helpful to the
Commission in its preparation of the recently adopted
Notice on Commitments [i.e., remedies] in Merger Cases434
(European Commission 2001a).
During these deliberations, the Commission floated a preliminary draft of this recent
Notice on remedies by the US competition agents for comments. As one member of the
EU’s Merger Task Force admits, the EU solicited US input because “we can learn from
them because they’re more experienced, they’ve been doing it longer”.435 Commissioner
Monti also admitted the role of the MWG in the EU’s preparation of its Notice on
remedies:
                                                
432 In other words, the MWG is designed to identify “best practices” and areas for potential convergence
(Monti 2000b, 5).
433 Hargreaves has also reported that the MWG would discuss “the transatlantic exchange of confidential
information” and that Klein says “We are looking to see how we can work together to ensure, where
possible, parties’ consent to transfer confidential information” (1999). However, the US and EU
competition agents have been reluctant to confirm officially discussions of this sensitive issue.
434 Commission Notice on remedies acceptable under Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 and under
Commission Regulation (EC) No 447/98, OJ C 68, 2.3.2001. pp. 3-11.
435 Interview with EU Merger Task Force official, September 2001.
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I have no hesitation in acknowledging that the
Commission’s approach to remedies as set out in the Notice
was influenced by the FTC’s previous study on the
divestiture process, which demonstrated that some
remedies secured by the FTC had proved less effective than
intended. Furthermore, the EU and US antitrust authorities
discussed their respective approaches to remedies within
the framework of a working group on merger control. The
exchange of expertise in this group proved invaluable to the
drafting of our Notice on remedies” (2002, 2).436
In particular, the FTC’s experience with structural and behavioral remedies proved useful
for the EU’s competition agents.
The work of the MWG provides a basis for convergence between EU and US
competition policy. For example, Monti claims “The Notice adopted by the Commission
represented a good step towards convergence between the EU and US policies and our ad
hoc co-operation in individual cases clearly confirms this trend” (Monti 2002, 7). This
comment provides a specific example of the MWG contributing to convergence of
remedial actions taken by the EU and US in merger cases. However, it is notable that the
convergence occurred in an area under the discretionary authority of the Commission
(i.e., the Notice on remedies), not a change to the non-discretionary statutes governing
competition policy in the EU.
Following the completion of its initial mandate, the MWG’s agenda continues to
evolve. As the European Commission claims, “In the longer term, the Working Group
could be further mandated to study other competition issues of common concern” (2000a
6). Thus, the MWG functions more as an ongoing, mutual learning process through
which agents can exchange notes and ideas on how best to cooperate.
While the MWG is informal and non-binding, it serves as a forum for devising
ways to limit political intervention, at least indirectly, by increasing implementation
cooperation and exploring the potential for convergence in discretionary areas of the EU
and US merger review processes. By exploring areas ripe for convergence, the MWG
reduces the likelihood of divergent merger decisions. This function reduces the likelihood
                                                
436 Monti notes that in order to develop “best practice guidelines” for merger remedies, the MTF’s
Enforcement Unit will “take into account the experience of other competition authorities in the Member
States, the US and elsewhere” (2002, 3). For more on the Enforcement Unit and similarities between EU
and US remedial actions, see Chapter 3.
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of political intervention in individual merger cases. By remaining informal and under the
discretionary authority of the competition agents, the MWG also avoids political
intervention in its general activities. In short, as the EU’s former Director-General for
Competition Alexander Schaub argues, the MWG facilitates the prevention of “high-
profile transatlantic political disputes” (2001, 11). While the MWG provides a useful
discretionary forum for exploring bilateral avenues for convergence and dispute
prevention, the EU and US competition agents have also turned their attention to the
challenges facing cooperation in competition relations at the multilateral level.
B. The 2001 International Competition Network—An Institution for Exploring
Multilateral Convergence
In another example of exploratory institutional cooperation, the EU and US have
been engaging for the last two years in discussions to establish an International
Competition Network (ICN).437 Instead of a formal international organization, the ICN is
an informal venue for discussing the multilateralization of cooperation in competition
policy. The negotiations over the ICN also present a useful case in which the EU and US
regulatory agents initially disagreed over the means by which to pursue international
cooperation in competition policy. As with the other cases of cooperation investigated in
the current study, the ICN displays evidence that the competition agents, in particular the
US agents, preferred to avoid political intervention or any other limitations on their
discretionary decision-making authority.
The 1990s witnessed considerable developments in transatlantic cooperation in
competition relations. At the same time, the EU spent much of the 1990s striving to
export its version of competition policy to other states (Damro 2001, Devuyst 2000,
Devuyst 1998).438 Due to the gradual negotiations on EU enlargement, the newly
democratized and marketized states of Central and Eastern Europe were natural targets
for the creation of new competition laws based on the Union model. The EU also
provided and continues to provide technical assistance to other states currently
developing competition policies. The US was generally less active on this front, but did
                                                
437 For more on the ICN, see Damro (forthcoming 2003b).
438 For official EU positions, see also Brittan (1999, 1997), Schaub (1998) and Van Miert (1998a, 1997a).
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and continues to provide antitrust assistance to a number of states developing competition
policies, including the EU applicants in Central and Eastern European.439
Throughout most of the 1990s, the EU and US discussed the possibility of
multilateralizing competition rules. However, during this dialogue, a fundamental
transatlantic disagreement emerged regarding whether competition policy should be
subsumed within the framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO). While the EU
pushed for inclusion of competition policy on the WTO agenda,440 the US steadfastly
refused such a move during most of the decade.
US opposition to including competition policy on the WTO agenda was
frequently articulated by former US Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust Joel I.
Klein.441 In a speech at an OECD conference on trade and competition policy, Klein
outlined three primary reasons for his opposition to including competition matters on the
WTO agenda.442 First, Klein argued that it was premature to begin negotiations over
competition rules in the WTO because of the limited experience the EU, US and
international community had with competition policy. In addition, because the WTO had
no previous experience with the complicated area of competition policy, Klein worried
that “if we try to run before we have learned to walk, we will stumble and badly injure
what we are all tying to promote—sound antitrust enforcement” (1999, 4).
Second, Klein was concerned that many other WTO members had only recently
established competition policies of their own, making it difficult to achieve an
                                                
439 According to former FTC Chairman Janet D. Steiger, the FTC and DoJ sent representatives to Central
and Eastern European states to “provide technical assistance, comment on draft competition and consumer
protection laws, and explain the structure and administration of our agencies. We describe our investigative
techniques and the tools of economic analysis of competition issues… our lawyers and economists have
been sent to work at the new agencies for up to nine-month periods” (1995, 2). For a useful discussion of
the types of and challenges (including funding limitations) to technical assistance in competition policy as
experienced by the US, other countries and international organizations, see Melamed (2000, 17-18).
440 One of the EU’s earliest proposals for multilateral competition rules on competition policy came from
Sir Leon Brittan (1992b). For the EU position on multilateralizing competition rules, see, for example,
European Commission (2002, 118-120) and Fox (1997a).
441 For examples of the US argument against WTO negotiations on antitrust rules, see also Griffin (1999,
197) on fear of trade-offs across policy areas within the WTO, and Varney (1996). The DoJ’s former
Acting Assistant Attorney General of Antitrust Division A. Douglas Melamed argues that “the WTO is not,
in any event, a suitable forum for negotiation of antitrust rules, and the cause of encouraging sound antitrust
enforcement in world markets would be undermined by the application of WTO dispute settlement
procedures to the kind of abstract rules that would result from negotiations in that forum” (2000, 11).
442 Klein’s objections were a reaction to an EU proposal advocated by Sir Leon Brittan and presented to the
WTO’s Working Group on Trade and Competition (Klein 1999).
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international consensus on what common rules for competition might be most
appropriate. As Klein argues, “a trade-focused forum like the WTO is (despite its many
other virtues) not the right place to develop such a consensus. Roughly half of the WTO’s
135 members do not even have antitrust laws, and most of the members that do have
them have only a very few years of very limited enforcement experience” (1999, 5).
Third, and, according to Klein, probably most important, the inclusion of
competition policy in the WTO would increase the likelihood of politicizing competition
issues. As Klein argues,
extending the WTO dispute settlement mechanism to
antitrust enforcement would necessarily involve the WTO
in second-guessing prosecutorial decision making in
complex evidentiary contexts—a task in which the WTO
has no experience and for which it is not suited—and
would inevitably politicize international antitrust
enforcement in ways that are not likely to improve either
the economic rationality or the legal neutrality of antitrust
decision making (italics added) (1999, 5).
Because of the binding nature of the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism any
agreement to move trade-related competition issues into this system would require treaty
ratification.443 Summarizing his opposition to bringing competition policy into the
WTO’s binding framework, Klein forcefully stated “at this point in time, WTO antitrust
rules would be useless, pernicious, or both, and would serve only to politicize the long-
term future of international antitrust enforcement, including through the intrusion of trade
disputes disguised as antitrust problems” (1999, 5).444
Fox presents a fourth argument for why US competition authorities resisted a
multilateralization of competition rules: “many U.S. antitrust enforcers, lawyers and
scholars fear a shift of the antitrust/trade issue from the hands of antitrust experts to the
hands of trade experts and a consequent shift of focus from what is anticompetitive and
                                                
443 As Klein admits, the EU did eventually moderate its position regarding the applicability of the WTO’s
dispute settlement mechanism for competition disagreements: “The EU and others favoring negotiations
seem to accept the validity of this concern, and thus have spoken of modifying the extent to which ordinary
WTO dispute settlement mechanisms might apply to individual antitrust decisions” (Klein 1999, 5).
444 It should be noted that in 2001, competition policy was included on the agenda for the Doha Round of
WTO trade negotiations. However, the Doha Ministerial Declaration reflects the US position of limiting
discussion of competition matters to only “focus on the clarification of: core principles, including
transparency, non-discrimination and procedural fairness, and provisions on hardcore cartels; modalities for
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harmful to consumers to what is unfair and harmful to domestic producers” (1997a,
12).445 Thus, US competition agents strongly oppose making their statutory obligations
subservient to other domestic public actors, especially trade authorities like the United
States Trade Representative. This concern reflects the competition agents’ belief that they
are most capable of “best” implementing competition policy (see Chapter 2).
The difference between the EU and US on whether or not to multilateralize
competition rules presents a surprising disagreement between competition agents with
similar preferences. However, according to Fox, the US resistance to a multilateralization
of competition rules should not be surprising. In comparison to the EU, “Americans are
not steeped in the postwar Western European tradition of community building. They have
the tools of unilateralism, they fear the compromises of bargaining, and they abjure the
‘relinquishment’ of sovereignty” (1997a, 12). Thus, because of the different institutional
environments (and, subsequently, experience with competition policy) that constrain their
respective behavior, the US and EU competition agents presented contradictory positions
on this issue. However, as discussed below, the EU and US competition agents did
ultimately find a mutual solution that served their similar preferences—the informal and
non-binding ICN.
While the US continued to resist the multilateralization of competition rules
within the WTO’s binding framework, it soon became clear that some type of
internationally-oriented initiative on competition policy would be useful because of the
increasing levels of cross-border business activity and the number of states adopting
competition policies. An important effort on the US side emerged to establish in
November 1997, an International Competition Policy Advisory Committee of antitrust
experts to investigate the new international competition landscape.446 As Klein reports,
“In order to provide an independent perspective in wrestling with… changes in the
international antitrust environment, in the Fall of 1997 Attorney General Reno and I
established an International Competition Policy Advisory Committee (ICPAC) to look at
                                                                                                                                                
voluntary cooperation; and support for progressive reinforcement of competition institutions in developing
countries through capacity building” (Article 25).
445 This argument is supported by research interviews conducted for the current study. Fox also argues that
“many worry that, in a world arena, disputes will be resolved by arbitrators or judges who do not
understand antitrust law and the sometimes-complex analysis that it entails” (1997a, 12).
446 For the exact membership of this prestigious committee, see ICPAC, Annex 1-B.
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these challenges with a fresh perspective” (Klein 1999, 4). ICPAC was mandated to focus
on three topics with international implications: multijurisdictional merger review,
enforcement cooperation between US competition officials and their counterparts around
the world (particularly in anti-cartel prosecution efforts), and the interface of trade and
competition issues (ICPAC 2000, 34).447
After two years of discussions and extensive public hearings—including
participation by competition authorities from outside the US—in Washington, DC,
ICPAC presented a lengthy and widely-disseminated report. The report identified
numerous policy recommendations for the US competition agents to undertake in their
efforts at increasing international cooperation in competition policy. One noteworthy
policy recommendation contained in the final report was for the creation of a new
“Global Competition Initiative.” ICPAC suggested that the membership of this initiative
should include government officials, private firms, non-governmental organizations and
others, with the intent of exchanging ideas and facilitating common solutions on
international competition issues. Following ICPAC’s final report, momentum for what
became known as a Global Competition Forum (GCF) grew rapidly. Ultimately, the GCF
concept was launched as the International Competition Network (ICN).448
The successful launching of the ICN was assured by the US’s endorsement of the
project in September 2000. At the EU’s 10th Anniversary Conference for Merger Control
in Brussels, Belgium, Klein made public his support for a global competition forum for
the first time.449 At two subsequent speeches in October 2000, EU Competition
Commissioner Mario Monti added his endorsement to the ICN approach (IBA 2001, 1).
Following these crucial expressions of support, the International Bar Association
convened an organizational session in Ditchley Park, England on February 4-5, 2001.
                                                
447 ICPAC’s final report includes a broader list of topics than that originally mandated. For a summary, see
ICPAC (2000, 34).
448 The GCF/ICN should not be confused with the OECD’s Global Forum on Competition. In October
2001, the OECD organized its first Global Forum on Competition. The OECD’s Competition Law and
Policy Division and its Centre for Co-operation with Non-Members organized the inaugural meeting of this
group in Paris on October 17-18. This group is one of eight “Global Forums” created by the OECD to
increase contacts with non-OECD members. As the OECD advertised, “This Forum will not replicate the
universality of other institutions (or address trade issues); rather, it will create an expanded network of
high-level officials from about 55 economies who meet regularly (in principle twice a year) to share
experiences on ‘front burner’ competition law and policy issues” (2001). For a list of this group’s
membership, see OECD (2001).
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The meeting gathered together forty-three competition law officials and professionals
acting in their individual capacities. According to the IBA, “This was the first
‘brainstorming’ between like-minded leading figures in the competition law enforcement
world. Participants represented 23 countries, 20 competition authorities and nine other
international institutions” (IBA 2001, 1).450 Following Ditchley Park, the IBA was
requested to provide services and support for the official launching of the ICN.451
The Ditchley Park process made clear the concern of participants regarding the
need to avoid political intervention. The participants decided that the ICN would be an
“evolutionary process without formalization of structure or activities until consensus on
approaches has emerged and participation has expanded” (IBA 2001, 11). The Ditchley
Park participants described the ICN as a “virtual organization” and emphasized that it
was not intended to be a new international organization of competition policy: “The
[ICN] should not be a new institution—it is not meant as an alternative to the
involvement of the OECD or the WTO in competition policy. It should be first and
foremost a competition authority forum, involving a minimum of permanent
infrastructure, with support primarily provided by participating authorities and
facilitators” (IBA 2001, 2).
For the EU, Commissioner Monti reiterated the desire that the ICN be informal:
“We agreed that the forum should not be a new international institution and that it should
involve a minimum of permanent infrastructure, with support primarily provided by its
participants…” (Monti 2001a, 7). A. Douglas Melamed, the DoJ’s former Acting
Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, made clear the inherent political obstacles to
creating a new formal international organization. Comparing the ICN to the G-8 model,
he emphasized the problems of acquiring funding from political principals for a new
organization:
...something more akin to the G-8, ‘but with less formality.’
That strikes me as pointing in the right direction, though of
course the G-8 model would be hard to transplant directly
to an enterprise with vastly broader participation. We need
to recognize that the chances of getting government
                                                                                                                                                
449 For Monti’s comments on Klein’s apparent shift of position, see (2000a, 5-6).
450 For a list of the Ditchley Park participants, see IBA (2001, 3-4).
451  For more on the Ditchley Park process, see European Commission (2002, 121).
221
funding, in the U.S. or elsewhere, for an expensive new
multilateral organization are very slim indeed and that
creating a bricks-and-mortar organization (even deciding
where to locate it) would create complex legal and
jurisdictional issues, coupled with intra- and
intergovernmental disputes, that would surely delay any
useful work by a [ICN] for years (2000, 12-13).
The ICN was not designed to eliminate the possibility of future competition
discussions in the WTO.452 This stipulation was crucial for the EU’s official support of
the ICN because the Union was still striving to place competition on the WTO agenda.
While Klein’s endorsement of an ICN was crucial, the arrival of the new Bush
Administration in the White House in 2001, stirred European fears that the US would
ignore a multilateral initiative like the ICN. However, shortly after his appointment as the
new US Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, Charles James strongly endorsed the
idea. While noting the useful contributions of other international organizations, James
critiqued their mandates as too broad to address the practical issues raised by
international competition enforcement. Using the term employed in the ICPAC final
report, James argued for the creation of a “Global Competition Initiative”: “What is
needed is another forum, focused specifically on the substantive and procedural issues
surrounding international antitrust enforcement. To the extent that the Global
Competition Initiative (GCI) can be this new and different forum, I fully support it”
(James 2001, 8).
James’ support for an ICN/GCI was unequivocal. Stating that the initiative should
be operational by mid-2002, he “devoted much time during my first few months at the
Antitrust Division thinking about GCI and consulting with [EU competition agents] and
others about getting GCI off the ground” (2001, 8).453 In discussing the mandate of an
ICN/GCI, he emphasized that it should operate as a forum for developed and developing
countries to exchange views on international antitrust enforcement.
                                                
452 Monti specifically stated “A global competition forum is not being proposed as an alternative to a WTO
multilateral competition law framework. The two should be regarded as complementary” (2001a, 5).
453 James was surprisingly supportive of the GCI:
Getting GCI off the ground will not be easy, but I have made it a personal priority.
Indeed, this is one reason why I have committed to do what I can to help launch GCI by
no later than mid-2002. It is also one of the reasons behind my decision to appoint Bill
Kolasky as a Deputy Attorney General devoted almost exclusively to international
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The original discussions over the ICN/GCI envisioned it playing a prominent role
in promoting convergence among national competition regimes across the world.
Likewise, James emphasized that the ICN/GCI would
formulate and develop consensus on proposals for
procedural and substantive convergence in antitrust
enforcement. Because our ultimate goal is convergence, I
believe GCI’s general approach to issues should be as
practical and concrete as possible and that we should avoid
abstract discussions that are unlikely to lead to
improvements in the practice of antitrust enforcement.
Unlike OECD, WTO, and UNCTAD, the GCI would not
deal with trade issues, or even non-antitrust issues that
could reasonably be included in the rubric of ‘competition
policy.’ It would be all antitrust, all the time (italics added)
(2001, 8-9).
These comments reflect the concern of the former head of the DoJ’s Antitrust Division
Joel Klein that linking competition issues with trade matters would increase the
likelihood of politicizing competition cases.
Further reflecting a desire to avoid political intervention, James also emphasized
the non-binding nature of the ICN/GCI: “The projects would be aimed at leading to non-
binding general guidelines or ‘best practice’ recommendations. Where the GCI reaches
consensus on particular recommendations, it would be left to governments to implement
them voluntarily, through unilateral, bilateral or multilateral arrangements, as
appropriate” (2001, 9). Endorsing the positions of earlier US and EU competition agents,
James also argued that the ICN/GCI should not have a permanent secretariat (2001, 9).
Because the ICN/GCI would focus on the promotion of convergence in
government enforcement policies, James also argued for limited involvement by private
parties:
I do not believe it would be appropriate for the private
sector to be involved in the decision-making functions of
GCI. I do, however, hope that the private sector will play a
critical role in the work of GCI. For example, I would
expect legal and economic antitrust practitioners,
academics, and businesspeople to help GCI to identify
projects and develop work plans. They also would be called
                                                                                                                                                
antitrust matters. Bill is a distinguished antitrust practitioner who is known to many of
you; he will lead the Antitrust Division’s participation in GCI (2001, 10).
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upon to contribute papers or participate in hearings on
topics (2001, 10).
These comments suggest the extent to which the current US competition agents prefer
avoiding intervention in their decision-making authority, whether by political principals
or private actors.
On October 25, 2001, the International Competition Network was officially
created in New York City.454 Unlike the bilateral MWG, the ICN exemplifies a new form
of EU-US discretionary exploratory institutional cooperation at the multilateral level.
Since its inception, the EU has continued to express its support for the project at high-
levels. As the EU’s former Director-General of Competition Alexander Schaub argues,
the ICN will encourage “the dissemination of antitrust expertise and best practices, as
well as facilitating further international cooperation” (2002, 12). According to
Commissioner Monti, economic internationalization was an important underlying cause
of the ICN: “This is the first time competition authorities worldwide have taken an
autonomous initiative designed to enable them to share experience and exchange views
on competition issues deriving from an ever-increasing globalisation of the world
economy” (European Commission 2002, 5-6).
According to the ICN’s Memorandum on the Establishment and Operation of the
International Competition Network, the ICN is
a project-oriented, consensus-based, informal network of
antitrust agencies from developed and developing countries
that will address antitrust enforcement and policy issues of
common interest and formulate proposals for procedural
and substantive convergence through a results-oriented
agenda and structure (2001, 1).
The ICN’s activities take place “on a voluntary basis and rely on the high level of
goodwill and cooperation among those jurisdictions involved” (ICN 2001, 1). Careful to
avoid any claims that may be construed as non-discretionary, and/or binding by domestic
political principals, the ICN makes clear that it will not exercise “any rule-making
function” (ICN 2001, 1). Rather, the ICN will provide “the opportunity for its members
to maintain regular contacts, in particular by means of annual conferences and progress
                                                
454 For information on the ICN, including its mandate, membership, history and financing, see
www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org.
224
meetings” (ICN 2001, 1). It should be noted that the ICN does offer to facilitate rule-
making, deciding that when the ICN “reaches consensus on recommendations arising
from the projects, it will be left to the individual antitrust agencies to decide whether and
how to implement the recommendations, through unilateral, bilateral or multilateral
arrangements, as appropriate” (ICN 2001, 1). Thus, the ICN defers to the discretion of
national competition agents and allows them to weigh the costs of bringing
recommendations before political principals. Conforming to the patterns of behavior
posited in Chapter 2, ICN recommendations will address areas under the discretionary
authority of national competition agents and, thus, not be likely to prompt or require
political intervention.
One of the ICN’s work programs is merger-specific. Among five working groups,
the ICN has established its own Mergers Working Group. This working group “will
develop best practice recommendations regarding three aspects of the process for
reviewing multi-jurisdictional mergers: 1) procedures, including timing, for reviewing
multi-jurisdictional mergers, 2) the analytical framework for merger review, and 3)
investigative techniques for conducting effective merger review.455
The members of the ICN are national and multinational competition agencies.
From this membership, the ICN draws a Steering Group that is responsible for
developing a work plan. The ICN does not have a permanent secretariat.456 The ICN also
seeks advice and contributions from “non-governmental advisers”—private sector and
non-governmental actors and organizations concerned with the application of antitrust
laws. These advisers are not actual members and do not participate in the internal
decisions of the ICN. The advisers include:
 International organisations, such as OECD, WTO, and UNCTAD
 Industry and consumer associations
 Associations and practitioners of antitrust law and/or economics
 Members of the academic community (ICN 2001, 2).
                                                
455 See http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/wg1.html.
456 The ICN notes, “Due to the project-oriented working group structure, it is not contemplated to establish
a permanent secretariat for the time being” (2001, 3).
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The ICN notes that it will seek input from the “non-governmental advisers” in particular
for the purpose of identifying projects, participating in working groups for designated
projects, contributing papers or participating in hearings related to ICN projects.
Because the ICN does not have a permanent secretariat, the network has had to
develop an innovative financing mechanism for its conferences and meetings. According
to the ICN’s Memorandum on Establishment, “Logistical support for the conferences and
meetings will be provided by the ICN member hosting the conference. There will be one
ICN conference per year.457 Antitrust agencies should commit to being represented by
agency heads to the maximum extent possible for these high-level events” (ICN 2001, 3).
In addition to the high-level conferences, the ICN will host meetings for the
representatives of the Steering Group (not necessarily heads of competition agencies).
Host countries are required to bear the organizational costs of these conferences and
meetings. Participating agencies and non-governmental advisers are responsible for all
other individual expenses.458
IV. Conclusions
In the current study, the transitional process to cooperative bilateralism is
enhanced by implementation and exploratory institutional cooperation after the initial
step (i.e., Bilateral Agreement) of rule-making cooperation. After the formal launching of
the new framework for cooperative bilateralism, implementation and exploratory
institutional cooperation can occur simultaneously with further efforts at rule-making
cooperation (i.e., PCA and AAA). However, this need not always be the case. It is
conceivable that the competition agents could engage in, albeit limited, implementation
cooperation without first creating a formal and binding cooperative framework. Such
implementation cooperation would likely be ad hoc, occurring on a case-be-case basis.
                                                
457 The first annual ICN Conference will be held in Naples, Italy in September 2002, hosted by the Italian
competition authority. At this conference, the ICN is expected to approve a draft conference schedule for
its future activities: Mexico as host in 2003, Korea as host in 2004, Germany as host in 2005, and South
Africa as host in 2006.
458 The ICN does note “Should antitrust agencies be unable to participate because of the lack of financial
resources, the possibility of financing the cost of participation would be appropriately considered” (ICN
2001, 4).
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Similarly, exploratory institutional cooperation could conceivably occur without prior
success at rule-making cooperation.
The central argument of the current chapter is that implementation and
exploratory institutional cooperation both occur primarily under the discretionary
authority of the competition agents, but in conformity with their respective domestic
power-sharing arrangements. Thus, in practice, these two processes of cooperation
conform to the patterns of behavior for agents and principals posited in Chapter 2. While
implementation cooperation occurs in general and case-specific terms, exploratory
institutional cooperation occurs both bilaterally and multilaterally.
The cooperative framework established under the 1991 Bilateral Agreement has
gradually evolved into four distinct stages of EU-US implementation cooperation: initial
contacts, notification contacts, review process contacts and remedial contacts. As each of
these stages has been discussed above, the specific merger cases suggest that
discretionary cooperation is increasing, tends to function smoothly and leads almost
invariably to convergent decisions. When divergent decisions do occur, they are
inconsistent, not conflicting. In fact, the EU and US competition agents have not yet
reached a conflicting decision in a concurrent jurisdiction merger case.459
For analytical purposes, implementation cooperation can be conceptualized as
occurring as two distinct types of behavior: general and case-specific. In general
implementation cooperation, exchanges of information are increasing (P1), while
respecting confidentiality provisions, the changing of which would increase the
likelihood of political intervention in the activities of competition agents (P2). Therefore,
the agents continue to shirk in implementation cooperation (P4). By doing so, the agents
maximize their independence from political principals. These discretionary increases in
implementation cooperation reduce information asymmetries through initial contacts,
notification contacts, review process contacts, and remedial contacts in individual
concurrent jurisdiction merger cases. It is useful to recapitulate the discretionary
increases that have occurred in each stage of implementation cooperation. With the
                                                
459 It is worth repeating that both the BMD and GEH mergers were cases of inconsistent decisions, not
conflicting decisions. For a discussion of the implications of inconsistent versus conflicting decisions, see
Chapter 6.
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exception of notification contacts, these discretionary increases were not explicitly
envisioned in the original Bilateral Agreement.
In the initial contacts stage, implementation cooperation is fundamentally
discretionary. Initial contacts are, by their very nature, discretionary because they address
behavior that is not explicitly detailed in domestic legislation and requires no direct
political involvement. For example, neither the HSR nor the MCR explicitly provide for
pre-notification contacts (PNCs) between competition agents and merging firms. As such,
PNCs represent a discretionary way in which the agents can delay the statutory timetables
that constrain their ability to acquire information necessary to analyze mergers (P2). In
addition, during concurrent jurisdiction merger cases, the agents can exchange relevant
information acquired through PNCs. However, again conforming to their domestic
institutional environments, the competition agents are careful not to share confidential
information (or call for changes to confidentiality provisions). Despite this constraint, the
competition agents can bring relevant information to the attention of their foreign
counterparts and discuss its implications in a hypothetical sense. In this way, initial
contacts function as a discretionary early warning system—by discussing market
definitions and analytical concepts,460 even hypothetically, before receipt of the formal
notification, the agents can alert each other to the potential use of different approaches to
evaluating a merger that could lead to divergent decisions.
According to Table 9, the increasing levels of EU-US notifications since 1991 are
positively correlated with the increasing number of concurrent jurisdiction competition
cases since 1990. This correlation supports the influence of EI suggested by the revised
cross-level approach. During notification contacts, the competition agents conform to the
provisions established in the Bilateral Agreement. However, the competition agents must
conform to different domestic statutes when engaging in notification contacts. The EU
(pursuant to MCR) publishes the fact that it has received an official notification of a
merger, while the US (pursuant to HSR) keeps it confidential until after a preliminary
investigation and the decision is made to open an investigation. Thus, before the
                                                
460 For example, recall that during the Exxon/Mobil merger case, EU and US competition agents were able
to discuss the parameters of relevant product markets (oil and gas), the identification and characteristics of
possibly dominant positions (super majors) and the future market impact of the transaction approximately
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competition agents can formally notify each other of an investigation that might affect
their counterpart’s important interests, they conform to their respective domestic statutes
governing disclosure of the receipt of the merger notification from the firms. The
Bilateral’s provisions for formal EU-US notifications have also modestly influenced
internal procedures, such as the guidelines for notifying the US that have now been
inserted in the Competition Directorate’s internal manual of procedures.
Review process contacts can occur via telephone calls, faxes, emails and even
face-to-face interactions through the reciprocal exchange of attendees as provided for
under the AAA.461 These review process contacts frequently target substantive issues
such as the definition of relevant product and geographic markets and the assessment of
the likely competitive effects of the proposed merger on those relevant markets. Such
coordination and exchanges of information reduce the likelihood of divergent decisions
in general implementation cooperation. However, even the use of similar market
definitions does not always guarantee convergent decisions because of differing market
conditions and competitive realities in the EU and US. How specifically then do review
process contacts reduce the likelihood of divergent decisions? To answer this question
requires a closer look at the review process contacts that occur in specific cases of
concurrent jurisdiction mergers. Unfortunately, systematic and consistently reliable
reporting of these intensive and sometimes mundane and technical contacts is not
available. However, the Commission’s descriptions of selected mergers from Table 10
provide insights into the practical means by which review process contacts reduce the
likelihood of divergent decisions. For example, in the Lockheed Martin/Loral merger, the
EU-US information exchanges provided the Commission with previously unknown
information (an SEC filing that was on public record) from a foreign jurisdiction that was
useful for reviewing a concurrent jurisdiction merger.
The BT/MCI (II) merger reveals the importance of cooperation during the review
process for mergers that effect changing and/or new product markets. Without
coordination, the definitions of new markets would very likely differ, which, in turn,
                                                                                                                                                
five months before the official notification of the merger was received from the firms and the HSR and
MCR timetables were set in motion.
461 Of course, these exchanges of attendees occurred before they were regularized under the AAA. See, for
example, the Guinness/Grand Metropolitan merger case.
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would increase the likelihood of divergent decisions. The AOL/Time Warner, Time
Warner/EMI and MCI WorldCom/Sprint mergers also reveal the importance of
cooperation on new market definitions. Cooperation is also useful when dealing with
more traditional, or established, market definitions as was the case in the Price
Waterhouse/Coopers & Lybrand, WorldCom/MCI, Wolters Kluwer/Reed Elsevier,
Exxon/Shell and Marsh & McLennan/Sedgwick mergers where the competition agents
reached consistent market definitions. Even when the competition agents use different
market definitions, they can still benefit from implementation cooperation (American
Home Products/Monsanto, and Hoffmann-La Roche/Boehringer Mannheim) because
review process contacts encourage the review and self-evaluation of market definitions
and provide a sounding board for them to confirm their analytical approaches.
Specific merger cases also suggest limitations to the utility of review process
contacts. For example, although Travelers/CitiCorp, Daimler Benz/Chrysler, and
BP/Amoco were very large volume (i.e., size of transaction) mergers, implementation
cooperation was limited for two reasons. When the main focus of the business activity
occurs outside one jurisdiction (Travelers/CitiCorp) or when the merging parties come
together from home positions in their respective territories and the competitive impact of
the overlap is minimal, review process contacts may be largely unnecessary.
During remedial contacts, the EU and US competition agents are devising new
discretionary ways to increase the likelihood of convergent decisions. For example, the
“best practices” in the MCI/WorldCom merger saw the DoJ and Commission cooperate
on market-testing and implementation of remedies. The competition agents also
cooperated in the implementation of remedies in the Halliburton/Dresser merger. As the
Commission argues, cooperation in the implementation of remedies may be an area of
growth in future EU-US implementation cooperation. Due to its comparatively limited
personnel resources, the Commission may find that cooperation with the US is vital to
ensuring that firms implement the agreed remedies in concurrent jurisdiction merger
cases.
The preceding discussion of general implementation cooperation provides specific
examples of the discretionary ways in which EU and US competition agents are reducing
the likelihood of divergent decisions despite the challenges of EI. Across each of the
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stages of implementation cooperation, the EU and US competition agents are engaging in
discretionary behavior designed to reduce information asymmetries, which, in turn,
reduces the likelihood of divergent decisions in individual merger cases. This behavior
reflects the concern of the agents that such decisions are typically perceived by political
principles as likely to affect adversely their national and/or constituent interests (se
Chapter 2).
Thus, in general implementation cooperation, the agents have reduced the
likelihood of divergent decisions through a variety of information exchanges. However,
political intervention has occurred in specific cases because the EU and US principals
retain their respective foreign intervention instruments. The continued existence of these
foreign intervention instruments conforms to the revised cross-level approach and the
structure of the cooperative framework established through rule-making cooperation. The
continuing ability of principals to exercise foreign intervention instruments is particularly
notable in the flawed BMD and GEH merger cases. These two cases are “flawed” in the
sense that the outcome deviated from the preferences of the competition agents to avoid
political intervention in the merger review process.
So, why did the principals intervene in these two cases? First, divergent decisions
occurred in each case. Second, the principals perceived the divergent decisions as threats
to national and/or constituent interests. Considering the size of the merging firms in both
cases, it should not be surprising that the principals perceived the divergent decisions as
costly enough to intervene (P6).462
According to the patterns of behavior, the fact that a divergent decision threatened
national and/or constituent interests should have been enough for the principals to
intervene. However, the two flawed cases suggest other potential factors that increased
the likelihood of political intervention. Despite the lessons learned from the BMD
experience, the competition agents were unable to avoid political intervention in the GEH
case. In this regard, the merging firms appear largely responsible for creating the flaw:
the speed with which the merger agreement was reached and the decision not to engage
in active PNCs severely limited the ability of the EU and US competition agents to share
information and reach a convergent decision. In addition, the merging firms’ publicity
                                                
462 See Chapter 6 for a discussion of the intervention cost calculations made by the principals.
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campaign and efforts to generate political pressure only reduced the likelihood that the
Commission would change its decision to one that was convergent with the US
competition agent’s decision.
The preceding analysis of exploratory institutional cooperation through the MWG
and the ICN illustrates the supposition in the fifth pattern of behavior (P5)—EI prompts
competition agents to continue shirking (discretionary pursuit of their own preference to
maximize certainty and decision making authority) via attempts at exploratory
institutional cooperation to maximize their independence from political principals.  In
addition, the MWG and ICN provide evidence of the EU and US competition agents
conforming to other patterns of behavior at both the bilateral and multilateral levels.
Bilaterally, the MWG suggests that the competition agents are shirking to reduce
information asymmetries with the intent of reducing the likelihood of divergent decisions
(P1). This serves the interests of both the EU and US competition agents. Given the
higher costs associated with changing non-discretionary authority, the competition agents
were careful to ensure that the MWG was an informal and ad hoc dialogue established
completely within the constraints of their discretionary authority (P2).
Similarly, at the multilateral level, the ICN conforms to the same patterns of
behavior for the competition agents (P1 and P2). However, the ICN demonstrates an
instance in which the EU and US competition agents disagreed on the most appropriate
means for shirking to increase multilateral cooperation in competition policy. Ultimately,
the US position shifted after the ICPAC report called for a separate forum to discuss
informally the challenges of EI to the enforcement of domestic competition policy in
concurrent jurisdiction mergers. The final compromise on the ICN did not eliminate the
possibility of discussing competition issues in the WTO or other international
organizations in the future.463 Rather, in order to satisfy the US’s concerns, the ICN does
not deal with issues that could increase the likelihood of political intervention, such as the
linkages between trade and competition policies; as the DoJ’s new Assistant Attorney
General for Antitrust, Charles James, argues, the ICN is “all antitrust, all the time”. This
                                                
463 In this regard, this case of exploratory institutional cooperation did distance itself from pre-existing fora
like the OECD, UNCTAD and WTO, which had proved insufficient to overcome the discordant
transatlantic relationship that had existed before 1991. Such international organizations function only as
advisors in the ICN; they do not provide a pre-existing institutional basis for the ICN’s activities.
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final compromise conforms to the agents’ pattern of behavior to limit exploratory
institutional cooperation to areas under their discretionary authority. By incorporating
competition issues into the WTO’s binding dispute settlement mechanism, the agents
would have prompted political intervention (via ratification procedures), a fact that the
Commission ultimately conceded before agreeing to pursue the ICN. As a result, the ICN
is careful to limit its operations to generating general guidelines or ‘best practice’
recommendations, which can be implemented on a voluntary basis and remain under the
discretionary authority of participating competition agents.
Regarding the likelihood of political principals intervening in exploratory
institutional cooperation (P6), the preceding case are largely inconclusive. This limitation
reflects the success with which the competition agents constructed the MWG and the ICN
in a conscious effort to expand their ability to cooperate internationally while staying
within the confines of their discretionary authority. Because of the great care taken by the
competition agents to avoid behavior that might be perceived as threatening by the
principals, the costs to political principals for not intervening in this shirking have
remained lower than the costs of intervening.
One final and unexpected point emerges from the preceding analysis of
exploratory institutional cooperation. The MWG and ICN display the strong desire of
competition agents to seek convergence at the bilateral and multilateral levels. This
convergence is not limited to convergent decisions. Rather, it also applies to convergence
of substantive and procedural aspects of domestic merger review, which, in turn, reduces
the likelihood of divergent decisions. It might be thought that the pursuit of such
institutional convergence runs contrary to the preferences and patterns of behavior for the
competition agents because convergence of domestic law requires approval by the
political principals. However, as noted above, the MWG and ICN are both intended to
enhance institutional convergence in areas under the discretionary authority of the
respective competition agents. Assuming a continuing EI environment, this finding
suggests that discretionary efforts at bilateral and multilateral convergence are likely to
occur in the future. Should the competition agents overstep the bounds of their
discretionary authority, principals will be likely to intervene, which would provide a
useful comparative case for assessing P6.
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CHAPTER 6: Expanding the Research Agenda of International
Regulatory Cooperation
I. Introduction
The preceding analysis has attempted to ascertain the major causes of cooperation
in a bilateral relationship that is extremely important for determining the likelihood of
change and stability in the international system. Given the prominence of the transatlantic
relationship in shaping international political decisions, scholarly investigations of the
causes and consequences of cooperation between the EU and US are particularly useful
for understanding the nature and likelihood of cooperation and conflict in the
international system.
The current study identifies a policy area in which EU-US cooperation excels—
competition policy—in order to investigate the causes of international cooperation.
Examinations of transatlantic cooperation in competition policy are particularly
informative for understanding the political, economic and legal dynamics of international
relations more generally. Indeed, this case displays a useful synthesis of the political,
economic and legal dynamics that motivate formal and informal efforts to enhance
bilateral and multilateral governance. These dynamics are all the more important because
they are occurring in a policy area that fundamentally organizes domestic economies but
increasingly addresses cross-border activities. Thus, due to the international importance
of this bilateral relationship across a number of policy areas, a better understanding of
EU-US competition relations may provide crucial insights into the future modalities and
organization of multilateral governance more generally.
This final chapter begins with a brief recapitulation of the central puzzle and
discusses the theoretical implications of the current study. Next, it summarizes the
findings of the study in terms of the patterns of behavior for agents and principals. The
chapter then comments on the role of societal (in particular business) influences in EU-
US cooperation in merger review. This section also investigates potential ways in which
to determine the role of firms in the intervention cost calculations of principals. The
chapter concludes with a discussion of the generalizability of the findings to international
regulatory cooperation in other policy areas. In particular, insights from the current study
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are compared to the international politics of trade policy and the emerging political
dynamics of cooperation in areas characterized by increasing international regulation.
These comparisons raise additional interesting questions that form a clear and promising
agenda for future research on the politics of international regulatory cooperation.
II. Theoretical Implications
Transatlantic competition relations were historically characterized by a political
tit-for-tat of extraterritorial unilateralism and national countermeasures. During the
1980s, the historical trend of transatlantic discord in competition relations showed few
signs of abating as Europe and the US continued to pursue their own interests in
competition policy. In addition, the exogenous stimulus of EI was increasing the
pressures on firms to engage in more cross-border mergers and consequently increasing
the likelihood of concurrent jurisdiction merger reviews. Based on historical experience,
the resulting jurisdictional overlaps could be expected to lead to further disagreements
and political brinkmanship in transatlantic competition relations. To the contrary,
however, transatlantic competition relations in the 1990s are more appropriately
characterized as cooperative bilateralism. Despite the historical discord in transatlantic
competition relations and the increasing challenges of EI, how and why has EU-US
cooperation in competition policy increased since 1990?
Traditional systemic IR explanations and more recent cross-level approaches
provide incomplete explanations for this transition to cooperation in competition policy
because they tend to exclude important actors from the analysis and focus on the role of
treaties when explaining international cooperation. In addition, these explanations fall
short of explaining a crucial characteristic of the post-1990 cooperation—it is largely
discretionary in nature and conducted by regulatory agents. To overcome these
shortcomings, the current study relaxes the unitary actor assumption of the state and
develops a revised cross-level approach. Relying on the work of Putnam (1988) and
Milner (1997, 1998, 1999), the revised cross-level approach employs a two-level game
metaphor to simplify political activity at the domestic and international levels and
incorporates a strategic bargaining framework of domestic politics that simplifies the
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impact of both interests and institutions on policymaking.464 However, this new approach
is notably distinct from those advanced by Putnam and Milner. The differences are most
readily apparent upon closer examination of the respective treatments of domestic
politics.
Putnam and Milner’s approaches emphasize the causal roles played by domestic
executives and legislators in international negotiations. Alternatively, the revised cross-
level approach emphasizes the causal role of domestic regulators (in addition to political
principals such as executives and legislators) in international negotiations.465 This is not
to claim that Putnam and Milner reject any role for other domestic actors, just that they
are more concerned with the behavior of executives and legislators in explaining
international politics.
The revised cross-level approach places domestic regulators at a different
analytical level. For Putnam and Milner, international negotiations among chiefs of
government (COGs) occur at Level I, while domestic negotiations between executives
and legislators occur at Level II. According to Putnam, if domestic regulators play a role,
it is at Level II.466 Alternatively, in the current study, domestic regulators are actors in
Level I negotiations. This distinction also changes the actors for Level II negotiations,
which, according to the cross-level approach, occur between multiple principals and
agents instead of between executives and legislators. For Putnam and Milner, the COGs
become the interface between the two levels, while the revised cross-level approach
presents regulators as the interface between the domestic and international levels.
                                                
464 However, it should be cautioned that the current study is not a two-level game in the traditional sense
because the preferences of the competition agents are so similar as to reduce the contentious nature of the
external bargaining that characterizes Putnam’s level II.
465 While emphasizing the role of regulators, the current study moves beyond the bureaucratic politics
literature to employ a strategic bargaining framework of domestic politics. Similar to the work of Ferejohn
and Shipan (1990), the current study shows “how the interaction among bureaucracies and the legislature
leads to certain policy choices and how changes in various conditions, such as the preferences of either of
these groups or the institutional structure, alter the outcomes. This form of rationalist institutionalism then
provides a way of understanding how policy results from the strategic interaction of bureaucrats and other
governmental actors within specific institutions” (Milner 1999, 137). Also, while studies of the bureaucracy
often portray bureaucrats as a source of resistance to policy change, the current findings suggest that
bureaucrats can function as positive forces for policy change. The current study also moves beyond
transgovernmentalist explanations by considering domestic institutions as causally significant determinants
of regulators’ behavior.
466 For example, Putnam notes “The actors at level II may represent bureaucratic agencies, interest group,
social classes, or even ‘public opinion’” (1993, 438).
236
The differences between the approaches emerge because the revised cross-level
approach considers an extremely important but understudied aspect of foreign
policymaking and international relations: executive agreements.467 Instead of focusing on
the domestic politics that follow from battles over treaty ratification, the current study
elucidates the domestic politics that emerge over the negotiation and signing of executive
agreements.468 As a result, regulators become central actors in the explanation, reflecting
the fact that executive agreements do not require the ratification procedures common to
non-discretionary treaty-making. Regulators (try to) negotiate and sign executive
agreements under their discretionary authority. Absent the ratification procedures that,
among other domestic political institutions, are fundamentally important to domestic
power-sharing in the Putnam and Milner frameworks,469 the revised cross-level approach
incorporates the domestic political institutions that embody the delegation of regulatory
authority from politicians to regulators. The domestic institutions of regulatory control
are incorporated because, unlike Putnam and Milner, the revised cross-level approach
employs the principal-agent framework of delegation (PAF) to simplify domestic politics.
Despite these differences, the current study provides an example of the type of
research that Milner argues is likely to be fruitful for IR theory (1998, 768). In particular,
Milner argues for the use of cross-level analyses that incorporate rational choice
                                                
467 These differences also reflect, in part, the fact that the revised cross-level approach was developed to
answer questions regarding rule-making in international regulatory cooperation in competition policy, not
the questions surrounding treaty-making in trade and other policy areas that inform much of the Putnam
and Milner approaches. The potential applicability of the revised cross-level approach to trade policy is
taken up below in comparison to international regulatory cooperation.
468 Such executive agreements are rough equivalents of Putnamian Level I agreements. As noted in Chapter
4, two of the three agreements considered in the current study (Bilateral and PCA) are asymmetrical: while
they were negotiated under the discretionary authority of the US competition agents, they both required
approval of the principals and agents (following the ECJ’s decision) in the EU. The AAA was negotiated
and signed completely under the discretionary authority of the US and EU competition agents with no
principal intervention required. All three agreements are labeled “executive agreements” in the US.
However, in the EU, the three agreements are labeled “administrative agreements”. For a useful discussion
of the legal effects and binding nature of international agreements signed by the EU, see Macleod et al.
(1996, 122-141). Despite these differences in terminology, this chapter uses the term “executive
agreement” in a general sense to cover all three agreements.
469 More specifically, Putnam uses the term ratification “to refer to any decision-process at Level II that is
required to endorse or implement a Level I agreement, whether formally or informally” (1993, 438). Milner
expands on Putnam emphasizing four elements of the policymaking process that are embedded in domestic
power-sharing arrangements: “the ability to initiate and set the agenda, to amend any proposed policy, to
ratify or veto policy, and to propose public referendums” (1997, 18). In addition, Milner considers the
degree of divided government a key explanatory variable for the likelihood of international cooperation.
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institutionalist approaches to understand domestic politics.470 In this view, institutions are
the means by which the “diverse preferences of individuals are aggregated into choices or
outcomes for the collective. Institutions here both shape and reflect the strategic
interaction among agents. Critical is the attention both to institutions and to strategic
interaction among agents” (Milner 1999, 760-61). Despite these benefits, rational choice
institutionalism has been criticized for being too static because of its focus on equilibria
conditions (Green and Shapiro 1994). This criticism suggests that the explanation has
difficulty accounting for change over time. However, as shown in the current study, the
approach can explain change over time when supplemented with careful process-tracing
that reveals the ascendancy, within the constraints of domestic institutions, of certain
actors’ preferences over others.471
As mentioned above, in order to simplify the domestic politics surrounding
international cooperation in competition policy, the study relies on insights from PAF.
While PAF is common in American and Comparative Politics, the framework has yet to
gain widespread application in IR/IPE.472 Nevertheless, as the current study shows, PAF
proves a useful and parsimonious tool for simplifying the complex domestic politics of
international regulatory cooperation. In particular, PAF directs the analysis toward the
interests of the most important actors and incorporates a causal role for domestic
institutions. The dynamics of control and independence between principals and agents
provide compelling insights into the domestic politics of EU-US cooperation in
competition policy.
                                                
470 For broader assessments of the institutionalist debates, see Peters (1999), Pierson (1996) and Hall and
Taylor (1994).
471 This process-tracing reflects the process-oriented approach suggested by Keohane’s definition of
international cooperation. Similarly, the process-oriented approach is advocated by Pollack as a means for
overcoming potential empirical pitfalls of the PAF approach. Specifically, Pollack encourages analysts to
“engage in careful process-tracing in order to establish the respective preferences of the [relevant actors],
and the subtle influences that these actors may exert upon each other. Process-tracing may also… reveal the
path-dependent effects of early decisions… which become ‘locked-in’ and affect the outcome of later
principal-agent interactions (1998, 223).
472 For notable exceptions that employ PAF to explain international policy change and cooperation in the
process of European integration, see Elgie (2002) and Pollack (1998, 1997).
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III. Summary of Findings
The elaboration of the patterns of behavior for principals and agents in the
preceding chapters demonstrates the analytical value of the revised cross-level approach.
The current study finds that EU-US cooperation in competition policy occurs primarily as
three bottom-up processes473—rule-making, implementation and exploratory institutional
cooperation—which are driven by the discretionary authority of utility-maximizing
competition regulators reacting to the exogenous stimulus of EI and the constraints of
domestic political institutions.
The different and often conflicting interests of the EU and US resulted in
discordant competition relations before 1990.474 However, the interests and preferences
of the respective principals and agents did not change after 1990.475 Given these stable
preferences, how can the current study explain the change in transatlantic competition
relations from discord to cooperative bilateralism? While the preferences of the “states”
(i.e., elected politicians in the EU and US) may appear to have changed after 1990 due to
the systemic stimulus of EI, this apparent change of “state” preferences is actually more
reflective of the agent preferences emerging over principal preferences due to the
expansion of discretionary authority. In short, prior to 1991, “the state’s” preference was
more reflective of principal preferences to retaliate if national and/or constituent interests
were threatened. After 1991, “the state’s” preference is more reflective of agent
preferences to avoid principal intervention.
The transition to cooperative bilateralism occurred because, as regulatory
authority has gradually expanded via discretionary means, the preferences of the
                                                
473The preceding analysis has relied on a specification of international cooperation beyond Keohane’s
definition to differentiate three explicit processes of international cooperation. Keohane defines
international cooperation as occurring “when actors adjust their behavior to the actual or anticipated
preferences of others, through a process of policy coordination” (Keohane 1984, 51).
474 Chapter 3 provides a summary of these different interests and the resulting discordant transatlantic
competition relations.
475 When trying to explain systemic level phenomena, consideration of domestic politics can create
apparent variance in state preferences. In order to overcome this complication, systemic IR explanations
often “capture” domestic preferences with simple assumptions about stable preferences (Moravcsik 1993,
11). Instead of employing such simple assumptions, the current study traces the process of cooperation to
reveal the stability or susceptibility to change of the preferences of relevant domestic actors. As argued in
Chapter 2 and supported in Chapter 3, this approach suggests that the preferences of relevant domestic
actors have remained stable for a considerable period of time—since the US and EU principals initially
delegated regulatory authority in competition policy to their respective agents.
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competition regulators have emerged as the dominant (albeit constrained by domestic
institutions) force driving the adjustment of EU and US behavior in transatlantic
competition relations. More specifically, EU-US cooperation in merger review occurs
when regulatory agents adjust their behavior (via shirking) to reduce the likelihood of
divergent decisions. This adjustment of behavior occurs as discretionary policy
coordination that can be disaggregated into three specific processes—rule-making,
implementation and exploratory institutional cooperation.
The PAF literature typically argues that increases in agent shirking will lead to
increases in political intervention via control instruments. Political principals prefer
intervening to prevent domestic and foreign agents from shirking when the costs of that
shirking exceed the costs of intervention. However, the current study suggests a counter-
intuitive argument that as agent shirking increases in international competition relations,
political intervention (both domestically and internationally) decreases. While agent
shirking increases in order to cope with the new challenges presented by merger activity
in an EI environment, political intervention decreases because agent shirking to expand
cooperation reduces the likelihood of divergent decisions that might prompt politicians to
intervene. Indeed, agent shirking is the conscious construction (via three distinct
processes of international cooperation) of a dispute prevention system that would
preclude the need for dispute resolution by political principals. In other words, the
principals are less likely to encounter situations in which the costs of no intervention
(perceived threats to national/constituent interests) exceed the costs of intervention
(exercising any variety of domestic control instruments and/or foreign intervention
instruments).
A. The Stimulus of Economic Internationalization
The EU and US regulatory agents are primarily responsible for the transition to
cooperative bilateralism in competition relations. However, EU-US cooperation in
competition policy was not simply initiated by competition agents enjoying and
expanding discretionary authority for external rule-making. If it were, the transition to
cooperative bilateralism would have occurred much earlier than 1991, because
discretionary authority for this rule-making cooperation dates for the US from the 1972
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CZA and, for the EU, somewhat ambiguously from the 1962 Regulation 17. While the
US and EU competition agents enjoyed such discretionary rule-making authority, they
did not exercise it transatlantically until 1991. Thus, the existence of discretionary rule-
making authority cannot be the sole explanation of the transition to cooperative
bilateralism after 1990.
The desire of competition agents to exercise their discretionary authority to
cooperate internationally was triggered by a systemic stimulus that affected both
jurisdictions—the external threat of EI increasing the likelihood of concurrent jurisdiction
mergers. Under the pre-1991 framework, the prospect of increasing concurrent
jurisdiction merger activity was likely to lead to an increasing number of divergent
decisions and subsequent political interventions. The increasing threat of EI appears to be
an important change in the external environment from the period of the CZA and
Regulation 17 to the negotiation of the 1991 Bilateral Agreement.476 However, the threat
of EI is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the discretionary international
cooperation that emerged in EU-US competition relations. Competition agents seeking to
avoid political intervention must also be present to translate this external threat into a
desire to pursue international cooperation via shirking.
From the perspective of the competition agents, the immediacy of their desire to
avoid political intervention was increased by domestic institutional developments in
Europe and America, including the US’s Section 301 and the Exon-Florio amendment,
and the EU’s Wood Pulp decision, pending completion of the SEM, and signing of the
MCR. In the eyes of the competition agents, these developments created imbalances in
their relations that would be exacerbated by the threat of EI. Both competition agents
perceived the imbalances as favoring their foreign counterpart. Taking advantage of the
imbalance, one competition agent could directly threaten the desire of the other to
maximize its regulatory independence as a way to increase its certainty and decision-
making authority in an EI environment.
                                                
476 As discussed in Chapter 3, this period also witnessed the signing of other competition agreements,
including the OECD Recommendations and bilateral agreements between the US and three individual
OECD members. Closer investigation of these cases may provide useful insights into the role of EI (if any)
in the signing of other international competition agreements. Such future research will require more
detailed studies of the domestic politics in the respective countries at the time the agreements were signed.
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B. The Role of Domestic Politics
The basic motivation of political principals and competition agents is a desire to
maximize their own certainty and decision-making authority. As such, political principals
are interested in maintaining control over competition agents, while competition agents
are interested in increasing their regulatory independence from political principals.
However, EI changes the traditional principal-agent dynamic because mergers become
more internationally-oriented in nature, which introduces foreign political principals and
competition agents into the calculus.
The role of domestic politics is explicitly reflected in the patterns of behavior
introduced in Chapter 2. Therefore, a brief recapitulation of the patterns of behavior for
principals and agents is useful at this point (see Figure 5).
                                                                                                                                                
In particular, these cases may indicate other systemic stimuli that create similar incentives for signing non-
binding recommendations and executive agreements without a significant role for EI.
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Figure 5: Patterns of Behavior for Principals and Agents
1. The Patterns of Agent Behavior
The first pattern of behavior (P1) addresses the crucial role of information in
international cooperation. Across all three processes of discretionary cooperation,
information plays an important role in explaining the emergence and subsequent
implementation of EU-US cooperation. Information asymmetries increase the likelihood
of divergent decisions between competition agents, which increases the likelihood of
political intervention. In order to reduce the likelihood of divergent decisions and, in turn
the likelihood of political intervention, EU and US competition agents have engaged in
rule-making cooperation to construct a cooperative framework for increasing information
exchanges.
Likewise, during implementation cooperation, competition agents actively
exchange information on individual merger cases. In implementation cooperation,
P1: Because EI increases the likelihood of concurrent jurisdiction mergers, regulatory agents
will pursue ways to reduce information asymmetries that could lead to divergent decisions.
P2: Given the higher costs associated with changing non-discretionary authority,
competition agents will pursue increases in rule-making cooperation (aimed at increasing
exchanges of information) with foreign agents via discretionary means (i.e., shirking).
P3: Political principals will intervene in domestic agent attempts to shirk (increase
discretionary rule-making cooperation) if the costs of not intervening exceed the costs of
intervening.
P4: Following successful rule-making cooperation, EI prompts competition agents to
continue shirking (discretionary pursuit of their own preference to maximize certainty and
decision making authority) via attempts at implementation cooperation to maximize their
independence from political principals.
P5: Following successful rule-making cooperation, EI prompts competition agents to
continue shirking (discretionary pursuit of their own preference to maximize certainty and
decision making authority) via attempts at exploratory institutional cooperation to maximize
their independence from political principals.
P6: Following successful rule-making cooperation, political principals will continue to
intervene in domestic and foreign agent attempts to shirk (increase discretionary
implementation and exploratory institutional cooperation) if the costs of not intervening
exceed the costs of intervening.
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competition agents remain constrained by their respective domestic institutions.
However, the competition agents are able to overcome these constraints to a certain
degree in their discretionary efforts to reduce information asymmetries. For example,
through shirking, the agents have largely overcome the domestic limitations on
exchanging confidential information and have developed cooperative means for
determining the appropriateness of remedies offered and ensuring that remedies are
implemented by the merging firms. None of these discretionary developments were
envisioned or explicitly mentioned in the original Bilateral Agreement.
The centrality of information exchanges in EU-US competition relations raises the
prospect of influence by firms. The current study intentionally minimizes the role of
firms for analytical simplification. However, the preceding analysis suggests that firms
generally support—as witnessed in the International Chamber of Commerce’s
endorsements—cooperation in rule-making and exploratory institutional cooperation.
This support is conditional; formal cooperation must respect domestic laws that protect
confidential information.477
In comparison, in implementation cooperation, individual firms may not support
cooperation, especially if they are the target of an investigation. In such cases, individual
firms can limit information exchanges on a case-specific basis by refusing to waive their
rights to confidentiality. This influence may vary between merger and non-merger cases
(Damro 2003 forthcoming; ICPAC 2000, 65). Rights of confidentiality are less
problematic in merger cases because firms typically waive them and competition agents
have devised ways to reduce their dependence on waivers. As discussed in Chapter 5,
through discretionary implementation cooperation, agents can overcome the limitations
of rights of confidentiality by engaging in hypothetical discussions during initial contacts
and discussions of previous related experiences during remedial contacts. During these
                                                
477 For evidence of strong corporate desire to maintain the confidentiality of sensitive business information
in merger review, see International Chamber of Commerce (1999). The ICC opposes the removal of the
right to confidentiality because “Confidential information supplied by companies to competition authorities
in the context of merger reviews or anti-trust investigations often includes extremely sensitive information
relating to the strategy of the company, its investment plans and its marketing goals and methods. If such
information falls into the hands of competitors of the company involved, or into the public domain, this
have serious adverse consequences on the competitive position of the company, or its share value. This risk
is not theoretical, especially when information is sent to countries where the company providing the
information faces strong competition, especially from state-owned companies, or in the context of mergers,
when share prices are particularly volatile.”
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hypothetical discussions, the agents do not exchange confidential information, but they
do largely overcome the constraints on implementation cooperation that are raised by
such domestic confidentiality protections and reduce potentially problematic information
asymmetries. Thus, firms are more likely to affect implementation cooperation through
actions witnessed in the GEH merger case: merger agreements may be reached too
quickly to consult competition authorities, pre-notifications contacts may be limited, and
publicity campaigns and efforts to increase political intervention may be attempted.
These preliminary findings suggest the need for further systematic analysis of the
role of firms across all three processes of international cooperation. Likewise, the
findings may suggest a fundamental weakness in PAF—the framework needs to be
flexible enough to consider more fully the role of firms. To address their role more fully,
this chapter discusses firms in the political intervention cost calculations in the next
section.
EU and US competition agents also have devised ways to overcome the obstacles
to implementation cooperation that arise from different domestic budgetary constraints.
The impact of different domestic budgetary constraints is most noticeable in the EU
where the Commission’s limited personnel resources reduce the agent’s ability to
determine the appropriateness of remedies offered and to ensure that remedies are
implemented properly. These limitations increase the likelihood of the EU and US
competition agents reaching divergent decisions on remedies. However, discretionary
efforts to increase remedial contacts have overcome this threat and reduced the
limitations presented by the Commission’s budget constraints. For example, the EU and
US are increasingly cooperating in market-testing and the implementation of remedies.
Given the US’s comparatively larger resources to engage in such activities, these types of
discretionary remedial contacts reduce problematic information asymmetries during and
after remedial contacts. As a result, they also reduce the likelihood of divergent decisions
and allow the Commission to overcome its domestic budgetary constraints.478
                                                
478 Despite these means to overcome certain domestic constraints, the GEH merger case suggests that
institutional differences may still play an important role in the likelihood of divergent decisions. For
example, US competition agents have greater resources for following up on decisions after final approval
of a merger. As Schaub argues, “In the US post-closing merger enforcement is a possibility, a merger that
went unchallenged at the level of the merger review procedure can still be attacked later on. Contrary to the
US system, the European system of merger control is a preventive one. The Commission has only a one-
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The desire of competition agents to reduce information asymmetries is also
demonstrated in exploratory institutional cooperation. The bilateral MWG and
multilateral ICN are informal fora for increasing contacts among competition agents and
increasing information exchanges in a general, non-case-specific sense. Both the MWG
and the ICN also suggest that the competition agents are keen on pursuing procedural and
substantive convergence as a means to reduce further the likelihood of divergent
decisions. As discussed in Chapter 5, this desire for institutional convergence is limited to
areas under the discretionary authority of the respective competition agents. Pursuing
convergence of the domestic laws governing competition policy would require approval
by the political principals, a circumstance the competition agents find undesirable (P2).
Assuming a continuing EI environment, this finding suggests that further discretionary
efforts at bilateral and multilateral convergence are likely to occur in the future.
Each of these efforts to reduce information asymmetries reflects the desire of
competition agents to increase cooperation via their discretionary authority (P2). Across
all three processes of cooperation, EU and US competition agents first attempted to shirk
as a means to maximize their own certainty and decision making authority. This should
not be particularly surprising given the fact that pursuing changes via non-discretionary
authority (e.g., treaty-making, statutory adjustment and judicial adjudication) are more
costly and less certain for regulators than pursuing changes via discretionary authority.
In rule-making cooperation, the competition agents attempted to establish
international agreements (executive agreements) under their discretionary authority (P2).
The agents consciously crafted these executive agreements so as not to require changes in
domestic statutes, such as those governing the protection of confidentiality. Indeed,
without the constraints of domestic institutional environments, the competition agents
likely would have pursued IAEAA agreements and/or MLATs (see Chapter 3). In
implementation cooperation, the competition agents attempted to reduce information
asymmetries by creating initial contacts, expanding the means and frequency of review
                                                                                                                                                
shot possibility to approve or block a notified merger – that is, at the time of its review. After the
Commission has decided, no further action can possibly be taken with regard to a merger. As a
consequence, the Commission has to ensure that the competitive structure of the relevant markets is not
harmed as a result of the merger” (2001, 9). Due to these institutional differences, the Commission may
have been more prone to use the economic concept of bundling (and its predictions about future market
structure) in its analysis, which contributed to the divergent decision with the US competition agents.
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process contacts, and devising techniques for market-testing and the implementation of
remedies. During all of these activities, the competition agents were careful to remain
within their discretionary authority (P4). In exploratory institutional cooperation,
competition agents also were careful to remain within their discretionary authority when
they created two new informal fora for pursuing convergence (P5). These two new fora
were consciously constructed in a manner that would reduce the likelihood of political
intervention: neither is a new “bricks and mortar” organization and, therefore, they
require no, or very limited, financing and political approval.
By increasing cooperation via their discretionary authority, the competition agents
reduce the likelihood of political intervention. However, as discussed below, this
“shirking strategy” adopted by the competition agents does not guarantee that no political
intervention will occur.
Before recounting the patterns of behavior for principals, another point should be
made regarding the preferences of competition agents. The preferences of EU and US
competition agents are similar but different. Both agents prefer increasing cooperation via
their own discretionary authority. This subtle distinction reflects the belief of both
competition agents that they are capable of “best” implementing competition policy. As
such, competition agents do not conveniently engage in international cooperation simply
because they have the same preferences or to make their jobs easier. Rather, the decision
to engage in international cooperation is part of a strategic calculation made by each
competition agent.
In practice, this distinction has different implications depending on the specific
process of cooperation. If EU and US agents cooperated simply because they have the
same preferences and to make their jobs easier, they could have continued to cooperate
under the pre-1991, non-binding OECD framework without signing the Bilateral
Agreement. However, in rule-making cooperation, the agents decided to pursue a new
binding framework because they feared increasing extraterritoriality by their foreign
counterpart,479 which could increase the likelihood of domestic political intervention.
Thus, the EU and US competition agents may have similar preferences, but they do not
                                                
479 The US feared the Wood Pulp doctrine and the pending completion of the SEM and MCR. The EU
feared Section 301 and the Exon-Florio amendment.
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believe that their overseas counterpart will act in accordance with their own preference at
all times. Therefore, both the EU and US agents decided that they needed a binding
framework in order to balance the relationship and to assure cooperation.480
Another important finding of the analysis of rule-making cooperation differs from
that which might be expected from a direct application of PAF’s insights on domestic
regulatory relations to international regulatory relations. The logic of PAF suggests that
regulatory agents might resist cooperating internationally because binding commitments
with foreign competition regulators imply a sacrifice of some regulatory independence
(Macey 2000). However, the current study finds that, again, EI plays a crucial role in
overcoming this problem. Without finding a way to meet the challenges of EI in
concurrent jurisdiction merger cases, political principals would become more involved in
implementing competition policy through their domestic and international control
instruments. As a result, regulatory agents would lose a degree of discretionary authority
to implement competition policy and, at the extreme, may become irrelevant as principals
gradually “take over” the implementation of competition policy in concurrent jurisdiction
merger cases. In conformity with the preferences listed in Chapter 2, regulatory agents
fear such intervention by principals more so than any potential sacrifice of regulatory
independence that might be implied by binding agreements on international cooperation.
2. The Patterns of Principal Behavior
P3 and P6 address the patterns of behavior for political principals across the three
processes of cooperation. According to P3, political principals will intervene in domestic
agent attempts to shirk in rule-making cooperation if the costs of not intervening exceed
the costs of intervening. As noted in Chapter 2, this statement raises questions about how
the principals calculate the costs of intervention. These questions are addressed in detail
in the next section.
                                                
480 This need for balance suggests that the EU and US competition agents behave as utility-maximizing
actors. They remain suspicious of each other’s commitment to cooperation and are not acting on some
shared conception of a common interest. The reason for this appears simple: if one agent were to act
extraterritorially, they would challenge the other agent’s preference to maximize their own certainty and
decision-making authority. Thus, the agreements are designed to reduce the likelihood of extraterritoriality
by agents. This, in turn, reduces the likelihood of political intervention. This finding suggests that, when
applied to international regulatory cooperation, the principal-agent insights of PAF must be expanded to
cover the patterns of behavior that emerge from agent-agent dynamics.
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The case studies in Chapter 4 demonstrate the pattern of behavior for principals in
rule-making cooperation. Like competition agents, the pattern of behavior for principals
is a function of their preferences and the domestic power-sharing arrangements that
provide the basis for their control (i.e., intervention). On the US side, political principals
did not intervene in rule-making cooperation because the costs were higher than those
associated with intervening. The US political principals did not perceive rule-making
cooperation as a threat to their national/constituent interests because the competition
agents signed the Bilateral Agreement, the PCA and the AAA entirely at their own
discretion and in conformity with the domestic power-sharing arrangements (i.e., CZA).
Had the competition agents attempted to construct a cooperative framework that
challenged or required changes in domestic statutes, principals would have certainly
intervened, either by their own volition or due to the ratification requirements of treaty-
making.
Unlike the US experience, EU political principals intervened in two of the cases
of rule-making cooperation. This difference is the result of less-clearly established
domestic power-sharing arrangements between the EU’s political principals and
competition agents. Beginning in 1991, the EU competition agents attempted to construct
a cooperative framework through shirking. However, political principals perceived a
threat to their national/constituent interests and calculated that the Commission had
overstepped its discretionary authority. As a result, this instance of shirking prompted
political intervention with France and other member states challenging the Bilateral
Agreement before the ECJ. Thereafter, the agents conformed to the domestic power-
sharing arrangements as clarified by the ECJ ruling. The subsequent examples of rule-
making cooperation reflect the patterns of behavior for principals as they maintained their
oversight capacity and co-signed the PCA along with the Commission. Because the AAA
was non-binding, the Commission was able to negotiate and sign the agreement solely
under its discretionary rule-making authority. These three cases suggest that political
principals remain important actors in EU-US rule-making cooperation in competition
policy due to the domestic power-sharing arrangements that constrain the Commission. It
is only when rule-making cooperation results in non-binding agreements that the
principals are comparatively less important actors.
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Similarly, the two cases of exploratory institutional cooperation demonstrate the
patterns of behavior for political principals (P6). Because the bilateral MWG and the
multilateral ICN were carefully negotiated and created to remain within the limits of
discretionary authority afforded to the competition agents, neither the EU or US
principals perceived these instances of cooperation as threats to their national/constituent
interests and did not intervene. However, should the competition agents overstep the
bounds of their discretionary authority in their future pursuit of bilateral and multilateral
institutional convergence, principals will be likely to intervene, which would provide a
useful comparative case for assessing P6.
The examples of EU-US rule-making and exploratory institutional cooperation
address the general dynamics between political principals and their domestic competition
agents. However, the case-specific dynamics of implementation cooperation complicate
the analysis by introducing the more frequent possibility of intervention by foreign
political principals. These complications and possible solutions are discussed in the next
section.
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, the current study has considered the judiciaries
in the EU and US to function as principals according to the PAF logic.481 Of course,
judiciaries have not delegated any significant discretionary authority to regulatory agents
and, therefore, are more limited than traditional principals in their ability to intervene. In
addition, the ability of the judiciary to exercise control over regulatory agents is
implemented through judicial review. The judiciary only intervenes when an actor
(private and/or public depending on the jurisdiction in question) formally brings a case
before them and, thus, triggers a review. During judicial review, EU and US courts do not
cooperate when deliberating over appeals in their respective merger control systems.
Judicial review can occur across all three processes of international cooperation,
                                                
481 Here another important distinction from Milner’s (1997) approach emerges. Milner focuses on three sets
of polyarchic domestic actors: executive, legislature and societal interest groups (1997, 12). The current
study also focuses on executives and legislatures, but includes judiciaries and competition agents. The role
of societal interest groups is discussed below.
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however, thus far, judicial review has only occurred in rule-making and implementation
cooperation.482
The role of courts appears to vary depending on the clarity of domestic power-
sharing arrangements and cross-national differences in domestic power-sharing
arrangements. First, the case of the 1991 Bilateral Agreement suggests that the ECJ
entered the process of cooperation because the domestic power-sharing arrangement
governing principal-agent relations in the EU was insufficiently clear. This lack of clarity
encouraged the EU competition agents to negotiate and sign the executive agreement
under its discretionary authority. However, acting on a different interpretation of the
domestic power-sharing arrangement, principals intervened in this behavior and brought
the Commission before the ECJ. For its part, the ECJ clarified the power-sharing
arrangement, to which the Commission conformed in subsequent efforts at rule-making
cooperation (i.e., PCA and AAA).
Second, the role of the EU and US judiciaries varies considerably in
implementation cooperation. This variance is based on cross-national differences in the
power-sharing arrangement governing the implementation of merger review in the EU
and US. In the US, courts are a central actor in the merger review process (see Chapter
3). Competition agents must try their cases before the courts. However, judicial review of
individual merger cases in the US during the review process is not really intervention in
the terms of PAF. Rather, judicial review is part of the domestic power-sharing
arrangement drafted by the legislature. As part of the power-sharing arrangement, the US
competition agents must consider the role (in particular, case law establishing
competition precedents) of the courts throughout their review process. This influence on
the behavior of US competition agents would benefit from further research comparing it
with the influence of courts in the EU system.
The analysis of the judiciary in the US suggests an important insight into the role
of private litigants in implementation cooperation. In the US, private litigants can bring
cases of anticompetitive behavior before the courts. The DoJ/FTC resists private litigants
bringing cases with international dimensions before the courts because of the foreign
                                                
482 The two cases of exploratory institutional cooperation (MWG and ICN) have not required judicial
review because the competition agents were careful to ensure that their shirking in these cases conformed
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political reactions that can follow from the possibility of treble damages (see Chapter
3).483 As a result, the competition authorities would be likely to prefer that private
plaintiffs not bring cases with an international dimension before the courts because such
actions shift any interest-balancing from the discretionary authority of the agents to the
courts. When this occurs in cases with transatlantic dimensions, courts are more likely to
reject comity considerations based on the Hartford Fire decision than competition agents
operating under the system established by the 1991 Bilateral Agreement.
Alternatively, in the EU, the role of courts in merger review is limited to those
cases that are legally challenged after the competition agents have reached a final
decision. Such judicial review is a lengthy (1-2 year) process that arguably disadvantages
merging firms that challenge EU merger decisions. This feature of the EU’s domestic
power-sharing arrangement has caused concern among merging firms because, by the
time the court hands down its final decision, market conditions may have changed and
the firms may no longer seek the merger.484 This situation has led some commentators to
decry the EU’s lack of an effective, timely judicial remedy.485
The findings herein are largely inconclusive on the role of the judiciary as a
political principal across the three processes of cooperation. The role of courts is similar
in rule-making and exploratory institutional cooperation. However, their role in
                                                                                                                                                
to the established power-sharing arrangements.
483 According to Griffin, “The ‘rogue elephants’ of private treble damage suits and private challenges to
transactions reviewed but not attacked by Government enforcers are especially troublesome because private
plaintiffs often are unwilling to exercise the degree of self-restraint and consideration of foreign
governmental sensibilities generally exercised by the U.S. Government” (1999, 194).
484 As The Economist argues, EU “Merger officials operate knowing that their decisions are unlikely to be
challenged by firms whose only resort is to appeal to the European Court of Justice, a two-year marathon
with uncertain prospects and in which even a victory can prove hollow, given the speed at which markets
now move. ‘In Brussels, officials can block a deal with impunity, whereas in America the FTC knows that
a poorly constructed case against a merger will quickly end up in court,’ says a banker involved in the
EMI-Time Warner deal” (2000, 85-86).
485 This lack of an effective, timely judicial remedy creates leverage for the competition authorities and
pressure for merging firms to compromise on commitments, divestitures and other remedies. (The author is
grateful to Jacques Bourgeois for the phraseology of “an effective, timely judicial remedy.”) This pressure
on merging firms is most often felt in “marginal” issues. For example, in cases where market definitions are
being argued, merging firms might feel the pressure to accept the MTF’s definition, even if it is
questionable or untenable. The pressure on merging firms to compromise can be so immense that
representatives of merging firms report offering more for remedies than they would have under a system
that realistically provided for a judicial review. Whether these claims of merging firms are true or not, the
current system does create the perception of leverage on the part of the competition authorities and limits
the influence of merging firms. Indeed, such a perception must help to determine when a lawyer will “stop
litigating and start negotiating.”
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implementation cooperation appears to differ considerably, primarily due to different
merger review procedures that require the US competition agents to argue their cases
before the courts. This fundamental difference limits generalizations on the role of the
judiciary as a principal across the three processes of cooperation. However, one
generalization holds: public and private actors requesting judicial review are required to
prompt intervention by the courts. This condition limits the judiciaries’ independent
ability to intervene and suggests a basic difference from the roles played by other
principals. This limitation may largely discount the consideration of the judiciary as a
principal in the traditional terms set out by PAF.
IV. To Intervene or Not To Intervene—The Role of Societal Influences in Political
Intervention Cost Calculations
As argued in Chapter 2, principals will decide whether or not to intervene in
discretionary cooperation based on cost calculations that reflect their perception of threats
to national/constituent interests. This approach relies on ex-post facto deductions of the
political “intervention cost calculations” based on how the principals actually acted in
any given situation. While this approach is limited in its predictive capacity, it has been
useful as a means to demonstrate the patterns of behavior posited in Chapter 2.
Nevertheless, it represents a fundamental limitation of the current study and raises two
important questions: What determines a political principal’s perception of threat? And
how do principals calculate the costs of intervention? These questions relate to all three
processes of cooperation, but become most complicated and interesting in
implementation cooperation. A fuller account of the behavior of political principals
requires a theory for determining how they calculate the costs of intervention. Such a
theory may be generalizable to international regulatory cooperation in other policy areas
and could inform testable hypotheses. In this regard, some preliminary comments are in
order at this point.486
                                                
486 The following discussion focuses on the role of firms in determining the behavior of political principals,
not competition agents, in implementation cooperation. During implementation cooperation, competition
agents may be limited in their ability to exchange information by firms not waiving their rights to
confidentiality, which, in turn increases the likelihood of divergent decisions. However, firms are
increasingly waiving their rights to confidentiality in an attempt to expedite the merger review and increase
the likelihood of convergent decisions. In addition, competition agents have devised ways to reduce the
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According to P6, political principals will intervene in domestic and foreign agent
attempts to increase discretionary implementation cooperation if the costs of not
intervening exceed the costs of intervening. In no cases discussed herein, did the costs of
increasing discretionary implementation cooperation appear to exceed the costs of not
intervening. In fact, the EU and US competition agents have only engaged in low-cost
efforts/shirking as regards implementation cooperation—e.g., adjusting internal
discretionary procedures for cooperation, exchanging information within the confines of
pre-existing domestic statutes, coordinating investigations within pre-existing timetables,
and coordinating remedial market-testing and implementation (see Chapter 5).
Because the competition agents’ shirking has not seriously challenged the pre-
existing domestic power-sharing arrangements, the principals did not intervene in general
EU-US implementation cooperation in competition policy. Rather, political principals
intervened in case-specific instances of EU-US implementation cooperation when they
perceived their national/constituent interests as being threatened in individual merger
reviews. As the analysis suggests, this is not a frequent occurrence. However, the BMD
and GEH merger cases do provide informative examples of US principals intervening. It
is to the decision of principals to intervene on a case-specific basis in merger review that
the discussion now turns.
Two explanatory factors—the nature of divergent decisions and the role of
firms—may help to explain the principals’ intervention cost calculations in individual
cases of implementation cooperation in merger review.
First, an important factor in a principal’s decision to intervene may be the nature
of the divergent decision. A necessary condition for a principal’s decision to intervene in
a concurrent jurisdiction merger case appears to be that a divergent decision must occur
                                                                                                                                                
obstacle of merging firms not waiving their rights to confidentiality (hypothetical discussions, etc.). Thus,
firms are likely to be less relevant in determining the likelihood of implementation cooperation between
competition agents than in determining the likelihood of principal intervention.
In addition, it may prove fruitful to consider the role of firms in rule-making and exploratory
institutional cooperation. In these two general processes of cooperation, firm influence may be greater
because they simultaneously address merger and non-merger cases. This increased role for firms may have
to do with the possibility that firm and agent preferences are the same in these two processes of
cooperation—create framework for improving likelihood of convergent decisions and decreasing likelihood
of political intervention—while they differ in implementation cooperation. If this is the case, PAF’s
assumption of different interests must be jettisoned and a means of overcoming possible mulitcolinearity
would have to be devised.
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(see Chapter 2). The decision to intervene in a concurrent jurisdiction merger case
requires a divergent decision because it increases the political principals’ perception of
threat to national/constituent interests. If the competition agents were to reach a
convergent decision that principals perceive as a threat to national/constituent interests,
the principals would direct the majority of their interventionist efforts toward their
domestic competition agents with domestic control instruments.
Domestic competition agents are targeted under such circumstances because, even
if the principals exercise international control instruments over foreign competition
agents and successfully pressure them to change their decision, the principals still must
overcome the decision made by their domestic competition agents that they originally
perceived as a threat to their national/constituent interests. From the principals’
perspective, such a threatening decision made by their domestic competition agents can
be countered with greater certainty through the exercise of domestic control instruments
because these control instruments are embedded in the domestic power-sharing
arrangements that limit the independence of domestic competition agents—no similar
power-sharing arrangements exists between principals and foreign agents, which
increases the uncertainty of exercising international control instruments.
For example, in the BMD and GEH cases, had the EU and US agents’ decisions
been convergent, US principals would have been less likely to intervene in the EU’s
merger review process. Instead, they would have been more likely to focus their
interventionist efforts on the FTC’s deliberations where they could have exercised their
domestic control instruments with greater certainty. Assuming a convergent decision, had
the US principals been able to pressure a change in the FTC’s decision, they then would
have targeted the EU’s merger review process with their full arsenal of international
control instruments. While such domestic and international interventions may occur
simultaneously—it is not necessarily a sequential process of intervening domestically and
then intervening internationally—principals are more likely to focus the majority of their
interventionist efforts on changing domestic decisions first and foremost because of the
greater certainty associated with control instruments embedded in domestic power-
sharing arrangements.
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Therefore, a divergent decision is a necessary condition for principals to intervene
in implementation cooperation. However, this condition does not appear sufficient to
prompt principal intervention because additional evidence in Chapter 5 suggests that
principals do not necessarily intervene actively when competition agents reach divergent
decisions. For example, in the BOC/Air Liquide merger case, the competition agents
reached divergent decisions (i.e., inconsistent remedies), but principals did not actively
intervene. This apparent contradiction of the principals’ pattern of behavior may speak to
a difference in the nature of divergent decisions. In other words, there is a difference in
cost calculations made by principals between conflicting and inconsistent decisions.487
Unfortunately, there is no way of confirming whether differences in the nature of
divergent decisions cause predictable variation in principals’ intervention cost
calculations because there has never been a competition case of conflicting decisions in
EU-US cooperation since the initiation of the cooperative framework in 1991. Therefore,
because principals have intervened and not intervened in cases of inconsistent decisions,
the potential explanatory power of this factor (nature of the divergent decision) is
inconclusive. All that can be said at this point is that the existence of a divergent—in
reality, an inconsistent—decision appears to be a necessary but not sufficient trigger for
principal intervention.488
Second, another important factor in a principal’s decision to intervene in an
individual merger case may be the role of firms.489 As noted in Chapter 2, the current
                                                
487 See Chapter 2 on the difference between inconsistent and conflicting decisions.
488 It is worth noting that this factor may help to explain variation in the control instruments used by
political principals. For example, the fact that there has never been a conflicting decision may explain why
EU and US principals have not used the extraterritorial intervention instruments that were so common
before 1991. Rather, the preferred response to divergent decisions has been to exercise weak foreign
intervention instruments (e.g., lobbying, threats, congressional resolutions), as was done in the BMD and
GEH cases of inconsistent decisions. Again, because no cases exist of conflicting decisions, the ability to
confirm this factor as an explanation of the preferred foreign intervention instruments of principals is
limited.
489 If the influence of firms is important for calculating intervention costs, then other societal influences
may also prompt politicians to intervene, thus determining the relative costs of intervening versus not
intervening. The relative impact of various societal influences has been the source of great debate between
pluralists and capture theorists (Gormley 1986, 597). However, due to unique characteristics of competition
policy, non-firm societal influences are unlikely to be particularly important. For example,
Several aspects of antitrust law differentiate it from the types of regulation that are
normally considered within the special interest framework. Regulation is normally
concerned with one or a few industries, but the antitrust laws are considerably broader in
scope. In addition, the courts play a much more visible role in antitrust than they do in
regulation… Our thesis is that the antitrust laws are a result of a special interest struggle
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study has not considered the influence of firms for analytical purposes. However, it bears
repeating that the influence of firms does enter the analysis as a function of EI, which
alters firms’ incentives and leads them increasingly to pursue internationally-oriented
mergers. In addition, firms may play a crucial role in determining the likelihood of
political intervention.
When foreign competition agents reach a decision that is inconsistent with the
decision reached by domestic competition agents, and that inconsistent decision
adversely affects two domestic firms (e.g., BMD, GEH), the likelihood of political
intervention (by the firms’ principals) may be increased significantly. This claim requires
more systematic analysis across all the internationally-oriented mergers reviewed
simultaneously by EU and US competition agents. Nevertheless, it suggests another
potentially important explanatory factor—the role of firms—in determining the
likelihood of principals’ to decide to intervene in an individual merger case.
Domestic merging firms adversely affected by an inconsistent decision made by
foreign competition agents may increase the costs of not intervening for their
principals.490 Merging firms can increase the costs of not intervening for their principals
by adjusting their political support (e.g., reducing, withholding or redirecting private
campaign contributions and public endorsements). It would be naïve to think that firms
never play a role in a principal’s decision to intervene—certainly, principals would be
less likely to intervene if they were not prompted to do so by their constituents, which
                                                                                                                                                
between small and large economic entities seeking changes in the general economic
environment rather than the specific favors usually associated with special interest
legislation (Benson et al. 1987, 30).
Therefore, the intervention cost calculations of principals are more likely to reflect the influence of merging
firms on their political principals than the influence of other interest groups.
It is possible that the influence of non-firm societal actors varies across the three processes of
international cooperation. For example, because rule-making cooperation has broader and more general
implications across society, non-firm societal influences may play a larger role in the cost calculations
made by principals. In such cases, theories are needed for determining the relative influence of the myriad
actors in society. Notable and potentially useful approaches for addressing this problem have been put forth
by Moravcsik (1998) and Sandhotlz and Stone Sweet (1998). Both of these approaches devise ways for
determining the relative influence of domestic actors in the “costly” (in terms of national sovereignty)
process of regional integration in Europe.
490 In describing such firms, the term “constituent” may be preferred over “domestic” because, in an EI
environment, foreign firms are increasingly contributing to and being perceived by principals as
constituents whose interests are deserving of protection. The transnational character of such firms
challenges typical notions of nationality (for example, see Reich 1996, 1991; Tyson 1991). However, for
simplicity, the current study employs the term “domestic”.
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include firms. Nevertheless, the fundamental question that needs to be answered is how
does a principal determine the comparative value of the claims of their domestic merging
firms and the claims of those firms’ competitors, all of whom may be constituents and
may equate their interests with national interests? Answering this fundamental question
requires further specification of the intervention cost calculations made by principals.
The BMD and GEH cases provide useful examples of the potential influence of
firms on the intervention cost calculations of principals. If firms do play an important role
in determining these calculations, then the US principals weighed the costs of not
intervening (offending BMD and GEH) versus the costs of intervening (offending
competitors of BMD and GEH,491 EU competition agents and EU principals). Similarly,
if US competition agents threatened to block a merger between EU firms A and B, EU
principals would be expected to weigh the costs of not intervening (offending EU firms A
and B) versus the costs of intervening (offending competitors of firms A and B, US
competition agents and US principals).
This brief look at the BMD and GEH mergers suggests that the cost calculation of
a principal for intervening in an individual merger case is a function of the relative values
given to the claims of the merging firms, the merging firms’ competitors, foreign
competition agents and foreign political principals. Figure 6 provides a basic
representation of these intervention cost calculations. The equations assume that domestic
and foreign competition agents reached a divergent decision—absent this assumption, no
or little intervention should be expected as discussed above. The claims of domestic
competition agents are not included for reasons discussed above.
                                                
491 US principals generally give greater weight to the claims of US-based competitors of BMD and GEH
than foreign-based competitors. For example, the foreign-based competitors of BMD and GEH, like Airbus
and Pratt & Whitney respectively, may be valued less if they contribute less to principals’ campaigns and
are not really considered constituents by the principals. For simplicity, the current study assumes no
variation in the valuations attributed by political principals to competitors, regardless of whether they are
more appropriately characterized as domestic or foreign.
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Figure 6: Intervention Cost Calculations of Political Principals in Individual Merger
Cases
According to Figure 6, principals will intervene with foreign intervention
instruments when the relative value of their domestic merging firms’ claims are greater
than the sum of the values attributed to the claims of competitors of the merging firms,
foreign competition agents and foreign political principals. Before 1991, this was the
most common outcome of disputes over competition cases. Principals calculated that
intervention was the most appropriate response because they attributed greater value to
the claims of domestic merging firms. Such calculations and the resulting intervention led
to a discordant transatlantic relationship based on the political brinkmanship of unilateral
extraterritoriality versus national countermeasures. Add to this the increasing levels of EI
and the attendant increases in concurrent jurisdictional mergers witnessed through the
1980s. Based on historical experience, the resulting jurisdictional overlaps caused by this
pre-1991 combination were likely to lead to further disagreements and political
brinkmanship in transatlantic competition relations during the 1990s.
However, the 1991 Bilateral Agreement signaled a significant change in the
circumstance surrounding intervention cost calculations by principals. After 1991,
principals still calculated that intervention was the most appropriate response to divergent
decisions because they continued to attribute greater value to the claims of domestic
merging firms in comparison to the other relevant actors. However, principals have been
less likely to find themselves in a situation where they even had to make such
calculations.492 This is so because the cooperative framework constructed by the
                                                
492 It is important to note that this statement in no way suggests that principals have lost any of their
authority to control domestic competition agents as afforded by their power-sharing arrangements. Indeed,
the institutional power-sharing arrangements (oversight and administrative procedures) remain fully intact.
Likewise, the principals retain full command of their arsenal of foreign intervention instruments. It is
Decision to intervene = value of domestic merging firms’ claims > value of competitors’ of
merging firms claims + value of foreign competition agents’ claims + value of foreign
political principals’ claims.
Decision not to intervene = value of domestic merging firms’ claims < value of competitors’
of merging firms claims + value of foreign competition agents’ claims + value of foreign
political principals’ claims.
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competition agents has reduced the likelihood of divergent decisions occurring. Without
the necessary condition of a divergent decision, principals do not have to make the
calculations for determining whether or not to intervene. Rather, assuming the merging
firms disagree with the regulators’ decision (one mutually arrived at with the foreign
competition agents) and decide to pressure principals for intervention on their behalf, the
principals will direct their various foreign intervention instruments to changing the
behavior of their domestic competition agents.493
But, how can we theorize about the likely values given to the claims of these
different actors? More specifically, when divergent decisions occur in cases of concurrent
jurisdiction mergers, why are principals more likely to attribute the greatest value to the
claims of domestic merging firms? It should not be surprising that the claims of foreign
competition agents and foreign principals are de-valued in comparison to the claims of
domestic firms (whether the merging firms or the competitors). This is expected because
political principals are not seeking to protect the interests of foreign competition agents
and foreign principals (as well as foreign competitors of the domestic merging firms).
Thus, the crucial distinction is how principals value the claims of domestic merging firms
versus the claims of competitors of the merging firms. For simplicity, the following
discussion assumes no variation in the valuations attributed by political principals to the
claims of competitors, regardless of whether they are more appropriately characterized as
domestic or foreign. Two factors may prove useful for explaining the relative values
attributed to these two different groups of domestic firms: size and organizational ability.
The privileged position given to the claims of domestic merging firms involved in
concurrent jurisdiction mergers may reflect the size of such firms. As was the case in
BMD and GEH, the merging firms were very large. They were large enough to meet the
statutory thresholds of the HSR and the MCR. Also, given the fact that competition
                                                                                                                                                
precisely because the principals retain these various intervention instruments that the competition agents
decided to create a binding cooperative framework to reduce the likelihood of divergent decisions.
493 This may have occurred in the BMD case. As Coleman et al. note, French President Jacques Chirac and
other European leaders became involved in an effort to resolve the standoff between the Commission and
BMD in order to avert a trade war (1997, A1). Thus, the EU principals may have sided with their domestic
firms (minus Airbus) against the wishes of its own domestic competition agents. Other than Airbus, most
domestic EU firms likely would have wanted their politicians to intervene because a trade war would have
seriously harmed their business interests. This insight suggests that all the preceding claims hold, unless
there is an extreme case in which the situation very likely will precipitate a trade war that would harm the
interests of numerous domestic businesses across a variety of sectors.
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regulators challenged both mergers, BMD and GEH controlled a large enough portion of
the market that they could be considered to have a “dominant position” in the parlance of
EU competition law. This explanation implies that the larger the firm, the more resources
that firm has at its disposal to pressure principals into intervening on their behalf. Such
resources include, but are not limited to, campaign contributions, access to principals and
access to the media. Such large firms can also argue that prohibition of their merger will
result in the loss of numerous jobs, which may adversely affect the national/constituent
interests of targeted principals. In comparison, competitors of the merging firms may be
smaller and, in turn, have fewer political resources at their disposal. They may also have
less of a desire to expend those resources obstructing a single merger than the merging
firms’ desire to complete the merger—the merging firms have already fully and publicly
(to shareholders, etc.) committed to the merger and will do whatever it takes for approval.
Regarding access to the media, the role of and arguments presented by competitors are
typically not reported. Rather, they remain part of the confidential record of the oral
hearing or market-testing procedures. Thus, competitors may have less access to and less
of a desire to use the media. These limitations decidedly shift the principals’ decision to
intervene in favor of the claims of the larger firms.
A second potentially useful factor for explaining the relative values attributed to
the claims of merging firms versus competitors may by the organizational abilities of the
two groups. Merging firms are well-organized, committed and united in their
determination to achieve one goal: quick approval of the merger. Alternatively,
competitors of the merging firms behave in accordance with a number of possibly
different preferences based on their share of the market, etc. As a result, the competitors
of merging firms may be less well-organized, committed and united in their
determination to obstruct the merger. Because competitors are typically more numerous
than the merging firms and have different preferences vis-à-vis any given merger, it is
more difficult for them to reach a common, united position. As a result, they may give
conflicting signals to principals regarding whether a merger should be prohibited. These
conflicting signals may be seen in conflicting testimony during pitch meetings and oral
hearings, and conflicting arguments supplied (in the US) to competition agents trying
cases in court. Even in market-testing, competitors may differ on the appropriate
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remedies necessary for approval of the merger: one competitor may support divestiture of
assets that do not present anticompetitive challenges to another competitor; one
competitor may seek divestiture of assets that they seek to purchase while another
competitor opposes such a purchase on the grounds that it will create new anticompetitive
problems in the market. These organizational problems for competitors again shift the
principals’ decision to intervene in favor of the merging firms.
V. Merger Review, Trade Policy and International Regulatory Cooperation—The
Potential for and Limits of Generalizability
The findings in the current study reveal the means by which international
cooperation has developed in a policy area that was traditionally discordant and still
largely domestic in nature. The increase in this cooperation and the resulting reduction of
political disputes has lead EU Competition Commissioner Mario Monti to argue that this
policy area may serve as a model for transatlantic cooperation more generally (2001, 2).
This section explores the potential for and limits of generalizing the findings herein to
transatlantic as well as multilateral relations in other policy areas, in particular trade
policy and international regulatory relations.
The majority of IPE studies has traditionally and continues to focus on the causes
and consequences of trade policy.494 This emphasis is understandable because
governments have historically been primarily concerned with tariff barriers to trade as the
most common, pervasive and readily apparent obstacles to international commerce.
However, through subsequent WTO trade rounds, tariff barriers to trade in goods have
been reduced dramatically. As a consequence, the international trade agenda began
focusing on the removal of non-tariff barriers to trade—such as quotas, trade
prohibitions, import licensing requirements and voluntary export restraints—as the next
most common, pervasive and readily apparent obstacles to international commerce.495
Today, due to the success of previous trade rounds and the impact of EI on the
global economy, the international trade agenda is increasingly targeting “new trade
issues”, such as investment (FDI), competition policy, intellectual property rights, public
                                                
494 Of course, many IPE studies have addressed non-trade issues.
495 For a useful cross-national analysis of non-tariff barriers, see Mansfield and Busch (1995).
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procurement and trade and the environment.496 Unlike tariff and non-tariff barriers, these
new trade issues address the removal of technical barriers to trade. However, such
“behind-the-border” technical barriers are difficult to identify, modify and/or remove
because they are embedded in domestic regulatory regimes that reflect complex sets of
bargains and compromises among numerous private and public actors (Damro and
Sbragia forthcoming 2003).
Despite this real-world shift in attention to “new trade issues”, the scholarly
debate in IPE remains largely dominated by questions about traditional tariff and non-
tariff barriers to trade.497 Due to the importance of FDI and its attendant concurrent
jurisdiction merger activity, the new trade issues linked to investment will inevitably
become a more prominent item on the international trade agenda.498 International
cooperation on FDI is fundamentally related to international regulatory cooperation in
competition policy. Therefore, scholarly analysis should also begin to expand efforts at
understanding the causes and consequences of this international regulatory
cooperation.499 For merger review, this call to arms is made all the more urgent by the
increasing numbers of countries that are drafting and implementing competition policies
for the first time.500
A useful starting point may be to investigate whether studies of international
regulatory cooperation (such as the current study’s investigation of competition policy)
                                                
496 This is not to say that tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade are no longer a concern in the international
trading system. Rather, they now share the attention of policymakers with “new trade issues”.
497 A large body of literature has investigated in great detail the relationship between domestic politics and
trade policy. However, this literature does not directly compare its findings with the relationship between
domestic politics and regulatory policy. For examples of the trade policy literature, see Mansfield, Milner
and Rosendorff (2000), Meunier (2000), Destler and Balint (1999), Morrow, Siverson and Tabares (1998),
Hanson (1998), Frieden and Rogowski (1996), Alt et al. (1996), Garrett and Lange (1995), Destler (1995),
Mansfield and Busch (1995), Goldstein (1993), Hayes (1993), Frieden (1991), Rogowski (1989), Milner
(1988) and Destler and Odell (1987).
498 Trade-related investment issues have already received attention in international trade negotiations. For
example, see the WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) and the Doha
Ministerial Declaration. See also Graham (2000b) on the negotiations surrounding the failed Multilateral
Investment Agreement.
499 Examples of the various general and policy-specific efforts at explaining international regulatory
cooperation can be found in Pollack and Shaffer (2001), Bermann et al. (2000), Evenett et al. (2000),
Kagan (2000, 1991), Kagan and Axelrad (2000), Kang (1997), Vogel (1997; 1995), Kapstein (1992), Haas
(1990) and Kapstein (1989).
500 As ICPAC argues, “Today, more than 80 countries have antitrust laws, approximately 60 percent of
which were introduced in the 1990s… Another 20 or more countries are in the process of drafting laws.
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prove useful for understanding changes in traditional trade issues like the removal of
tariff and non-tariff barriers. At the very least, the current study may help to explain the
likelihood of discretionary cooperation emerging in trade and other regulatory policies.
With this goal in mind, a brief comparison of trade and competition policy suggests the
limits of generalizing the findings of the current study to future cooperation in trade
policy.
The most important difference between trade and competition policy emerges
from the fundamentally different nature of trade and competition policies. The difference
has led some commentators to distinguish trade policy as more “political” and
competition policy as more “legalistic” or “de-politicized”. For example, Doern argues
…trade policy is primarily about controlling the behavior
of governments whereas competition policy is largely about
regulating the behavior of firms and businesses… as a
logical result of the first point, trade policy has less of an
enforceable legal base to it than competition policy. Hence
both trade and competition policy specialists tend to agree
that trade policy is decided through more political
processes than through legal processes. In short, trade
policy is more political and competition policy is
considerably de-politicized (Doern 1996, 281).501
Similarly, Egan argues that the different domestic nature of competition and trade
policies have implications for international cooperation:
In competition issues, cooperation is aimed at achieving a
common regulatory result in terms of enforcement whereas
trade negotiations are designed to protect, defend and
maximize the benefits for domestic interests… While trade
negotiations can operate through issue linkage across
sectors, aiming to balance benefits and losses for domestic
producers, competition is guided by case law,
administrative discretion and leaves little or no market for
political bargaining (Egan 2001, 16).
Due to the different natures of these two policies, trade regulators are likely to be more
concerned with the distributional consequences of their cooperation while competition
                                                                                                                                                
Moreover, those countries with competition laws accounted for nearly 80 percent of world output and 86
percent of world trade” (2000, 33 and note 1).
501 Doern goes on to clarify this distinction, arguing “competition policy is in some ways simply politicized
‘differently’ rather than ‘less’ than trade policy” (1996, 281).
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regulators are more concerned with the efficiency gains of their cooperation. As Devuyst
argues
The [EU and US] agencies cooperate to increase the
effectiveness of their common regulatory task, not with a
view of defending their domestic industry. On the contrary,
competition cooperation often takes the form of
enforcement requests to the agency based in the national
territory of the companies under scrutiny because they are
better placed to gather evidence. This constitutes a major
difference with the trade world, in which the authorities do
not cooperate to achieve a common regulatory result but
rather to defend the interests of their domestic producers.
The aim of trade negotiators is to manage the inevitable
conflicts that arise from the attempts by each side to obtain
an outcome that maximizes the benefits for their domestic
producers. In brief, competition relations are characterized
by ‘regulatory cooperation’ while trade relations have to
focus on ‘conflict management’ (Devuyst 2001, 149).502
Regardless of the specific terminology employed, the differences in the nature of
trade and competition policies have broad implications for variance in the processes and
types of EU-US cooperation that can be expected. Because trade policy is inherently
more politicized than competition policy, principals retain much stronger domestic
                                                
502 Devuyst illustrates this difference with evidence from the BMD merger case (see Chapter 5):
The very different negotiation dynamics in the trade and competition fields certainly
contributed to the misunderstanding during the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger.
Trade negotiators aim at agreements between governments that counterbalance economic
losses in one sector by benefits in the other. Cross-issue linkages and attempts to obtain
compensatory adjustment—sustained by retaliation threats—are common to trade
bargaining. In competition cases, the formal structure of the negotiations is entirely
different. A public regulator such as the European Commission has the authority to
prohibit or block private transactions without any need for agreement by EU member
states, third countries, or the enterprises under scrutiny, whether EU member states or
their countries. The Clinton administration’s attempts to influence the Commission’s
decision through contacts with top politicians of the member states had therefore no
visible effect on the outcome of the case. When Commissioner Van Miert was summoned
to the General Affairs Council, he simply explained to the foreign affairs ministers that
the Commission was looking at the Boeing case under its own competences as defined in
the merger regulation and that it would reach a decision based on Boeing’s reply to the
antitrust consideration listed in the Commission’s statement of objections. In contrast to
trade deals, competition decisions are guided by the law, especially the case law of the
European Court of Justice. Any Commission decision deviating from the principles of the
European Court of Justice is likely to be overturned. This leaves little margin for political
bargaining. Trade policy elements such as the threat of retaliation are therefore hardly
factors that can be taken into account during the competition decision-making process.
Once Boeing realized this, it came forward with the necessary concessions to allow for a
positive Commission decision (Devuyst 2001, 149-150).
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control instruments. Political principals are much less likely to delegate authority to
agents for rule-making in trade policy than in competition policy. As a result, it is not
surprising that EU-US cooperation displays lower levels of discretion in trade policy than
in competition policy. In those cases when political principals do delegate trade authority,
they are less likely to tolerate shirking and, rather, more likely to intervene. For example,
in rule-making cooperation, if trade agents (e.g., EU’s Directorate for Trade, US’s
Department of Commerce) were to pursue executive agreements with foreign trade
authorities, political principals would quickly perceive this as a threat to
national/constituent interests and intervene accordingly.503 As a result, principals remain
more actively engaged in trade policy and rule-making is not surprisingly pursued
primarily through the negotiation and signing of non-discretionary treaties. Similarly, in
implementation cooperation, the rare occurrence of divergent competition decisions
prompt political principals to intervene. However, in trade policy, “divergent” decisions
occur daily, prompting political principals to intervene and strike compromises that are
then typically codified in international treaties. Finally, it is not clear that discretionary
efforts at exploratory institutional cooperation (which result in non-binding, informal
fora) would be beneficial because cooperation in trade policy is already formalized via
treaties that have established the WTO’s binding dispute settlement mechanism.
Due to the fundamental differences between trade and competition policy, the
patterns of behavior posited in the current study are unlikely to be generalizable to
cooperation in trade policy. Despite this limitation, some of the dynamics uncovered
herein may be consistent with international regulatory cooperation in other policy areas.
The remainder of the discussion in this chapter is not intended to constitute a
comprehensive research proposal for international regulatory cooperation. Rather, it is
intended to suggest potential avenues for future research that may prove useful for
understanding the increasingly important politics of international regulatory cooperation
more generally.
First and foremost, the patterns of behavior for agents and principals in
transatlantic competition relations (see Figure 6.1) may be evinced in other areas of
                                                
503 In the EU, this intervention could occur through the CoM. In the US, this intervention could occur
through the US Trade Representative, which coordinates trade policy across the federal government and,
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regulatory cooperation. As such, these patterns of behavior could be translated into
hypotheses for international regulatory cooperation that would benefit from future
analysis across other regulatory policy areas. Each of the patterns of behavior present
explicit testable statements of belief regarding the expected relationship between two or
more concepts or factors and, thus, deserves analysis across other areas of regulatory
cooperation. As Odell argues, “One of the most valuable contributions of any method
would be the generation of a new hypothesis that turned out to be valid or generated fresh
lines of investigation” (2001, 165). It is in this spirit that the chapter recommends
comparing the patterns of behavior for agents and principals with behavior in other areas
of international regulatory cooperation.
Second, as with the preceding discussion of trade policy, any future analysis of
the patterns of behavior must take into consideration differences between competition
policy and other regulatory policies. Such differences may suggest limitations to
generalizing the findings of the current study, but may also suggest useful comparative
insights for understanding the causes and effects of international regulatory cooperation
more generally. One such difference may be that most regulatory policies cover a single
or a few industries while competition policy broadly covers the entire economy (Benson
et al. 1987, 30). This difference suggests that the role of targeted firms could be greater in
other regulatory policies because their attention is more concentrated and their
preferences are possibly less diverse than in competition policy. Similarly, because
competition policy applies most directly to individual firms in individual cases, it does
not seem to generate the same salience among non-firm actors in society as other
regulatory policies that affect multiple non-firm actors in society. As a result, non-firm
actors in society may be more important actors in other areas of regulatory policy.
Another difference relates to the role of the judiciary. For example, in the US, courts play
a much more active role in competition policy than in other regulatory policies (Benson
et al. 1987, 30). This difference may suggest that the judiciary is less important as a
political principal in other regulatory policies than it was found to be in competition
policy. The comparatively high degree of discretion that characterizes competition policy
presents another potentially important analytical distinction from other regulatory
                                                                                                                                                
thus, acts as a direct conduit through which the White House can exert political control.
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policies. This difference may indicate that discretionary cooperation is more likely in
competition policy than in other regulatory policies because competition agents operate
under comparatively looser power-sharing arrangements in competition policy. These
looser power-sharing arrangements allow greater latitude for competition agents to
pursue their own preferences than that found in other policy areas. The important
question is whether regulators in other policy areas can conform to their respective
power-sharing arrangements and still shirk to increase cooperation. As the current study
suggests, this is possible, if the agents pursue forms of rule-making cooperation that are
non-binding (e.g., AAA), implementation cooperation that respects domestic law (e.g.,
exchanging non-confidential information), and exploratory institutional cooperation that
is ad hoc, informal and that does not create new “bricks-and-mortar” international
organizations.
Third, when investigating the patterns of behavior as hypotheses for the likelihood
of cooperation in other regulatory policy areas, certain conditions that follow from the
revised cross-level approach and the logic PAF must also be considered. For example, the
revised cross-level approach suggests that the exogenous stimulus of EI must challenge
the ability of regulators to manage activity within their domestic jurisdiction. In
regulatory policies that are comparatively insulated from the effects of EI, the revised
cross-level approach will have to be adjusted. In addition, regulators must agree 1) that
they can best implement regulation in a given policy area without intervention by
principals, and 2) that cooperating with foreign regulators will reduce the likelihood of
political intervention. If these and other conditions found in the current study are
determined not to exist in other areas of international regulatory cooperation, the utility of
the revised cross-level approach will be in question and the existence of the patterns of
behavior will be doubtful.
The jury remains out on Monti’s suggestion that cooperation in competition
policy can serve as a model for transatlantic cooperation more generally. However, this
possibility and the potential benefits that do follow from the EU-US cooperative
framework in competition relations are intriguing and deserving of further study. Indeed,
because the Commission enjoys its greatest supranational authority in competition policy,
the findings in the current study could be an indication of the future of transatlantic
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cooperation if the EU presses forward with its integration agenda. Ultimately, if the
Commission does acquire greater discretionary authority in other policy areas, the
likelihood of increasing transatlantic cooperation in those areas largely will depend on the
levels of discretionary authority enjoyed by like-minded but self-interested, utility-
maximizing US regulatory agents.
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